Test cases for attested Root-of-Trust
Add tests for verfied boot state and VBMeta digest. Bug: 255344624 Test: VtsKeyMintAidlTargetTest Change-Id: I4f0697e1a7cb83ca87150b6683cac3084a593864
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Tri Vo
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2 changed files with 113 additions and 38 deletions
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@ -43,8 +43,11 @@ cc_defaults {
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"android.hardware.gatekeeper-V1-ndk",
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"android.hardware.security.rkp-V3-ndk",
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"android.hardware.security.secureclock-V1-ndk",
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"libavb_user",
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"libavb",
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"libcppbor_external",
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"libcppcose_rkp",
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"libfs_mgr",
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"libjsoncpp",
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"libkeymint",
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"libkeymint_remote_prov_support",
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@ -21,7 +21,11 @@
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#include <string>
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#include <vector>
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#include <android-base/properties.h>
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#include <android/binder_manager.h>
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#include <fstab/fstab.h>
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#include <libavb/libavb.h>
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#include <libavb_user/avb_ops_user.h>
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#include <remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h>
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#include "KeyMintAidlTestBase.h"
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@ -34,50 +38,118 @@ using ::std::vector;
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// Since this test needs to talk to KeyMint HAL, it can only run as root. Thus,
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// bootloader can not be locked.
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class BootloaderStateTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {};
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class BootloaderStateTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {
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public:
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virtual void SetUp() override {
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KeyMintAidlTestBase::SetUp();
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// Generate a key with attestation.
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vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
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vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
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AuthorizationSet keyDesc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
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.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
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.EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
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.AttestationChallenge("foo")
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.AttestationApplicationId("bar")
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.Digest(Digest::NONE)
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.SetDefaultValidity();
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auto result = GenerateKey(keyDesc, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
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// If factory provisioned attestation key is not supported by Strongbox,
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// then create a key with self-signed attestation and use it as the
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// attestation key instead.
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if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX &&
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result == ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED) {
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result = GenerateKeyWithSelfSignedAttestKey(
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AuthorizationSetBuilder()
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.EcdsaKey(EcCurve::P_256)
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.AttestKey()
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.SetDefaultValidity(), /* attest key params */
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keyDesc, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
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}
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ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
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// Parse attested AVB values.
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X509_Ptr cert(parse_cert_blob(cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
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ASSERT_TRUE(cert.get());
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = get_attestation_record(cert.get());
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ASSERT_TRUE(attest_rec);
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auto error = parse_root_of_trust(attest_rec->data, attest_rec->length, &attestedVbKey_,
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&attestedVbState_, &attestedBootloaderState_,
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&attestedVbmetaDigest_);
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ASSERT_EQ(error, ErrorCode::OK);
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}
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vector<uint8_t> attestedVbKey_;
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VerifiedBoot attestedVbState_;
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bool attestedBootloaderState_;
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vector<uint8_t> attestedVbmetaDigest_;
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};
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// Check that attested bootloader state is set to unlocked.
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TEST_P(BootloaderStateTest, IsUnlocked) {
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// Generate a key with attestation.
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vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
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vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
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AuthorizationSet keyDesc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
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.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
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.EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
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.AttestationChallenge("foo")
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.AttestationApplicationId("bar")
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.Digest(Digest::NONE)
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.SetDefaultValidity();
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auto result = GenerateKey(keyDesc, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
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// If factory provisioned attestation key is not supported by Strongbox,
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// then create a key with self-signed attestation and use it as the
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// attestation key instead.
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if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX &&
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result == ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED) {
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result = GenerateKeyWithSelfSignedAttestKey(
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AuthorizationSetBuilder()
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.EcdsaKey(EcCurve::P_256)
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.AttestKey()
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.SetDefaultValidity(), /* attest key params */
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keyDesc, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
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TEST_P(BootloaderStateTest, BootloaderIsUnlocked) {
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ASSERT_FALSE(attestedBootloaderState_)
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<< "This test runs as root. Bootloader must be unlocked.";
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}
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// Check that verified boot state is set to "unverified", i.e. "orange".
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TEST_P(BootloaderStateTest, VbStateIsUnverified) {
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// Unlocked bootloader implies that verified boot state must be "unverified".
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ASSERT_EQ(attestedVbState_, VerifiedBoot::UNVERIFIED)
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<< "Verified boot state must be \"UNVERIFIED\" aka \"orange\".";
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// AVB spec stipulates that bootloader must set "androidboot.verifiedbootstate" parameter
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// on the kernel command-line. This parameter is exposed to userspace as
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// "ro.boot.verifiedbootstate" property.
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auto vbStateProp = ::android::base::GetProperty("ro.boot.verifiedbootstate", "");
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ASSERT_EQ(vbStateProp, "orange")
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<< "Verified boot state must be \"UNVERIFIED\" aka \"orange\".";
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}
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// Following error codes from avb_slot_data() mean that slot data was loaded
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// (even if verification failed).
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static inline bool avb_slot_data_loaded(AvbSlotVerifyResult result) {
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switch (result) {
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case AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_OK:
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case AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_ERROR_VERIFICATION:
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case AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_ERROR_ROLLBACK_INDEX:
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case AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_ERROR_PUBLIC_KEY_REJECTED:
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return true;
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default:
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return false;
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}
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ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
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}
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// Parse attested AVB values.
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X509_Ptr cert(parse_cert_blob(cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
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ASSERT_TRUE(cert.get());
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// Check that attested vbmeta digest is correct.
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TEST_P(BootloaderStateTest, VbmetaDigest) {
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AvbSlotVerifyData* avbSlotData;
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auto suffix = fs_mgr_get_slot_suffix();
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const char* partitions[] = {nullptr};
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auto avbOps = avb_ops_user_new();
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = get_attestation_record(cert.get());
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ASSERT_TRUE(attest_rec);
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// For VTS, devices run with vendor_boot-debug.img, which is not release key
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// signed. Use AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_FLAGS_ALLOW_VERIFICATION_ERROR to bypass avb
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// verification errors. This is OK since we only care about the digest for
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// this test case.
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auto result = avb_slot_verify(avbOps, partitions, suffix.c_str(),
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AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_FLAGS_ALLOW_VERIFICATION_ERROR,
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AVB_HASHTREE_ERROR_MODE_EIO, &avbSlotData);
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ASSERT_TRUE(avb_slot_data_loaded(result)) << "Failed to load avb slot data";
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vector<uint8_t> key;
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VerifiedBoot attestedVbState;
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bool attestedBootloaderState;
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vector<uint8_t> attestedVbmetaDigest;
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auto error = parse_root_of_trust(attest_rec->data, attest_rec->length, &key, &attestedVbState,
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&attestedBootloaderState, &attestedVbmetaDigest);
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ASSERT_EQ(error, ErrorCode::OK);
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ASSERT_FALSE(attestedBootloaderState) << "This test runs as root. Bootloader must be unlocked.";
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// Unfortunately, bootloader is not required to report the algorithm used
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// to calculate the digest. There are only two supported options though,
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// SHA256 and SHA512. Attested VBMeta digest must match one of these.
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vector<uint8_t> digest256(AVB_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
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vector<uint8_t> digest512(AVB_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE);
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avb_slot_verify_data_calculate_vbmeta_digest(avbSlotData, AVB_DIGEST_TYPE_SHA256,
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digest256.data());
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avb_slot_verify_data_calculate_vbmeta_digest(avbSlotData, AVB_DIGEST_TYPE_SHA512,
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digest512.data());
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ASSERT_TRUE((attestedVbmetaDigest_ == digest256) || (attestedVbmetaDigest_ == digest512))
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<< "Attested digest does not match computed digest.";
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}
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INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(BootloaderStateTest);
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