Add new SecurityLevel::KEYSTORE
We need a way to distinguish between tags that are enforced by KeyMint with security level "SOFTWARE" and tags that are not enforced by KeyMint but are expected to be enforced by KEYSTORE. Test: VtsAidlKeyMintTargetTest Change-Id: I9f414bec43959577a50d49146029c9edb031be56
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3 changed files with 50 additions and 4 deletions
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@ -22,4 +22,5 @@ enum SecurityLevel {
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SOFTWARE = 0,
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TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT = 1,
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STRONGBOX = 2,
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KEYSTORE = 100,
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}
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@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ parcelable KeyCreationResult {
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* deciding whether a given tag from `keyParams` argument to the generation/import method should
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* be returned in `keyCharacteristics` are:
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*
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* - If the IKeyMintDevice cannot fully enforce the semantics of the tag, it should be omitted.
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* - If the semantics of the tag are fully enforced by the IKeyMintDevice, without any
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* assistance from components running at other security levels, it should be included in an
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* entry with the SecurityLevel of the IKeyMintDevice.
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@ -45,6 +44,9 @@ parcelable KeyCreationResult {
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* SecurityLevel of the involved components. For example if a StrongBox IKeyMintDevice relies
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* on a TEE to validate biometric authentication, biometric authentication tags go in an entry
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* with SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT.
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* - If the semantics are not enforced by KeyMint at all, SecurityLevel::KEYSTORE is used to
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* indicate that Keystore should enforce. Note that in Keymaster (predecessor to KeyMint),
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* these tags would have been in SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE.
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*/
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KeyCharacteristics[] keyCharacteristics;
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@ -17,16 +17,59 @@
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package android.hardware.security.keymint;
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/**
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* Device security levels.
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* Device security levels. These enum values are used in two ways:
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*
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* 1. Returned from IKeyMintDevice::getHardwareInfo to identify the security level of the
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* IKeyMintDevice. This characterizes the sort of environment in which the KeyMint
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* implementation runs, and therefore the security of its operations.
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*
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* 2. Associated with individual KeyMint authorization Tags in KeyCharacteristics or in attestation
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* certificates. This specifies the security level of the weakest environment involved in
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* enforcing that particular tag, i.e. the sort of security environment an attacker would have
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* to subvert in order to break the enforcement of that tag.
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*/
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@VintfStability
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@Backing(type="int")
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enum SecurityLevel {
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/**
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* The SOFTWARE security level represents a KeyMint implementation that runs in an Android
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* process, or a tag enforced by such an implementation. An attacker who can compromise that
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* process, or obtain root, or subvert the kernel on the device can defeat it.
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*
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* Note that the distinction between SOFTWARE and KEYSTORE is only relevant on-device. For
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* attestation purposes, these categories are combined into the software-enforced authorization
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* list.
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*/
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SOFTWARE = 0,
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/**
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* The TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT security level represents a KeyMint implementation that runs in an
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* Android process, or a tag enforced by such an implementation. An attacker who completely
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* compromises Android, including the Linux kernel, does not have the ability to subvert it. At
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* attacker who can find an exploit that gains them control of the trusted environment, or who
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* has access to the physical device and can mount a sophisticated hardware attack, may be able
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* to defeat it.
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*/
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TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT = 1,
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/**
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* STRONGBOX specifies that the secure hardware satisfies the requirements specified in CDD
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* 9.11.2.
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* The STRONGBOX security level represents a KeyMint implementation that runs in security
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* hardware that satisfies the requirements specified in CDD 9.11.2. Roughly speaking, these
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* are discrete, security-focus computing environments that are hardened against physical and
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* side channel attack, and have had their security formally validated by a competent
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* penetration testing lab.
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*/
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STRONGBOX = 2,
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/**
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* KeyMint implementations must never return the KEYSTORE security level from getHardwareInfo.
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* It is used to specify tags that are not enforced by the IKeyMintDevice, but are instead
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* to be enforced by Keystore. An attacker who can subvert the keystore process or gain root or
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* subvert the kernel can prevent proper enforcement of these tags.
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*
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*
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* Note that the distinction between SOFTWARE and KEYSTORE is only relevant on-device. When
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* KeyMint generates an attestation certificate, these categories are combined into the
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* software-enforced authorization list.
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*/
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KEYSTORE = 100
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}
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