Versioned duplicate symbols cause problems for LTO. These symbols were
introduced during the CIL integration several releases ago and were only
consumed by other SELinux userspace components.
Related: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/issues/245
Signed-off-by: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
Previous commits removed some symbols and broke ABI, therefore we need to change
SONAME.
See the following quotes from distribution guidelines:
https://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ch-sharedlibs.html#run-time-shared-libraries
Every time the shared library ABI changes in a way that may break
binaries linked against older versions of the shared library, the SONAME
of the library and the corresponding name for the binary package
containing the runtime shared library should change.
https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/#_downstream_so_name_versioning
When new versions of the library are released, you should use an ABI
comparison tool to check for ABI differences in the built shared
libraries. If it detects any incompatibilities, bump the n number by
one.
Signed-off-by: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
These functions were converted to no-op by commit
c3f9492d7f ("selinux: Remove legacy local boolean and user code") and
left in libsepol/src/deprecated_functions.c to preserve API/ABI. As we
change libsepol ABI dropping duplicate symbols it's time to drop these
functions too.
Signed-off-by: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
Versioned duplicate symbols cause problems for LTO. These symbols were
introduced during the CIL integration several releases ago and were only
consumed by other SELinux userspace components.
Fixes: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/issues/245
Signed-off-by: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
When find_avtab_node() is called with key->specified & AVTAB_XPERMS and
xperms=NULL, xperms is being dereferenced. This is detected as a
"NULL pointer dereference issue" by static analyzers.
Even though it does not make much sense to call find_avtab_node() in a
way which triggers the NULL pointer dereference issue, static analyzers
have a hard time with calls such as:
node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, NULL);
... where xperms=NULL.
So, make the function report an error instead of crashing.
Here is an example of report from clang's static analyzer:
https://558-118970575-gh.circle-artifacts.com/0/output-scan-build/2020-10-02-065849-6375-1/report-d86a57.html#EndPath
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
Contrary to Linux kernel, BUG_ON() does not halt the execution, in
libsepol/src/services.c. Instead it displays an error message and
continues the execution.
This means that this code does not prevent an out-of-bound write from
happening:
case CEXPR_AND:
BUG_ON(sp < 1);
sp--;
s[sp] &= s[sp + 1];
Use if(...){BUG();rc=-EINVAL;goto out;} constructions instead, to make
sure that the array access is always in-bound.
This issue has been found using clang's static analyzer:
https://558-118970575-gh.circle-artifacts.com/0/output-scan-build/2020-10-02-065849-6375-1/report-50a861.html#EndPath
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
When compiling SELinux userspace tools with -ftrapv (this option
generates traps for signed overflow on addition, subtraction,
multiplication operations, instead of silently wrapping around),
semodule crashes when running the tests from
scripts/ci/fedora-test-runner.sh in a Fedora 32 virtual machine:
[root@localhost selinux-testsuite]# make test
make -C policy load
make[1]: Entering directory '/root/selinux-testsuite/policy'
# Test for "expand-check = 0" in /etc/selinux/semanage.conf
# General policy build
make[2]: Entering directory '/root/selinux-testsuite/policy/test_policy'
Compiling targeted test_policy module
Creating targeted test_policy.pp policy package
rm tmp/test_policy.mod.fc
make[2]: Leaving directory '/root/selinux-testsuite/policy/test_policy'
# General policy load
domain_fd_use --> off
/usr/sbin/semodule -i test_policy/test_policy.pp test_mlsconstrain.cil test_overlay_defaultrange.cil test_add_levels.cil test_glblub.cil
make[1]: *** [Makefile:174: load] Aborted (core dumped)
Using "coredumpctl gdb" leads to the following strack trace:
(gdb) bt
#0 0x00007f608fe4fa25 in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6
#1 0x00007f608fe38895 in abort () from /lib64/libc.so.6
#2 0x00007f6090028aca in __addvsi3.cold () from /lib64/libsepol.so.1
#3 0x00007f6090096f59 in __avrule_xperm_setrangebits (low=30, high=30, xperms=0x8b9eea0)
at ../cil/src/cil_binary.c:1551
#4 0x00007f60900970dd in __cil_permx_bitmap_to_sepol_xperms_list (xperms=0xb650a30, xperms_list=0x7ffce2653b18)
at ../cil/src/cil_binary.c:1596
#5 0x00007f6090097286 in __cil_avrulex_ioctl_to_policydb (k=0xb8ec200 "@\023\214\022\006", datum=0xb650a30,
args=0x239a640) at ../cil/src/cil_binary.c:1649
#6 0x00007f609003f1e5 in hashtab_map (h=0x41f8710, apply=0x7f60900971da <__cil_avrulex_ioctl_to_policydb>,
args=0x239a640) at hashtab.c:234
#7 0x00007f609009ea19 in cil_binary_create_allocated_pdb (db=0x2394f10, policydb=0x239a640)
at ../cil/src/cil_binary.c:4969
#8 0x00007f609009d19d in cil_binary_create (db=0x2394f10, policydb=0x7ffce2653d30) at ../cil/src/cil_binary.c:4329
#9 0x00007f609008ec23 in cil_build_policydb_create_pdb (db=0x2394f10, sepol_db=0x7ffce2653d30)
at ../cil/src/cil.c:631
#10 0x00007f608fff4bf3 in semanage_direct_commit () from /lib64/libsemanage.so.1
#11 0x00007f608fff9fae in semanage_commit () from /lib64/libsemanage.so.1
#12 0x0000000000403e2b in main (argc=7, argv=0x7ffce2655058) at semodule.c:753
(gdb) f 3
#3 0x00007f6090096f59 in __avrule_xperm_setrangebits (low=30, high=30, xperms=0x8b9eea0)
at ../cil/src/cil_binary.c:1551
1551 xperms->perms[i] |= XPERM_SETBITS(h) - XPERM_SETBITS(low);
A signed integer overflow therefore occurs in XPERM_SETBITS(h):
#define XPERM_SETBITS(x) ((1 << (x & 0x1f)) - 1)
This macro is expanded with h=31, so "(1 << 31) - 1" is computed:
* (1 << 31) = -0x80000000 is the lowest signed 32-bit integer value
* (1 << 31) - 1 overflows the capacity of a signed 32-bit integer and
results in 0x7fffffff (which is unsigned)
Using unsigned integers (with "1U") fixes the crash, as
(1U << 31) = 0x80000000U has no overflowing issues.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
Acked-by: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
Function matchpathcon() is deprecated in favor of selabel_lookup() but
program "matchpathcon" is much easier to use than "selabel_loopkup" to
find the file context which would be applied to some files and
directories.
More precisely:
matchpathcon /path/to/my/file
is easier to type and remember than:
selabel_lookup -b file -k /path/to/my/file
It also allows performing multiple context searches in one command,
where selabel_lookup cannot use multiple -k options.
Migrate matchpathcon to the preferred API.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
Acked-by: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
The order of the subnet and netmask is wrong and also the value of netmask is wrong for single address subnet
Use an ipaddr reserved for documentation: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5737
Add ipv6 example: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3849
Signed-off-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@defensec.nl>
allowx requires a equivalent "allow ioctl" rule to be present
auditallowx requires a equivalent "auditallow" ioctl rule to be present
dontauditx requires atleast one equivalent "allowx" rule to be present (can be a random irrelevant ioctlcmd)
Signed-off-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@defensec.nl>
When classmaps used in a neverallow were being expanded during CIL
neverallow checking, an empty classmapping in the list of
classmappings for a classmap would cause the classmap expansion to
stop and the rest of the classmapping of the classmap to be ignored.
This would mean that not all of the classes and permissions associated
with the classmap would be used to check for a neverallow violation.
Do not end the expansion of a classmap when one classmapping is empty.
Reported-by: Jonathan Hettwer <j2468h@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Add additional information about the log callback message types. Indicate
which types could be audited and the relevant audit record types for them.
Signed-off-by: Chris PeBenito <chpebeni@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
9e4480b921 ("Remove trailing slash on selabel_file lookups.") introduced
a bug which turns the root directory lookup "/" into an empty string.
Signed-off-by: Chris PeBenito <chpebeni@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
CIL was not correctly determining the depth of conditional expressions
which prevented it from giving an error when the max depth was exceeded.
This allowed invalid policy binaries to be created.
Validate the conditional expression using the same logic that is used
when evaluating a conditional expression. This includes checking the
depth of the expression.
Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
CIL was not correctly determining the depth of constraint expressions
which prevented it from giving an error when the max depth was exceeded.
This allowed invalid policy binaries with constraint expressions exceeding
the max depth to be created.
Validate the constraint expression using the same logic that is used
when reading the binary policy. This includes checking the depth of the
the expression.
Reported-by: Jonathan Hettwer <j2468h@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Compilation of newrole with PAM and audit support currently requires that you have the respective headers installed on the host. Instead make the header location customizable to accomodate cross-compilation.
Signed-off-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@defensec.nl>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
This will enable userspace object managers to send proper audits for policy
loads and setenforce messages generated by the userspace AVC code.
Signed-off-by: Chris PeBenito <chpebeni@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
If not initialized to the current policyload count, an enforcing change
will trigger policyload-callbacks in selinux_status_updated().
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Access the shared nenory safe in regard to consistent view of the SELinux
kernel status page - not in regard to thread-safety.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Having a trailing slash on a file lookup, e.g. "/some/path/", can
cause a different result, for example, when file contexts are written to have
the directory have a different label than the contents. This is inconsistent
with normal Linux behaviors where trailing slashes are ignored.
Many callers already strip the trailing slash before the lookup or users
revise the file contexts to work around this. This fixes it comprehensively.
v2: fix length issues
Signed-off-by: Chris PeBenito <chpebeni@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
The argument for security_check_context(_raw) is defined as `const char *`.
Say so in the man page.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Currently:
#============= sshd_t ==============
#!!!! This avc is allowed in the current policy
#!!!! This av rule may have been overridden by an extended permission av rule
allow sshd_t ptmx_t:chr_file ioctl;
#!!!! This avc is allowed in the current policy
#!!!! This av rule may have been overridden by an extended permission av rule
allow sshd_t sshd_devpts_t:chr_file ioctl;
#!!!! This avc is allowed in the current policy
#!!!! This av rule may have been overridden by an extended permission av rule
allow sshd_t user_devpts_t:chr_file ioctl;
#============= user_t ==============
#!!!! This avc is allowed in the current policy
#!!!! This av rule may have been overridden by an extended permission av rule
allow user_t devtty_t:chr_file ioctl;
#!!!! This avc is allowed in the current policy
#!!!! This av rule may have been overridden by an extended permission av rule
allow user_t user_devpts_t:chr_file ioctl;
allowxperm sshd_t ptmx_t:chr_file ioctl { 0x5430-0x5431 0x5441 };
allowxperm sshd_t sshd_devpts_t:chr_file ioctl 0x5401;
allowxperm sshd_t user_devpts_t:chr_file ioctl { 0x5401-0x5402 0x540e };
allowxperm user_t user_devpts_t:chr_file ioctl { 0x4b33 0x5401 0x5403 0x540a 0x540f-0x5410 0x5413-0x5414 };
allowxperm user_t devtty_t:chr_file ioctl 0x4b33;
Changed:
#============= sshd_t ==============
#!!!! This avc is allowed in the current policy
#!!!! This av rule may have been overridden by an extended permission av rule
allow sshd_t ptmx_t:chr_file ioctl;
allowxperm sshd_t ptmx_t:chr_file ioctl { 0x5430-0x5431 0x5441 };
#!!!! This avc is allowed in the current policy
#!!!! This av rule may have been overridden by an extended permission av rule
allow sshd_t sshd_devpts_t:chr_file ioctl;
allowxperm sshd_t sshd_devpts_t:chr_file ioctl 0x5401;
#!!!! This avc is allowed in the current policy
#!!!! This av rule may have been overridden by an extended permission av rule
allow sshd_t user_devpts_t:chr_file ioctl;
allowxperm sshd_t user_devpts_t:chr_file ioctl { 0x5401-0x5402 0x540e };
#============= user_t ==============
#!!!! This avc is allowed in the current policy
#!!!! This av rule may have been overridden by an extended permission av rule
allow user_t devtty_t:chr_file ioctl;
allowxperm user_t devtty_t:chr_file ioctl 0x4b33;
#!!!! This avc is allowed in the current policy
#!!!! This av rule may have been overridden by an extended permission av rule
allow user_t user_devpts_t:chr_file ioctl;
allowxperm user_t user_devpts_t:chr_file ioctl { 0x4b33 0x5401 0x5403 0x540a 0x540f-0x5410 0x5413-0x5414 };
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
All tools like ausearch(8) or sesearch(1) and online documentation[1]
use hexadecimal values for extended permissions.
Hence use them, e.g. for audit2allow output, as well.
[1]: https://github.com/strace/strace/blob/master/linux/64/ioctls_inc.h
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
We need to install the include files before we try to build the source.
Otherwise, make DESTDIR=~/obj install can fail if there are older
headers under /usr/include.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
By bind mounting every filesystem we want to relabel we can access all
files without anything hidden due to active mounts.
This comes at the cost of user experience, because setfiles only
displays the percentage if no path is given or the path is /
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Hettwer <j2468h@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
git log -1 may use a pager to output long messages, and when the pager
is invoked, leads to stalls on the ci system waiting for user input.
Use --oneline to print the short part of the commit message and
the digest. This information is for debug/informational purposes only,
so truncating the output is sufficient.
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Commit bc2a8f418e ("libselinux: add selinux_status_* interfaces for
/selinux/status") introduced the sestatus mechanism, which allows for
mmap()'ing of the kernel status page as a replacement for avc_netlink.
The mechanism was initially intended for userspace object managers that
were calculating access decisions within their application and did not
rely on the libselinux AVC implementation. In order to properly make use
of sestatus within avc_has_perm(), the status mechanism needs to
properly set avc internals during status events; else, avc_enforcing is
never updated upon sestatus changes.
This commit gets rid of the default avc_netlink_open() in
avc_init_internal(), replacing it with selinux_status_open(). In the
event that the kernel status page cannot be mapped, the netlink fallback
will be used. By default, avc_has_perm_noaudit() and
selinux_check_access() will now attempt to read the kernel status page,
which removes a system call from two critical code paths.
Since the AVC thread create/stop callbacks were intended to avoid a
system call in the critical code path, they no longer need to be created
by default. In the event that the kernel status page is successfully
mapped, threads will not be created. Threads will still be
created/stopped for the sestatus fallback codepaths.
Userspace object managers that still need a netlink socket can call
avc_netlink_acquire_fd() to open and/or obtain one.
Update the manpage to reflect the new avc_netlink_acquire_fd()
functionality.
Signed-off-by: Mike Palmiotto <mike.palmiotto@crunchydata.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
License the ci scripts with a permissive, OSI approved license, such as
MIT.
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
[omosnace: removed the dummy copyright header from LICENSE]
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Implement a new, more space-efficient form of storing filename
transitions in the binary policy. The internal structures have already
been converted to this new representation; this patch just implements
reading/writing an equivalent representation from/to the binary policy.
This new format reduces the size of Fedora policy from 7.6 MB to only
3.3 MB (with policy optimization enabled in both cases). With the
unconfined module disabled, the size is reduced from 3.3 MB to 2.4 MB.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
In preparation to support a new policy format with a more optimal
representation of filename transition rules, this patch applies an
equivalent change from kernel commit c3a276111ea2 ("selinux: optimize
storage of filename transitions").
See the kernel commit's description [1] for the rationale behind this
representation. This change doesn't bring any measurable difference of
policy build performance (semodule -B) on Fedora.
[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git/commit/?id=c3a276111ea2572399281988b3129683e2a6b60b
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
This completely inactivate the .desktop file incase the user session is
managed by systemd as restorecond also provide a service file
Signed-off-by: Laurent Bigonville <bigon@bigon.be>
I found that building on OpenWrt/musl failed with:
sepolgen-ifgen-attr-helper.c:152:16: error: 'PATH_MAX' undeclared ...
Musl is less "generous" than glibc in recursively including header
files, and I suspect this is the reason for this error. Explicitly
including limits.h fixes the problem.
Signed-off-by: W. Michael Petullo <mike@flyn.org>
Some features where dropped or change since the docs were last updated.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Hettwer <j2468h@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Carter <jwcart2@gmail.com>
The -c option allows to check the validity of contexts against a
specified binary policy. Its use is restricted: no pathname can be used
when a binary policy is given to setfiles. It's not clear if this is
intentional as the built-in help and the man page are not stating the
same thing about this (the man page document -c as a normal option,
while the built-in help shows it is restricted).
When generating full system images later used with SELinux in enforcing
mode, the extended attributed of files have to be set by the build
machine. The issue is setfiles always checks the contexts against a
policy (ctx_validate = 1) and using an external binary policy is not
currently possible when using a pathname. This ends up in setfiles
failing early as the contexts of the target image are not always
compatible with the ones of the build machine.
This patch reworks a check on optind only made when -c is used, that
enforced the use of a single argument to allow 1+ arguments, allowing to
use setfiles with an external binary policy and pathnames. The following
command is then allowed, as already documented in the man page:
$ setfiles -m -r target/ -c policy.32 file_contexts target/
Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart <antoine.tenart@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
One thing that confused me when investigating
https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/issues/248 (i.e.
https://github.com/coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker/issues/512) was that the
manual page for `setfiles` seemed to imply that paths were fully
resolved. This was consistent with the issues above where `setfiles` was
failing because the target of the symbolic link didn't exist.
But in fact, the wording around symbolic links in
`setfiles`/`restorecon` refers actually to whether the parent
directories are canonicalized via `realpath(3)` before labeling.
Clarify the man pages to explain this.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
At least on Debian, /etc/protocols, which is used by
socket.getprotobyname() to resolve protocols to names, does not
contain an entry for "ipv4". In that case, set the protocol number
used by audit logs for "ipv4" to a fixed value. To ensure audit log
compatibility, let's use the same numeric value as Fedora: 4, which is
actually understood by kernel as IP over IP.
Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
error occur when selinux_restorecon_default_handle return NULL in
restorecon_init.
fixes: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/issues/249
Signed-off-by: Ji Qin <jiqin.ji@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
On a SELinux disabled system the python call
`selinux.security_policyvers()` will fail.
Move the logic to find a binary policy from the python script
`sepolgen-ifgen` to the C-helper `sepolgen-ifgen-attr-helper`.
Change the helper command line interface to accept an optional policy
path as second argument. If not given try the current loaded policy
(`selinux_current_policy_path`) and if running on a SELinux disabled
system iterate over the default store path appending policy versions
starting at the maximum supported policy version
(`sepol_policy_kern_vers_max`).
This changes the helper command line interface from:
sepolgen-ifgen-attr-helper policy_file out_file
to
sepolgen-ifgen-attr-helper out_file [policy_file]
and adds a linkage to libselinux.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Currently sepolgen-ifgen parses a gen_tunable statement as interface
and reports in verbose mode:
Missing interface definition for gen_tunable
Add grammar for gen_tunable statements in the refparser
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Start a section in the README for documenting that custom CFLAGS yields
custom results and that your mileage may vary. The first CFLAG to
document that you likely want to include is -fno-semantic-interposition.
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
xml.etree.ElementTree.Element.getiterator() was deprecated since Python 3.2 and
dropped in Python 3.9
Fixes:
Verify sepolicy interface -c -i works ... Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/usr/bin/sepolicy", line 691, in <module>
args = parser.parse_args(args=parser_args)
File "/usr/lib64/python3.9/argparse.py", line 1819, in parse_args
args, argv = self.parse_known_args(args, namespace)
File "/usr/lib64/python3.9/argparse.py", line 1852, in parse_known_args
namespace, args = self._parse_known_args(args, namespace)
File "/usr/lib64/python3.9/argparse.py", line 2043, in _parse_known_args
positionals_end_index = consume_positionals(start_index)
File "/usr/lib64/python3.9/argparse.py", line 2020, in consume_positionals
take_action(action, args)
File "/usr/lib64/python3.9/argparse.py", line 1929, in take_action
action(self, namespace, argument_values, option_string)
File "/usr/lib64/python3.9/argparse.py", line 1208, in __call__
subnamespace, arg_strings = parser.parse_known_args(arg_strings, None)
File "/usr/lib64/python3.9/argparse.py", line 1852, in parse_known_args
namespace, args = self._parse_known_args(args, namespace)
File "/usr/lib64/python3.9/argparse.py", line 2061, in _parse_known_args
start_index = consume_optional(start_index)
File "/usr/lib64/python3.9/argparse.py", line 2001, in consume_optional
take_action(action, args, option_string)
File "/usr/lib64/python3.9/argparse.py", line 1929, in take_action
action(self, namespace, argument_values, option_string)
File "/usr/bin/sepolicy", line 216, in __call__
interface_dict = get_interface_dict()
File "/usr/lib/python3.9/site-packages/sepolicy/interface.py", line 149, in get_interface_dict
for i in m.getiterator('interface'):
AttributeError: 'xml.etree.ElementTree.Element' object has no attribute 'getiterator'
Signed-off-by: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
As reported in https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/issues/248,
setfiles -r (rootpath) fails when the alternate root contains a symlink
that is correct relative to the alternate root but not in the current root.
This is a regression introduced by commit e016502c0a ("libselinux: Save
digest of all partial matches for directory"). Do not call statfs(2) here
if acting on a symbolic link. Unfortunately there is no lstatfs() call.
Ensure that we initialize the statfs buffer always. If the supplied
file is a symlink, then we don't need to worry about the later tests of
filesystem type because we wouldn't be setting the digest anyway and
we are not performing a full sysfs relabel. While here, fix the earlier
test for a directory to use the correct test.
Reproducer:
$ mkdir /root/my-chroot && echo foo > /root/my-chroot/link-target && ln -s /link-target /root/my-chroot/symlink
$ echo "/root/my-chroot/symlink" | setfiles -vFi -r /root/my-chroot -f - /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/files/file_contexts
Before:
setfiles: statfs(/root/my-chroot/symlink) failed: No such file or directory
After:
Relabeled /root/my-chroot/symlink from unconfined_u:object_r:admin_home_t:s0 to system_u:object_r:default_t:s0
Fixes: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/issues/248
Fixes: e016502c0a ("libselinux: Save digest of all partial matches for directory")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
Not everyone's github project is "selinux" so use the projects
name, as derived from TRAVIS_BUILD_DIR. TRAVIS_BUILD_DIR is
the absolute path to the project checkout on disk, so the
basename should be sufficient. The script that runs in the KVM
environment also needs to be updated where it can find the
selinux project code, so we pass it in through an env variable
in the ssh command.
Tested on Travis CI here:
- https://travis-ci.org/github/williamcroberts/selinux/jobs/697307824
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Acked-by: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
The current Travis CI runs the userspace tooling and libraries against
policy files, but cannot test against an SELinux enabled kernel. Thus,
some tests are not being done in the CI. Travis, unfortunately only
provides Ubuntu images, so in order to run against a modern distro with
SELinux in enforcing mode, we need to launch a KVM with something like
Fedora.
This patch enables this support by launching a Fedora32 Cloud Image with
the SELinux userspace library passed on from the Travis clone, it then
builds and replaces the current SELinux bits on the Fedora32 image and
runs the SELinux testsuite.
The cloud image run can be controlled with the TRAVIS env variable:
TRAVIS_CLOUD_IMAGE_VERSION. That variable takes the major and minor
version numbers in a colon delimited string, eg: "32:1.6".
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
