These are old enough now that the latest devices will have kernels that
support them.
Also add basic doc comments to <sys/mman.h>.
Test: treehugger
Change-Id: I1b5ff5db0b6270f5c374287cac1d6a751a0259f5
Plain __ for generated syscalls didn't mean it was a hidden symbol, it
just meant "please don't use this". We added ___ to signify that a
hidden symbol should be generated, but then we added the map files
anyway so you now have to explicitly export symbols. Given that, this
convention serves no particular purpose so we may as well just use the
nicer names have everything look the same.
Test: treehugger
Change-Id: If424e17a49c36f4be545f5d283c4561a6ea9c7ea
This doesn't address `struct sigaction` and `sigaction`. That will
come later.
Bug: http://b/72493232
Test: ran tests
Change-Id: I4134346757ce3a4dac6feae413361cec16223386
iOS 10 has <sys/random.h> with getentropy, glibc >= 2.25 has
<sys/random.h> with getentropy and getrandom. (glibc also pollutes
<unistd.h>, but that seems like a bad idea.)
Also, all supported devices now have kernels with the getrandom system
call.
We've had these available internally for a while, but it seems like the
time is ripe to expose them.
Bug: http://b/67014255
Test: ran tests
Change-Id: I76dde1e3a2d0bc82777eea437ac193f96964f138
GMM calls this system call directly at the moment. That's silly.
Bug: http://b/36405699
Test: ran tests
Change-Id: I1e14c0e5ce0bc2aa888d884845ac30dc20f13cd5
fstat64/fstatat64/_flush_cache were accidentally put in SYSCALLS.TXT in:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/390454/
This patch just moves them to SECCOMP_WHITELIST.TXT because we do not
want stubs accidenatally generated for the mentioned syscalls using
gensyscalls.py script.
This commit does not introduce any functional changes to mips64_policy.cpp.
Test: Run genseccomp.py -> File seccomp/mips64_policy.cpp not changed.
Test: Run gensyscalls.py -> INFO:root:no changes detected!
Change-Id: I3b527b3d9f18715c44a4e6ddc6db6e49f48f4890
Signed-off-by: Miodrag Dinic <miodrag.dinic@imgtec.com>
File libc/SYSCALLS.TXT is updated to generate bionic's system call wrappers
for clock_gettime() & gettimeofday() that will be called if kernel vdso
implementations fail to execute.
The system call wrappers are generated using a python script gensyscalls.py.
Since all architectures support vdso now, there is no more need for conditional
statements regarding supported architectures in libc/bionic/vdso.cpp &
libc/private/bionic_vdso.h files.
Test: builds
Change-Id: I7213f29c179a7929851499d78a72900638ae861a
Signed-off-by: Goran Ferenc <goran.ferenc@imgtec.com>
There's no change to the generated stubs, because the script only cares
that this is a pointer type, not what it's a pointer to.
Change-Id: I766720965f0f3d201fc90677a076b26870485377
It turns out that at least the Nexus 9 kernel is built without CONFIG_QUOTA.
If we decide we're going to mandate quota functionality, I'm happy for us to
be a part of CTS that ensures that happens, but I don't want to be first, so
there's not much to test here other than "will it compile?". The strace
output looks right though.
Bug: http://b/27948821
Bug: http://b/27952303
Change-Id: If667195eee849ed17c8fa9110f6b02907fc8fc04
{get,set}domainname aren't in POSIX but are widely-implemented
extensions.
The Linux kernel provides a setdomainname syscall but not a symmetric
getdomainname syscall, since it expects userspace to get the domain name
from uname(2).
Change-Id: I96726c242f4bb646c130b361688328b0b97269a0
Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
The mremap definition was incorrect (unsigned long instead of int) and
it was missing the optional new_address parameter.
Change-Id: Ib9d0675aaa098c21617cedc9b2b8cf267be3aec4
This patch give the possibility of time vdso support on 32bit kernel.
If the 32bit x86 kernel provides gettimeofday() and clock_gettime()
primitives in vdso. In this case make bionic use them. If the kernel
doesn't provide them, fallback to the legacy system call versions.
Change-Id: I87b772a9486fa356903e1f98f486ab9eb0b6f6f7
Signed-off-by: Robert Jarzmik <robert.jarzmik@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mingwei Shi <mingwei.shi@intel.com>
A continuation of commit 2825f10b7f.
Add O_PATH compatibility support for flistxattr(). This allows
a process to list out all the extended attributes associated with
O_PATH file descriptors.
Change-Id: Ie2285ac7ad2e4eac427ddba6c2d182d41b130f75
Support O_PATH file descriptors when handling fgetxattr and fsetxattr.
This avoids requiring file read access to pull extended attributes.
This is needed to support O_PATH file descriptors when calling
SELinux's fgetfilecon() call. In particular, this allows the querying
and setting of SELinux file context by using something like the following
code:
int dirfd = open("/path/to/dir", O_DIRECTORY);
int fd = openat(dirfd, "file", O_PATH | O_NOFOLLOW);
char *context;
fgetfilecon(fd, &context);
This change was motivated by a comment in
https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/152680/1/toys/posix/ls.c
Change-Id: Ic0cdf9f9dd0e35a63b44a4c4a08400020041eddf
This doesn't affect code like Chrome that correctly ignores EINTR on
close, makes code that tries TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY work (where before it might
have closed a different fd and appeared to succeed, or had a bogus EBADF),
and makes "goto fail" code work (instead of mistakenly assuming that EINTR
means that the close failed).
Who loses? Anyone actively trying to detect that they caught a signal while
in close(2). I don't think those people exist, and I think they have better
alternatives available.
Bug: https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=269623
Bug: http://b/20501816
Change-Id: I11e2f66532fe5d1b0082b2433212e24bdda8219b
The kernel system call faccessat() does not have any flags arguments,
so passing flags to the kernel is currently ignored.
Fix the kernel system call so that no flags argument is passed in.
Ensure that we don't support AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW. This non-POSIX
(http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/access.html)
flag is a glibc extension, and has non-intuitive, error prone behavior.
For example, consider the following code:
symlink("foo.is.dangling", "foo");
if (faccessat(AT_FDCWD, "foo", R_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == 0) {
int fd = openat(AT_FDCWD, "foo", O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW);
}
The faccessat() call in glibc will return true, but an attempt to
open the dangling symlink will end up failing. GLIBC documents this
as returning the access mode of the symlink itself, which will
always return true for any symlink on Linux.
Some further discussions of this are at:
* http://lists.landley.net/pipermail/toybox-landley.net/2014-September/003617.html
* http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.lib.musl.general/6952
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW seems broken by design. I suspect this is why this
function was never added to POSIX. (note that "access" is pretty much
broken by design too, since it introduces a race condition between
check and action). We shouldn't support this until it's clearly
documented by POSIX or we can have it produce intuitive results.
Don't support AT_EACCESS for now. Implementing it is complicated, and
pretty much useless on Android, since we don't have setuid binaries.
See http://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/commit/?id=0a05eace163cee9b08571d2ff9d90f5e82d9c228
for how an implementation might look.
Bug: 18867827
Change-Id: I25b86c5020f3152ffa3ac3047f6c4152908d0e04
In https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/127908/5/libc/SYSCALLS.TXT@116
Elliott said:
for LP64 these will be hidden. for LP32 we were cowards and left
them all public for compatibility (though i don't think we ever
dremeled to see whether it was needed). we don't have an easy
way to recognize additions, though, so we can't prevent adding
new turds.
Add a mechanism to prevent the adding of new turds, and use that
mechanism on the fchmod/fchmodat system calls.
Bug: 19233951
Change-Id: I98f98345970b631a379f348df57858f9fc3d57c0
Many libc functions have an option to not follow symbolic
links. This is useful to avoid security sensitive code
from inadvertantly following attacker supplied symlinks
and taking inappropriate action on files it shouldn't.
For example, open() has O_NOFOLLOW, chown() has
lchown(), stat() has lstat(), etc.
There is no such equivalent function for chmod(), such as lchmod().
To address this, POSIX introduced fchmodat(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW),
which is intended to provide a way to perform a chmod operation
which doesn't follow symlinks.
Currently, the Linux kernel doesn't implement AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW.
In GLIBC, attempting to use the AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flag causes
fchmodat to return ENOTSUP. Details are in "man fchmodat".
Bionic currently differs from GLIBC in that AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW
is silently ignored and treated as if the flag wasn't present.
This patch provides a userspace implementation of
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW for bionic. Using open(O_PATH | O_NOFOLLOW),
we can provide a way to atomically change the permissions on
files without worrying about race conditions.
As part of this change, we add support for fchmod on O_PATH
file descriptors, because it's relatively straight forward
and could be useful in the future.
The basic idea behind this implementation comes from
https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=14578 , specifically
comment #10.
Change-Id: I1eba0cdb2c509d9193ceecf28f13118188a3cfa7
The kernel version of the stat structure is used during the syscalls. After the syscall,
the kernel stat structure is converted to match the generic one. Eventually we would like
the generic stat structure and related syscalls be added to MIPS64 kernel, removing the
thunks added to AOSP.
Change-Id: I7764e80278c1cc8254754c3531ec2dda7544a8ec
Add the missing prototypes, fix the existing prototypes to use clockid_t
rather than int, fix clock_nanosleep's failure behavior, and add simple
tests.
Bug: 17644443
Bug: https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=77372
Change-Id: I03fba369939403918abcabae9551a7123953d780
Signed-off-by: Haruki Hasegawa <h6a.h4i.0@gmail.com>
Also remove declaration.
The only user is compiler-rt, and they can replace that call with one to
syscall(2). compiler-rt doesn't currently build on mips64 anyway.
Bug: 11156955
Change-Id: Ieae0ba49c8e7aa50253401fc1d7c2d17bc867d39
