platform_bionic/tests/sys_stat_test.cpp

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/*
* Copyright (C) 2013 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <android-base/file.h>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
#include "utils.h"
#if defined(__BIONIC__)
#define HAVE_STATX
#elif defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
#if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 28)
#define HAVE_STATX
#endif
#endif
TEST(sys_stat, futimens) {
FILE* fp = tmpfile();
ASSERT_TRUE(fp != nullptr);
int fd = fileno(fp);
ASSERT_NE(fd, -1);
timespec times[2];
times[0].tv_sec = 123;
times[0].tv_nsec = 0;
times[1].tv_sec = 456;
times[1].tv_nsec = 0;
ASSERT_EQ(0, futimens(fd, times)) << strerror(errno);
struct stat sb;
ASSERT_EQ(0, fstat(fd, &sb));
ASSERT_EQ(times[0].tv_sec, static_cast<long>(sb.st_atime));
ASSERT_EQ(times[1].tv_sec, static_cast<long>(sb.st_mtime));
fclose(fp);
}
TEST(sys_stat, futimens_EBADF) {
timespec times[2];
times[0].tv_sec = 123;
times[0].tv_nsec = 0;
times[1].tv_sec = 456;
times[1].tv_nsec = 0;
ASSERT_EQ(-1, futimens(-1, times));
ASSERT_ERRNO(EBADF);
}
TEST(sys_stat, mkfifo_failure) {
errno = 0;
ASSERT_EQ(-1, mkfifo("/", 0666));
ASSERT_ERRNO(EEXIST);
}
TEST(sys_stat, mkfifoat_failure) {
errno = 0;
ASSERT_EQ(-1, mkfifoat(-2, "x", 0666));
ASSERT_ERRNO(EBADF);
}
TEST(sys_stat, mkfifo) {
if (getuid() == 0) {
// Racy but probably sufficient way to get a suitable filename.
std::string path;
{
TemporaryFile tf;
path = tf.path;
}
ASSERT_EQ(0, mkfifo(path.c_str(), 0666));
struct stat sb;
ASSERT_EQ(0, stat(path.c_str(), &sb));
ASSERT_TRUE(S_ISFIFO(sb.st_mode));
unlink(path.c_str());
} else {
// SELinux policy forbids us from creating FIFOs. http://b/17646702.
GTEST_SKIP() << "SELinux policy forbids non-root from creating FIFOs";
}
}
TEST(sys_stat, stat64_lstat64_fstat64) {
struct stat64 sb;
ASSERT_EQ(0, stat64("/proc/version", &sb));
ASSERT_EQ(0, lstat64("/proc/version", &sb));
int fd = open("/proc/version", O_RDONLY);
ASSERT_EQ(0, fstat64(fd, &sb));
close(fd);
}
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TEST(sys_stat, statx) {
#if defined(HAVE_STATX)
struct statx sx;
int rc = statx(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/version", AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT, STATX_ALL, &sx);
if (rc == -1 && errno == ENOSYS) GTEST_SKIP() << "no statx() in this kernel";
ASSERT_EQ(0, rc);
struct stat64 sb;
ASSERT_EQ(0, stat64("/proc/version", &sb));
EXPECT_EQ(sb.st_ino, sx.stx_ino);
EXPECT_EQ(sb.st_mode, sx.stx_mode);
#else
GTEST_SKIP() << "statx not available";
#endif
}
TEST(sys_stat, fchmod_EBADF) {
ASSERT_EQ(-1, fchmod(-1, 0751));
ASSERT_ERRNO(EBADF);
}
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TEST(sys_stat, fchmodat_EFAULT_file) {
ASSERT_EQ(-1, fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, (char *) 0x1, 0751, 0));
ASSERT_ERRNO(EFAULT);
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}
TEST(sys_stat, fchmodat_AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW_EFAULT_file) {
ASSERT_EQ(-1, fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, (char *) 0x1, 0751, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW));
#if defined(__BIONIC__)
ASSERT_ERRNO(EFAULT);
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#else
// glibc 2.19 does not implement AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW and always
// returns ENOTSUP
ASSERT_ERRNO(ENOTSUP);
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#endif
}
TEST(sys_stat, fchmodat_bad_flags) {
ASSERT_EQ(-1, fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, "/blah", 0751, ~AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW));
ASSERT_ERRNO(EINVAL);
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}
TEST(sys_stat, fchmodat_bad_flags_ALL) {
ASSERT_EQ(-1, fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, "/blah", 0751, ~0));
ASSERT_ERRNO(EINVAL);
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}
TEST(sys_stat, fchmodat_nonexistant_file) {
ASSERT_EQ(-1, fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, "/blah", 0751, 0));
ASSERT_ERRNO(ENOENT);
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}
TEST(sys_stat, fchmodat_AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW_nonexistant_file) {
ASSERT_EQ(-1, fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, "/blah", 0751, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW));
#if defined(__BIONIC__)
ASSERT_ERRNO(ENOENT);
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#else
// glibc 2.19 does not implement AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW and always
// returns ENOTSUP
ASSERT_ERRNO(ENOTSUP);
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#endif
}
static void AssertFileModeEquals(mode_t expected_mode, const char* filename) {
struct stat sb;
ASSERT_EQ(0, stat(filename, &sb));
mode_t mask = S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO;
ASSERT_EQ(expected_mode & mask, static_cast<mode_t>(sb.st_mode) & mask);
}
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TEST(sys_stat, fchmodat_file) {
TemporaryFile tf;
ASSERT_EQ(0, fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, tf.path, 0751, 0));
AssertFileModeEquals(0751, tf.path);
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}
TEST(sys_stat, fchmodat_AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW_file) {
TemporaryFile tf;
errno = 0;
int result = fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, tf.path, 0751, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
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#if defined(__BIONIC__)
ASSERT_EQ(0, result);
ASSERT_ERRNO(0);
AssertFileModeEquals(0751, tf.path);
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#else
// glibc 2.19 does not implement AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW and always
// returns ENOTSUP
ASSERT_EQ(-1, result);
ASSERT_ERRNO(ENOTSUP);
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#endif
}
TEST(sys_stat, fchmodat_symlink) {
TemporaryFile tf;
char linkname[255];
snprintf(linkname, sizeof(linkname), "%s.link", tf.path);
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ASSERT_EQ(0, symlink(tf.path, linkname));
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ASSERT_EQ(0, fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, linkname, 0751, 0));
AssertFileModeEquals(0751, tf.path);
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unlink(linkname);
}
TEST(sys_stat, fchmodat_dangling_symlink) {
TemporaryFile tf;
char linkname[255];
char target[255];
snprintf(linkname, sizeof(linkname), "%s.link", tf.path);
snprintf(target, sizeof(target), "%s.doesnotexist", tf.path);
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ASSERT_EQ(0, symlink(target, linkname));
ASSERT_EQ(-1, fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, linkname, 0751, 0));
ASSERT_ERRNO(ENOENT);
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unlink(linkname);
}
static void AssertSymlinkModeEquals(mode_t expected_mode, const char* linkname) {
struct stat sb;
ASSERT_EQ(0, fstatat(AT_FDCWD, linkname, &sb, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW));
mode_t mask = S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO;
ASSERT_EQ(expected_mode & mask, static_cast<mode_t>(sb.st_mode) & mask);
}
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TEST(sys_stat, fchmodat_AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW_with_symlink) {
TemporaryFile tf;
struct stat tf_sb;
ASSERT_EQ(0, stat(tf.path, &tf_sb));
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char linkname[255];
snprintf(linkname, sizeof(linkname), "%s.link", tf.path);
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ASSERT_EQ(0, symlink(tf.path, linkname));
int result = fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, linkname, 0751, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
// It depends on the kernel whether chmod operation on symlink is allowed.
if (result == 0) {
AssertSymlinkModeEquals(0751, linkname);
} else {
ASSERT_EQ(-1, result);
ASSERT_ERRNO(ENOTSUP);
}
// Target file mode shouldn't be modified.
AssertFileModeEquals(tf_sb.st_mode, tf.path);
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unlink(linkname);
}
TEST(sys_stat, fchmodat_AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW_with_dangling_symlink) {
TemporaryFile tf;
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char linkname[255];
char target[255];
snprintf(linkname, sizeof(linkname), "%s.link", tf.path);
snprintf(target, sizeof(target), "%s.doesnotexist", tf.path);
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ASSERT_EQ(0, symlink(target, linkname));
int result = fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, linkname, 0751, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
// It depends on the kernel whether chmod operation on symlink is allowed.
if (result == 0) {
AssertSymlinkModeEquals(0751, linkname);
} else {
ASSERT_EQ(-1, result);
ASSERT_ERRNO(ENOTSUP);
}
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unlink(linkname);
}
Fix "faccessat ignores flags" The kernel system call faccessat() does not have any flags arguments, so passing flags to the kernel is currently ignored. Fix the kernel system call so that no flags argument is passed in. Ensure that we don't support AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW. This non-POSIX (http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/access.html) flag is a glibc extension, and has non-intuitive, error prone behavior. For example, consider the following code: symlink("foo.is.dangling", "foo"); if (faccessat(AT_FDCWD, "foo", R_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == 0) { int fd = openat(AT_FDCWD, "foo", O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW); } The faccessat() call in glibc will return true, but an attempt to open the dangling symlink will end up failing. GLIBC documents this as returning the access mode of the symlink itself, which will always return true for any symlink on Linux. Some further discussions of this are at: * http://lists.landley.net/pipermail/toybox-landley.net/2014-September/003617.html * http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.lib.musl.general/6952 AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW seems broken by design. I suspect this is why this function was never added to POSIX. (note that "access" is pretty much broken by design too, since it introduces a race condition between check and action). We shouldn't support this until it's clearly documented by POSIX or we can have it produce intuitive results. Don't support AT_EACCESS for now. Implementing it is complicated, and pretty much useless on Android, since we don't have setuid binaries. See http://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/commit/?id=0a05eace163cee9b08571d2ff9d90f5e82d9c228 for how an implementation might look. Bug: 18867827 Change-Id: I25b86c5020f3152ffa3ac3047f6c4152908d0e04
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TEST(sys_stat, faccessat_EINVAL) {
ASSERT_EQ(-1, faccessat(AT_FDCWD, "/dev/null", F_OK, ~AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW));
ASSERT_ERRNO(EINVAL);
Fix "faccessat ignores flags" The kernel system call faccessat() does not have any flags arguments, so passing flags to the kernel is currently ignored. Fix the kernel system call so that no flags argument is passed in. Ensure that we don't support AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW. This non-POSIX (http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/access.html) flag is a glibc extension, and has non-intuitive, error prone behavior. For example, consider the following code: symlink("foo.is.dangling", "foo"); if (faccessat(AT_FDCWD, "foo", R_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == 0) { int fd = openat(AT_FDCWD, "foo", O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW); } The faccessat() call in glibc will return true, but an attempt to open the dangling symlink will end up failing. GLIBC documents this as returning the access mode of the symlink itself, which will always return true for any symlink on Linux. Some further discussions of this are at: * http://lists.landley.net/pipermail/toybox-landley.net/2014-September/003617.html * http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.lib.musl.general/6952 AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW seems broken by design. I suspect this is why this function was never added to POSIX. (note that "access" is pretty much broken by design too, since it introduces a race condition between check and action). We shouldn't support this until it's clearly documented by POSIX or we can have it produce intuitive results. Don't support AT_EACCESS for now. Implementing it is complicated, and pretty much useless on Android, since we don't have setuid binaries. See http://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/commit/?id=0a05eace163cee9b08571d2ff9d90f5e82d9c228 for how an implementation might look. Bug: 18867827 Change-Id: I25b86c5020f3152ffa3ac3047f6c4152908d0e04
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#if defined(__BIONIC__)
ASSERT_EQ(-1, faccessat(AT_FDCWD, "/dev/null", ~(R_OK | W_OK | X_OK), 0));
ASSERT_ERRNO(EINVAL);
Fix "faccessat ignores flags" The kernel system call faccessat() does not have any flags arguments, so passing flags to the kernel is currently ignored. Fix the kernel system call so that no flags argument is passed in. Ensure that we don't support AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW. This non-POSIX (http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/access.html) flag is a glibc extension, and has non-intuitive, error prone behavior. For example, consider the following code: symlink("foo.is.dangling", "foo"); if (faccessat(AT_FDCWD, "foo", R_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == 0) { int fd = openat(AT_FDCWD, "foo", O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW); } The faccessat() call in glibc will return true, but an attempt to open the dangling symlink will end up failing. GLIBC documents this as returning the access mode of the symlink itself, which will always return true for any symlink on Linux. Some further discussions of this are at: * http://lists.landley.net/pipermail/toybox-landley.net/2014-September/003617.html * http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.lib.musl.general/6952 AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW seems broken by design. I suspect this is why this function was never added to POSIX. (note that "access" is pretty much broken by design too, since it introduces a race condition between check and action). We shouldn't support this until it's clearly documented by POSIX or we can have it produce intuitive results. Don't support AT_EACCESS for now. Implementing it is complicated, and pretty much useless on Android, since we don't have setuid binaries. See http://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/commit/?id=0a05eace163cee9b08571d2ff9d90f5e82d9c228 for how an implementation might look. Bug: 18867827 Change-Id: I25b86c5020f3152ffa3ac3047f6c4152908d0e04
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#else
ASSERT_EQ(0, faccessat(AT_FDCWD, "/dev/null", ~(R_OK | W_OK | X_OK), AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW));
ASSERT_EQ(-1, faccessat(AT_FDCWD, "/dev/null", ~(R_OK | W_OK | X_OK), 0));
ASSERT_ERRNO(EINVAL);
Fix "faccessat ignores flags" The kernel system call faccessat() does not have any flags arguments, so passing flags to the kernel is currently ignored. Fix the kernel system call so that no flags argument is passed in. Ensure that we don't support AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW. This non-POSIX (http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/access.html) flag is a glibc extension, and has non-intuitive, error prone behavior. For example, consider the following code: symlink("foo.is.dangling", "foo"); if (faccessat(AT_FDCWD, "foo", R_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == 0) { int fd = openat(AT_FDCWD, "foo", O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW); } The faccessat() call in glibc will return true, but an attempt to open the dangling symlink will end up failing. GLIBC documents this as returning the access mode of the symlink itself, which will always return true for any symlink on Linux. Some further discussions of this are at: * http://lists.landley.net/pipermail/toybox-landley.net/2014-September/003617.html * http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.lib.musl.general/6952 AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW seems broken by design. I suspect this is why this function was never added to POSIX. (note that "access" is pretty much broken by design too, since it introduces a race condition between check and action). We shouldn't support this until it's clearly documented by POSIX or we can have it produce intuitive results. Don't support AT_EACCESS for now. Implementing it is complicated, and pretty much useless on Android, since we don't have setuid binaries. See http://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/commit/?id=0a05eace163cee9b08571d2ff9d90f5e82d9c228 for how an implementation might look. Bug: 18867827 Change-Id: I25b86c5020f3152ffa3ac3047f6c4152908d0e04
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#endif
}
TEST(sys_stat, faccessat_AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW_EINVAL) {
#if defined(__BIONIC__)
// Android doesn't support AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW
ASSERT_EQ(-1, faccessat(AT_FDCWD, "/dev/null", F_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW));
ASSERT_ERRNO(EINVAL);
Fix "faccessat ignores flags" The kernel system call faccessat() does not have any flags arguments, so passing flags to the kernel is currently ignored. Fix the kernel system call so that no flags argument is passed in. Ensure that we don't support AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW. This non-POSIX (http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/access.html) flag is a glibc extension, and has non-intuitive, error prone behavior. For example, consider the following code: symlink("foo.is.dangling", "foo"); if (faccessat(AT_FDCWD, "foo", R_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == 0) { int fd = openat(AT_FDCWD, "foo", O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW); } The faccessat() call in glibc will return true, but an attempt to open the dangling symlink will end up failing. GLIBC documents this as returning the access mode of the symlink itself, which will always return true for any symlink on Linux. Some further discussions of this are at: * http://lists.landley.net/pipermail/toybox-landley.net/2014-September/003617.html * http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.lib.musl.general/6952 AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW seems broken by design. I suspect this is why this function was never added to POSIX. (note that "access" is pretty much broken by design too, since it introduces a race condition between check and action). We shouldn't support this until it's clearly documented by POSIX or we can have it produce intuitive results. Don't support AT_EACCESS for now. Implementing it is complicated, and pretty much useless on Android, since we don't have setuid binaries. See http://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/commit/?id=0a05eace163cee9b08571d2ff9d90f5e82d9c228 for how an implementation might look. Bug: 18867827 Change-Id: I25b86c5020f3152ffa3ac3047f6c4152908d0e04
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#else
ASSERT_EQ(0, faccessat(AT_FDCWD, "/dev/null", F_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW));
#endif
}
TEST(sys_stat, faccessat_dev_null) {
ASSERT_EQ(0, faccessat(AT_FDCWD, "/dev/null", F_OK, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(0, faccessat(AT_FDCWD, "/dev/null", R_OK, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(0, faccessat(AT_FDCWD, "/dev/null", W_OK, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(0, faccessat(AT_FDCWD, "/dev/null", R_OK|W_OK, 0));
}
TEST(sys_stat, faccessat_nonexistant) {
ASSERT_EQ(-1, faccessat(AT_FDCWD, "/blah", F_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW));
#if defined(__BIONIC__)
// Android doesn't support AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW
ASSERT_ERRNO(EINVAL);
Fix "faccessat ignores flags" The kernel system call faccessat() does not have any flags arguments, so passing flags to the kernel is currently ignored. Fix the kernel system call so that no flags argument is passed in. Ensure that we don't support AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW. This non-POSIX (http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/access.html) flag is a glibc extension, and has non-intuitive, error prone behavior. For example, consider the following code: symlink("foo.is.dangling", "foo"); if (faccessat(AT_FDCWD, "foo", R_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == 0) { int fd = openat(AT_FDCWD, "foo", O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW); } The faccessat() call in glibc will return true, but an attempt to open the dangling symlink will end up failing. GLIBC documents this as returning the access mode of the symlink itself, which will always return true for any symlink on Linux. Some further discussions of this are at: * http://lists.landley.net/pipermail/toybox-landley.net/2014-September/003617.html * http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.lib.musl.general/6952 AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW seems broken by design. I suspect this is why this function was never added to POSIX. (note that "access" is pretty much broken by design too, since it introduces a race condition between check and action). We shouldn't support this until it's clearly documented by POSIX or we can have it produce intuitive results. Don't support AT_EACCESS for now. Implementing it is complicated, and pretty much useless on Android, since we don't have setuid binaries. See http://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/commit/?id=0a05eace163cee9b08571d2ff9d90f5e82d9c228 for how an implementation might look. Bug: 18867827 Change-Id: I25b86c5020f3152ffa3ac3047f6c4152908d0e04
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#else
ASSERT_ERRNO(ENOENT);
Fix "faccessat ignores flags" The kernel system call faccessat() does not have any flags arguments, so passing flags to the kernel is currently ignored. Fix the kernel system call so that no flags argument is passed in. Ensure that we don't support AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW. This non-POSIX (http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/access.html) flag is a glibc extension, and has non-intuitive, error prone behavior. For example, consider the following code: symlink("foo.is.dangling", "foo"); if (faccessat(AT_FDCWD, "foo", R_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == 0) { int fd = openat(AT_FDCWD, "foo", O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW); } The faccessat() call in glibc will return true, but an attempt to open the dangling symlink will end up failing. GLIBC documents this as returning the access mode of the symlink itself, which will always return true for any symlink on Linux. Some further discussions of this are at: * http://lists.landley.net/pipermail/toybox-landley.net/2014-September/003617.html * http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.lib.musl.general/6952 AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW seems broken by design. I suspect this is why this function was never added to POSIX. (note that "access" is pretty much broken by design too, since it introduces a race condition between check and action). We shouldn't support this until it's clearly documented by POSIX or we can have it produce intuitive results. Don't support AT_EACCESS for now. Implementing it is complicated, and pretty much useless on Android, since we don't have setuid binaries. See http://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/commit/?id=0a05eace163cee9b08571d2ff9d90f5e82d9c228 for how an implementation might look. Bug: 18867827 Change-Id: I25b86c5020f3152ffa3ac3047f6c4152908d0e04
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#endif
}