b24c89b4df
I've never been able to repro the flake myself (in hundreds of thousands
of runs), but it's certainly possible that a byte of the cookie is
already zero. So let's invert the byte we plan to corrupt rather than
set it to zero.
Bug: http://b/202948861
Test: treehugger
Change-Id: Iccd552fe302d6c01e376819d23c11a308e03acdb
(cherry picked from commit 23ce50c172)
26 lines
1.1 KiB
C++
26 lines
1.1 KiB
C++
/*
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* Copyright (C) 2012 The Android Open Source Project
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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* You may obtain a copy of the License at
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*
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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* limitations under the License.
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*/
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// Deliberately overwrite the stack canary.
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__attribute__((noinline)) void modify_stack_protector_test() {
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// We can't use memset here because it's fortified, and we want to test
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// the line of defense *after* that.
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// Without volatile, the generic x86/x86-64 targets don't write to the stack.
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// We can't make a constant change, since the existing byte might already have
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// had that value.
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volatile char* p = reinterpret_cast<volatile char*>(&p + 1);
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*p = ~*p;
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}
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