identity: VTS: allow for multiple interpretations of AuthKey validity.
Bug: 271948315 Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest (cherry picked from https://android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:719920700e0e8c0849ef25eeaad8de2bf2442b6e) Merged-In: Iedb9caad933b0df2b190915f5cc7177e507f15b5 Change-Id: I6599499e08db91729fe6898dbfa5ecb77450d11e
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1 changed files with 18 additions and 2 deletions
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@ -445,8 +445,24 @@ void verifyAuthKeyCertificate(const vector<uint8_t>& authKeyCertChain) {
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int64_t allowDriftSecs = 10;
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EXPECT_LE(-allowDriftSecs, diffSecs);
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EXPECT_GE(allowDriftSecs, diffSecs);
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constexpr uint64_t kSecsInOneYear = 365 * 24 * 60 * 60;
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EXPECT_EQ(notBefore + kSecsInOneYear, notAfter);
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// The AIDL spec used to call for "one year in the future (365
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// days)" but was updated to say "current time and 31536000
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// seconds in the future (approximately 365 days)" to clarify that
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// this was the original intention.
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//
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// However a number of implementations interpreted this as a
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// "literal year" which started causing problems in March 2023
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// because 2024 is a leap year. Since the extra day doesn't really
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// matter (the validity period is specified in the MSO anyway and
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// that's what RPs use), we allow both interpretations.
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//
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// For simplicity, we just require that that notAfter is after
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// 31536000 and which also covers the case if there's a leap-day
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// and possible leap-seconds.
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//
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constexpr uint64_t kSecsIn365Days = 365 * 24 * 60 * 60;
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EXPECT_LE(notBefore + kSecsIn365Days, notAfter);
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}
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vector<RequestNamespace> buildRequestNamespaces(const vector<TestEntryData> entries) {
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