gki_arm64 is a special target to build multiple GKI boot-*.img
files. It has neither system.img nor vbmeta.img. Skips checking
system.img and vbmeta.img in this case.
Bug: 223078405
Test: validate_target_files signed-gki_arm64-target_files-8277156.zip
Change-Id: I9d3c102c11787cf70c1e1fc8e6a552f8fd19ff72
Pixel moved away from sparse images, so validate_target_files is failing
because it expects sparse images.
Test: th
Change-Id: I322ff10c2afbacfb4d78991be60c11aac92a6d4c
We should skip lines that don't contain '=', e.g. empty lines.
Also, pop a warning instead of an error if a prop is defined
multiple times with the same value
Bug: 177240467
Test: unittest, run validate_target_files
Change-Id: Ifc9eadb91e5dda7170a19d875016e5a47e8fc592
When opening an zip file through zipfile.ZipFile(), python2 by default
disables zip64 support. To support update files >4GB, we manually add
allowZip64 to override the setting.
Test: generate && serve an OTA
Change-Id: I9645e963ced830cc2d3a4b72bc63b9369a1cefe8
add_img_to_target_files.py
See bug description:
"When resigning images, the validate_target_files.py can be used to
verify the images using avbtool. The script will use the vbmeta.img to
achieve this, and all relevant images need to be in the IMAGES folder.
However, due to changes on add_img_to_target_files.py and specifically
the commit 5277d1015, some images (e.g. acpio.img and tos.img) are no
longer copied from RADIO to the IMAGES folder. This causes an error on
validate_target_files.py indicating that it cannot find image such as
IMAGES/acpio.img."
This CL fixes this by symlink images under RADIO directory to IMAGES
directory before invoking avbtool.
Bug: 159299583
Test: python3 -m unittest test_validate_target_files
Change-Id: I5769ee2ab5230d2a3a7cef10706dcc5788e654f8
Starting from http://go/aog/1328118, we chained the 1st GKI
boot image into vbmeta. However, this fails avb validation;
because the avbtool constructs the image path based by using
"partition name + ext".
This cl works around the issue by renaming boot-5.4.img to
boot.img, so avbtool can find the image correctly.
Bug: 159656873
Test: run validate target file
Change-Id: I577226596e139e5b5f3e6ca3c28ced02431ca392
The custom images are any images owned by OEMs and SoCs, oem images
mounted on /oem is an example. The oem images can be used to customize
devices for different carriers, like wallpaper, ringtones, and
carrier-specific apks. OEMs can generate multiple oem images, like
oem.img, oem-carrier1.img and oem-carrier2.img and flash different oem
images for different carriers. The oem images are only one case, OEMs
and SoCs can add more custom images and mount them to custom partitions.
This change enables custom images to be vbmeta.img chained partitions.
The following configuration in BoardConfig.mk is an exmaple. It has two
custom partitions: oem and test. They will be signed by different keys.
And they will be chained by vbmeta.img. The custom images here are
prebuilts, which can be built by `make custom_images` separately.
BOARD_AVB_<CUSTOM_PARTITION>_IMAGE_LIST should include all custom images
to apply AVB signing. And to every custom partition, one image whose
name is partition name must be added in its
BOARD_AVB_<CUSTOM_PARTITION>_IMAGE_LIST.
BOARD_CUSTOMIMAGES_PARTITION_LIST := oem test
BOARD_AVB_OEM_KEY_PATH := external/avb/test/data/testkey_rsa4096.pem
BOARD_AVB_OEM_ALGORITHM := SHA256_RSA4096
BOARD_AVB_OEM_ADD_HASHTREE_FOOTER_ARGS :=
BOARD_AVB_OEM_ROLLBACK_INDEX_LOCATION := 1
BOARD_AVB_OEM_PARTITION_SIZE := 5242880
BOARD_AVB_OEM_IMAGE_LIST := \
device/xxxx/yyyy/oem/oem.img \
device/xxxx/yyyy/oem/oem1.img
BOARD_AVB_TEST_KEY_PATH := external/avb/test/data/testkey_rsa2048.pem
BOARD_AVB_TEST_ALGORITHM := SHA256_RSA2048
BOARD_AVB_TEST_ADD_HASHTREE_FOOTER_ARGS :=
BOARD_AVB_TEST_ROLLBACK_INDEX_LOCATION := 2
BOARD_AVB_TEST_PARTITION_SIZE := 10485760
BOARD_AVB_TEST_IMAGE_LIST := \
device/xxxx/yyyy/test/test.img \
device/xxxx/yyyy/test/test1.img
To resign the custom images in the target zip file, the
avb_extra_custom_image_key, avb_extra_custom_image_algorithms and
avb_extra_custom_image_extra_args options are added to the
sign_target_files_apks tool too. The following test cases list some
examples about how to use them.
BUG: 154171021
Test: 1) "atest --host releasetools_test releasetools_py3_test -c"
2) Build images by 'make dist', sign and validate target files.
a) Test on dist w/ chained vbmeta_system and ome custom images
sign_target_files_apks -d certs \
--avb_extra_custom_image_key oem=oem_rsa4096.pem \
--avb_extra_custom_image_algorithm oem=SHA256_RSA4096 \
xxx-target_xxx.zip signed.zip
validate_target_files.py signed.zip
Flash image and boot up.
Verify the oem images and vbmeta images in OUT and target zips by
avbtool.
b) Test on dist w/ chained vbmeta_system and oem and test custom images
sign_target_files_apks -d certs \
--avb_extra_custom_image_key oem=oem_rsa4096.pem \
--avb_extra_custom_image_algorithm oem=SHA256_RSA4096 \
--avb_extra_custom_image_extra_args oem=--do_not_generate_fec \
--avb_extra_custom_image_key test=test_rsa4096.pem \
--avb_extra_custom_image_algorithm test=SHA256_RSA4096 \
xxx-target_xxx.zip signed.zip
validate_target_files.py signed.zip
Verify the oem, test images and vbmeta images in OUT and target zips
by avbtool.
c) Test on dist w/o chained partition.
sign_target_files_apks -d certs xxx-target_xxx.zip signed.zip
validate_target_files.py signed.zip
Flash image and boot up.
Verify the vbmeta images in OUT and target zips by avbtool.
Change-Id: Ifccfee5e8909697eef6ccda0cc352fa16a9f6db6
If a key is specified, the avbtool always use the input key to verify
all the chained images. And this will cause failures when the vbmeta &
system use different keys (e.g. RSA 4096 vs RSA2048). Because the public
key to vbmeta will always fail to verify the system image. Remove the
'--key' parameter in the verification command, so the avbtool will use
the embedded public in the image.
Test: validate target-file from sdk_gphone_x86_64
Bug: 148916990
Change-Id: I9d31be0f8c32af605af94fa73d07818f40f51ec4
For following cases:
Case 1: A/B devices: no change
Case 2: non-A/B devices, with unsigned recovery image:
not allowed anymore by mandating BOARD_AVB_RECOVERY_KEY_PATH
Case 3: non-A/B devices, with signed recovery image:
vbmeta.img should not include ChainPartitionDescriptor of recovery.img,
otherwise device can not even boot into normal mode if recovery partition
is damaged
This CL will cause a build break if BOARD_AVB_RECOVERY_KEY_PATH
is not set for non-A/B targets with recovery.img
The following is an example to fix the build break by specifying
AVB signing configs for the recovery.img.
BOARD_AVB_RECOVERY_KEY_PATH := external/avb/test/data/testkey_rsa2048.pem
BOARD_AVB_RECOVERY_ALGORITHM := SHA256_RSA2048
BOARD_AVB_RECOVERY_ROLLBACK_INDEX := $(PLATFORM_SECURITY_PATCH_TIMESTAMP)
BOARD_AVB_RECOVERY_ROLLBACK_INDEX_LOCATION := 2
Also note that libavb in bootloader needs an update to include this
commit Iaa886037edb18c2ff6c60fa2a7f883ab7303ba1a, to support verifying
recovery.img independently (not through vbmeta.img).
Bug: 130351427
Test (Case 3):
normal mode: avb_slot_verify(flags=AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_FLAGS_NONE)
recovery mode: avb_slot_verify(flags=AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_FLAGS_NO_VBMETA_PARTITION)
Test: PYTHONPATH=build/make/tools/releasetools \
python -m unittest test_validate_target_files
Test: Use a lunch'd target. `atest --host releasetools_test releasetools_py3_test`
Test: validate_target_files.py with Case-3 target files
Change-Id: I2a73252b385fa463b4abd444923a8acc473df0b4
This change is part of a topic that moves the recovery resources from the
system partition to the vendor partition, if it exists, or the vendor directory
on the system partition otherwise. The recovery resources are moving from the
system image to the vendor partition so that a single system image may be used
with either an A/B or a non-A/B vendor image. The topic removes a delta in the
system image that prevented such reuse in the past.
The recovery resources that are moving are involved with updating the recovery
partition after an update. In a non-A/B configuration, the system boots from
the recovery partition, updates the other partitions (system, vendor, etc.)
Then, the next time the system boots normally, a script updates the recovery
partition (if necessary). This script, the executables it invokes, and the data
files that it uses were previously on the system partition. The resources that
are moving include the following.
* install-recovery.sh
* applypatch
* recovery-resource.dat (if present)
* recovery-from-boot.p (if present)
This change includes the platform build system and release tools changes to
move the recovery resources from system to vendor (or /system/vendor). The
release tools need to know where to generate the recovery patch, and they
discover this from misc_info.txt variable board_uses_vendorimage, which the
platform build system generates.
We remove applypatch from PRODUCT_PACKAGES, but it is added back as a required
module in target/product/base_vendor.mk.
Several release tools rely on the misc_info.txt board_uses_vendorimage variable
to know how to generate and detect the recovery patch.
This change partially removes the --rebuild_recovery flag from the
merge_target_files.py script. The flag will be fully removed in a follow-on
change.
Bug: 68319577
Test: Ensure that recovery partition is updated correctly.
Change-Id: Ia4045bd67ffb3d899efa8d20dab4c4299b87ee5f
The commit in d14b895665
(https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/build/+/728287)
changed partition layout, to always build the root dir into system.img,
even for devices not using system-as-root (i.e. the ones with separate
boot ramdisk).
With the new layout, there will be two root dirs for non-system-as-root
targets during the boot. If such a device uses Verified Boot 1.0,
/verity_key needs to be available in both roots, to establish the chain
of trust.
- bootloader uses the baked-in key to verify boot.img; it then loads
the ramdisk from the verified boot.img
- First stage init uses /verity_key (in ramdisk) to verify and mount
system.img at /system, then chroot's to it
- Second stage init uses /verity_key (in system.img) to verify and
mount other partitions
This CL adds rules to additionally install verity_key into ramdisk for
such targets.
Bug: 139770257
Test: Set up a target to use non-system-as-root
(BOARD_BUILD_SYSTEM_ROOT_IMAGE != true). `m dist`.
Test: Check that both ROOT/verity_key and BOOT/RAMDISK/verity_key exist
in the built target_files.zip.
Test: Run validate_target_files to validate the above target_files.zip.
$ validate_target_files \
--verity_key_mincrypt /path/to/verity_key \
target_files.zip
Test: Run sign_target_files_apks to sign the above target. Re-run
validate_target_files on the signed target_files.zip.
Test: python -m unittest test_validate_target_files
Change-Id: Ibe7e771c8c376429add85851ac86055564765d3c
It used to be packed at IMAGES/recovery-two-step.img, but to serve OTA
purpose only.
Test: `m dist` with a non-A/B target. Check the file in the generated
target_files.zip.
Test: Create two-step package. Check that recovery-two-step.img is used.
Change-Id: Iec6a73c682e0f844cd8c0b758c9470fa35dd15d8
This allows a consistent logic in using the avbtool which could be
board-specific.
Test: `atest releasetools_test`
Test: Run sign_target_files_apks.py on a target_files.zip.
Change-Id: I8cd93b8e71146985734f85c31f4662f5e2e9534c
Chained vbmeta partitions (vbmeta_system, vbmeta_vendor) were added to
support dynamic partitions. validate_target_files.py misses the logic in
handling such partitions.
Bug: 132882632
Test: Run validate_target_files.py on a target_files.zip that uses
chained vbmeta_system partition.
Change-Id: Id06c575d13d5e9cc1b621f485ceb75d3e354c39f
Merged-In: Id06c575d13d5e9cc1b621f485ceb75d3e354c39f
(cherry picked from commit 814b14b3f7)
This reverts commit 9788b4ed31. All the
blocking issues have been addressed.
Fixes: 120517892
Test: Run validate_target_files.py on crosshatch signed
target_files.zip.
Change-Id: I95de241e159998e002dedddafea65953b1a1b263
The validate_target_files.py checks the 'incomplete' field of the range
in file_map. And range has already considered the shared blocks and
could be smaller in size than the original file range. Therefore, the
'incomplete' flag was set on the original range in common.py; and we
should switch to use the original range also during validation.
I also checked another flag usage in CanUseImgdiff(), and it has
explicitly rejected cases of shared blocks.
Bug: 124868891
Test: unit tests pass
Change-Id: I03959625d7b81fd83420db98f01d23f54064bcd2
Setting 'uses_shared_blocks' indicates that the block list for a given
file is incomplete, as some of the blocks are "owned" by others. As a
result, such a file will be skipped from imgdiff'ing.
This CL makes a copy of the original block list before removing the
shared blocks. It uses the original RangeSet as the value of
extra['uses_shared_blocks']. validate_target_files.py will try to read
the file as in the original RangeSet, unless the original list is also
incomplete or has non-monotonic ranges.
Test: Run validate_target_files on a target that uses
`BOARD_EXT4_SHARE_DUP_BLOCKS := true`.
Change-Id: I259e871ecc249ba0c14b5796bef413185a1b8242
stdout and stderr will default to subprocess.PIPE and subprocess.STDOUT
respectively (which is the expected behavior from most of the existing
callers), unless caller specifies any of them.
Test: `m dist`
Test: python -m unittest \
test_common \
test_add_img_to_target_files \
test_ota_from_target_files \
test_validate_target_files
Change-Id: I43b3f08edfa8a9bcfe54baf9848dc705c048e327
For example, verify a target_files.zip that has system AVB-signed as a
chained partition.
$ build/make/tools/releasetools/validate_target_files.py \
signed-target_files-4904652.zip \
--verity_key verifiedboot_pub.pem \
--avb_system_key_path system_pub.pem
Note that verifiedboot_pub.pem should be the key (either public or
private) to verify vbmeta.img, and 'system_pub.pem' should be the key
(either public or private) for the chained partition of system.
testdata/testkey.key is the private key converted from
testdata/testkey.pk8 for testing purpose (`openssl pkcs8 -in
testdata/testkey.pk8 -inform DER -out testdata/testkey.key -nocrypt`).
Bug: 63706333
Test: python -m unittest test_common
Test: python -m unittest test_add_img_to_target_files
Test: `m dist` on aosp_walleye-userdebug; Run validate_target_files.py
on the generated target_files.zip.
Test: Set up walleye with chained system partition; `m dist`; Run
validate_target_files.py on the generated target_files.zip.
Change-Id: I38517ab39baf8a5bc1a6062fab2fe229b68e897d
This writes /system/bin/install-recovery.sh with the updated argument
formats. Requires matching changes to bootable/recovery/applypatch.
Bug: 110106408
Test: python -m unittest test_common.InstallRecoveryScriptFormatTest
Test: See additional tests in the other CL.
Change-Id: I2dec6f064819c01b5bb34c3d6fd0e247a5f48f08
Bug: 79951743
Test: Run validate_target_files.py on target_files.zip that has
non-monotonic ranges listed in IMAGES/system.map.
Change-Id: I28d3ca6972d361362589cd51e60731af9994a551
Targets can define 'TARGET_USERIMAGES_SPARSE_EXT_DISABLED := true' to
generate non-sparse system images, but validate_target_files.py doesn't
work with such images. This CL adds a workaround to temporarily skip the
file consistency check for such images.
Bug: 79616357
Test: Run validate_target_files.py on a target_files.zip that's not
using sparse image.
Test: Run validate_target_files.py on marlin target_files.zip (which
uses sparse image).
Change-Id: I1f4066c5b3fec595b10cab10283d62c1c5a6c624
For a given (signed) target-files.zip, this CLs allows verifying the
Verified Boot related images. It works with both of VB 1.0 and VB 2.0
images.
As part of the CL, it also moves validate_target_files.py to argparse,
which is more flexible than the traditional getopt module.
Also add unittests for the VB 1.0 path. VB 2.0 tests will be added in
follow-up CL.
Example usage:
- Run the script on aosp_bullhead target-files.zip.
$ ./build/make/tools/releasetools/validate_target_files.py \
--verity_key build/target/product/security/verity.x509.pem \
--verity_key_mincrypt build/target/product/security/verity_key \
aosp_bullhead-target_files-4522605.zip
- Run the script on aosp_walleye target-files.zip.
$ ./build/make/tools/releasetools/validate_target_files.py \
--verity_key external/avb/test/data/testkey_rsa4096.pem \
aosp_walleye-target_files-4627254.zip
Bug: 63706333
Bug: 65486807
Test: Run validate_target_files.py on target_files.zip files.
Test: PYTHONPATH=build/make/tools/releasetools python -m unittest \
test_validate_target_files
Change-Id: I170f14d5828d15f3687d8af0a89a816968069057
The file was broken due to earlier touches:
- Missing 'import zipfile';
- Mismatching arguments when calling GetSparseImage().
Bug: 73996151
Test: Run validate_target_files.py with a walleye-target_files.zip.
Test: pylint --rcfile=pylintrc validate_target_files.py
Change-Id: I3692bd51fb27a3da698e06b75155e84502549f66
In addition to the unzipping work, common.UnzipTemp() kindly bundles an
open ZipFile object as part of the return value. It doesn't look very
helpful to the callers though. It also looks less obvious that the
caller needs to properly close the handle (missing the close here is
benign though). This CL just removes the ZipFile object out of the
return value, and leaves the work to callers.
Test: `m dist` on both of A/B and non-A/B target.
Test: python -m unittest test_add_img_to_target_files
Test: python -m unittest test_common
Test: python -m unittest test_ota_from_target_files
Test: Check the callers to common.UnzipTemp() in code search.
Change-Id: Id47da3fd42a0e76d6ae8851f05780db319ee48cf
This CL detects incomplete block ranges (e.g. due to the holes in
mke2fs created images). Such block ranges will be tagged, so we won't
attempt to imgdiff those files. Note that the change to blockimgdiff.py,
which uses the tag info, will come in a separate CL.
An 'extra' attribute is added to RangeSet class, which defaults to an
empty dict. An 'incomplete' tag will be added into the dict by the
caller of the class. Not adding this tag as an immediate attribute,
because it is not a property regarding the ranges being represented, but
rather some storage space for the caller.
This CL also refactors GetSparseImage and RoundUpTo4K into common.py, so
the same code can be called from both of ota_from_target_files.py and
validate_target_files.py. Not able to add unittests for
GetSparseImage(), as SparseImage requires data in specific format.
Bug: 68016761
Test: Run validate_target_files.py on target-files.zip. It skips
validating files with missing holes as before.
Test: Run ota_from_target_files.py on angler target-files.zip. It gives
identical packages w/ and w/o the CL.
Test: pylint on changed files. There're warnings with common.py, but
unrelated to this change.
Change-Id: I126ccfea13c0d5ebcc8c1b4ff1a4f9200e97423a
C: 73, 0: Wrong hanging indentation (add 4 spaces).
file_name, actual_sha1, expected_sha1)
^ | (bad-continuation)
C:171, 0: Wrong continued indentation (add 20 spaces).
'SYSTEM/etc/recovery.img', expected_recovery_sha1)
^ | (bad-continuation)
C:185, 0: Wrong continued indentation (add 20 spaces).
file_path='IMAGES/boot.img', expected_sha1=boot_info[3])
^ | (bad-continuation)
C:191, 0: Wrong continued indentation (add 20 spaces).
file_path='IMAGES/recovery.img',
^ | (bad-continuation)
C:192, 0: Wrong continued indentation (add 20 spaces).
expected_sha1=expected_recovery_sha1)
^ | (bad-continuation)
W: 67,15: Use % formatting in logging functions and pass the % parameters as arguments (logging-format-interpolation)
W:150,17: Use % formatting in logging functions and pass the % parameters as arguments (logging-format-interpolation)
W:153,15: Use % formatting in logging functions and pass the % parameters as arguments (logging-format-interpolation)
W:194,15: Use % formatting in logging functions and pass the % parameters as arguments (logging-format-interpolation)
C: 27, 0: standard import "import logging" comes before "import common" (wrong-import-order)
C: 28, 0: standard import "import os.path" comes before "import common" (wrong-import-order)
C: 29, 0: standard import "import re" comes before "import common" (wrong-import-order)
C: 31, 0: standard import "import sys" comes before "import common" (wrong-import-order)
Test: pylint --rcfile=pylintrc validate_target_files.py
Test: Run validate_target_files.py with a target-files.zip.
Change-Id: Ie64acdb4cee4326938c4ad5a34b575d7b82478c0
When creating ext4 images with mke2fs, it may skip allocating some
blocks if they contain all zeros. As a result, there could be less
blocks listed in the block map than the actual file length.
For example, for a file with a length of 112200-byte (27+ blocks),
the listed blocks in block.map could be '43665-43688' (24 blocks).
Because some all-zero blocks are not taking actual space.
The generated ext4 images are perfectly valid - kernel will figure out
that data block is not allocated and writes all zeros into user buffer.
However, we can't fully reconstruct a file from its block list in our
Python script. Ideally this can be avoided by mounting or parsing an
ext4 image directly, which is yet to be supported in our script.
This CL skips checking for such files to avoid failing
validate_target_files.py.
Bug: 65213616
Test: validate_target_files.py passes on targets with mke2fs generated
images (e.g. marlin).
Change-Id: Id9cc59e345b9283844044ef94ceb5702f0ca0526
Check the SHA1 of recovery.img and boot.img embedded in the
install-recovery.sh.
Bug: 35411009
Test: validation script detects mismatch for both full recovery and
recovery-from-boot.
Change-Id: I5f07a869d9fa17fad26a22ef9ca3ecb06b1b28e3
