Merge changes from topic "ic-hal-v2-rvc" into rvc-dev

* changes:
  Identity Credential: Add method to accept verification token.
  Identity Credential: Pass additional information to HAL.
This commit is contained in:
David Zeuthen 2020-05-28 22:04:19 +00:00 committed by Android (Google) Code Review
commit fc7b29c5a0
41 changed files with 1070 additions and 53 deletions

View file

@ -18,5 +18,8 @@ aidl_interface {
},
},
},
versions: ["1"],
versions: [
"1",
"2",
],
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1 @@
194e04be642728623d65ec8321a3764fdea52ae0

View file

@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
// breakage is intended.
//
// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
package android.hardware.identity;
@VintfStability
parcelable Certificate {
byte[] encodedCertificate;
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
// breakage is intended.
//
// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
package android.hardware.identity;
@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
enum CipherSuite {
CIPHERSUITE_ECDHE_HKDF_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA256 = 1,
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
// breakage is intended.
//
// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
package android.hardware.identity;
@VintfStability
parcelable HardwareInformation {
@utf8InCpp String credentialStoreName;
@utf8InCpp String credentialStoreAuthorName;
int dataChunkSize;
boolean isDirectAccess;
@utf8InCpp String[] supportedDocTypes;
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
// breakage is intended.
//
// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
package android.hardware.identity;
@VintfStability
interface IIdentityCredential {
byte[] deleteCredential();
byte[] createEphemeralKeyPair();
void setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(in byte[] publicKey);
long createAuthChallenge();
void startRetrieval(in android.hardware.identity.SecureAccessControlProfile[] accessControlProfiles, in android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthToken authToken, in byte[] itemsRequest, in byte[] signingKeyBlob, in byte[] sessionTranscript, in byte[] readerSignature, in int[] requestCounts);
void startRetrieveEntryValue(in @utf8InCpp String nameSpace, in @utf8InCpp String name, in int entrySize, in int[] accessControlProfileIds);
byte[] retrieveEntryValue(in byte[] encryptedContent);
void finishRetrieval(out byte[] mac, out byte[] deviceNameSpaces);
android.hardware.identity.Certificate generateSigningKeyPair(out byte[] signingKeyBlob);
void setRequestedNamespaces(in android.hardware.identity.RequestNamespace[] requestNamespaces);
void setVerificationToken(in android.hardware.keymaster.VerificationToken verificationToken);
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
// breakage is intended.
//
// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
package android.hardware.identity;
@VintfStability
interface IIdentityCredentialStore {
android.hardware.identity.HardwareInformation getHardwareInformation();
android.hardware.identity.IWritableIdentityCredential createCredential(in @utf8InCpp String docType, in boolean testCredential);
android.hardware.identity.IIdentityCredential getCredential(in android.hardware.identity.CipherSuite cipherSuite, in byte[] credentialData);
const int STATUS_OK = 0;
const int STATUS_FAILED = 1;
const int STATUS_CIPHER_SUITE_NOT_SUPPORTED = 2;
const int STATUS_INVALID_DATA = 3;
const int STATUS_INVALID_AUTH_TOKEN = 4;
const int STATUS_INVALID_ITEMS_REQUEST_MESSAGE = 5;
const int STATUS_READER_SIGNATURE_CHECK_FAILED = 6;
const int STATUS_EPHEMERAL_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_FOUND = 7;
const int STATUS_USER_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED = 8;
const int STATUS_READER_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED = 9;
const int STATUS_NO_ACCESS_CONTROL_PROFILES = 10;
const int STATUS_NOT_IN_REQUEST_MESSAGE = 11;
const int STATUS_SESSION_TRANSCRIPT_MISMATCH = 12;
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
// breakage is intended.
//
// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
package android.hardware.identity;
@VintfStability
interface IWritableIdentityCredential {
android.hardware.identity.Certificate[] getAttestationCertificate(in byte[] attestationApplicationId, in byte[] attestationChallenge);
void startPersonalization(in int accessControlProfileCount, in int[] entryCounts);
android.hardware.identity.SecureAccessControlProfile addAccessControlProfile(in int id, in android.hardware.identity.Certificate readerCertificate, in boolean userAuthenticationRequired, in long timeoutMillis, in long secureUserId);
void beginAddEntry(in int[] accessControlProfileIds, in @utf8InCpp String nameSpace, in @utf8InCpp String name, in int entrySize);
byte[] addEntryValue(in byte[] content);
void finishAddingEntries(out byte[] credentialData, out byte[] proofOfProvisioningSignature);
void setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(in int expectedProofOfProvisioningSize);
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
// breakage is intended.
//
// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
package android.hardware.identity;
@VintfStability
parcelable RequestDataItem {
@utf8InCpp String name;
long size;
int[] accessControlProfileIds;
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
// breakage is intended.
//
// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
package android.hardware.identity;
@VintfStability
parcelable RequestNamespace {
@utf8InCpp String namespaceName;
android.hardware.identity.RequestDataItem[] items;
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
// breakage is intended.
//
// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
package android.hardware.identity;
@VintfStability
parcelable SecureAccessControlProfile {
int id;
android.hardware.identity.Certificate readerCertificate;
boolean userAuthenticationRequired;
long timeoutMillis;
long secureUserId;
byte[] mac;
}

View file

@ -27,4 +27,6 @@ interface IIdentityCredential {
byte[] retrieveEntryValue(in byte[] encryptedContent);
void finishRetrieval(out byte[] mac, out byte[] deviceNameSpaces);
android.hardware.identity.Certificate generateSigningKeyPair(out byte[] signingKeyBlob);
void setRequestedNamespaces(in android.hardware.identity.RequestNamespace[] requestNamespaces);
void setVerificationToken(in android.hardware.keymaster.VerificationToken verificationToken);
}

View file

@ -24,4 +24,5 @@ interface IWritableIdentityCredential {
void beginAddEntry(in int[] accessControlProfileIds, in @utf8InCpp String nameSpace, in @utf8InCpp String name, in int entrySize);
byte[] addEntryValue(in byte[] content);
void finishAddingEntries(out byte[] credentialData, out byte[] proofOfProvisioningSignature);
void setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(in int expectedProofOfProvisioningSize);
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
// breakage is intended.
//
// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
package android.hardware.identity;
@VintfStability
parcelable RequestDataItem {
@utf8InCpp String name;
long size;
int[] accessControlProfileIds;
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
// breakage is intended.
//
// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
package android.hardware.identity;
@VintfStability
parcelable RequestNamespace {
@utf8InCpp String namespaceName;
android.hardware.identity.RequestDataItem[] items;
}

View file

@ -17,8 +17,10 @@
package android.hardware.identity;
import android.hardware.identity.Certificate;
import android.hardware.identity.RequestNamespace;
import android.hardware.identity.SecureAccessControlProfile;
import android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthToken;
import android.hardware.keymaster.VerificationToken;
@VintfStability
interface IIdentityCredential {
@ -70,10 +72,11 @@ interface IIdentityCredential {
/**
* Creates a challenge value to be used for proving successful user authentication. This
* is included in the authToken passed to the startRetrieval() method.
* is included in the authToken passed to the startRetrieval() method and the
* verificationToken passed to the setVerificationToken() method.
*
* This method may only be called once per instance. If called more than once, STATUS_FAILED
* will be returned.
* will be returned. If user authentication is not needed, this method may not be called.
*
* @return challenge, a non-zero number.
*/
@ -82,6 +85,9 @@ interface IIdentityCredential {
/**
* Start an entry retrieval process.
*
* The setRequestedNamespaces() and setVerificationToken() methods will be called before
* this method is called.
*
* This method be called after createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(),
* createAuthChallenge() and before startRetrieveEntry(). This method call is followed by
* multiple calls of startRetrieveEntryValue(), retrieveEntryValue(), and finally
@ -93,7 +99,19 @@ interface IIdentityCredential {
* must be identical for each startRetrieval() invocation. If this is not the case, this call
* fails with the STATUS_SESSION_TRANSCRIPT_MISMATCH error.
*
* If the provided authToken is not valid this method fails with STATUS_INVALID_AUTH_TOKEN.
* If either authToken or verificationToken (as passed with setVerificationToken())
* is not valid this method fails with STATUS_INVALID_AUTH_TOKEN. Note that valid tokens
* are only passed if they are actually needed and available (this can be detected by
* the timestamp being set to zero). For example, if no data items with access control
* profiles using user authentication are requested, the tokens are not filled in.
* It's also possible that no usable auth token is actually available (it could be the user
* never unlocked the device within the timeouts in the access control profiles) and
* in this case the tokens aren't filled in either.
*
* For test credentials (identified by the testCredential boolean in the CredentialData
* CBOR created at provisioning time), the |mac| field in both the authToken and
* verificationToken should not be checked against the shared HMAC key (see IKeyMasterDevice
* for details). This is to enable VTS tests to check for correct behavior.
*
* Each of the provided accessControlProfiles is checked in this call. If they are not
* all valid, the call fails with STATUS_INVALID_DATA.
@ -176,7 +194,8 @@ interface IIdentityCredential {
*
* @param authToken
* The authentication token that proves the user was authenticated, as required
* by one or more of the provided accessControlProfiles. See above.
* by one or more of the provided accessControlProfiles. This token is only valid
* if the timestamp field is non-zero. See above.
*
* @param itemsRequest
* If non-empty, contains request data that is signed by the reader. See above.
@ -274,7 +293,7 @@ interface IIdentityCredential {
* "DeviceAuthentication",
* SessionTranscript,
* DocType,
* DeviceNameSpaceBytes,
* DeviceNameSpacesBytes,
* ]
*
* DocType = tstr
@ -343,4 +362,25 @@ interface IIdentityCredential {
* @return an X.509 certificate for the new signing key, signed by the credential key.
*/
Certificate generateSigningKeyPair(out byte[] signingKeyBlob);
/**
* Sets the namespaces and data items (including their size and access control profiles)
* which will be requested. This method must be called before startRetrieval() is called.
*
* This information is provided to make it possible for a HAL implementation to
* incrementally build up cryptographically authenticated data which includes the
* DeviceNameSpaces CBOR.
*
* @param requestNamespaces Namespaces and data items which will be requested.
*/
void setRequestedNamespaces(in RequestNamespace[] requestNamespaces);
/**
* Sets the VerificationToken. This method must be called before startRetrieval() is
* called. This token uses the same challenge as returned by createAuthChallenge().
*
* @param verificationToken
* The verification token. This token is only valid if the timestamp field is non-zero.
*/
void setVerificationToken(in VerificationToken verificationToken);
}

View file

@ -120,6 +120,8 @@ interface IWritableIdentityCredential {
*
* startPersonalization must not be called more than once.
*
* The setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize() method will be called before this method.
*
* @param accessControlProfileCount specifies the number of access control profiles that will
* be provisioned with addAccessControlProfile().
*
@ -288,4 +290,16 @@ interface IWritableIdentityCredential {
*/
void finishAddingEntries(out byte[] credentialData,
out byte[] proofOfProvisioningSignature);
/**
* Sets the expected size of the ProofOfProvisioning returned by finishAddingEntries(). This
* method must be called before startPersonalization() is called.
*
* This information is provided to make it possible for a HAL implementation to
* incrementally build up cryptographically authenticated data which includes the
* ProofOfProvisioning CBOR.
*
* @param expectedProofOfProvisioningSize the expected size of ProofOfProvisioning.
*/
void setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(in int expectedProofOfProvisioningSize);
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
/*
* Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
package android.hardware.identity;
@VintfStability
parcelable RequestDataItem {
/**
* The data item name being requested, for example "driving_privileges".
*/
@utf8InCpp String name;
/**
* The size of the data item value.
*
* Data item values are always encoded as CBOR so this is the length of
* the CBOR encoding of the value.
*/
long size;
/**
* The access control profile ids this data item is configured with.
*/
int[] accessControlProfileIds;
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
/*
* Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
package android.hardware.identity;
import android.hardware.identity.RequestDataItem;
@VintfStability
parcelable RequestNamespace {
/**
* The name of the namespace that items are being requested from, for
* example "org.iso.18013.5.1".
*/
@utf8InCpp String namespaceName;
/**
* The data items requested.
*/
RequestDataItem[] items;
}

View file

@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <android-base/logging.h>
#include <android-base/stringprintf.h>
#include <cppbor.h>
#include <cppbor_parse.h>
@ -32,6 +33,7 @@
namespace aidl::android::hardware::identity {
using ::aidl::android::hardware::keymaster::Timestamp;
using ::android::base::StringPrintf;
using ::std::optional;
using namespace ::android::hardware::identity;
@ -196,15 +198,8 @@ bool checkReaderAuthentication(const SecureAccessControlProfile& profile,
return false;
}
Timestamp clockGetTime() {
struct timespec time;
clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &time);
Timestamp ts;
ts.milliSeconds = time.tv_sec * 1000 + time.tv_nsec / 1000000;
return ts;
}
bool checkUserAuthentication(const SecureAccessControlProfile& profile,
const VerificationToken& verificationToken,
const HardwareAuthToken& authToken, uint64_t authChallenge) {
if (profile.secureUserId != authToken.userId) {
LOG(ERROR) << "secureUserId in profile (" << profile.secureUserId
@ -212,6 +207,15 @@ bool checkUserAuthentication(const SecureAccessControlProfile& profile,
return false;
}
if (verificationToken.timestamp.milliSeconds == 0) {
LOG(ERROR) << "VerificationToken is not set";
return false;
}
if (authToken.timestamp.milliSeconds == 0) {
LOG(ERROR) << "AuthToken is not set";
return false;
}
if (profile.timeoutMillis == 0) {
if (authToken.challenge == 0) {
LOG(ERROR) << "No challenge in authToken";
@ -225,19 +229,11 @@ bool checkUserAuthentication(const SecureAccessControlProfile& profile,
return true;
}
// Note that the Epoch for timestamps in HardwareAuthToken is at the
// discretion of the vendor:
// Timeout-based user auth follows. The verification token conveys what the
// time is right now in the environment which generated the auth token. This
// is what makes it possible to do timeout-based checks.
//
// "[...] since some starting point (generally the most recent device
// boot) which all of the applications within one secure environment
// must agree upon."
//
// Therefore, if this software implementation is used on a device which isn't
// the emulator then the assumption that the epoch is the same as used in
// clockGetTime above will not hold. This is OK as this software
// implementation should never be used on a real device.
//
Timestamp now = clockGetTime();
const Timestamp now = verificationToken.timestamp;
if (authToken.timestamp.milliSeconds > now.milliSeconds) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Timestamp in authToken (" << authToken.timestamp.milliSeconds
<< ") is in the future (now: " << now.milliSeconds << ")";
@ -253,6 +249,18 @@ bool checkUserAuthentication(const SecureAccessControlProfile& profile,
return true;
}
ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::setRequestedNamespaces(
const vector<RequestNamespace>& requestNamespaces) {
requestNamespaces_ = requestNamespaces;
return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
}
ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::setVerificationToken(
const VerificationToken& verificationToken) {
verificationToken_ = verificationToken;
return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
}
ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::startRetrieval(
const vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>& accessControlProfiles,
const HardwareAuthToken& authToken, const vector<int8_t>& itemsRequestS,
@ -451,7 +459,7 @@ ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::startRetrieval(
"Type mismatch in nameSpaces map"));
}
string requestedNamespace = nsKey->value();
vector<string> requestedKeys;
set<string> requestedKeys;
for (size_t m = 0; m < nsInnerMap->size(); m++) {
const auto& [innerMapKeyItem, innerMapValueItem] = (*nsInnerMap)[m];
const cppbor::Tstr* nameItem = innerMapKeyItem->asTstr();
@ -463,13 +471,13 @@ ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::startRetrieval(
IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_ITEMS_REQUEST_MESSAGE,
"Type mismatch in value in nameSpaces map"));
}
requestedKeys.push_back(nameItem->value());
requestedKeys.insert(nameItem->value());
}
requestedNameSpacesAndNames_[requestedNamespace] = requestedKeys;
}
}
// Finally, validate all the access control profiles in the requestData.
// Validate all the access control profiles in the requestData.
bool haveAuthToken = (authToken.mac.size() > 0);
for (const auto& profile : accessControlProfiles) {
if (!secureAccessControlProfileCheckMac(profile, storageKey_)) {
@ -479,7 +487,8 @@ ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::startRetrieval(
}
int accessControlCheck = IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_OK;
if (profile.userAuthenticationRequired) {
if (!haveAuthToken || !checkUserAuthentication(profile, authToken, authChallenge_)) {
if (!haveAuthToken ||
!checkUserAuthentication(profile, verificationToken_, authToken, authChallenge_)) {
accessControlCheck = IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_USER_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED;
}
} else if (profile.readerCertificate.encodedCertificate.size() > 0) {
@ -500,10 +509,118 @@ ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::startRetrieval(
itemsRequest_ = itemsRequest;
signingKeyBlob_ = byteStringToUnsigned(signingKeyBlobS);
// Finally, calculate the size of DeviceNameSpaces. We need to know it ahead of time.
expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_ = calcDeviceNameSpacesSize();
numStartRetrievalCalls_ += 1;
return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
}
size_t cborNumBytesForLength(size_t length) {
if (length < 24) {
return 0;
} else if (length <= 0xff) {
return 1;
} else if (length <= 0xffff) {
return 2;
} else if (length <= 0xffffffff) {
return 4;
}
return 8;
}
size_t cborNumBytesForTstr(const string& value) {
return 1 + cborNumBytesForLength(value.size()) + value.size();
}
size_t IdentityCredential::calcDeviceNameSpacesSize() {
/*
* This is how DeviceNameSpaces is defined:
*
* DeviceNameSpaces = {
* * NameSpace => DeviceSignedItems
* }
* DeviceSignedItems = {
* + DataItemName => DataItemValue
* }
*
* Namespace = tstr
* DataItemName = tstr
* DataItemValue = any
*
* This function will calculate its length using knowledge of how CBOR is
* encoded.
*/
size_t ret = 0;
size_t numNamespacesWithValues = 0;
for (const RequestNamespace& rns : requestNamespaces_) {
vector<RequestDataItem> itemsToInclude;
for (const RequestDataItem& rdi : rns.items) {
// If we have a CBOR request message, skip if item isn't in it
if (itemsRequest_.size() > 0) {
const auto& it = requestedNameSpacesAndNames_.find(rns.namespaceName);
if (it == requestedNameSpacesAndNames_.end()) {
continue;
}
const set<string>& dataItemNames = it->second;
if (dataItemNames.find(rdi.name) == dataItemNames.end()) {
continue;
}
}
// Access is granted if at least one of the profiles grants access.
//
// If an item is configured without any profiles, access is denied.
//
bool authorized = false;
for (auto id : rdi.accessControlProfileIds) {
auto it = profileIdToAccessCheckResult_.find(id);
if (it != profileIdToAccessCheckResult_.end()) {
int accessControlForProfile = it->second;
if (accessControlForProfile == IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_OK) {
authorized = true;
break;
}
}
}
if (!authorized) {
continue;
}
itemsToInclude.push_back(rdi);
}
// If no entries are to be in the namespace, we don't include it...
if (itemsToInclude.size() == 0) {
continue;
}
// Key: NameSpace
ret += cborNumBytesForTstr(rns.namespaceName);
// Value: Open the DeviceSignedItems map
ret += 1 + cborNumBytesForLength(itemsToInclude.size());
for (const RequestDataItem& item : itemsToInclude) {
// Key: DataItemName
ret += cborNumBytesForTstr(item.name);
// Value: DataItemValue - entryData.size is the length of serialized CBOR so we use
// that.
ret += item.size;
}
numNamespacesWithValues++;
}
// Now that we now the nunber of namespaces with values, we know how many
// bytes the DeviceNamespaces map in the beginning is going to take up.
ret += 1 + cborNumBytesForLength(numNamespacesWithValues);
return ret;
}
ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::startRetrieveEntryValue(
const string& nameSpace, const string& name, int32_t entrySize,
const vector<int32_t>& accessControlProfileIds) {
@ -562,8 +679,8 @@ ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::startRetrieveEntryValue(
IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_NOT_IN_REQUEST_MESSAGE,
"Name space was not requested in startRetrieval"));
}
const auto& dataItemNames = it->second;
if (std::find(dataItemNames.begin(), dataItemNames.end(), name) == dataItemNames.end()) {
const set<string>& dataItemNames = it->second;
if (dataItemNames.find(name) == dataItemNames.end()) {
return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_NOT_IN_REQUEST_MESSAGE,
"Data item name in name space was not requested in startRetrieval"));
@ -608,7 +725,6 @@ ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::startRetrieveEntryValue(
ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::retrieveEntryValue(const vector<int8_t>& encryptedContentS,
vector<int8_t>* outContent) {
auto encryptedContent = byteStringToUnsigned(encryptedContentS);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> content =
support::decryptAes128Gcm(storageKey_, encryptedContent, entryAdditionalData_);
if (!content) {
@ -659,6 +775,17 @@ ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::finishRetrieval(vector<int8_t>* outMac,
}
vector<uint8_t> encodedDeviceNameSpaces = deviceNameSpacesMap_.encode();
if (encodedDeviceNameSpaces.size() != expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "encodedDeviceNameSpaces is " << encodedDeviceNameSpaces.size() << " bytes, "
<< "was expecting " << expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_;
return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_DATA,
StringPrintf(
"Unexpected CBOR size %zd for encodedDeviceNameSpaces, was expecting %zd",
encodedDeviceNameSpaces.size(), expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_)
.c_str()));
}
// If there's no signing key or no sessionTranscript or no reader ephemeral
// public key, we return the empty MAC.
optional<vector<uint8_t>> mac;

View file

@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <aidl/android/hardware/identity/BnIdentityCredential.h>
#include <aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.h>
#include <aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.h>
#include <android/hardware/identity/support/IdentityCredentialSupport.h>
#include <map>
@ -31,16 +32,19 @@
namespace aidl::android::hardware::identity {
using ::aidl::android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthToken;
using ::aidl::android::hardware::keymaster::VerificationToken;
using ::std::map;
using ::std::set;
using ::std::string;
using ::std::vector;
using MapStringToVectorOfStrings = map<string, vector<string>>;
class IdentityCredential : public BnIdentityCredential {
public:
IdentityCredential(const vector<uint8_t>& credentialData)
: credentialData_(credentialData), numStartRetrievalCalls_(0), authChallenge_(0) {}
: credentialData_(credentialData),
numStartRetrievalCalls_(0),
authChallenge_(0),
expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_(0) {}
// Parses and decrypts credentialData_, return a status code from
// IIdentityCredentialStore. Must be called right after construction.
@ -51,6 +55,9 @@ class IdentityCredential : public BnIdentityCredential {
ndk::ScopedAStatus createEphemeralKeyPair(vector<int8_t>* outKeyPair) override;
ndk::ScopedAStatus setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(const vector<int8_t>& publicKey) override;
ndk::ScopedAStatus createAuthChallenge(int64_t* outChallenge) override;
ndk::ScopedAStatus setRequestedNamespaces(
const vector<RequestNamespace>& requestNamespaces) override;
ndk::ScopedAStatus setVerificationToken(const VerificationToken& verificationToken) override;
ndk::ScopedAStatus startRetrieval(
const vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>& accessControlProfiles,
const HardwareAuthToken& authToken, const vector<int8_t>& itemsRequest,
@ -86,6 +93,12 @@ class IdentityCredential : public BnIdentityCredential {
// Set by createAuthChallenge()
uint64_t authChallenge_;
// Set by setRequestedNamespaces()
vector<RequestNamespace> requestNamespaces_;
// Set by setVerificationToken().
VerificationToken verificationToken_;
// Set at startRetrieval() time.
map<int32_t, int> profileIdToAccessCheckResult_;
vector<uint8_t> signingKeyBlob_;
@ -93,16 +106,21 @@ class IdentityCredential : public BnIdentityCredential {
std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Item> sessionTranscriptItem_;
vector<uint8_t> itemsRequest_;
vector<int32_t> requestCountsRemaining_;
MapStringToVectorOfStrings requestedNameSpacesAndNames_;
map<string, set<string>> requestedNameSpacesAndNames_;
cppbor::Map deviceNameSpacesMap_;
cppbor::Map currentNameSpaceDeviceNameSpacesMap_;
// Calculated at startRetrieval() time.
size_t expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_;
// Set at startRetrieveEntryValue() time.
string currentNameSpace_;
string currentName_;
size_t entryRemainingBytes_;
vector<uint8_t> entryValue_;
vector<uint8_t> entryAdditionalData_;
size_t calcDeviceNameSpacesSize();
};
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::identity

View file

@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <android/hardware/identity/support/IdentityCredentialSupport.h>
#include <android-base/logging.h>
#include <android-base/stringprintf.h>
#include <cppbor/cppbor.h>
#include <cppbor/cppbor_parse.h>
@ -34,6 +35,7 @@
namespace aidl::android::hardware::identity {
using ::android::base::StringPrintf;
using ::std::optional;
using namespace ::android::hardware::identity;
@ -105,6 +107,12 @@ ndk::ScopedAStatus WritableIdentityCredential::getAttestationCertificate(
return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
}
ndk::ScopedAStatus WritableIdentityCredential::setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(
int32_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize) {
expectedProofOfProvisioningSize_ = expectedProofOfProvisioningSize;
return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
}
ndk::ScopedAStatus WritableIdentityCredential::startPersonalization(
int32_t accessControlProfileCount, const vector<int32_t>& entryCounts) {
if (startPersonalizationCalled_) {
@ -255,7 +263,7 @@ ndk::ScopedAStatus WritableIdentityCredential::beginAddEntry(
}
ndk::ScopedAStatus WritableIdentityCredential::addEntryValue(const vector<int8_t>& contentS,
vector<int8_t>* outEncryptedContent) {
vector<int8_t>* outEncryptedContentS) {
auto content = byteStringToUnsigned(contentS);
size_t contentSize = content.size();
@ -311,7 +319,7 @@ ndk::ScopedAStatus WritableIdentityCredential::addEntryValue(const vector<int8_t
signedDataCurrentNamespace_.add(std::move(entryMap));
}
*outEncryptedContent = byteStringToSigned(encryptedContent.value());
*outEncryptedContentS = byteStringToSigned(encryptedContent.value());
return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
}
@ -384,6 +392,16 @@ ndk::ScopedAStatus WritableIdentityCredential::finishAddingEntries(
.add(testCredential_);
vector<uint8_t> encodedCbor = popArray.encode();
if (encodedCbor.size() != expectedProofOfProvisioningSize_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "CBOR for proofOfProvisioning is " << encodedCbor.size() << " bytes, "
<< "was expecting " << expectedProofOfProvisioningSize_;
return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_DATA,
StringPrintf("Unexpected CBOR size %zd for proofOfProvisioning, was expecting %zd",
encodedCbor.size(), expectedProofOfProvisioningSize_)
.c_str()));
}
optional<vector<uint8_t>> signature = support::coseSignEcDsa(credentialPrivKey_,
encodedCbor, // payload
{}, // additionalData

View file

@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ class WritableIdentityCredential : public BnWritableIdentityCredential {
const vector<int8_t>& attestationChallenge,
vector<Certificate>* outCertificateChain) override;
ndk::ScopedAStatus setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(
int32_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize) override;
ndk::ScopedAStatus startPersonalization(int32_t accessControlProfileCount,
const vector<int32_t>& entryCounts) override;
@ -62,7 +65,7 @@ class WritableIdentityCredential : public BnWritableIdentityCredential {
vector<int8_t>* outCredentialData,
vector<int8_t>* outProofOfProvisioningSignature) override;
// private:
private:
string docType_;
bool testCredential_;
@ -82,6 +85,7 @@ class WritableIdentityCredential : public BnWritableIdentityCredential {
cppbor::Array signedDataAccessControlProfiles_;
cppbor::Map signedDataNamespaces_;
cppbor::Array signedDataCurrentNamespace_;
size_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize_;
// This field is initialized in addAccessControlProfile
set<int32_t> accessControlProfileIds_;

View file

@ -22,9 +22,14 @@
#include "IdentityCredentialStore.h"
using ::android::base::InitLogging;
using ::android::base::StderrLogger;
using aidl::android::hardware::identity::IdentityCredentialStore;
int main() {
int main(int /*argc*/, char* argv[]) {
InitLogging(argv, StderrLogger);
ABinderProcess_setThreadPoolMaxThreadCount(0);
std::shared_ptr<IdentityCredentialStore> store =
ndk::SharedRefBase::make<IdentityCredentialStore>();

View file

@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ using ::android::String16;
using ::android::binder::Status;
using ::android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthToken;
using ::android::hardware::keymaster::VerificationToken;
class IdentityAidl : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
public:
@ -82,7 +83,20 @@ TEST_P(IdentityAidl, createAndRetrieveCredential) {
// Profile 1 (no authentication)
{1, {}, false, 0}};
// It doesn't matter since no user auth is needed in this particular test,
// but for good measure, clear out the tokens we pass to the HAL.
HardwareAuthToken authToken;
VerificationToken verificationToken;
authToken.challenge = 0;
authToken.userId = 0;
authToken.authenticatorId = 0;
authToken.authenticatorType = ::android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthenticatorType::NONE;
authToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = 0;
authToken.mac.clear();
verificationToken.challenge = 0;
verificationToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = 0;
verificationToken.securityLevel = ::android::hardware::keymaster::SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE;
verificationToken.mac.clear();
// Here's the actual test data:
const vector<test_utils::TestEntryData> testEntries = {
@ -112,6 +126,11 @@ TEST_P(IdentityAidl, createAndRetrieveCredential) {
// TODO: set it to something random and check it's in the cert chain
ASSERT_GE(attData.attestationCertificate.size(), 2);
// This is kinda of a hack but we need to give the size of
// ProofOfProvisioning that we'll expect to receive.
const int32_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize = 262861 - 326 + readerCertificate.value().size();
// OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(expectedProofOfProvisioningSize);
ASSERT_TRUE(
writableCredential->startPersonalization(testProfiles.size(), testEntriesEntryCounts)
.isOk());
@ -268,6 +287,11 @@ TEST_P(IdentityAidl, createAndRetrieveCredential) {
Certificate signingKeyCertificate;
ASSERT_TRUE(credential->generateSigningKeyPair(&signingKeyBlob, &signingKeyCertificate).isOk());
vector<RequestNamespace> requestedNamespaces = test_utils::buildRequestNamespaces(testEntries);
// OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
credential->setRequestedNamespaces(requestedNamespaces).isOk();
// OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
credential->setVerificationToken(verificationToken);
ASSERT_TRUE(credential
->startRetrieval(secureProfiles.value(), authToken, itemsRequestBytes,
signingKeyBlob, sessionTranscriptBytes,

View file

@ -279,14 +279,17 @@ TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass) {
EXPECT_TRUE(attData.result.isOk())
<< attData.result.exceptionCode() << "; " << attData.result.exceptionMessage() << endl;
const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {1u};
writableCredential->startPersonalization(1, entryCounts);
ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
<< endl;
optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate1 = test_utils::GenerateReaderCertificate("123456");
ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate1);
const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {1u};
size_t expectedPoPSize = 186 + readerCertificate1.value().size();
// OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(expectedPoPSize);
result = writableCredential->startPersonalization(1, entryCounts);
ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
<< endl;
const vector<test_utils::TestProfile> testProfiles = {{1, readerCertificate1.value(), true, 1}};
optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> secureProfiles =
@ -374,7 +377,11 @@ TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyManyProfilesAndEntriesPass) {
{2, readerCertificate2.value(), true, 2},
};
const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {1u, 3u, 1u, 1u, 2u};
writableCredential->startPersonalization(testProfiles.size(), entryCounts);
size_t expectedPoPSize =
525021 + readerCertificate1.value().size() + readerCertificate2.value().size();
// OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(expectedPoPSize);
result = writableCredential->startPersonalization(testProfiles.size(), entryCounts);
ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
<< endl;
@ -518,11 +525,6 @@ TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyEmptyNameSpaceMixedWithNonEmptyWorks) {
ASSERT_TRUE(attData.result.isOk())
<< attData.result.exceptionCode() << "; " << attData.result.exceptionMessage() << endl;
const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {2u, 2u};
writableCredential->startPersonalization(3, entryCounts);
ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
<< endl;
optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate1 = test_utils::GenerateReaderCertificate("123456");
ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate1);
@ -530,6 +532,16 @@ TEST_P(IdentityCredentialTests, verifyEmptyNameSpaceMixedWithNonEmptyWorks) {
test_utils::GenerateReaderCertificate("123456987987987987987987");
ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate2);
const vector<int32_t> entryCounts = {2u, 2u};
size_t expectedPoPSize =
377 + readerCertificate1.value().size() + readerCertificate2.value().size();
;
// OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(expectedPoPSize);
writableCredential->startPersonalization(3, entryCounts);
ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
<< endl;
const vector<test_utils::TestProfile> testProfiles = {{0, readerCertificate1.value(), false, 0},
{1, readerCertificate2.value(), true, 1},
{2, {}, false, 0}};

View file

@ -176,4 +176,28 @@ void SetImageData(vector<uint8_t>& image) {
}
}
vector<RequestNamespace> buildRequestNamespaces(const vector<TestEntryData> entries) {
vector<RequestNamespace> ret;
RequestNamespace curNs;
for (const TestEntryData& testEntry : entries) {
if (testEntry.nameSpace != curNs.namespaceName) {
if (curNs.namespaceName.size() > 0) {
ret.push_back(curNs);
}
curNs.namespaceName = testEntry.nameSpace;
curNs.items.clear();
}
RequestDataItem item;
item.name = testEntry.name;
item.size = testEntry.valueCbor.size();
item.accessControlProfileIds = testEntry.profileIds;
curNs.items.push_back(item);
}
if (curNs.namespaceName.size() > 0) {
ret.push_back(curNs);
}
return ret;
}
} // namespace android::hardware::identity::test_utils

View file

@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ bool ValidateAttestationCertificate(vector<Certificate>& inputCertificates);
void SetImageData(vector<uint8_t>& image);
vector<RequestNamespace> buildRequestNamespaces(const vector<TestEntryData> entries);
} // namespace android::hardware::identity::test_utils
#endif // VTS_IDENTITY_TEST_UTILS_H

View file

@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
#define HARDWARE_INTERFACES_KEYMASTER_40_SUPPORT_KEYMASTER_UTILS_H_
#include <android/hardware/keymaster/4.0/types.h>
#include <optional>
#include <vector>
namespace android {
namespace hardware {
@ -52,6 +54,15 @@ inline static hidl_vec<uint8_t> blob2hidlVec(const std::vector<uint8_t>& blob) {
HardwareAuthToken hidlVec2AuthToken(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& buffer);
hidl_vec<uint8_t> authToken2HidlVec(const HardwareAuthToken& token);
// Serializes and deserializes a verification token. This format is private and
// not stable between releases and should not be persisted to disk.
//
// Currently doesn't support the |parametersVerified| field, will fail if set.
//
std::optional<VerificationToken> deserializeVerificationToken(
const std::vector<uint8_t>& serializedToken);
std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>> serializeVerificationToken(const VerificationToken& token);
uint32_t getOsVersion();
uint32_t getOsPatchlevel();

View file

@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <regex.h>
#include <android-base/logging.h>
#include <android-base/properties.h>
#include <hardware/hw_auth_token.h>
#include <keymasterV4_0/keymaster_utils.h>
@ -110,6 +111,80 @@ HardwareAuthToken hidlVec2AuthToken(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& buffer) {
return token;
}
void appendUint64(std::vector<uint8_t>& vec, uint64_t value) {
for (size_t n = 0; n < sizeof(uint64_t); n++) {
uint8_t byte = (value >> (n * 8)) & 0xff;
vec.push_back(byte);
}
}
uint64_t extractUint64(const std::vector<uint8_t>& data, size_t offset) {
uint64_t value = 0;
for (size_t n = 0; n < sizeof(uint64_t); n++) {
uint8_t byte = data[offset + n];
value |= byte << (n * 8);
}
return value;
}
void appendUint32(std::vector<uint8_t>& vec, uint32_t value) {
for (size_t n = 0; n < sizeof(uint32_t); n++) {
uint8_t byte = (value >> (n * 8)) & 0xff;
vec.push_back(byte);
}
}
uint32_t extractUint32(const std::vector<uint8_t>& data, size_t offset) {
uint32_t value = 0;
for (size_t n = 0; n < sizeof(uint32_t); n++) {
uint8_t byte = data[offset + n];
value |= byte << (n * 8);
}
return value;
}
std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>> serializeVerificationToken(const VerificationToken& token) {
if (token.parametersVerified.size() > 0) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Serializing verification tokens with parametersVerified is not supported";
return {};
}
if (!(token.mac.size() == 0 || token.mac.size() == 32)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Unexpected MAC size " << token.mac.size() << ", expected 0 or 32";
return {};
}
std::vector<uint8_t> serializedToken;
appendUint64(serializedToken, token.challenge);
appendUint64(serializedToken, token.timestamp);
appendUint32(serializedToken, uint32_t(token.securityLevel));
appendUint32(serializedToken, token.mac.size());
serializedToken.insert(serializedToken.end(), token.mac.begin(), token.mac.end());
return serializedToken;
}
std::optional<VerificationToken> deserializeVerificationToken(
const std::vector<uint8_t>& serializedToken) {
if (serializedToken.size() < 24) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Unexpected serialized VerificationToken size " << serializedToken.size()
<< ", expected at least 24 bytes";
return {};
}
VerificationToken token;
token.challenge = extractUint64(serializedToken, 0);
token.timestamp = extractUint64(serializedToken, 8);
token.securityLevel = SecurityLevel(extractUint32(serializedToken, 16));
size_t macSize = extractUint32(serializedToken, 20);
size_t expectedSerializedSize = 24 + macSize;
if (serializedToken.size() != expectedSerializedSize) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Unexpected serialized VerificationToken size " << serializedToken.size()
<< ", expected " << expectedSerializedSize;
return {};
}
if (macSize > 0) {
token.mac = std::vector<uint8_t>(serializedToken.begin() + 24, serializedToken.end());
}
return token;
}
namespace {
constexpr char kPlatformVersionProp[] = "ro.build.version.release";

View file

@ -15,5 +15,8 @@ aidl_interface {
},
},
},
versions: ["1"],
versions: [
"1",
"2",
],
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1 @@
91ab0be1887410935f564e3938ff12c5f5f8c59d

View file

@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
// breakage is intended.
//
// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
package android.hardware.keymaster;
@VintfStability
parcelable HardwareAuthToken {
long challenge;
long userId;
long authenticatorId;
android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthenticatorType authenticatorType;
android.hardware.keymaster.Timestamp timestamp;
byte[] mac;
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
// breakage is intended.
//
// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
package android.hardware.keymaster;
@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
enum HardwareAuthenticatorType {
NONE = 0,
PASSWORD = 1,
FINGERPRINT = 2,
ANY = -1,
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
// breakage is intended.
//
// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
package android.hardware.keymaster;
@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
enum SecurityLevel {
SOFTWARE = 0,
TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT = 1,
STRONGBOX = 2,
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
// breakage is intended.
//
// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
package android.hardware.keymaster;
@VintfStability
parcelable Timestamp {
long milliSeconds;
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
// breakage is intended.
//
// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
package android.hardware.keymaster;
@VintfStability
parcelable VerificationToken {
long challenge;
android.hardware.keymaster.Timestamp timestamp;
android.hardware.keymaster.SecurityLevel securityLevel;
byte[] mac;
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
// breakage is intended.
//
// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
package android.hardware.keymaster;
@Backing(type="int") @VintfStability
enum SecurityLevel {
SOFTWARE = 0,
TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT = 1,
STRONGBOX = 2,
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL interface (or parcelable). Do not try to
// edit this file. It looks like you are doing that because you have modified
// an AIDL interface in a backward-incompatible way, e.g., deleting a function
// from an interface or a field from a parcelable and it broke the build. That
// breakage is intended.
//
// You must not make a backward incompatible changes to the AIDL files built
// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
package android.hardware.keymaster;
@VintfStability
parcelable VerificationToken {
long challenge;
android.hardware.keymaster.Timestamp timestamp;
android.hardware.keymaster.SecurityLevel securityLevel;
byte[] mac;
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
/*
* Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
package android.hardware.keymaster;
/**
* Device security levels.
*/
@VintfStability
@Backing(type="int")
enum SecurityLevel {
SOFTWARE = 0,
TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT = 1,
/**
* STRONGBOX specifies that the secure hardware satisfies the requirements specified in CDD
* 9.11.2.
*/
STRONGBOX = 2,
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
/*
* Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
package android.hardware.keymaster;
import android.hardware.keymaster.SecurityLevel;
import android.hardware.keymaster.Timestamp;
import android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthenticatorType;
/**
* VerificationToken instances are used for secure environments to authenticate one another.
*
* This version of the parcelable currently don't use the parametersVerified field since it's not
* needed for time-based verification. This can be added in a later version, if needed.
*/
@VintfStability
parcelable VerificationToken {
/**
* The operation handle, used to ensure freshness.
*/
long challenge;
/**
* The current time of the secure environment that generates the VerificationToken. This can be
* checked against auth tokens generated by the same secure environment, which avoids needing to
* synchronize clocks.
*/
Timestamp timestamp;
/**
* SecurityLevel of the secure environment that generated the token.
*/
SecurityLevel securityLevel;
/**
* 32-byte HMAC-SHA256 of the above values, computed as:
*
* HMAC(H,
* "Auth Verification" || challenge || timestamp || securityLevel || parametersVerified)
*
* where:
*
* ``HMAC'' is the shared HMAC key (see computeSharedHmac() in IKeymaster).
*
* ``||'' represents concatenation
*
* The representation of challenge and timestamp is as 64-bit unsigned integers in big-endian
* order. securityLevel is represented as a 32-bit unsigned integer in big-endian order.
*
* If parametersVerified is non-empty, the representation of parametersVerified is an ASN.1 DER
* encoded representation of the values. The ASN.1 schema used is the AuthorizationList schema
* from the Keystore attestation documentation. If parametersVerified is empty, it is simply
* omitted from the HMAC computation.
*/
byte[] mac;
}