Merge "KM 4 tests for Root-of-Trust" am: 62d6a35dfc am: e8c50237d2 am: 96ba494049

Original change: https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/hardware/interfaces/+/2582033

Change-Id: Ib2575c4ecb6c6702f3e2db93ec11eed021d0de32
Signed-off-by: Automerger Merge Worker <android-build-automerger-merge-worker@system.gserviceaccount.com>
This commit is contained in:
Treehugger Robot 2023-05-11 22:31:07 +00:00 committed by Automerger Merge Worker
commit a0ca3e549b
5 changed files with 182 additions and 26 deletions

View file

@ -30,13 +30,17 @@ cc_test {
"keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp",
],
srcs: [
"BootloaderStateTest.cpp",
"HmacKeySharingTest.cpp",
"VerificationTokenTest.cpp",
"keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp",
],
static_libs: [
"android.hardware.keymaster@4.0",
"libavb_user",
"libavb",
"libcrypto_static",
"libfs_mgr",
"libkeymaster4support",
"libkeymaster4vtstest",
],
@ -64,6 +68,7 @@ cc_test_library {
],
static_libs: [
"android.hardware.keymaster@4.0",
"libcrypto_static",
"libkeymaster4support",
],
}

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@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
/*
* Copyright (C) 2023 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include <memory>
#include <optional>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include <android-base/properties.h>
#include <fstab/fstab.h>
#include <libavb/libavb.h>
#include <libavb_user/avb_ops_user.h>
#include "KeymasterHidlTest.h"
namespace android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::test {
using ::std::string;
using ::std::vector;
// Since this test needs to talk to Keymaster HAL, it can only run as root. Thus,
// bootloader can not be locked.
class BootloaderStateTest : public KeymasterHidlTest {
public:
virtual void SetUp() override {
KeymasterHidlTest::SetUp();
// Generate a key.
auto ec = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256));
ASSERT_EQ(ec, ErrorCode::OK) << "Failed to generate key.";
// Generate attestation.
hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
ec = AttestKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge"))
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("foo")),
&cert_chain);
ASSERT_EQ(ec, ErrorCode::OK) << "Failed to generate attestation.";
X509_Ptr cert(parse_cert_blob(cert_chain[0]));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert.get()) << "Failed to parse certificate blob.";
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = get_attestation_record(cert.get());
ASSERT_TRUE(attest_rec) << "Failed to get attestation record.";
// Parse root of trust.
HidlBuf verified_boot_key;
keymaster_verified_boot_t verified_boot_state;
bool device_locked;
HidlBuf verified_boot_hash;
auto result =
parse_root_of_trust(attest_rec->data, attest_rec->length, &verified_boot_key,
&verified_boot_state, &device_locked, &verified_boot_hash);
ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::OK) << "Failed to parse root of trust.";
}
hidl_vec<uint8_t> attestedVbKey_;
keymaster_verified_boot_t attestedVbState_;
bool attestedBootloaderState_;
hidl_vec<uint8_t> attestedVbmetaDigest_;
};
// Check that attested bootloader state is set to unlocked.
TEST_P(BootloaderStateTest, BootloaderIsUnlocked) {
ASSERT_FALSE(attestedBootloaderState_)
<< "This test runs as root. Bootloader must be unlocked.";
}
// Check that verified boot state is set to "unverified", i.e. "orange".
TEST_P(BootloaderStateTest, VbStateIsUnverified) {
// Unlocked bootloader implies that verified boot state must be "unverified".
ASSERT_EQ(attestedVbState_, KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_UNVERIFIED)
<< "Verified boot state must be \"UNVERIFIED\" aka \"orange\".";
// AVB spec stipulates that bootloader must set "androidboot.verifiedbootstate" parameter
// on the kernel command-line. This parameter is exposed to userspace as
// "ro.boot.verifiedbootstate" property.
auto vbStateProp = ::android::base::GetProperty("ro.boot.verifiedbootstate", "");
ASSERT_EQ(vbStateProp, "orange")
<< "Verified boot state must be \"UNVERIFIED\" aka \"orange\".";
}
// Following error codes from avb_slot_data() mean that slot data was loaded
// (even if verification failed).
static inline bool avb_slot_data_loaded(AvbSlotVerifyResult result) {
switch (result) {
case AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_OK:
case AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_ERROR_VERIFICATION:
case AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_ERROR_ROLLBACK_INDEX:
case AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_ERROR_PUBLIC_KEY_REJECTED:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
// Check that attested vbmeta digest is correct.
TEST_P(BootloaderStateTest, VbmetaDigest) {
AvbSlotVerifyData* avbSlotData;
auto suffix = fs_mgr_get_slot_suffix();
const char* partitions[] = {nullptr};
auto avbOps = avb_ops_user_new();
// For VTS, devices run with vendor_boot-debug.img, which is not release key
// signed. Use AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_FLAGS_ALLOW_VERIFICATION_ERROR to bypass avb
// verification errors. This is OK since we only care about the digest for
// this test case.
auto result = avb_slot_verify(avbOps, partitions, suffix.c_str(),
AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_FLAGS_ALLOW_VERIFICATION_ERROR,
AVB_HASHTREE_ERROR_MODE_EIO, &avbSlotData);
ASSERT_TRUE(avb_slot_data_loaded(result)) << "Failed to load avb slot data";
// Unfortunately, bootloader is not required to report the algorithm used
// to calculate the digest. There are only two supported options though,
// SHA256 and SHA512. Attested VBMeta digest must match one of these.
vector<uint8_t> digest256(AVB_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
vector<uint8_t> digest512(AVB_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE);
avb_slot_verify_data_calculate_vbmeta_digest(avbSlotData, AVB_DIGEST_TYPE_SHA256,
digest256.data());
avb_slot_verify_data_calculate_vbmeta_digest(avbSlotData, AVB_DIGEST_TYPE_SHA512,
digest512.data());
ASSERT_TRUE((attestedVbmetaDigest_ == digest256) || (attestedVbmetaDigest_ == digest512))
<< "Attested digest does not match computed digest.";
}
INSTANTIATE_KEYMASTER_HIDL_TEST(BootloaderStateTest);
} // namespace android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::test

View file

@ -841,6 +841,30 @@ std::vector<Digest> KeymasterHidlTest::InvalidDigests() {
return {};
}
X509* parse_cert_blob(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& blob) {
const uint8_t* p = blob.data();
return d2i_X509(nullptr, &p, blob.size());
}
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* get_attestation_record(X509* certificate) {
ASN1_OBJECT_Ptr oid(OBJ_txt2obj(kAttestionRecordOid, 1 /* dotted string format */));
EXPECT_TRUE(!!oid.get());
if (!oid.get()) return nullptr;
int location = X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(certificate, oid.get(), -1 /* search from beginning */);
EXPECT_NE(-1, location) << "Attestation extension not found in certificate";
if (location == -1) return nullptr;
X509_EXTENSION* attest_rec_ext = X509_get_ext(certificate, location);
EXPECT_TRUE(!!attest_rec_ext)
<< "Found attestation extension but couldn't retrieve it? Probably a BoringSSL bug.";
if (!attest_rec_ext) return nullptr;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(attest_rec_ext);
EXPECT_TRUE(!!attest_rec) << "Attestation extension contained no data";
return attest_rec;
}
} // namespace test
} // namespace V4_0
} // namespace keymaster

View file

@ -22,7 +22,9 @@
#include <hidl/GtestPrinter.h>
#include <hidl/ServiceManagement.h>
#include <keymasterV4_0/attestation_record.h>
#include <keymasterV4_0/authorization_set.h>
#include <keymasterV4_0/openssl_utils.h>
namespace android {
namespace hardware {
@ -241,6 +243,11 @@ class KeymasterHidlTest : public ::testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
testing::ValuesIn(KeymasterHidlTest::build_params()), \
android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString)
X509* parse_cert_blob(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& blob);
// Extract attestation record from cert. Returned object is still part of cert; don't free it
// separately.
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* get_attestation_record(X509* certificate);
} // namespace test
} // namespace V4_0
} // namespace keymaster

View file

@ -263,11 +263,6 @@ struct RSA_Delete {
void operator()(RSA* p) { RSA_free(p); }
};
X509* parse_cert_blob(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& blob) {
const uint8_t* p = blob.data();
return d2i_X509(nullptr, &p, blob.size());
}
bool verify_chain(const hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>>& chain, const std::string& msg,
const std::string& signature) {
{
@ -337,27 +332,6 @@ bool verify_chain(const hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>>& chain, const std::string& m
return true;
}
// Extract attestation record from cert. Returned object is still part of cert; don't free it
// separately.
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* get_attestation_record(X509* certificate) {
ASN1_OBJECT_Ptr oid(OBJ_txt2obj(kAttestionRecordOid, 1 /* dotted string format */));
EXPECT_TRUE(!!oid.get());
if (!oid.get()) return nullptr;
int location = X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(certificate, oid.get(), -1 /* search from beginning */);
EXPECT_NE(-1, location) << "Attestation extension not found in certificate";
if (location == -1) return nullptr;
X509_EXTENSION* attest_rec_ext = X509_get_ext(certificate, location);
EXPECT_TRUE(!!attest_rec_ext)
<< "Found attestation extension but couldn't retrieve it? Probably a BoringSSL bug.";
if (!attest_rec_ext) return nullptr;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(attest_rec_ext);
EXPECT_TRUE(!!attest_rec) << "Attestation extension contained no data";
return attest_rec;
}
bool tag_in_list(const KeyParameter& entry) {
// Attestations don't contain everything in key authorization lists, so we need to filter
// the key lists to produce the lists that we expect to match the attestations.