341fe02903
gki_arm64 is a special target to build multiple GKI boot-*.img files. It has neither system.img nor vbmeta.img. Skips checking system.img and vbmeta.img in this case. Bug: 223078405 Test: validate_target_files signed-gki_arm64-target_files-8277156.zip Change-Id: I9d3c102c11787cf70c1e1fc8e6a552f8fd19ff72
566 lines
22 KiB
Python
Executable file
566 lines
22 KiB
Python
Executable file
#!/usr/bin/env python
|
|
|
|
# Copyright (C) 2017 The Android Open Source Project
|
|
#
|
|
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
|
|
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
|
|
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
|
|
#
|
|
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
|
|
#
|
|
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
|
|
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
|
|
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
|
|
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
|
|
# limitations under the License.
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
Validate a given (signed) target_files.zip.
|
|
|
|
It performs the following checks to assert the integrity of the input zip.
|
|
|
|
- It verifies the file consistency between the ones in IMAGES/system.img (read
|
|
via IMAGES/system.map) and the ones under unpacked folder of SYSTEM/. The
|
|
same check also applies to the vendor image if present.
|
|
|
|
- It verifies the install-recovery script consistency, by comparing the
|
|
checksums in the script against the ones of IMAGES/{boot,recovery}.img.
|
|
|
|
- It verifies the signed Verified Boot related images, for both of Verified
|
|
Boot 1.0 and 2.0 (aka AVB).
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
import argparse
|
|
import filecmp
|
|
import logging
|
|
import os.path
|
|
import re
|
|
import zipfile
|
|
|
|
from hashlib import sha1
|
|
from common import IsSparseImage
|
|
|
|
import common
|
|
import rangelib
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _ReadFile(file_name, unpacked_name, round_up=False):
|
|
"""Constructs and returns a File object. Rounds up its size if needed."""
|
|
assert os.path.exists(unpacked_name)
|
|
with open(unpacked_name, 'rb') as f:
|
|
file_data = f.read()
|
|
file_size = len(file_data)
|
|
if round_up:
|
|
file_size_rounded_up = common.RoundUpTo4K(file_size)
|
|
file_data += b'\0' * (file_size_rounded_up - file_size)
|
|
return common.File(file_name, file_data)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def ValidateFileAgainstSha1(input_tmp, file_name, file_path, expected_sha1):
|
|
"""Check if the file has the expected SHA-1."""
|
|
|
|
logging.info('Validating the SHA-1 of %s', file_name)
|
|
unpacked_name = os.path.join(input_tmp, file_path)
|
|
assert os.path.exists(unpacked_name)
|
|
actual_sha1 = _ReadFile(file_name, unpacked_name, False).sha1
|
|
assert actual_sha1 == expected_sha1, \
|
|
'SHA-1 mismatches for {}. actual {}, expected {}'.format(
|
|
file_name, actual_sha1, expected_sha1)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def ValidateFileConsistency(input_zip, input_tmp, info_dict):
|
|
"""Compare the files from image files and unpacked folders."""
|
|
|
|
def CheckAllFiles(which):
|
|
logging.info('Checking %s image.', which)
|
|
path = os.path.join(input_tmp, "IMAGES", which + ".img")
|
|
if not IsSparseImage(path):
|
|
logging.info("%s is non-sparse image", which)
|
|
image = common.GetNonSparseImage(which, input_tmp)
|
|
else:
|
|
logging.info("%s is sparse image", which)
|
|
# Allow having shared blocks when loading the sparse image, because allowing
|
|
# that doesn't affect the checks below (we will have all the blocks on file,
|
|
# unless it's skipped due to the holes).
|
|
image = common.GetSparseImage(which, input_tmp, input_zip, True)
|
|
prefix = '/' + which
|
|
for entry in image.file_map:
|
|
# Skip entries like '__NONZERO-0'.
|
|
if not entry.startswith(prefix):
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
# Read the blocks that the file resides. Note that it will contain the
|
|
# bytes past the file length, which is expected to be padded with '\0's.
|
|
ranges = image.file_map[entry]
|
|
|
|
# Use the original RangeSet if applicable, which includes the shared
|
|
# blocks. And this needs to happen before checking the monotonicity flag.
|
|
if ranges.extra.get('uses_shared_blocks'):
|
|
file_ranges = ranges.extra['uses_shared_blocks']
|
|
else:
|
|
file_ranges = ranges
|
|
|
|
incomplete = file_ranges.extra.get('incomplete', False)
|
|
if incomplete:
|
|
logging.warning('Skipping %s that has incomplete block list', entry)
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
# If the file has non-monotonic ranges, read each range in order.
|
|
if not file_ranges.monotonic:
|
|
h = sha1()
|
|
for file_range in file_ranges.extra['text_str'].split(' '):
|
|
for data in image.ReadRangeSet(rangelib.RangeSet(file_range)):
|
|
h.update(data)
|
|
blocks_sha1 = h.hexdigest()
|
|
else:
|
|
blocks_sha1 = image.RangeSha1(file_ranges)
|
|
|
|
# The filename under unpacked directory, such as SYSTEM/bin/sh.
|
|
unpacked_name = os.path.join(
|
|
input_tmp, which.upper(), entry[(len(prefix) + 1):])
|
|
unpacked_file = _ReadFile(entry, unpacked_name, True)
|
|
file_sha1 = unpacked_file.sha1
|
|
assert blocks_sha1 == file_sha1, \
|
|
'file: %s, range: %s, blocks_sha1: %s, file_sha1: %s' % (
|
|
entry, file_ranges, blocks_sha1, file_sha1)
|
|
|
|
logging.info('Validating file consistency.')
|
|
|
|
# TODO(b/79617342): Validate non-sparse images.
|
|
if info_dict.get('extfs_sparse_flag') != '-s':
|
|
logging.warning('Skipped due to target using non-sparse images')
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
# Verify IMAGES/system.img if applicable.
|
|
# Some targets, e.g., gki_arm64, gki_x86_64, etc., are system.img-less.
|
|
if 'IMAGES/system.img' in input_zip.namelist():
|
|
CheckAllFiles('system')
|
|
|
|
# Verify IMAGES/vendor.img if applicable.
|
|
if 'VENDOR/' in input_zip.namelist():
|
|
CheckAllFiles('vendor')
|
|
|
|
# Not checking IMAGES/system_other.img since it doesn't have the map file.
|
|
|
|
|
|
def ValidateInstallRecoveryScript(input_tmp, info_dict):
|
|
"""Validate the SHA-1 embedded in install-recovery.sh.
|
|
|
|
install-recovery.sh is written in common.py and has the following format:
|
|
|
|
1. full recovery:
|
|
...
|
|
if ! applypatch --check type:device:size:sha1; then
|
|
applypatch --flash /vendor/etc/recovery.img \\
|
|
type:device:size:sha1 && \\
|
|
...
|
|
|
|
2. recovery from boot:
|
|
...
|
|
if ! applypatch --check type:recovery_device:recovery_size:recovery_sha1; then
|
|
applypatch [--bonus bonus_args] \\
|
|
--patch /vendor/recovery-from-boot.p \\
|
|
--source type:boot_device:boot_size:boot_sha1 \\
|
|
--target type:recovery_device:recovery_size:recovery_sha1 && \\
|
|
...
|
|
|
|
For full recovery, we want to calculate the SHA-1 of /vendor/etc/recovery.img
|
|
and compare it against the one embedded in the script. While for recovery
|
|
from boot, we want to check the SHA-1 for both recovery.img and boot.img
|
|
under IMAGES/.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
board_uses_vendorimage = info_dict.get("board_uses_vendorimage") == "true"
|
|
|
|
if board_uses_vendorimage:
|
|
script_path = 'VENDOR/bin/install-recovery.sh'
|
|
recovery_img = 'VENDOR/etc/recovery.img'
|
|
else:
|
|
script_path = 'SYSTEM/vendor/bin/install-recovery.sh'
|
|
recovery_img = 'SYSTEM/vendor/etc/recovery.img'
|
|
|
|
if not os.path.exists(os.path.join(input_tmp, script_path)):
|
|
logging.info('%s does not exist in input_tmp', script_path)
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
logging.info('Checking %s', script_path)
|
|
with open(os.path.join(input_tmp, script_path), 'r') as script:
|
|
lines = script.read().strip().split('\n')
|
|
assert len(lines) >= 10
|
|
check_cmd = re.search(r'if ! applypatch --check (\w+:.+:\w+:\w+);',
|
|
lines[1].strip())
|
|
check_partition = check_cmd.group(1)
|
|
assert len(check_partition.split(':')) == 4
|
|
|
|
full_recovery_image = info_dict.get("full_recovery_image") == "true"
|
|
if full_recovery_image:
|
|
assert len(lines) == 10, "Invalid line count: {}".format(lines)
|
|
|
|
# Expect something like "EMMC:/dev/block/recovery:28:5f9c..62e3".
|
|
target = re.search(r'--target (.+) &&', lines[4].strip())
|
|
assert target is not None, \
|
|
"Failed to parse target line \"{}\"".format(lines[4])
|
|
flash_partition = target.group(1)
|
|
|
|
# Check we have the same recovery target in the check and flash commands.
|
|
assert check_partition == flash_partition, \
|
|
"Mismatching targets: {} vs {}".format(
|
|
check_partition, flash_partition)
|
|
|
|
# Validate the SHA-1 of the recovery image.
|
|
recovery_sha1 = flash_partition.split(':')[3]
|
|
ValidateFileAgainstSha1(
|
|
input_tmp, 'recovery.img', recovery_img, recovery_sha1)
|
|
else:
|
|
assert len(lines) == 11, "Invalid line count: {}".format(lines)
|
|
|
|
# --source boot_type:boot_device:boot_size:boot_sha1
|
|
source = re.search(r'--source (\w+:.+:\w+:\w+) \\', lines[4].strip())
|
|
assert source is not None, \
|
|
"Failed to parse source line \"{}\"".format(lines[4])
|
|
|
|
source_partition = source.group(1)
|
|
source_info = source_partition.split(':')
|
|
assert len(source_info) == 4, \
|
|
"Invalid source partition: {}".format(source_partition)
|
|
ValidateFileAgainstSha1(input_tmp, file_name='boot.img',
|
|
file_path='IMAGES/boot.img',
|
|
expected_sha1=source_info[3])
|
|
|
|
# --target recovery_type:recovery_device:recovery_size:recovery_sha1
|
|
target = re.search(r'--target (\w+:.+:\w+:\w+) && \\', lines[5].strip())
|
|
assert target is not None, \
|
|
"Failed to parse target line \"{}\"".format(lines[5])
|
|
target_partition = target.group(1)
|
|
|
|
# Check we have the same recovery target in the check and patch commands.
|
|
assert check_partition == target_partition, \
|
|
"Mismatching targets: {} vs {}".format(
|
|
check_partition, target_partition)
|
|
|
|
recovery_info = target_partition.split(':')
|
|
assert len(recovery_info) == 4, \
|
|
"Invalid target partition: {}".format(target_partition)
|
|
ValidateFileAgainstSha1(input_tmp, file_name='recovery.img',
|
|
file_path='IMAGES/recovery.img',
|
|
expected_sha1=recovery_info[3])
|
|
|
|
logging.info('Done checking %s', script_path)
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Symlink files in `src` to `dst`, if the files do not
|
|
# already exists in `dst` directory.
|
|
def symlinkIfNotExists(src, dst):
|
|
if not os.path.isdir(src):
|
|
return
|
|
for filename in os.listdir(src):
|
|
if os.path.exists(os.path.join(dst, filename)):
|
|
continue
|
|
os.symlink(os.path.join(src, filename), os.path.join(dst, filename))
|
|
|
|
|
|
def ValidatePartitionFingerprints(input_tmp, info_dict):
|
|
build_info = common.BuildInfo(info_dict)
|
|
# Expected format:
|
|
# Prop: com.android.build.vendor.fingerprint -> 'generic/aosp_cf_x86_64_phone/vsoc_x86_64:S/AOSP.MASTER/7335886:userdebug/test-keys'
|
|
# Prop: com.android.build.vendor_boot.fingerprint -> 'generic/aosp_cf_x86_64_phone/vsoc_x86_64:S/AOSP.MASTER/7335886:userdebug/test-keys'
|
|
p = re.compile(
|
|
r"Prop: com.android.build.(?P<partition>\w+).fingerprint -> '(?P<fingerprint>[\w\/:\.-]+)'")
|
|
for vbmeta_partition in ["vbmeta", "vbmeta_system"]:
|
|
image = os.path.join(input_tmp, "IMAGES", vbmeta_partition + ".img")
|
|
if not os.path.exists(image):
|
|
assert vbmeta_partition != "vbmeta",\
|
|
"{} is a required partition for AVB.".format(
|
|
vbmeta_partition)
|
|
logging.info("vb partition %s not present, skipping", vbmeta_partition)
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
output = common.RunAndCheckOutput(
|
|
[info_dict["avb_avbtool"], "info_image", "--image", image])
|
|
matches = p.findall(output)
|
|
for (partition, fingerprint) in matches:
|
|
actual_fingerprint = build_info.GetPartitionFingerprint(
|
|
partition)
|
|
if actual_fingerprint is None:
|
|
logging.warning(
|
|
"Failed to get fingerprint for partition %s", partition)
|
|
continue
|
|
assert fingerprint == actual_fingerprint, "Fingerprint mismatch for partition {}, expected: {} actual: {}".format(
|
|
partition, fingerprint, actual_fingerprint)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def ValidateVerifiedBootImages(input_tmp, info_dict, options):
|
|
"""Validates the Verified Boot related images.
|
|
|
|
For Verified Boot 1.0, it verifies the signatures of the bootable images
|
|
(boot/recovery etc), as well as the dm-verity metadata in system images
|
|
(system/vendor/product). For Verified Boot 2.0, it calls avbtool to verify
|
|
vbmeta.img, which in turn verifies all the descriptors listed in vbmeta.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
input_tmp: The top-level directory of unpacked target-files.zip.
|
|
info_dict: The loaded info dict.
|
|
options: A dict that contains the user-supplied public keys to be used for
|
|
image verification. In particular, 'verity_key' is used to verify the
|
|
bootable images in VB 1.0, and the vbmeta image in VB 2.0, where
|
|
applicable. 'verity_key_mincrypt' will be used to verify the system
|
|
images in VB 1.0.
|
|
|
|
Raises:
|
|
AssertionError: On any verification failure.
|
|
"""
|
|
# See bug 159299583
|
|
# After commit 5277d1015, some images (e.g. acpio.img and tos.img) are no
|
|
# longer copied from RADIO to the IMAGES folder. But avbtool assumes that
|
|
# images are in IMAGES folder. So we symlink them.
|
|
symlinkIfNotExists(os.path.join(input_tmp, "RADIO"),
|
|
os.path.join(input_tmp, "IMAGES"))
|
|
# Verified boot 1.0 (images signed with boot_signer and verity_signer).
|
|
if info_dict.get('boot_signer') == 'true':
|
|
logging.info('Verifying Verified Boot images...')
|
|
|
|
# Verify the boot/recovery images (signed with boot_signer), against the
|
|
# given X.509 encoded pubkey (or falling back to the one in the info_dict if
|
|
# none given).
|
|
verity_key = options['verity_key']
|
|
if verity_key is None:
|
|
verity_key = info_dict['verity_key'] + '.x509.pem'
|
|
for image in ('boot.img', 'recovery.img', 'recovery-two-step.img'):
|
|
if image == 'recovery-two-step.img':
|
|
image_path = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'OTA', image)
|
|
else:
|
|
image_path = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'IMAGES', image)
|
|
if not os.path.exists(image_path):
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
cmd = ['boot_signer', '-verify', image_path, '-certificate', verity_key]
|
|
proc = common.Run(cmd)
|
|
stdoutdata, _ = proc.communicate()
|
|
assert proc.returncode == 0, \
|
|
'Failed to verify {} with boot_signer:\n{}'.format(image, stdoutdata)
|
|
logging.info(
|
|
'Verified %s with boot_signer (key: %s):\n%s', image, verity_key,
|
|
stdoutdata.rstrip())
|
|
|
|
# Verify verity signed system images in Verified Boot 1.0. Note that not using
|
|
# 'elif' here, since 'boot_signer' and 'verity' are not bundled in VB 1.0.
|
|
if info_dict.get('verity') == 'true':
|
|
# First verify that the verity key is built into the root image (regardless
|
|
# of system-as-root).
|
|
verity_key_mincrypt = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'ROOT', 'verity_key')
|
|
assert os.path.exists(verity_key_mincrypt), 'Missing verity_key'
|
|
|
|
# Verify /verity_key matches the one given via command line, if any.
|
|
if options['verity_key_mincrypt'] is None:
|
|
logging.warn(
|
|
'Skipped checking the content of /verity_key, as the key file not '
|
|
'provided. Use --verity_key_mincrypt to specify.')
|
|
else:
|
|
expected_key = options['verity_key_mincrypt']
|
|
assert filecmp.cmp(expected_key, verity_key_mincrypt, shallow=False), \
|
|
"Mismatching mincrypt verity key files"
|
|
logging.info('Verified the content of /verity_key')
|
|
|
|
# For devices with a separate ramdisk (i.e. non-system-as-root), there must
|
|
# be a copy in ramdisk.
|
|
if info_dict.get("system_root_image") != "true":
|
|
verity_key_ramdisk = os.path.join(
|
|
input_tmp, 'BOOT', 'RAMDISK', 'verity_key')
|
|
assert os.path.exists(
|
|
verity_key_ramdisk), 'Missing verity_key in ramdisk'
|
|
|
|
assert filecmp.cmp(
|
|
verity_key_mincrypt, verity_key_ramdisk, shallow=False), \
|
|
'Mismatching verity_key files in root and ramdisk'
|
|
logging.info('Verified the content of /verity_key in ramdisk')
|
|
|
|
# Then verify the verity signed system/vendor/product images, against the
|
|
# verity pubkey in mincrypt format.
|
|
for image in ('system.img', 'vendor.img', 'product.img'):
|
|
image_path = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'IMAGES', image)
|
|
|
|
# We are not checking if the image is actually enabled via info_dict (e.g.
|
|
# 'system_verity_block_device=...'). Because it's most likely a bug that
|
|
# skips signing some of the images in signed target-files.zip, while
|
|
# having the top-level verity flag enabled.
|
|
if not os.path.exists(image_path):
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
cmd = ['verity_verifier', image_path, '-mincrypt', verity_key_mincrypt]
|
|
proc = common.Run(cmd)
|
|
stdoutdata, _ = proc.communicate()
|
|
assert proc.returncode == 0, \
|
|
'Failed to verify {} with verity_verifier (key: {}):\n{}'.format(
|
|
image, verity_key_mincrypt, stdoutdata)
|
|
logging.info(
|
|
'Verified %s with verity_verifier (key: %s):\n%s', image,
|
|
verity_key_mincrypt, stdoutdata.rstrip())
|
|
|
|
# Handle the case of Verified Boot 2.0 (AVB).
|
|
if info_dict.get("avb_building_vbmeta_image") == "true":
|
|
logging.info('Verifying Verified Boot 2.0 (AVB) images...')
|
|
|
|
key = options['verity_key']
|
|
if key is None:
|
|
key = info_dict['avb_vbmeta_key_path']
|
|
|
|
ValidatePartitionFingerprints(input_tmp, info_dict)
|
|
|
|
# avbtool verifies all the images that have descriptors listed in vbmeta.
|
|
# Using `--follow_chain_partitions` so it would additionally verify chained
|
|
# vbmeta partitions (e.g. vbmeta_system).
|
|
image = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'IMAGES', 'vbmeta.img')
|
|
cmd = [info_dict['avb_avbtool'], 'verify_image', '--image', image,
|
|
'--follow_chain_partitions']
|
|
|
|
# Custom images.
|
|
custom_partitions = info_dict.get(
|
|
"avb_custom_images_partition_list", "").strip().split()
|
|
|
|
# Append the args for chained partitions if any.
|
|
for partition in (common.AVB_PARTITIONS + common.AVB_VBMETA_PARTITIONS +
|
|
tuple(custom_partitions)):
|
|
key_name = 'avb_' + partition + '_key_path'
|
|
if info_dict.get(key_name) is not None:
|
|
if info_dict.get('ab_update') != 'true' and partition == 'recovery':
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
# Use the key file from command line if specified; otherwise fall back
|
|
# to the one in info dict.
|
|
key_file = options.get(key_name, info_dict[key_name])
|
|
chained_partition_arg = common.GetAvbChainedPartitionArg(
|
|
partition, info_dict, key_file)
|
|
cmd.extend(['--expected_chain_partition', chained_partition_arg])
|
|
|
|
# Handle the boot image with a non-default name, e.g. boot-5.4.img
|
|
boot_images = info_dict.get("boot_images")
|
|
if boot_images:
|
|
# we used the 1st boot image to generate the vbmeta. Rename the filename
|
|
# to boot.img so that avbtool can find it correctly.
|
|
first_image_name = boot_images.split()[0]
|
|
first_image_path = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'IMAGES', first_image_name)
|
|
assert os.path.isfile(first_image_path)
|
|
renamed_boot_image_path = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'IMAGES', 'boot.img')
|
|
os.rename(first_image_path, renamed_boot_image_path)
|
|
|
|
proc = common.Run(cmd)
|
|
stdoutdata, _ = proc.communicate()
|
|
assert proc.returncode == 0, \
|
|
'Failed to verify {} with avbtool (key: {}):\n{}'.format(
|
|
image, key, stdoutdata)
|
|
|
|
logging.info(
|
|
'Verified %s with avbtool (key: %s):\n%s', image, key,
|
|
stdoutdata.rstrip())
|
|
|
|
# avbtool verifies recovery image for non-A/B devices.
|
|
if (info_dict.get('ab_update') != 'true' and
|
|
info_dict.get('no_recovery') != 'true'):
|
|
image = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'IMAGES', 'recovery.img')
|
|
key = info_dict['avb_recovery_key_path']
|
|
cmd = [info_dict['avb_avbtool'], 'verify_image', '--image', image,
|
|
'--key', key]
|
|
proc = common.Run(cmd)
|
|
stdoutdata, _ = proc.communicate()
|
|
assert proc.returncode == 0, \
|
|
'Failed to verify {} with avbtool (key: {}):\n{}'.format(
|
|
image, key, stdoutdata)
|
|
logging.info(
|
|
'Verified %s with avbtool (key: %s):\n%s', image, key,
|
|
stdoutdata.rstrip())
|
|
|
|
|
|
def CheckDataInconsistency(lines):
|
|
build_prop = {}
|
|
for line in lines:
|
|
if line.startswith("import") or line.startswith("#"):
|
|
continue
|
|
if "=" not in line:
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
key, value = line.rstrip().split("=", 1)
|
|
if key in build_prop:
|
|
logging.info("Duplicated key found for {}".format(key))
|
|
if value != build_prop[key]:
|
|
logging.error("Key {} is defined twice with different values {} vs {}"
|
|
.format(key, value, build_prop[key]))
|
|
return key
|
|
build_prop[key] = value
|
|
|
|
|
|
def CheckBuildPropDuplicity(input_tmp):
|
|
"""Check all buld.prop files inside directory input_tmp, raise error
|
|
if they contain duplicates"""
|
|
|
|
if not os.path.isdir(input_tmp):
|
|
raise ValueError("Expect {} to be a directory".format(input_tmp))
|
|
for name in os.listdir(input_tmp):
|
|
if not name.isupper():
|
|
continue
|
|
for prop_file in ['build.prop', 'etc/build.prop']:
|
|
path = os.path.join(input_tmp, name, prop_file)
|
|
if not os.path.exists(path):
|
|
continue
|
|
logging.info("Checking {}".format(path))
|
|
with open(path, 'r') as fp:
|
|
dupKey = CheckDataInconsistency(fp.readlines())
|
|
if dupKey:
|
|
raise ValueError("{} contains duplicate keys for {}".format(
|
|
path, dupKey))
|
|
|
|
|
|
def main():
|
|
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
|
|
description=__doc__,
|
|
formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter)
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
'target_files',
|
|
help='the input target_files.zip to be validated')
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
'--verity_key',
|
|
help='the verity public key to verify the bootable images (Verified '
|
|
'Boot 1.0), or the vbmeta image (Verified Boot 2.0, aka AVB), where '
|
|
'applicable')
|
|
for partition in common.AVB_PARTITIONS + common.AVB_VBMETA_PARTITIONS:
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
'--avb_' + partition + '_key_path',
|
|
help='the public or private key in PEM format to verify AVB chained '
|
|
'partition of {}'.format(partition))
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
'--verity_key_mincrypt',
|
|
help='the verity public key in mincrypt format to verify the system '
|
|
'images, if target using Verified Boot 1.0')
|
|
args = parser.parse_args()
|
|
|
|
# Unprovided args will have 'None' as the value.
|
|
options = vars(args)
|
|
|
|
logging_format = '%(asctime)s - %(filename)s - %(levelname)-8s: %(message)s'
|
|
date_format = '%Y/%m/%d %H:%M:%S'
|
|
logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO, format=logging_format,
|
|
datefmt=date_format)
|
|
|
|
logging.info("Unzipping the input target_files.zip: %s", args.target_files)
|
|
input_tmp = common.UnzipTemp(args.target_files)
|
|
|
|
info_dict = common.LoadInfoDict(input_tmp)
|
|
with zipfile.ZipFile(args.target_files, 'r', allowZip64=True) as input_zip:
|
|
ValidateFileConsistency(input_zip, input_tmp, info_dict)
|
|
|
|
CheckBuildPropDuplicity(input_tmp)
|
|
|
|
ValidateInstallRecoveryScript(input_tmp, info_dict)
|
|
|
|
ValidateVerifiedBootImages(input_tmp, info_dict, options)
|
|
|
|
# TODO: Check if the OTA keys have been properly updated (the ones on /system,
|
|
# in recovery image).
|
|
|
|
logging.info("Done.")
|
|
|
|
|
|
if __name__ == '__main__':
|
|
try:
|
|
main()
|
|
finally:
|
|
common.Cleanup()
|