Merge changes from topic "keymint_aidl_impl" am: 34a7139467

Original change: https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/hardware/interfaces/+/1570080

MUST ONLY BE SUBMITTED BY AUTOMERGER

Change-Id: I5a8050d780bc01a27551a99ce74967053bd8cc6f
This commit is contained in:
Treehugger Robot 2021-02-13 22:40:09 +00:00 committed by Automerger Merge Worker
commit d224907547
7 changed files with 273 additions and 18 deletions

View file

@ -43,5 +43,7 @@ interface IKeyMintDevice {
void deleteAllKeys();
void destroyAttestationIds();
android.hardware.security.keymint.BeginResult begin(in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose inPurpose, in byte[] inKeyBlob, in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter[] inParams, in android.hardware.security.keymint.HardwareAuthToken inAuthToken);
void deviceLocked(in boolean passwordOnly, in @nullable android.hardware.security.secureclock.TimeStampToken timestampToken);
void earlyBootEnded();
const int AUTH_TOKEN_MAC_LENGTH = 32;
}

View file

@ -37,4 +37,5 @@ parcelable KeyMintHardwareInfo {
android.hardware.security.keymint.SecurityLevel securityLevel;
@utf8InCpp String keyMintName;
@utf8InCpp String keyMintAuthorName;
boolean timestampTokenRequired;
}

View file

@ -22,10 +22,11 @@ import android.hardware.security.keymint.HardwareAuthToken;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.IKeyMintOperation;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyCreationResult;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyFormat;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyMintHardwareInfo;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.SecurityLevel;
import android.hardware.security.secureclock.TimeStampToken;
/**
* KeyMint device definition.
@ -346,8 +347,8 @@ interface IKeyMintDevice {
*
* @return The result of key creation. See KeyCreationResult.aidl.
*/
KeyCreationResult importKey(in KeyParameter[] keyParams, in KeyFormat keyFormat,
in byte[] keyData);
KeyCreationResult importKey(
in KeyParameter[] keyParams, in KeyFormat keyFormat, in byte[] keyData);
/**
* Securely imports a key, or key pair, returning a key blob and a description of the imported
@ -429,11 +430,8 @@ interface IKeyMintDevice {
*
* @return The result of key creation. See KeyCreationResult.aidl.
*/
KeyCreationResult importWrappedKey(in byte[] wrappedKeyData,
in byte[] wrappingKeyBlob,
in byte[] maskingKey,
in KeyParameter[] unwrappingParams,
in long passwordSid,
KeyCreationResult importWrappedKey(in byte[] wrappedKeyData, in byte[] wrappingKeyBlob,
in byte[] maskingKey, in KeyParameter[] unwrappingParams, in long passwordSid,
in long biometricSid);
/**
@ -705,8 +703,44 @@ interface IKeyMintDevice {
* from operations that generate an IV or nonce, and IKeyMintOperation object pointer
* which is used to perform update(), finish() or abort() operations.
*/
BeginResult begin(in KeyPurpose inPurpose,
in byte[] inKeyBlob,
in KeyParameter[] inParams,
BeginResult begin(in KeyPurpose inPurpose, in byte[] inKeyBlob, in KeyParameter[] inParams,
in HardwareAuthToken inAuthToken);
/**
* Called by client to notify the IKeyMintDevice that the device is now locked, and keys with
* the UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED tag should no longer be usable. When this function is called,
* the IKeyMintDevice should note the current timestamp, and attempts to use
* UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED keys must be rejected with Error::DEVICE_LOCKED until an
* authentication token with a later timestamp is presented. If the `passwordOnly' argument is
* set to true the sufficiently-recent authentication token must indicate that the user
* authenticated with a password, not a biometric.
*
* Note that the IKeyMintDevice UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED semantics are slightly different from
* the UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED semantics enforced by keystore. Keystore handles device locking
* on a per-user basis. Because auth tokens do not contain an Android user ID, it's not
* possible to replicate the keystore enformcement logic in IKeyMintDevice. So from the
* IKeyMintDevice perspective, any user unlock unlocks all UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED keys.
* Keystore will continue enforcing the per-user device locking.
*
* @param passwordOnly specifies whether the device must be unlocked with a password, rather
* than a biometric, before UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED keys can be used.
*
* @param timestampToken is used by StrongBox implementations of IKeyMintDevice. It
* provides the StrongBox IKeyMintDevice with a fresh, MACed timestamp which it can use as the
* device-lock time, for future comparison against auth tokens when operations using
* UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED keys are attempted. Unless the auth token timestamp is newer than
* the timestamp in the timestampToken, the device is still considered to be locked.
* Crucially, if a StrongBox IKeyMintDevice receives a deviceLocked() call with a timestampToken
* timestamp that is less than the timestamp in the last deviceLocked() call, it must ignore the
* new timestamp. TEE IKeyMintDevice implementations will receive an empty timestampToken (zero
* values and empty vectors) and should use their own clock as the device-lock time.
*/
void deviceLocked(in boolean passwordOnly, in @nullable TimeStampToken timestampToken);
/**
* Called by client to notify the IKeyMintDevice that the device has left the early boot
* state, and that keys with the EARLY_BOOT_ONLY tag may no longer be used. All attempts to use
* an EARLY_BOOT_ONLY key after this method is called must fail with Error::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
*/
void earlyBootEnded();
}

View file

@ -45,4 +45,11 @@ parcelable KeyMintHardwareInfo {
* same author.
*/
@utf8InCpp String keyMintAuthorName;
/* The timestampTokenRequired is a boolean flag, which when true reflects that IKeyMintDevice
* instance will expect a valid TimeStampToken with various operations. This will typically
* required by the StrongBox implementations that generally don't have secure clock hardware to
* generate timestamp tokens.
*/
boolean timestampTokenRequired;
}

View file

@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ using std::optional;
namespace test {
namespace {
typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase::KeyData KeyData;
// Predicate for testing basic characteristics validity in generation or import.
bool KeyCharacteristicsBasicallyValid(SecurityLevel secLevel,
const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics) {
@ -461,6 +461,34 @@ void KeyMintAidlTestBase::AbortIfNeeded() {
}
}
auto KeyMintAidlTestBase::ProcessMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, KeyPurpose operation,
const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& in_params)
-> std::tuple<ErrorCode, string, AuthorizationSet /* out_params */> {
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
ErrorCode result = Begin(operation, key_blob, in_params, &begin_out_params);
AuthorizationSet out_params(std::move(begin_out_params));
if (result != ErrorCode::OK) {
return {result, {}, out_params};
}
string output;
int32_t consumed = 0;
AuthorizationSet update_params;
AuthorizationSet update_out_params;
result = Update(update_params, message, &update_out_params, &output, &consumed);
out_params.push_back(update_out_params);
if (result != ErrorCode::OK) {
return {result, output, out_params};
}
string unused;
AuthorizationSet finish_params;
AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
result = Finish(finish_params, message.substr(consumed), unused, &finish_out_params, &output);
out_params.push_back(finish_out_params);
return {result, output, out_params};
}
string KeyMintAidlTestBase::ProcessMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, KeyPurpose operation,
const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
AuthorizationSet* out_params) {
@ -859,6 +887,35 @@ AuthorizationSet KeyMintAidlTestBase::SwEnforcedAuthorizations(
return authList;
}
ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::UseAesKey(const vector<uint8_t>& aesKeyBlob) {
auto [result, ciphertext, out_params] = ProcessMessage(
aesKeyBlob, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, "1234567890123456",
AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
return result;
}
ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::UseHmacKey(const vector<uint8_t>& hmacKeyBlob) {
auto [result, mac, out_params] = ProcessMessage(
hmacKeyBlob, KeyPurpose::SIGN, "1234567890123456",
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128).Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256));
return result;
}
ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::UseRsaKey(const vector<uint8_t>& rsaKeyBlob) {
std::string message(2048 / 8, 'a');
auto [result, signature, out_params] = ProcessMessage(
rsaKeyBlob, KeyPurpose::SIGN, message,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
return result;
}
ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::UseEcdsaKey(const vector<uint8_t>& ecdsaKeyBlob) {
auto [result, signature, out_params] =
ProcessMessage(ecdsaKeyBlob, KeyPurpose::SIGN, "a",
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256));
return result;
}
} // namespace test
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint

View file

@ -43,6 +43,11 @@ constexpr uint64_t kOpHandleSentinel = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF;
class KeyMintAidlTestBase : public ::testing::TestWithParam<string> {
public:
struct KeyData {
vector<uint8_t> blob;
vector<KeyCharacteristics> characteristics;
};
void SetUp() override;
void TearDown() override {
if (key_blob_.size()) {
@ -61,7 +66,6 @@ class KeyMintAidlTestBase : public ::testing::TestWithParam<string> {
vector<KeyCharacteristics>* key_characteristics);
ErrorCode GenerateKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc);
ErrorCode ImportKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc, KeyFormat format,
const string& key_material, vector<uint8_t>* key_blob,
vector<KeyCharacteristics>* key_characteristics);
@ -106,7 +110,9 @@ class KeyMintAidlTestBase : public ::testing::TestWithParam<string> {
string ProcessMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, KeyPurpose operation,
const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
AuthorizationSet* out_params);
std::tuple<ErrorCode, std::string /* processedMessage */, AuthorizationSet /* out_params */>
ProcessMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, KeyPurpose operation,
const std::string& message, const AuthorizationSet& in_params);
string SignMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& message,
const AuthorizationSet& params);
string SignMessage(const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& params);
@ -149,6 +155,56 @@ class KeyMintAidlTestBase : public ::testing::TestWithParam<string> {
std::pair<ErrorCode, vector<uint8_t>> UpgradeKey(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob);
template <typename TagType>
std::tuple<KeyData /* aesKey */, KeyData /* hmacKey */, KeyData /* rsaKey */,
KeyData /* ecdsaKey */>
CreateTestKeys(TagType tagToTest, ErrorCode expectedReturn) {
/* AES */
KeyData aesKeyData;
ErrorCode errorCode = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(tagToTest)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
&aesKeyData.blob, &aesKeyData.characteristics);
EXPECT_EQ(expectedReturn, errorCode);
/* HMAC */
KeyData hmacKeyData;
errorCode = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.HmacKey(128)
.Authorization(tagToTest)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
&hmacKeyData.blob, &hmacKeyData.characteristics);
EXPECT_EQ(expectedReturn, errorCode);
/* RSA */
KeyData rsaKeyData;
errorCode = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Authorization(tagToTest)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.SetDefaultValidity(),
&rsaKeyData.blob, &rsaKeyData.characteristics);
EXPECT_EQ(expectedReturn, errorCode);
/* ECDSA */
KeyData ecdsaKeyData;
errorCode = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.EcdsaSigningKey(256)
.Authorization(tagToTest)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.SetDefaultValidity(),
&ecdsaKeyData.blob, &ecdsaKeyData.characteristics);
EXPECT_EQ(expectedReturn, errorCode);
return {aesKeyData, hmacKeyData, rsaKeyData, ecdsaKeyData};
}
bool IsSecure() const { return securityLevel_ != SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE; }
SecurityLevel SecLevel() const { return securityLevel_; }
@ -182,6 +238,10 @@ class KeyMintAidlTestBase : public ::testing::TestWithParam<string> {
const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics);
AuthorizationSet SwEnforcedAuthorizations(
const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics);
ErrorCode UseAesKey(const vector<uint8_t>& aesKeyBlob);
ErrorCode UseHmacKey(const vector<uint8_t>& hmacKeyBlob);
ErrorCode UseRsaKey(const vector<uint8_t>& rsaKeyBlob);
ErrorCode UseEcdsaKey(const vector<uint8_t>& ecdsaKeyBlob);
private:
std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice> keymint_;

View file

@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test {
namespace {
template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag, typename ValueT>
bool contains(vector<KeyParameter>& set, TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag, ValueT expected_value) {
bool contains(const vector<KeyParameter>& set, TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag,
ValueT expected_value) {
auto it = std::find_if(set.begin(), set.end(), [&](const KeyParameter& param) {
if (auto p = authorizationValue(ttag, param)) {
return *p == expected_value;
@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ bool contains(vector<KeyParameter>& set, TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag, ValueT ex
}
template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag>
bool contains(vector<KeyParameter>& set, TypedTag<tag_type, tag>) {
bool contains(const vector<KeyParameter>& set, TypedTag<tag_type, tag>) {
auto it = std::find_if(set.begin(), set.end(),
[&](const KeyParameter& param) { return param.tag == tag; });
return (it != set.end());
@ -4961,6 +4962,99 @@ TEST_P(KeyAgreementTest, Ecdh) {
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(KeyAgreementTest);
typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase EarlyBootKeyTest;
TEST_P(EarlyBootKeyTest, CreateEarlyBootKeys) {
auto [aesKeyData, hmacKeyData, rsaKeyData, ecdsaKeyData] =
CreateTestKeys(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, ErrorCode::OK);
CheckedDeleteKey(&aesKeyData.blob);
CheckedDeleteKey(&hmacKeyData.blob);
CheckedDeleteKey(&rsaKeyData.blob);
CheckedDeleteKey(&ecdsaKeyData.blob);
}
// This is a more comprenhensive test, but it can only be run on a machine which is still in early
// boot stage, which no proper Android device is by the time we can run VTS. To use this,
// un-disable it and modify vold to remove the call to earlyBootEnded(). Running the test will end
// early boot, so you'll have to reboot between runs.
TEST_P(EarlyBootKeyTest, DISABLED_FullTest) {
auto [aesKeyData, hmacKeyData, rsaKeyData, ecdsaKeyData] =
CreateTestKeys(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, ErrorCode::OK);
// TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY should be in hw-enforced.
EXPECT_TRUE(HwEnforcedAuthorizations(aesKeyData.characteristics).Contains(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY));
EXPECT_TRUE(
HwEnforcedAuthorizations(hmacKeyData.characteristics).Contains(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY));
EXPECT_TRUE(HwEnforcedAuthorizations(rsaKeyData.characteristics).Contains(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY));
EXPECT_TRUE(
HwEnforcedAuthorizations(ecdsaKeyData.characteristics).Contains(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY));
// Should be able to use keys, since early boot has not ended
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, UseAesKey(aesKeyData.blob));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, UseHmacKey(hmacKeyData.blob));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, UseRsaKey(rsaKeyData.blob));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, UseEcdsaKey(ecdsaKeyData.blob));
// End early boot
ErrorCode earlyBootResult = GetReturnErrorCode(keyMint().earlyBootEnded());
EXPECT_EQ(earlyBootResult, ErrorCode::OK);
// Should not be able to use already-created keys.
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::EARLY_BOOT_ENDED, UseAesKey(aesKeyData.blob));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::EARLY_BOOT_ENDED, UseHmacKey(hmacKeyData.blob));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::EARLY_BOOT_ENDED, UseRsaKey(rsaKeyData.blob));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::EARLY_BOOT_ENDED, UseEcdsaKey(ecdsaKeyData.blob));
CheckedDeleteKey(&aesKeyData.blob);
CheckedDeleteKey(&hmacKeyData.blob);
CheckedDeleteKey(&rsaKeyData.blob);
CheckedDeleteKey(&ecdsaKeyData.blob);
// Should not be able to create new keys
std::tie(aesKeyData, hmacKeyData, rsaKeyData, ecdsaKeyData) =
CreateTestKeys(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, ErrorCode::EARLY_BOOT_ENDED);
CheckedDeleteKey(&aesKeyData.blob);
CheckedDeleteKey(&hmacKeyData.blob);
CheckedDeleteKey(&rsaKeyData.blob);
CheckedDeleteKey(&ecdsaKeyData.blob);
}
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(EarlyBootKeyTest);
typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase UnlockedDeviceRequiredTest;
// This may be a problematic test. It can't be run repeatedly without unlocking the device in
// between runs... and on most test devices there are no enrolled credentials so it can't be
// unlocked at all, meaning the only way to get the test to pass again on a properly-functioning
// device is to reboot it. For that reason, this is disabled by default. It can be used as part of
// a manual test process, which includes unlocking between runs, which is why it's included here.
// Well, that and the fact that it's the only test we can do without also making calls into the
// Gatekeeper HAL. We haven't written any cross-HAL tests, and don't know what all of the
// implications might be, so that may or may not be a solution.
TEST_P(UnlockedDeviceRequiredTest, DISABLED_KeysBecomeUnusable) {
auto [aesKeyData, hmacKeyData, rsaKeyData, ecdsaKeyData] =
CreateTestKeys(TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED, ErrorCode::OK);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, UseAesKey(aesKeyData.blob));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, UseHmacKey(hmacKeyData.blob));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, UseRsaKey(rsaKeyData.blob));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, UseEcdsaKey(ecdsaKeyData.blob));
ErrorCode rc = GetReturnErrorCode(
keyMint().deviceLocked(false /* passwordOnly */, {} /* verificationToken */));
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, rc);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::DEVICE_LOCKED, UseAesKey(aesKeyData.blob));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::DEVICE_LOCKED, UseHmacKey(hmacKeyData.blob));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::DEVICE_LOCKED, UseRsaKey(rsaKeyData.blob));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::DEVICE_LOCKED, UseEcdsaKey(ecdsaKeyData.blob));
CheckedDeleteKey(&aesKeyData.blob);
CheckedDeleteKey(&hmacKeyData.blob);
CheckedDeleteKey(&rsaKeyData.blob);
CheckedDeleteKey(&ecdsaKeyData.blob);
}
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(UnlockedDeviceRequiredTest);
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test
int main(int argc, char** argv) {