platform_bionic/libc/bionic/libc_init_common.cpp

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/*
* Copyright (C) 2008 The Android Open Source Project
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
* "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
* FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
* COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING,
* BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS
* OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED
* AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
* OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT
* OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "libc_init_common.h"
#include <async_safe/log.h>
#include <elf.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/auxv.h>
#include <sys/personality.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "heap_tagging.h"
#include "private/ScopedPthreadMutexLocker.h"
#include "private/WriteProtected.h"
#include "private/bionic_defs.h"
#include "private/bionic_globals.h"
#include "private/bionic_tls.h"
#include "private/thread_private.h"
#include "pthread_internal.h"
extern "C" int __system_properties_init(void);
extern "C" void scudo_malloc_set_zero_contents(int);
extern "C" void scudo_malloc_set_pattern_fill_contents(int);
__LIBC_HIDDEN__ WriteProtected<libc_globals> __libc_globals;
// Not public, but well-known in the BSDs.
__BIONIC_WEAK_VARIABLE_FOR_NATIVE_BRIDGE
const char* __progname;
void __libc_init_globals() {
// Initialize libc globals that are needed in both the linker and in libc.
// In dynamic binaries, this is run at least twice for different copies of the
// globals, once for the linker's copy and once for the one in libc.so.
__libc_globals.initialize();
__libc_globals.mutate([](libc_globals* globals) {
__libc_init_vdso(globals);
__libc_init_setjmp_cookie(globals);
});
}
#if !defined(__LP64__)
static void __check_max_thread_id() {
if (gettid() > 65535) {
async_safe_fatal("Limited by the size of pthread_mutex_t, 32 bit bionic libc only accepts "
"pid <= 65535, but current pid is %d", gettid());
}
}
#endif
static void arc4random_fork_handler() {
_rs_forked = 1;
_thread_arc4_lock();
}
__BIONIC_WEAK_FOR_NATIVE_BRIDGE
void __libc_init_scudo() {
// Heap tagging level *must* be set before interacting with Scudo, otherwise
// the primary will be mapped with PROT_MTE even if MTE is is not enabled in
// this process.
SetDefaultHeapTaggingLevel();
// TODO(b/158870657) make this unconditional when all devices support SCUDO.
#if defined(USE_SCUDO)
#if defined(SCUDO_PATTERN_FILL_CONTENTS)
scudo_malloc_set_pattern_fill_contents(1);
#elif defined(SCUDO_ZERO_CONTENTS)
scudo_malloc_set_zero_contents(1);
#endif
#endif
}
__BIONIC_WEAK_FOR_NATIVE_BRIDGE
__attribute__((no_sanitize("hwaddress", "memtag"))) void
__libc_init_mte_late() {
#if defined(__aarch64__)
if (!__libc_shared_globals()->heap_tagging_upgrade_timer_sec) {
return;
}
struct sigevent event = {};
static timer_t timer;
event.sigev_notify = SIGEV_THREAD;
event.sigev_notify_function = [](union sigval) {
async_safe_format_log(ANDROID_LOG_INFO, "libc",
"Downgrading MTE to async.");
ScopedPthreadMutexLocker l(&g_heap_tagging_lock);
SetHeapTaggingLevel(M_HEAP_TAGGING_LEVEL_ASYNC);
timer_delete(timer);
};
if (timer_create(CLOCK_REALTIME, &event, &timer) == -1) {
async_safe_format_log(ANDROID_LOG_ERROR, "libc",
"Failed to create MTE downgrade timer: %m");
// Revert back to ASYNC. If we fail to create or arm the timer, otherwise
// the process would be indefinitely stuck in SYNC.
SetHeapTaggingLevel(M_HEAP_TAGGING_LEVEL_ASYNC);
return;
}
struct itimerspec timerspec = {};
timerspec.it_value.tv_sec =
__libc_shared_globals()->heap_tagging_upgrade_timer_sec;
if (timer_settime(timer, /* flags= */ 0, &timerspec, nullptr) == -1) {
async_safe_format_log(ANDROID_LOG_ERROR, "libc",
"Failed to arm MTE downgrade timer: %m");
// Revert back to ASYNC. If we fail to create or arm the timer, otherwise
// the process would be indefinitely stuck in SYNC.
SetHeapTaggingLevel(M_HEAP_TAGGING_LEVEL_ASYNC);
timer_delete(timer);
return;
}
async_safe_format_log(
ANDROID_LOG_INFO, "libc", "Armed MTE downgrade timer for %" PRId64 " s",
__libc_shared_globals()->heap_tagging_upgrade_timer_sec);
#endif
}
__BIONIC_WEAK_FOR_NATIVE_BRIDGE
void __libc_add_main_thread() {
// Get the main thread from TLS and add it to the thread list.
pthread_internal_t* main_thread = __get_thread();
__pthread_internal_add(main_thread);
}
void __libc_init_common() {
// Initialize various globals.
environ = __libc_shared_globals()->init_environ;
errno = 0;
setprogname(__libc_shared_globals()->init_progname ?: "<unknown>");
#if !defined(__LP64__)
__check_max_thread_id();
#endif
__libc_add_main_thread();
__system_properties_init(); // Requires 'environ'.
__libc_init_fdsan(); // Requires system properties (for debug.fdsan).
__libc_init_fdtrack();
}
void __libc_init_fork_handler() {
// Register atfork handlers to take and release the arc4random lock.
pthread_atfork(arc4random_fork_handler, _thread_arc4_unlock, _thread_arc4_unlock);
}
extern "C" void scudo_malloc_set_add_large_allocation_slack(int add_slack);
__BIONIC_WEAK_FOR_NATIVE_BRIDGE void __libc_set_target_sdk_version(int target __unused) {
#if defined(USE_SCUDO)
scudo_malloc_set_add_large_allocation_slack(target < __ANDROID_API_S__);
#endif
}
__noreturn static void __early_abort(int line) {
// We can't write to stdout or stderr because we're aborting before we've checked that
// it's safe for us to use those file descriptors. We probably can't strace either, so
// we rely on the fact that if we dereference a low address, either debuggerd or the
// kernel's crash dump will show the fault address.
*reinterpret_cast<int*>(line) = 0;
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
// Force any of the stdin/stdout/stderr file descriptors that aren't
// open to be associated with /dev/null.
static void __nullify_closed_stdio() {
for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(fcntl(i, F_GETFL)) == -1) {
// The only error we allow is that the file descriptor does not exist.
if (errno != EBADF) __early_abort(__LINE__);
// This file descriptor wasn't open, so open /dev/null.
// init won't have /dev/null available, but SELinux provides an equivalent.
// This takes advantage of the fact that open() will take the lowest free
// file descriptor, and we're iterating in order from 0, but we'll
// double-check we got the right fd anyway...
int fd;
if (((fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open("/dev/null", O_RDWR))) == -1 &&
(fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open("/sys/fs/selinux/null", O_RDWR))) == -1) ||
fd != i) {
__early_abort(__LINE__);
}
}
}
}
// Check if the environment variable definition at 'envstr'
// starts with '<name>=', and if so return the address of the
// first character after the equal sign. Otherwise return null.
static const char* env_match(const char* envstr, const char* name) {
size_t i = 0;
while (envstr[i] == name[i] && name[i] != '\0') {
++i;
}
if (name[i] == '\0' && envstr[i] == '=') {
return envstr + i + 1;
}
return nullptr;
}
static bool __is_valid_environment_variable(const char* name) {
// According to the kernel source, by default the kernel uses 32*PAGE_SIZE
// as the maximum size for an environment variable definition.
const int MAX_ENV_LEN = 32*4096;
if (name == nullptr) {
return false;
}
// Parse the string, looking for the first '=' there, and its size.
int pos = 0;
int first_equal_pos = -1;
while (pos < MAX_ENV_LEN) {
if (name[pos] == '\0') {
break;
}
if (name[pos] == '=' && first_equal_pos < 0) {
first_equal_pos = pos;
}
pos++;
}
// Check that it's smaller than MAX_ENV_LEN (to detect non-zero terminated strings).
if (pos >= MAX_ENV_LEN) {
return false;
}
// Check that it contains at least one equal sign that is not the first character
if (first_equal_pos < 1) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
static bool __is_unsafe_environment_variable(const char* name) {
// None of these should be allowed when the AT_SECURE auxv
// flag is set. This flag is set to inform userspace that a
// security transition has occurred, for example, as a result
// of executing a setuid program or the result of an SELinux
// security transition.
static constexpr const char* UNSAFE_VARIABLE_NAMES[] = {
"ANDROID_DNS_MODE",
"GCONV_PATH",
"GETCONF_DIR",
"HOSTALIASES",
"JE_MALLOC_CONF",
"LD_AOUT_LIBRARY_PATH",
"LD_AOUT_PRELOAD",
"LD_AUDIT",
"LD_CONFIG_FILE",
"LD_DEBUG",
"LD_DEBUG_OUTPUT",
"LD_DYNAMIC_WEAK",
"LD_HWASAN",
"LD_LIBRARY_PATH",
"LD_ORIGIN_PATH",
"LD_PRELOAD",
"LD_PROFILE",
"LD_SHOW_AUXV",
"LD_USE_LOAD_BIAS",
"LIBC_DEBUG_MALLOC_OPTIONS",
"LIBC_HOOKS_ENABLE",
"LOCALDOMAIN",
"LOCPATH",
"MALLOC_CHECK_",
"MALLOC_CONF",
"MALLOC_TRACE",
"NIS_PATH",
"NLSPATH",
"RESOLV_HOST_CONF",
"RES_OPTIONS",
"SCUDO_OPTIONS",
"TMPDIR",
"TZDIR",
};
for (const auto& unsafe_variable_name : UNSAFE_VARIABLE_NAMES) {
if (env_match(name, unsafe_variable_name) != nullptr) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
static void __sanitize_environment_variables(char** env) {
char** src = env;
char** dst = env;
for (; src[0] != nullptr; ++src) {
if (!__is_valid_environment_variable(src[0])) {
continue;
}
// Remove various unsafe environment variables if we're loading a setuid program.
if (__is_unsafe_environment_variable(src[0])) {
continue;
}
dst[0] = src[0];
++dst;
}
dst[0] = nullptr;
}
static void __initialize_personality() {
#if !defined(__LP64__)
int old_value = personality(0xffffffff);
if (old_value == -1) {
async_safe_fatal("error getting old personality value: %s", strerror(errno));
}
if (personality((static_cast<unsigned int>(old_value) & ~PER_MASK) | PER_LINUX32) == -1) {
async_safe_fatal("error setting PER_LINUX32 personality: %s", strerror(errno));
}
#endif
}
void __libc_init_AT_SECURE(char** env) {
// Check that the kernel provided a value for AT_SECURE.
errno = 0;
unsigned long is_AT_SECURE = getauxval(AT_SECURE);
if (errno != 0) __early_abort(__LINE__);
Ensure STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR always exist File descriptor confusion can result if a process is exec()d and STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR do not exist. In those situations, the first, second, and third files opened by the exec()d application will have FD 0, 1, and 2 respectively. Code which reads / writes to these STD* file descriptors may end up reading / writing to unintended files. To prevent this, guarantee that FDs 0, 1, and 2 always exist. Bionic only currently guarantees this for AT_SECURE programs (eg, a setuid binary, setgid binary, filesystem capabilities, or SELinux domain transition). Extending this to all exec()s adds robustness against this class of bugs. Additionally, it allows a caller to do: close(STDIN_FILENO); close(STDOUT_FILENO); close(STDERR_FILENO); and know that the exec()d process will reopen these file descriptors on its own. This has the potential to simplify other parts of Android, eg https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/system/apex/+/915694 Steps to reproduce: sleep 100 <&- >&- 2>&- & BGPID=$! && ls -la /proc/$BGPID/fd && kill $BGPID Expected: $ sleep 100 <&- >&- 2>&- & BGPID=$! && ls -la /proc/$BGPID/fd && kill $BGPID [1] 3154 total 0 dr-x------ 2 shell shell 0 1970-04-17 12:15 . dr-xr-xr-x 9 shell shell 0 1970-04-17 12:15 .. lrwx------ 1 shell shell 64 1970-04-17 12:15 0 -> /dev/null lrwx------ 1 shell shell 64 1970-04-17 12:15 1 -> /dev/null lrwx------ 1 shell shell 64 1970-04-17 12:15 2 -> /dev/null $ [1] + Terminated \sleep 100 <&- >&- 2>&- Actual: $ sleep 100 <&- >&- 2>&- & BGPID=$! && ls -la /proc/$BGPID/fd && kill $BGPID [1] 16345 total 0 dr-x------ 2 shell shell 0 2019-02-28 20:22 . dr-xr-xr-x 9 shell shell 0 2019-02-28 20:22 .. $ [1] + Terminated \sleep 100 <&- >&- 2>&- Test: manual (see above) Change-Id: I3e05700a1e8ebc7fc9d192211dd9fc030cc40139
2019-02-28 21:57:24 +01:00
// Always ensure that STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR exist. This prevents file
// descriptor confusion bugs where a parent process closes
// STD*, the exec()d process calls open() for an unrelated reason,
// the newly created file descriptor is assigned
// 0<=FD<=2, and unrelated code attempts to read / write to the STD*
// FDs.
// In particular, this can be a security bug for setuid/setgid programs.
// For example:
// https://www.freebsd.org/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-02:23.stdio.asc
// However, for robustness reasons, we don't limit these protections to
// just security critical executables.
//
// Init is excluded from these protections unless AT_SECURE is set, as
// /dev/null and/or /sys/fs/selinux/null will not be available at
// early boot.
if ((getpid() != 1) || is_AT_SECURE) {
__nullify_closed_stdio();
Ensure STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR always exist File descriptor confusion can result if a process is exec()d and STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR do not exist. In those situations, the first, second, and third files opened by the exec()d application will have FD 0, 1, and 2 respectively. Code which reads / writes to these STD* file descriptors may end up reading / writing to unintended files. To prevent this, guarantee that FDs 0, 1, and 2 always exist. Bionic only currently guarantees this for AT_SECURE programs (eg, a setuid binary, setgid binary, filesystem capabilities, or SELinux domain transition). Extending this to all exec()s adds robustness against this class of bugs. Additionally, it allows a caller to do: close(STDIN_FILENO); close(STDOUT_FILENO); close(STDERR_FILENO); and know that the exec()d process will reopen these file descriptors on its own. This has the potential to simplify other parts of Android, eg https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/system/apex/+/915694 Steps to reproduce: sleep 100 <&- >&- 2>&- & BGPID=$! && ls -la /proc/$BGPID/fd && kill $BGPID Expected: $ sleep 100 <&- >&- 2>&- & BGPID=$! && ls -la /proc/$BGPID/fd && kill $BGPID [1] 3154 total 0 dr-x------ 2 shell shell 0 1970-04-17 12:15 . dr-xr-xr-x 9 shell shell 0 1970-04-17 12:15 .. lrwx------ 1 shell shell 64 1970-04-17 12:15 0 -> /dev/null lrwx------ 1 shell shell 64 1970-04-17 12:15 1 -> /dev/null lrwx------ 1 shell shell 64 1970-04-17 12:15 2 -> /dev/null $ [1] + Terminated \sleep 100 <&- >&- 2>&- Actual: $ sleep 100 <&- >&- 2>&- & BGPID=$! && ls -la /proc/$BGPID/fd && kill $BGPID [1] 16345 total 0 dr-x------ 2 shell shell 0 2019-02-28 20:22 . dr-xr-xr-x 9 shell shell 0 2019-02-28 20:22 .. $ [1] + Terminated \sleep 100 <&- >&- 2>&- Test: manual (see above) Change-Id: I3e05700a1e8ebc7fc9d192211dd9fc030cc40139
2019-02-28 21:57:24 +01:00
}
Ensure STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR always exist File descriptor confusion can result if a process is exec()d and STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR do not exist. In those situations, the first, second, and third files opened by the exec()d application will have FD 0, 1, and 2 respectively. Code which reads / writes to these STD* file descriptors may end up reading / writing to unintended files. To prevent this, guarantee that FDs 0, 1, and 2 always exist. Bionic only currently guarantees this for AT_SECURE programs (eg, a setuid binary, setgid binary, filesystem capabilities, or SELinux domain transition). Extending this to all exec()s adds robustness against this class of bugs. Additionally, it allows a caller to do: close(STDIN_FILENO); close(STDOUT_FILENO); close(STDERR_FILENO); and know that the exec()d process will reopen these file descriptors on its own. This has the potential to simplify other parts of Android, eg https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/system/apex/+/915694 Steps to reproduce: sleep 100 <&- >&- 2>&- & BGPID=$! && ls -la /proc/$BGPID/fd && kill $BGPID Expected: $ sleep 100 <&- >&- 2>&- & BGPID=$! && ls -la /proc/$BGPID/fd && kill $BGPID [1] 3154 total 0 dr-x------ 2 shell shell 0 1970-04-17 12:15 . dr-xr-xr-x 9 shell shell 0 1970-04-17 12:15 .. lrwx------ 1 shell shell 64 1970-04-17 12:15 0 -> /dev/null lrwx------ 1 shell shell 64 1970-04-17 12:15 1 -> /dev/null lrwx------ 1 shell shell 64 1970-04-17 12:15 2 -> /dev/null $ [1] + Terminated \sleep 100 <&- >&- 2>&- Actual: $ sleep 100 <&- >&- 2>&- & BGPID=$! && ls -la /proc/$BGPID/fd && kill $BGPID [1] 16345 total 0 dr-x------ 2 shell shell 0 2019-02-28 20:22 . dr-xr-xr-x 9 shell shell 0 2019-02-28 20:22 .. $ [1] + Terminated \sleep 100 <&- >&- 2>&- Test: manual (see above) Change-Id: I3e05700a1e8ebc7fc9d192211dd9fc030cc40139
2019-02-28 21:57:24 +01:00
if (is_AT_SECURE) {
__sanitize_environment_variables(env);
}
// Now the environment has been sanitized, make it available.
environ = __libc_shared_globals()->init_environ = env;
__initialize_personality();
}
/* This function will be called during normal program termination
* to run the destructors that are listed in the .fini_array section
* of the executable, if any.
*
* 'fini_array' points to a list of function addresses. The first
* entry in the list has value -1, the last one has value 0.
*/
void __libc_fini(void* array) {
typedef void (*Dtor)();
Dtor* fini_array = reinterpret_cast<Dtor*>(array);
const Dtor minus1 = reinterpret_cast<Dtor>(static_cast<uintptr_t>(-1));
// Validity check: the first entry must be -1.
if (array == nullptr || fini_array[0] != minus1) return;
// Skip over it.
fini_array += 1;
// Count the number of destructors.
int count = 0;
while (fini_array[count] != nullptr) {
++count;
}
// Now call each destructor in reverse order, ignoring any -1s.
while (count > 0) {
Dtor dtor = fini_array[--count];
if (dtor != minus1) dtor();
}
}