This allows debugging tools to know they are working with Android
binaries and adapt accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <thiago.bauermann@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Hope <michael.hope@linaro.org>
Change-Id: Ic906992fcad61c028bb765821637a3e1333bf52b
In particular this affects assert(3) and __cxa_pure_virtual, both of
which have managed to confuse people this week by apparently aborting
without reason. (Because stderr goes nowhere, normally.)
Bug: 6852995
Bug: 6840813
Change-Id: I7f5d17d5ddda439e217b7932096702dc013b9142
RETRY macro may retry command if result is -1. In this
case the command was "connect < 0" instead of just
connect. The comparison will not return -1 and thus
retry is never done. This is now corrected so that
interrupts will cause retry instead of fail.
(There was no other negative side effect of the bug.
The result code from RETRY was used in an if-statement
and it would be true for all negative connect results.
This was according to expectations.)
Change-Id: Ie206b39878e9befea4e3be9a4061ee39eb232d80
Move the stackpointer so a captured signal does not corrupt
stack variables needed for __thread_entry.
Change-Id: I3e1e7b94a6d7cd3a07081f849043262743aa8064
The factory file (and Factory time zone) was meant as a way to say
"not configured" that would give a clear error when running date(1).
For us it would just look like UTC, so it is of no value.
Bug: 2997381
Change-Id: I1a4b85dce97d1d9370b22ba79e8fe5dafff56541
This upgrade involved rewriting the script; the data has moved to ftp.iana.org,
where it's slightly less convenient to access, so it's time to use something
that can talk FTP...
As for tzdata2012d, it's just updating Morocco for this weekend's changes, now
they've been decided at the last minute (as usual).
Change-Id: I772df57a6e09b3bf3d9541bfc08930d6f18633b4
This test is designed to detect code such as:
int main() {
char buf[10];
memcpy(buf, "1234567890", sizeof(buf));
size_t len = strlen(buf); // segfault here with _FORTIFY_SOURCE
printf("%d\n", len);
return 0;
}
or anytime strlen reads beyond an object boundary. This should
help address memory leakage vulnerabilities and make other
unrelated vulnerabilities harder to exploit.
Change-Id: I354b425be7bef4713c85f6bab0e9738445e00182
In our previous FORTIFY_SOURCE change, we started using a custom
inline for memcpy(), rather than using GCC's __builtin_memcpy_chk().
This allowed us to delete our copy of __memcpy_chk(), and replace it
by __memcpy_chk2().
Apparently GCC uses __memcpy_chk() outside of __builtin_memcpy_chk().
Specifically, __memcpy_chk() is used by __builtin__memMOVE_chk() under
certain optimization levels.
Keep the old __memcpy_chk() function around, and have it call into
__memcpy_chk2().
Change-Id: I2453930b24b8a492a3b6ed860e18d92a6b762b80
Two changes:
1) Detect memory read overruns.
For example:
int main() {
char buf[10];
memcpy(buf, "abcde", sizeof(buf));
sprintf("%s\n", buf);
}
because "abcde" is only 6 bytes, copying 10 bytes from it is a bug.
This particular bug will be detected at compile time. Other similar
bugs may be detected at runtime.
2) Detect overlapping buffers on memcpy()
It is a bug to call memcpy() on buffers which overlap. For
example, the following code is buggy:
char buf3[0x800];
char *first_half = &buf3[0x400];
char *second_half = &buf3[1];
memset(buf3, 0, sizeof(buf3));
memcpy(first_half, second_half, 0x400);
printf("1: %s\n", buf3);
We now detect this at compile and run time.
Change-Id: I092bd89f11f18e08e8a9dda0ca903aaea8e06d91
memmove() unconditionally calls memcpy() if "dst" < "src". For
example, in the code below, memmove() would end up calling memcpy(),
even though the regions of memory overlap.
int main() {
char buf3[0x800];
char *dst = &buf3[1];
char *src = &buf3[0x400];
memset(buf3, 0, sizeof(buf3));
memmove(dst, src, 0x400);
printf("1: %s\n", buf3);
return 0;
}
Calling memcpy() on overlaping regions only works if you assume
that memcpy() copies from start to finish. On some architectures,
it's more efficient to call memcpy() from finish to start.
This is also triggering a failure in some of my code.
More reading:
* http://lwn.net/Articles/414467/
* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=638477#c31 (comment 31)
Change-Id: I65a51ae3a52dd4af335fe5c278056b8c2cbd8948
libc's stack protector initialization routine (__guard_setup)
is in bionic/ssp.c. This code deliberately modifies the stack
canary. This code should never be compiled with -fstack-protector-all
otherwise it will crash (mismatched canary value).
Force bionic/ssp.c to be compiled with -fno-stack-protector
Change-Id: Ib95a5736e4bafe1a460d6b4e522ca660b417d8d6
limits.h relies on PAGE_SIZE being defined without actually including
page.h. Make sure this is included to avoid compilation failures.
Signed-off-by: Arun Raghavan <arun.raghavan@collabora.co.uk>
Add fortify_source support for openat(). This change requires that
an argument be supplied when using O_CREAT.
Fix unnecessary call to __open_2. If, at compile time, we know that
"flags" is constant and DOESN'T contain O_CREAT, the call to __open_2
is useless.
Change-Id: Ifcd29c4fb25e25656961d7552d672e161f0cfdbd
Prefix private functions with underscores, to prevent name
conflicts.
Use __error__ instead of error, since occasionally programs will
create their own "#define error ...".
Change-Id: I7bb171df58aec5627e61896032a140db547fd95d
Add a FORTIFY_SOURCE check which requires that you pass a
"mode" argument when calling open(..., O_CREAT). If a mode isn't
passed, then the file is created with "undefined" permissions.
Change-Id: I4427be4f9ce170c69da01af5b00fb05b03613a28
Add strlcpy / strlcat support to FORTIFY_SOURCE. This allows
us to do consistency checks on to ensure we don't overflow buffers
when the compiler is able to tell us the size of the buffer we're
dealing with.
Unlike previous changes, this change DOES NOT use the compiler's
builtin support. Instead, we do everything the compiler would
normally do.
Change-Id: I47c099a911382452eafd711f8e9bfe7c2d0a0d22
According to
http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Function-Attributes.html
realloc should NOT be marked with __attribute__((malloc)). Quoting:
realloc-like functions do not have this property as the memory
pointed to does not have undefined content.
For reference, __mallocfunc is defined in sys/cdefs.h as:
#define __mallocfunc __attribute__((malloc))
Change-Id: I56083542ba92e4608dd7c55fb5596a138eb50cc9
sprintf FORTIFY_SOURCE protections are not available
on clang.
Also add various __attribute__s to stdio functions.
Change-Id: I936d1f9e55fe53a68885c4524b7b59e68fed218d
Pull in an updated version of filter.h / prctl.h / seccomp.h
from the linux kernel. Pulled from upstream kernel at
94fa83c424321189ca24fb6cb4c0d224cdedc72d
This file was generated using the following command:
cd bionic/libc/kernel/
./tools/clean_header.py -u ../../../external/kernel-headers/original/linux/seccomp.h
./tools/clean_header.py -u ../../../external/kernel-headers/original/linux/filter.h
./tools/clean_header.py -u ../../../external/kernel-headers/original/linux/prctl.h
Change-Id: I1ca996541d05b0d5927ab828a6ce49c09877ea01
Add _FORTIFY_SOURCE support for snprintf, vsnprintf
At this time, we opt out of these protections for clang, as clang
does not implement __builtin_va_arg_pack().
http://clang.llvm.org/docs/UsersManual.html#c_unimpl_gcc
Change-Id: I73ebe5ec8dad1dca8898a76d6afb693a25f75375
Fix runtime error when snprintf() FORTIFY_SOURCE protections are
applied. The size passed to snprintf() is larger than the tmp
buffer size, which results in a runtime assertion failure.
Even though the size passed to snprintf is larger than the buffer,
there's no danger of overwriting the buffer because of the format
string passed to snprintf.
Change-Id: I35f0217d25f3b9c6d04c5a76c3238759c235545a
This was misleading 'configure' into thinking we actually support AF_LINK,
but we're Linux, so we don't, and we never implemented the functions we
declared here either.
Reported to AOSP by Jun-ya Kato.
(cherry-pick of 5056f1fad1187cd67729bb04ba72397d78256f03.)
Change-Id: Ic67f674d2221497c8166994812bb5fc7f0831066
This was misleading 'configure' into thinking we actually support AF_LINK,
but we're Linux, so we don't, and we never implemented the functions we
declared here either.
Reported to AOSP by Jun-ya Kato.
Change-Id: I111f9887f3812469b411b9cf5124d9dd624f19f7
Ensure that strcat / strncat check for integer overflows
when computing the length of the resulting string.
Change-Id: Ib806ad33a0d3b50876f384bc17787a28f0dddc37
I've basically just copied the relevant bits out of liblog and
EventLog.cpp. While this will let us do the uid logging we want
to address the concerns in 245c07027f78565858dd489eb0d94c3d48743e9d
it doesn't give us much else.
Change-Id: Icac6ff20bc0a3ade5927f6f76fedffe1ae6f8522
Add _FORTIFY_SOURCE support for the following functions:
* memset
* bzero
Move the __BIONIC_FORTIFY_INLINE definition to cdefs.h so it
can be used from multiple header files.
Change-Id: Iead4d5e35de6ec97786d58ee12573f9b11135bb7
Add initial support for -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE to bionic for the
following functions:
* memcpy
* memmove
* strcpy
* strcat
* strncpy
* strncat
This change adds a new version of the above functions which passes
the size of the destination buffer to __builtin___*_chk.
If the compiler can determine, at compile time, that the destination
buffer is large enough, or the destination buffer can point to an object
of unknown size, then the check call is bypassed.
If the compiler can't make a compile time decision, then it calls
the __*_chk() function, which does a runtime buffer size check
These options are only enabled if the code is compiled with
-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 or 2, and only when optimizations are enabled.
Please see
* http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Object-Size-Checking.html
* http://gcc.gnu.org/ml/gcc-patches/2004-09/msg02055.html
for additional details on FORTIFY_SOURCE.
Testing: Compiled the entire Android tree with -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=1,
and verified that everything appears to be working properly.
Also created a test buffer overflow, and verified that it was
caught by this change.
Change-Id: I4fddb445bafe92b16845b22458d72e6dedd24fbc
This patch is a rewrite of libc.debug.malloc = 10 (chk_malloc). It provides
the same features as the original (poison freed memory, detect heap overruns
and underruns), except that it provides more debugging information whenever it
detects a problem.
In addition to the original features, the new chk_malloc() implementation
detects multiple frees within a given range of the last N allocations, N being
configurable via the system property libc.debug.malloc.backlog.
Finally, this patch keeps track of all outstanding memory allocations. On
program exit, we walk that list and report each outstanding allocation.
(There is support (not enabled) for a scanner thread periodically walks over
the list of outstanding allocations as well as the backlog of recently-freed
allocations, checking for heap-usage errors.)
Feature overview:
1) memory leaks
2) multiple frees
3) use after free
4) overrun
Implementation:
-- for each allocation, there is a:
1) stack trace at the time the allocation is made
2) if the memory is freed, there is also a stack trace at the point
3) a front and rear guard (fence)
4) the stack traces are kept together with the allocation
-- the following lists and maintained
1) all outstanding memory allocations
3) a backlog of allocations what are freed; when you call free(), instead of
actually freed, the allocation is moved to this backlog;
4) when the backlog of allocations gets full, the oldest entry gets evicted
from it; at that point, the allocation is checked for overruns or
use-after-free errors, and then actually freed.
5) when the program exits, the list of outstanding allocations and the
backlog are inspected for errors, then freed;
To use this, set the following system properties before running the process or
processes you want to inspect:
libc.malloc.debug.backlog # defaults to 100
libc.malloc.debug 10
When a problem is detected, you will see the following on logcat for a multiple
free:
E/libc ( 7233): +++ ALLOCATION 0x404b9278 SIZE 10 BYTES MULTIPLY FREED!
E/libc ( 7233): +++ ALLOCATION 0x404b9278 SIZE 10 ALLOCATED HERE:
E/libc ( 7233): *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
E/libc ( 7233): #00 pc 0000c35a /system/lib/libc_malloc_debug_leak.so
E/libc ( 7233): #01 pc 0000c658 /system/lib/libc_malloc_debug_leak.so
E/libc ( 7233): #02 pc 00016d80 /system/lib/libc.so
E/libc ( 7233): #03 pc 4009647c /system/bin/malloctest
E/libc ( 7233): #04 pc 00016f24 /system/lib/libc.so
E/libc ( 7233): +++ ALLOCATION 0x404b9278 SIZE 10 FIRST FREED HERE:
E/libc ( 7233): *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
E/libc ( 7233): #00 pc 0000c35a /system/lib/libc_malloc_debug_leak.so
E/libc ( 7233): #01 pc 0000c7d2 /system/lib/libc_malloc_debug_leak.so
E/libc ( 7233): #02 pc 00016d94 /system/lib/libc.so
E/libc ( 7233): #03 pc 40096490 /system/bin/malloctest
E/libc ( 7233): #04 pc 00016f24 /system/lib/libc.so
E/libc ( 7233): +++ ALLOCATION 0x404b9278 SIZE 10 NOW BEING FREED HERE:
E/libc ( 7233): *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
E/libc ( 7233): #00 pc 0000c35a /system/lib/libc_malloc_debug_leak.so
E/libc ( 7233): #01 pc 0000c6ac /system/lib/libc_malloc_debug_leak.so
E/libc ( 7233): #02 pc 00016d94 /system/lib/libc.so
E/libc ( 7233): #03 pc 400964a0 /system/bin/malloctest
E/libc ( 7233): #04 pc 00016f24 /system/lib/libc.so
The following for a heap overrun and underrun:
E/libc ( 7233): +++ REAR GUARD MISMATCH [10, 11)
E/libc ( 7233): +++ ALLOCATION 0x404b9198 SIZE 10 HAS A CORRUPTED REAR GUARD
E/libc ( 7233): +++ ALLOCATION 0x404b9198 SIZE 10 ALLOCATED HERE:
E/libc ( 7233): *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
E/libc ( 7233): #00 pc 0000c35a /system/lib/libc_malloc_debug_leak.so
E/libc ( 7233): #01 pc 0000c658 /system/lib/libc_malloc_debug_leak.so
E/libc ( 7233): #02 pc 00016d80 /system/lib/libc.so
E/libc ( 7233): #03 pc 40096438 /system/bin/malloctest
E/libc ( 7233): #04 pc 00016f24 /system/lib/libc.so
E/libc ( 7233): +++ ALLOCATION 0x404b9198 SIZE 10 FREED HERE:
E/libc ( 7233): *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
E/libc ( 7233): #00 pc 0000c35a /system/lib/libc_malloc_debug_leak.so
E/libc ( 7233): #01 pc 0000c7d2 /system/lib/libc_malloc_debug_leak.so
E/libc ( 7233): #02 pc 00016d94 /system/lib/libc.so
E/libc ( 7233): #03 pc 40096462 /system/bin/malloctest
E/libc ( 7233): #04 pc 00016f24 /system/lib/libc.so
E/libc ( 7233): +++ ALLOCATION 0x404b9358 SIZE 10 HAS A CORRUPTED FRONT GUARD
E/libc ( 7233): +++ ALLOCATION 0x404b9358 SIZE 10 ALLOCATED HERE:
E/libc ( 7233): *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
E/libc ( 7233): #00 pc 0000c35a /system/lib/libc_malloc_debug_leak.so
E/libc ( 7233): #01 pc 0000c658 /system/lib/libc_malloc_debug_leak.so
E/libc ( 7233): #02 pc 00016d80 /system/lib/libc.so
E/libc ( 7233): #03 pc 400964ba /system/bin/malloctest
E/libc ( 7233): #04 pc 00016f24 /system/lib/libc.so
E/libc ( 7233): +++ ALLOCATION 0x404b9358 SIZE 10 FREED HERE:
E/libc ( 7233): *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
E/libc ( 7233): #00 pc 0000c35a /system/lib/libc_malloc_debug_leak.so
E/libc ( 7233): #01 pc 0000c7d2 /system/lib/libc_malloc_debug_leak.so
E/libc ( 7233): #02 pc 00016d94 /system/lib/libc.so
E/libc ( 7233): #03 pc 400964e4 /system/bin/malloctest
E/libc ( 7233): #04 pc 00016f24 /system/lib/libc.so
The following for a memory leak:
E/libc ( 7233): +++ THERE ARE 1 LEAKED ALLOCATIONS
E/libc ( 7233): +++ DELETING 4096 BYTES OF LEAKED MEMORY AT 0x404b95e8 (1 REMAINING)
E/libc ( 7233): +++ ALLOCATION 0x404b95e8 SIZE 4096 ALLOCATED HERE:
E/libc ( 7233): *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
E/libc ( 7233): #00 pc 0000c35a /system/lib/libc_malloc_debug_leak.so
E/libc ( 7233): #01 pc 0000c658 /system/lib/libc_malloc_debug_leak.so
E/libc ( 7233): #02 pc 00016d80 /system/lib/libc.so
E/libc ( 7233): #03 pc 0001bc94 /system/lib/libc.so
E/libc ( 7233): #04 pc 0001edf6 /system/lib/libc.so
E/libc ( 7233): #05 pc 0001b80a /system/lib/libc.so
E/libc ( 7233): #06 pc 0001c086 /system/lib/libc.so
E/libc ( 7233): #07 pc 40096402 /system/bin/malloctest
E/libc ( 7233): #08 pc 00016f24 /system/lib/libc.so
Change-Id: Ic440e9d05a01e2ea86b25e8998714e88bc2d16e0
Signed-off-by: Iliyan Malchev <malchev@google.com>
Rewrite
crtbegin.S -> crtbegin.c
crtbegin_so.S -> crtbegin_so.c
This change allows us to generate PIC code without relying
on text relocations.
As a consequence of this rewrite, also rewrite
__dso_handle.S -> __dso_handle.c
__dso_handle_so.S -> __dso_handle_so.c
atexit.S -> atexit.c
In crtbegin.c _start, place the __PREINIT_ARRAY__, __INIT_ARRAY__,
__FINI_ARRAY__, and __CTOR_LIST__ variables onto the stack, instead of
passing a pointer to the text section of the binary.
This change appears sorta wonky, as I attempted to preserve,
as much as possible, the structure of the original assembly.
As a result, you have C files including other C files, and other
programming uglyness.
Result: This change reduces the number of files with text-relocations
from 315 to 19 on my Android build.
Before:
$ scanelf -aR $OUT/system | grep TEXTREL | wc -l
315
After:
$ scanelf -aR $OUT/system | grep TEXTREL | wc -l
19
Change-Id: Ib9f98107c0eeabcb606e1ddc7ed7fc4eba01c9c4
libc.debug.malloc.program provides an additional level of control over which
processes to enable libc.debug.malloc functionality for. The string value of
libc.debug.malloc.program is matched against the program name; if the value of
libc.debug.malloc.program is a substring of the program name, then malloc debug
is applied to that program at whatever level libc.debug.malloc specifies.
If lib.debug.malloc.program is not specified, then libc.debug.malloc has the
same effect as before.
For example, to enable libc.deubug.malloc = 10 only to the mediaserver, do the
following:
adb root # necessary for setprop
adb setprop libc.debug.malloc.program mediaserver
adb setprop libc.debug.malloc 10
adb kill -9 $(pid mediaserver)
Change-Id: I6f01c12f033c8e2e015d73025369d7f1685ba200
Signed-off-by: Iliyan Malchev <malchev@google.com>
crtbegin_dynamic and crtbegin_static are essentially identical,
minus a few trivial differences (comments and whitespace).
Eliminate duplicates.
Change-Id: Ic9fae6bc9695004974493b53bfc07cd3bb904480
For example:
@@@ ABORTING: INVALID HEAP ADDRESS IN dlfree addr=0x5c3bfbd0
Fatal signal 11 (SIGSEGV) at 0xdeadbaad (code=1), thread 2942
The addr=0x5c3bfbd0 part is new.
Change-Id: I8670144b2b0a3a6182384150d762c97dfee5452f
Modify the dynamic linker so that executables can be loaded
at locations other than 0x00000000.
Modify crtbegin* so that non-PIC compilant "thumb interwork
veneers" are not created by the linker.
Bug: 5323301
Change-Id: Iece0272e2b708c79034f302c20160e1fe9029588
