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RKP HAL: fix typos

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Test: None, comment change only
Change-Id: I74ddad8ccf9f7e2d6ff2237dac32b94957a9161c
This commit is contained in:
David Drysdale 2022-08-30 16:33:13 +01:00
parent 5195a49c3c
commit 77f66a3ccc
1 changed files with 12 additions and 12 deletions
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24
security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
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@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ import android.hardware.security.keymint.RpcHardwareInfo;
* validate the request and create certificates.
*
* This interface does not provide any way to use the generated and certified key pairs. It's
* intended to be implemented by a HAL service that does other things with keys (e.g. Keymint).
* intended to be implemented by a HAL service that does other things with keys (e.g. KeyMint).
*
* The root of trust for secure provisioning is something called the Device Identifier Composition
* Engine (DICE) Chain. The DICE Chain is a chain of certificates, represented as COSE_Sign1 objects
@ -79,9 +79,9 @@ import android.hardware.security.keymint.RpcHardwareInfo;
* While a proper DICE Chain, as described above, reflects the complete boot sequence from boot ROM
* to the secure area image of the IRemotelyProvisionedComponent, it's also possible to use a
* "degenerate" DICE Chain which consists only of a single, self-signed certificate containing the
* public key of a hardware-bound key pair. This is an appopriate solution for devices which haven't
* implemented everything necessary to produce a proper DICE Chain, but can derive a unique key pair
* in the secure area. In this degenerate case, UDS_Pub is the same as CDI_Leaf_Pub.
* public key of a hardware-bound key pair. This is an appropriate solution for devices which
* haven't implemented everything necessary to produce a proper DICE Chain, but can derive a unique
* key pair in the secure area. In this degenerate case, UDS_Pub is the same as CDI_Leaf_Pub.
*
* DICE Chain Privacy
* ==================
@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent {
* If testMode is false, the keysToCertify array must not contain any keys flagged as
* test keys. Otherwise, the method must return STATUS_TEST_KEY_IN_PRODUCTION_REQUEST.
*
* @param in endpointEncryptionKey contains an X22519 public key which will be used to encrypt
* @param in endpointEncryptionKey contains an X25519 public key which will be used to encrypt
* the BCC. For flexibility, this is represented as a certificate chain, represented as a
* CBOR array of COSE_Sign1 objects, ordered from root to leaf. The leaf contains the
* X25519 encryption key, each other element is an Ed25519 key signing the next in the
@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent {
* -2 : bstr ; Ed25519 public key
* }
*
* SignatureKeyP256 = {
* SignatureKeyP256 = { ; COSE_Key
* 1 : 2, ; Key type : EC2
* 3 : AlgorithmES256, ; Algorithm
* -1 : 1, ; Curve: P256
@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent {
* 2 : bstr ; KID : EEK ID
* 3 : -25, ; Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
* -1 : 4, ; Curve : X25519
* -2 : bstr ; Ed25519 public key
* -2 : bstr ; X25519 public key
* }
*
* EekP256 = { ; COSE_Key
@ -246,8 +246,8 @@ interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent {
* payload: bstr .cbor EekX25519 / .cbor EekP256
* ]
*
* AlgorithmES256 = -7
* AlgorithmEdDSA = -8
* AlgorithmES256 = -7 ; RFC 8152 section 8.1
* AlgorithmEdDSA = -8 ; RFC 8152 section 8.2
*
* If the contents of endpointEncryptionKey do not match the SignedEek structure above,
* the method must return STATUS_INVALID_EEK.
@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent {
* in the chain, which implies that it must not attempt to validate the signature.
*
* If testMode is false, the method must validate the chain signatures, and must verify
* that the public key in the root certifictate is in its pre-configured set of
* that the public key in the root certificate is in its pre-configured set of
* authorized EEK root keys. If the public key is not in the database, or if signature
* verification fails, the method must return STATUS_INVALID_EEK.
*
@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent {
* @param out ProtectedData contains the encrypted BCC and the ephemeral MAC key used to
* authenticate the keysToSign (see keysToSignMac output argument).
*
* @return The of KeysToSign in the CertificateRequest structure. Specifically, it contains:
* @return The MAC of KeysToSign in the CertificateRequest structure. Specifically, it contains:
*
* HMAC-256(EK_mac, .cbor KeysToMacStructure)
*
@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent {
* ; intermediate certificates between Root and Leaf.
* ]
*
* ; A bstr containing a DER-encoded X.509 certificate (RSA, NIST P-curve, or edDSA)
* ; A bstr containing a DER-encoded X.509 certificate (RSA, NIST P-curve, or EdDSA)
* X509Certificate = bstr
*
* ; The DICE Chain contains measurements about the device firmware.