f3e0600395
This adds a new method which allows applications to use mdoc ECDSA authentication instead of mdoc MAC authentication. Additionally, also relax requirements on SessionTranscript so the APIs can be used even when mdoc session encryption isn't being used. Also add new VTS test to check for this. Since this is new API, bump API version to 5 and the Identity Credential feature version to 202301. Bug: 241912421 Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Change-Id: I4085a89be0382c10f5449e13c6a92a46c74c225d
246 lines
10 KiB
C++
246 lines
10 KiB
C++
/*
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* Copyright 2020, The Android Open Source Project
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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* You may obtain a copy of the License at
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*
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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* limitations under the License.
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*/
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#ifndef ANDROID_HARDWARE_IDENTITY_FAKESECUREHARDWAREPROXY_H
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#define ANDROID_HARDWARE_IDENTITY_FAKESECUREHARDWAREPROXY_H
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#include <libeic/libeic.h>
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#include "SecureHardwareProxy.h"
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namespace android::hardware::identity {
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// This implementation uses libEmbeddedIC in-process.
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//
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class FakeSecureHardwareProvisioningProxy : public SecureHardwareProvisioningProxy {
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public:
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FakeSecureHardwareProvisioningProxy() = default;
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virtual ~FakeSecureHardwareProvisioningProxy();
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bool initialize(bool testCredential) override;
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bool initializeForUpdate(bool testCredential, const string& docType,
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const vector<uint8_t>& encryptedCredentialKeys) override;
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bool shutdown() override;
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optional<uint32_t> getId() override;
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// Returns public key certificate.
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optional<vector<uint8_t>> createCredentialKey(const vector<uint8_t>& challenge,
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const vector<uint8_t>& applicationId) override;
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optional<vector<uint8_t>> createCredentialKeyUsingRkp(
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const vector<uint8_t>& challenge, const vector<uint8_t>& applicationId,
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const vector<uint8_t>& attestationKeyBlob,
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const vector<uint8_t>& attestationKeyCert) override;
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bool startPersonalization(int accessControlProfileCount, const vector<int>& entryCounts,
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const string& docType,
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size_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize) override;
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// Returns MAC (28 bytes).
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optional<vector<uint8_t>> addAccessControlProfile(int id,
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const vector<uint8_t>& readerCertificate,
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bool userAuthenticationRequired,
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uint64_t timeoutMillis,
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uint64_t secureUserId) override;
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bool beginAddEntry(const vector<int>& accessControlProfileIds, const string& nameSpace,
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const string& name, uint64_t entrySize) override;
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// Returns encryptedContent.
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optional<vector<uint8_t>> addEntryValue(const vector<int>& accessControlProfileIds,
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const string& nameSpace, const string& name,
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const vector<uint8_t>& content) override;
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// Returns signatureOfToBeSigned (EIC_ECDSA_P256_SIGNATURE_SIZE bytes).
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optional<vector<uint8_t>> finishAddingEntries() override;
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// Returns encryptedCredentialKeys (80 bytes).
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optional<vector<uint8_t>> finishGetCredentialData(const string& docType) override;
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protected:
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// See docs for id_.
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//
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bool validateId(const string& callerName);
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// We use a singleton libeic object, shared by all proxy instances. This is to
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// properly simulate a situation where libeic is used on constrained hardware
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// with only enough RAM for a single instance of the libeic object.
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//
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static EicProvisioning ctx_;
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// On the HAL side we keep track of the ID that was assigned to the libeic object
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// created in secure hardware. For every call into libeic we validate that this
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// identifier matches what is on the secure side. This is what the validateId()
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// method does.
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//
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uint32_t id_ = 0;
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};
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// This implementation uses libEmbeddedIC in-process.
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//
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class FakeSecureHardwareSessionProxy : public SecureHardwareSessionProxy {
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public:
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FakeSecureHardwareSessionProxy() = default;
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virtual ~FakeSecureHardwareSessionProxy();
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bool initialize() override;
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bool shutdown() override;
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optional<uint32_t> getId() override;
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optional<uint64_t> getAuthChallenge() override;
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// Returns private key
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optional<vector<uint8_t>> getEphemeralKeyPair() override;
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bool setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(const vector<uint8_t>& readerEphemeralPublicKey) override;
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bool setSessionTranscript(const vector<uint8_t>& sessionTranscript) override;
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protected:
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// See docs for id_.
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//
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bool validateId(const string& callerName);
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// We use a singleton libeic object, shared by all proxy instances. This is to
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// properly simulate a situation where libeic is used on constrained hardware
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// with only enough RAM for a single instance of the libeic object.
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//
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static EicSession ctx_;
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// On the HAL side we keep track of the ID that was assigned to the libeic object
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// created in secure hardware. For every call into libeic we validate that this
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// identifier matches what is on the secure side. This is what the validateId()
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// method does.
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//
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uint32_t id_ = 0;
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};
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// This implementation uses libEmbeddedIC in-process.
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//
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class FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy : public SecureHardwarePresentationProxy {
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public:
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FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy() = default;
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virtual ~FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy();
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bool initialize(uint32_t sessionId, bool testCredential, const string& docType,
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const vector<uint8_t>& encryptedCredentialKeys) override;
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bool shutdown() override;
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optional<uint32_t> getId() override;
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// Returns publicKeyCert (1st component) and signingKeyBlob (2nd component)
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optional<pair<vector<uint8_t>, vector<uint8_t>>> generateSigningKeyPair(const string& docType,
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time_t now) override;
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// Returns private key
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optional<vector<uint8_t>> createEphemeralKeyPair() override;
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optional<uint64_t> createAuthChallenge() override;
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bool startRetrieveEntries() override;
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bool setAuthToken(uint64_t challenge, uint64_t secureUserId, uint64_t authenticatorId,
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int hardwareAuthenticatorType, uint64_t timeStamp, const vector<uint8_t>& mac,
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uint64_t verificationTokenChallenge, uint64_t verificationTokenTimestamp,
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int verificationTokenSecurityLevel,
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const vector<uint8_t>& verificationTokenMac) override;
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bool pushReaderCert(const vector<uint8_t>& certX509) override;
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optional<bool> validateAccessControlProfile(int id, const vector<uint8_t>& readerCertificate,
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bool userAuthenticationRequired, int timeoutMillis,
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uint64_t secureUserId,
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const vector<uint8_t>& mac) override;
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bool validateRequestMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& sessionTranscript,
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const vector<uint8_t>& requestMessage, int coseSignAlg,
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const vector<uint8_t>& readerSignatureOfToBeSigned) override;
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bool prepareDeviceAuthentication(const vector<uint8_t>& sessionTranscript,
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const vector<uint8_t>& readerEphemeralPublicKey,
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const vector<uint8_t>& signingKeyBlob, const string& docType,
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unsigned int numNamespacesWithValues,
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size_t expectedDeviceNamespacesSize) override;
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AccessCheckResult startRetrieveEntryValue(
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const string& nameSpace, const string& name, unsigned int newNamespaceNumEntries,
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int32_t entrySize, const vector<int32_t>& accessControlProfileIds) override;
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optional<vector<uint8_t>> retrieveEntryValue(
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const vector<uint8_t>& encryptedContent, const string& nameSpace, const string& name,
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const vector<int32_t>& accessControlProfileIds) override;
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optional<vector<uint8_t>> finishRetrieval() override;
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optional<pair<vector<uint8_t>, vector<uint8_t>>> finishRetrievalWithSignature() override;
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optional<vector<uint8_t>> deleteCredential(const string& docType,
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const vector<uint8_t>& challenge,
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bool includeChallenge,
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size_t proofOfDeletionCborSize) override;
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optional<vector<uint8_t>> proveOwnership(const string& docType, bool testCredential,
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const vector<uint8_t>& challenge,
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size_t proofOfOwnershipCborSize) override;
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protected:
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// See docs for id_.
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//
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bool validateId(const string& callerName);
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// We use a singleton libeic object, shared by all proxy instances. This is to
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// properly simulate a situation where libeic is used on constrained hardware
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// with only enough RAM for a single instance of the libeic object.
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//
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static EicPresentation ctx_;
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// On the HAL side we keep track of the ID that was assigned to the libeic object
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// created in secure hardware. For every call into libeic we validate that this
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// identifier matches what is on the secure side. This is what the validateId()
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// method does.
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//
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uint32_t id_ = 0;
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};
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// Factory implementation.
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//
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class FakeSecureHardwareProxyFactory : public SecureHardwareProxyFactory {
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public:
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FakeSecureHardwareProxyFactory() {}
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virtual ~FakeSecureHardwareProxyFactory() {}
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sp<SecureHardwareProvisioningProxy> createProvisioningProxy() override {
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return new FakeSecureHardwareProvisioningProxy();
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}
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sp<SecureHardwareSessionProxy> createSessionProxy() override {
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return new FakeSecureHardwareSessionProxy();
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}
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sp<SecureHardwarePresentationProxy> createPresentationProxy() override {
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return new FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy();
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}
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};
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} // namespace android::hardware::identity
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#endif // ANDROID_HARDWARE_IDENTITY_FAKESECUREHARDWAREPROXY_H
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