blacklist and whitelist are replaced with blocklist and allowlist
respectively.
Test: CtsSeccompHostTestCases
Change-Id: I39d9eda89038d1addbdaed59284a254a34cea1c6
Allow to provide a list of prioritized syscalls (e.g., syscalls that we
know occur often) which are checked before other syscalls in seccomp.
When constructing the bpf seccomp filter, traverse prioritized syscalls
in a linear list before checking all other syscalls in a binary tree.
Bug: 156732794
Test: make, inspect generated *_system_policy.cpp files
Test: simpleperf on futex/ioctl-heavy app seems to show 5-10% less time
spent in seccomp call
Change-Id: I509343bcd32ada90c0591785ab5cb12d2a38c31e
(cherry picked from commit ce84677733)
This change avoids having to run the genseccomp.py script every time a
policy file is edited, and instead generates these files at
compile-time.
Bug: None
Test: m
Test: find out/soong/ -name x86_64_global_policy.cpp # Shows files
Test: generated policies are equivalent to original policies
Change-Id: I12461fe0c5fb02c008c1b2503fbb994b8aa2f56b
This change makes it possible to invoke this tool without having to
fiddle with the path.
Bug: None
Test: ./bionic/libc/tools/genseccomp.py # Succeeded
Change-Id: Ib24d70abc973fe774cda4209e46a5b66ae7617be
To pave the way to reducing app's kernel attack surface, this change
split the single filter into one for system and one for apps. Note that
there is current no change between them.
Zygote will apply these filters appropriately to system server and apps.
Keep set_seccomp_filter() for now until the caller has switched to the
new API, which I will do immediately after this before the two filters
diverse.
Also remove get_seccomp_filter() since it doesn't seem to be used
anyway.
Test: diff the generated code, no difference except the variable names
Test: cts -m CtsSecurityTestCases -t android.security.cts.SeccompTest
Bug: 63944145
Change-Id: Id8ba05a87332c92ec697926af77bc5742eb04b23
Enabling seccomp across all processes, rather than just zygote, is
useful for auditing the syscall usage of AOSP. Create a global seccomp
policy that can optionally be enabled by init.
Bug: 37960259
Test: confirm global seccomp by removing finit_module from policy and
observing modprobe fail, confirm regular seccomp unchanged by
comparing length of installed bpf
Change-Id: Iac53a42fa26a80b05126f262dd9525f4f66df558
Bug: 37253880
Test: Make sure device boots
Run pylint on genseccomp.py, test_genseccomp.py
Run test_genseccomp.py
Run new CTS test
cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityTestCases -t android.security.cts.SeccompTest
Change-Id: I833a5364a1481d65173e77654da1798dc45a3f9d
The check that we are not below the lowest permitted syscall was
off by one, so we always allowed them, rather than always denying
them
Test: Check arm64 boots, chrome and maps work
mips and mips64 emulators boot
Note that arm, x86 and x86_64 already allow syscall 0 so there
will be no functional change there
Change-Id: I85873f1d04124e634e648bd47c027f280f1d6dbd
Test: Make sure arm, x86, x86_64, mips, mips64 emulators boot
Make sure sailfish still boots
Ran CTS test from
https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/348671/3 and it passed
The instructions for how to run mips emulators above worked, but
the CTS tests did not seem to actually run.
Change-Id: Iddee5acdb19ed32c7bd4657573313ca439cf6a49
Policy library which exports an autogenerated policy from SYSCALLS.TXT
blocking any other calls.
Test: Generate policy, install onto Sailfish, check boots, Chrome runs,
calls are blocked.
Bug: 32313202
Change-Id: Ib590704e50122f077eeae26561eb9b0a70386551
