audit2allow was generating rules which would not compile. We can only
do one per line, not tons of types at one time.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Return low quality matches as well as high quality matches. Sometimes
we just want the crap with the sugar.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Filenames can have a +, so we should be able to parse and handle those
files.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
We still want to be able to use sepolgen even if setools isn't
installed. Degrade functionality, but still work if it can't be found.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwlash@redhat.com>
I am running into an issue with sepolgen. Debian ships more
than one version of the refpolicy, a default one, and a MLS enabled
one. So, the include files live in either
/usr/share/selinux/{default,mls}/include sepolgen (in
src/sepolgen/defaults.py) sets refpolicy_devel() to a single
location -- and thus, only one version of the security policy may be
supported. So, sepolgen-ifgen from policycoreutils can only work
with one policy, which may not be the one installed on the target
machine. Could this be made configurable, somehow? As far as I can
see, sepolgen's python library does not offer any way to set the
value. This change fixes that. Now you may set the path to look for
development headers in /etc/selinux/sepolgen.conf, in the variable
SELINUX_DEVEL_PATH. The builtin default will have it work on Debian
and fedora machines out of the box.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Bigonville bigon@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
FIPS does not allow md5 as a valid algorithm. Although we don't really
care about cryptographic strength since the algorithm isn't allowed to
be used at all use something strong, like sha256.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
If you pass output from a log file that does not include any avc's
audit2allow will crash. This patch fixes this problem.
ausearch -m avc -ts recent | audit2allow
If there was no AVC's recently, we do not want the python to crash.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
combine analysys of audit2why into audit2allow, so users can see if a
boolean would solve an AVC or if it is a constrain violation. Rather
then blindly adding allow rules to modules.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
We already allow this in policy, so allow it in sepolgen as well.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
During Rawhide releases we change all "unconfined_domains" to
permissive domains in order to find new AVC messages without breaking
rawhide boxes. The way we do this is changing the unconfined_domain
interface and putting permissive $1; in it. sepolgen does not like
this and blows up the build. This patch tells sepolgen to ignore the
permissive in an interface.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Change the default "make" target for the libraries from "install" to
"all" in the makefiles.
Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
module names must begin with a letter, optionally followed by letters,
numbers, "-", "_", "."\n' some of these were being denied.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
This patch allows audit2allow to do analysis on the AVC's to see if a
boolean would have solved the problem or if the AVC is caused by a
constraint.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
This patch adds open to sepolgen checks and resets the priorities to
get better matches on AVCs
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
The parser cannot handle the new format of filename_trans rules. Nor
can it handle the " now used. Add support for both.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Bump checkpolicy to 2.1.0
Bump libselinux to 2.1.0
Bump libsepol to 2.1.0
Bump libsemanage to 2.1.0
Bump policycoreutils to 2.1.0
Bump sepolgen to 1.1.0
Sepolgen has long not recovered from parsing errors, leading to
a blacklist of none bad modules in the source. I finally tracked
down the problem (lexer state) and this patch fixes the problem
by causing the lexer to be rebuilt on error.
Acked-by: Joshua Brindle <jbrindle@tresys.com>
On 03/08/2010 11:11 AM, Karl MacMillan wrote:
> Accidentally sent this straight to Josh.
>
> Karl
>
> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 4:46 PM, Karl MacMillan<karlwmacmillan@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I meant this - I don't want to pass around a boolean flag when we have
>> a flag for rule type. This allows cleanly adding support for, say,
>> generating both allow rules and auditallow rules at the same time.
>>
>>
<snip>
Ok this one only adds a flag to the policygenerator to tell it to
generate dontaudit rules.
No passing of args.
Acked-by: Karl MacMillan <karlwmacmillan@gmail.com>
On Mon, 2009-08-24 at 23:37 +1000, Russell Coker wrote:
> On Mon, 24 Aug 2009, Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> wrote:
> > >>> http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=503252
> > >>
> > >> audit2allow -l is looking for the load_policy message which does not go
> > >> to the dmesg, /var/log/messages. Therefore the tool has no idea when
> > >> policy was last loaded.
> > >
> > > That would be a kernel bug then.
> >
> > Well I believe the messages that are intercepted by the audit.log do not go
> > into dmesg, by design. Although Steve, James or Eric could probably say for
> > sure.
>
> When auditd is not running on a Debian system with CentOS kernel
> 2.6.18-92.1.13.el5xen or Debian/Lenny kernel 2.6.26-2-xen-686 then nothing
> goes to the kernel message log which is interpreted by audit2allow as a
> candidate for the "-l" functionality.
>
> It's OK if all the AVC messages go to the audit log and "dmesg|audit2allow -l"
> gives no output. But if all AVC messages other than the load_policy message
> go to the kernel message log then it's a bug.
Originally audit2allow used the avc: allowed message generated by
auditallow statement for load_policy to identify policy reloads. Later
it was switched to use the MAC_POLICY_LOAD events generated by the audit
framework. Those events should still get logged via printk if auditd is
not running, but it appears that the code (audit_printk_skb) will then
log the type= field as an integer rather than a string, and
audit2allow/sepolgen only looks for the string MAC_POLICY_LOAD.
So I suspect that this would be resolved by modifying sepolgen/audit.py
to also match on type=1403 for load messages. Try this:
Signed-off-by: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
Add support to sepolgen for new Xen ocontext identifiers.
Signed-off-by: Paul Nuzzi <pjnuzzi@tycho.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
