5e6c4e9a91
The non-A/B package installation is subject to TOC/TOU flaw if the attacker can switch the package in the middle of installation. And the most pratical case is to store the package on an external device, e.g. a sdcard, and swap the device in the middle. To prevent that, we can adopt the same protection as used in sideloading a package with FUSE. Specifically, when we install the package with FUSE, we read the entire package to cryptographically verify its signature. The hash for each transfer block is recorded in the memory (TOC), and the subsequent reads (TOU) will be rejected upon dectecting a mismatch. This CL forces the package installation with FUSE when the package stays on a removable media. Bug: 136498130 Test: Run bin/recovery --update_package with various paths; and packages are installed from FUSE as expected Test: recovery_component_test - all passing Change-Id: Ibc9b095036a2fa624e8edf6c347ed4f12aef072f Merged-In: Ibc9b095036a2fa624e8edf6c347ed4f12aef072f |
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| .. | ||
| include | ||
| adb_install.cpp | ||
| Android.bp | ||
| asn1_decoder.cpp | ||
| fuse_install.cpp | ||
| install.cpp | ||
| package.cpp | ||
| snapshot_utils.cpp | ||
| verifier.cpp | ||
| wipe_data.cpp | ||
| wipe_device.cpp | ||