This allows A/B devices to install legacy (non-payload) style update.zip
packages like our addonsu or gapps.
Do not abort an update if META-INF/com/android/metadata is missing,
instead use it to determine whether the update is an A/B ota or not.
Change-Id: I907a92732470b947de007dde11fb71db64d94c9b
Only allow test-key OTA to be installed on test-key devices,
and only allow release-key OTA to be installed on release-key devices.
Test: sideload recovery OTA
Bug: 314013134
Change-Id: I6609923929247ab498d3a315637765ae2d1370b0
Makes testing easier, brick packaegs can now be tested directly in
recovery w/o having to go through GOTA.
Test: adb sideload brick_ota.zip
Bug: 273561331
Change-Id: I48214dc03e63b69e61fc217bc3f58923bb90a9a6
Devices that launched with Android 10 or later require FBE (File Based
Encryption) from the beginning, so there's no need to support converting
to FBE after the fact anymore. This was only ever a developer option,
so it probably wasn't used much. And in any case, it's not used
anymore, as isConvertibleToFBE() is hard-coded to return false. Besides
the fact that FBE has been required for several releases now, this
functionality was only ever available on devices that use FDE (Full Disk
Encryption), but FDE support has been removed from Android.
Therefore, remove this unused code.
Bug: 208476087
Change-Id: I1f56c8e05fb3fba09aab4bf5f8609b0f552b8999
Normally, if an ota package has --wipe_user_data flag, we set bootloader
parameter --wipe_data, so that next boot into bootloader will wipe
userdata. But this doesn't work in recovery, likely because after
recovery we don't reboot to bootloader, but directly boot into android.
Therefore perform data reset in recovery if the OTA package has
POWERWASH flag.
Bug: 203507329
Test: apply an OTA pkg with --wipe_user_data, verify that data wipe
happened
Change-Id: Icca4a5f74246bde44a5fd589395404c9f57867ee
Applying an SPL downgrade package can cause boot failures
(/data failed to decrypt). Today's ota_from_target_files
tool already try to prevent this. But Packages generated
using older tools are still around.
Add check in recovery to prevent such OTA package from
installing.
Test: th
Test: Sideload an OTA with newer SPL, make sure check passes
Test; Sideload an OTA with older SPL, make sure check fails
Bug: 186581246
Change-Id: Icffe8097521c511e151af023a443ccbb4b59e22c
On 32bit devices, an ZipEntry64 may have size > 2^32, we should check
for such cases before attempting to allocate memory.
Test: mm -j
Change-Id: I0f916ef4b2a692f167719a74bd6ff2e887c6c2ce
There's already library support for zip64 in libziparchive. We just need
to start using the new APIs.
Bug: 167951876
Test: Sideload a large ota package in recovery
Change-Id: I652741965f28de079d873c6822317ee9fa855201
After http://go/aog/1306461, the metadata in the OTA package can have
multiple fingerprints or device names
e.g. from pre-device=lmiin to pre-device=lmiin|lmiinpro
This CL updates recovery code to recognize them
Test: Added unit tests for this
Bug: 159850736
Change-Id: If6315bf2d3dea77abb9d7d83145f55b0148cdfb1
Check the package metadata to determine whether this is an
A/B or non-A/B update package. This is more accurate.
Also checks ro.virtual_ab.allow_non_ab flag. This is useful for
continuously supporting (and testing) non-A/B.
Bug: 153581609
Test: apply non-A/B update on cuttlefish
Change-Id: I629a533a67966d46d9cd87a59c6b9af26daf1667
(cherry picked from commit 2a4afd29a1)
Merged-In: I629a533a67966d46d9cd87a59c6b9af26daf1667
The non-A/B package installation is subject to TOC/TOU flaw if the
attacker can switch the package in the middle of installation. And the
most pratical case is to store the package on an external device, e.g. a
sdcard, and swap the device in the middle.
To prevent that, we can adopt the same protection as used in sideloading
a package with FUSE. Specifically, when we install the package with FUSE,
we read the entire package to cryptographically verify its signature.
The hash for each transfer block is recorded in the memory (TOC), and
the subsequent reads (TOU) will be rejected upon dectecting a mismatch.
This CL forces the package installation with FUSE when the package stays
on a removable media.
Bug: 136498130
Test: Run bin/recovery --update_package with various paths;
and packages are installed from FUSE as expected
Test: recovery_unit_test - no new failures
Change-Id: Ia5afd19854c3737110339fd59491b96708926ae5
Merged-In: I35119c2334895aa0ef4ed71b3ddd08f280c0c031
This reverts commit 5e6c4e9a91.
Reason for revert: BUG: 149432069 - build failure on git_qt-qpr1-dev-plus-aosp on docs. 'otautil/roots.h' file not found is the error.
Forrest run: https://android-build.googleplex.com/builds/forrest/run/L85900000460577420
Change-Id: I35119c2334895aa0ef4ed71b3ddd08f280c0c031
Merged-In: I35119c2334895aa0ef4ed71b3ddd08f280c0c031
The non-A/B package installation is subject to TOC/TOU flaw if the
attacker can switch the package in the middle of installation. And the
most pratical case is to store the package on an external device, e.g. a
sdcard, and swap the device in the middle.
To prevent that, we can adopt the same protection as used in sideloading
a package with FUSE. Specifically, when we install the package with FUSE,
we read the entire package to cryptographically verify its signature.
The hash for each transfer block is recorded in the memory (TOC), and
the subsequent reads (TOU) will be rejected upon dectecting a mismatch.
This CL forces the package installation with FUSE when the package stays
on a removable media.
Bug: 136498130
Test: Run bin/recovery --update_package with various paths;
and packages are installed from FUSE as expected
Test: recovery_component_test - all passing
Change-Id: Ibc9b095036a2fa624e8edf6c347ed4f12aef072f
Merged-In: Ibc9b095036a2fa624e8edf6c347ed4f12aef072f
A number of utility functions are intended for serving recovery's own
use. Exposing them via libotautil (which is a static lib) would pass the
dependencies onto libotautil's users (e.g. recovery image, updater, host
simulator, device-specific recovery UI/updater extensions etc). This CL
finds a new home for the utils that are private to recovery.
Test: mmma bootable/recovery
Change-Id: I575e97ad099b85fe1c1c8c7c9458a5a43d4e11e1
Some global variables are only used for recovery.cpp and
recovery_main.cpp, remove them from common.h and handle their usage
accordingly. Variables include:
static constexpr int kRecoveryApiVersion;
extern struct selabel_handle* sehandle;
extern RecoveryUI* ui;
extern bool has_cache;
bool is_ro_debuggable();
Test: unit tests pass, boot into recovery mode and run graphic tests
Change-Id: If83a005786c9b38412731da97aaf85af69a3b917
Therefore InstallPackage() doesn't need to worry about the details of a
given Package.
Bug: 127071893
Test: run update from /bin/recovery --update_package=@path, sideload a package
Change-Id: I0caa36785b43924f884ee398e7ea640d7472a92e
The results from these functions have boolean semantics. They're
returning `int` prior to this CL, with some of them mixing 0 and
InstallResult. Note that SetUpNonAbUpdateCommands() was returning
INSTALL_CORRUPT / INSTALL_ERROR / 0 prior to this change, but all the
callers handle INSTALL_CORRUPT and INSTALL_ERROR the same way.
This CL changes them to return bool instead.
Test: `mmma -j bootable/recovery`
Test: TreeHugger
Test: Sideload on taimen.
Change-Id: Ic1b5dbf79aaca68b53ab8ea2c8ba3d19f988c571
Therefore, libinstall becomes the sole owner to handle the request
from minadbd service.
The change also includes
1. move logging.cpp out of librecovery
2. drop the dependency on common.h
3. now it's more sensible to move the wipe_cache as part of
install_package. move the wipe_cache to the end of the function.
Bug: 130166585
Test: wipe data and cache from menu
Change-Id: I6f356dccdb38015c50acf756bac246f87c30fc1f
Build libinstall as a shared library. Also drop the dependency on the
global variables in common.h.
Test: unit tests pass, sideload an OTA
Change-Id: I30a20047768ce00689fc0e7851c1c5d712a365a0
