platform_system_core/libcutils/fs_config.cpp

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/*
* Copyright (C) 2007 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include <private/fs_config.h>
// This file is used to define the properties of the filesystem
// images generated by build tools (mkbootfs and mkyaffs2image) and
// by the device side of adb.
#define LOG_TAG "fs_config"
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <fnmatch.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <string>
#include <android-base/strings.h>
#include <cutils/fs.h>
#include <log/log.h>
#include <private/android_filesystem_config.h>
#include "fs_config.h"
using android::base::EndsWith;
using android::base::StartsWith;
#define ALIGN(x, alignment) (((x) + ((alignment)-1)) & ~((alignment)-1))
#define CAP_MASK_LONG(cap_name) (1ULL << (cap_name))
// Rules for directories.
// These rules are applied based on "first match", so they
// should start with the most specific path and work their
// way up to the root.
static const struct fs_path_config android_dirs[] = {
Set bin directories to 0751 Currently, /system/bin, /system/xbin, /product/bin, and /vendor/bin are 0755, which allows any process to iterate through those directories and list out the contents. For the vast majority of processes, this is unnecessary. They only need to know whether a particular binary exists or doesn't exist, but they don't need to know the other binaries within those directories. Allowing this is particularly problematic for SELinux. In particular, some third party Android applications try to examine every file in the bin directories, generating SELinux audit noise along the way. This audit noise makes it harder to see real bugs, and falsely implies an architectural dependency between the application and random files in directories like /system/bin. This change removes the ability to list the contents of the various bin directories, preventing random probing by such apps. The ability to execute files, or to probe a specific file by name, remain unchanged. Addresses SELinux denials similar to the following: avc: denied { getattr } for comm="Thread-11" path="/system/bin/atrace" dev="dm-0" ino=189 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_27:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:atrace_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 app=uk.co.santander.santanderUK avc: denied { getattr } for comm="Binder:26637_2" path="/system/bin/atrace" dev="dm-0" ino=168 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:atrace_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 app=com.tencent.mm avc: denied { getattr } for comm="Thread-12" path="/system/bin/apexd" dev="dm-0" ino=451 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_27:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:apexd_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 app=com.grppl.android.shell.CMBlloydsTSB73 Shell access to these directories continues to be allowed, to allow for host-side CTS tests. Also adjust the indentation of some clang directives, to make the presubmit hooks happy. Test: Device boots and no apparent problems. Change-Id: Ibe75682fac1983d39f3f479a5850ab5a96f6627d
2018-11-11 17:39:20 +01:00
// clang-format off
{ 00770, AID_SYSTEM, AID_CACHE, 0, "cache" },
{ 00555, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "config" },
{ 00771, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM, 0, "data/app" },
{ 00771, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM, 0, "data/app-private" },
{ 00771, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM, 0, "data/app-ephemeral" },
{ 00771, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "data/dalvik-cache" },
{ 00771, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM, 0, "data/data" },
{ 00771, AID_SHELL, AID_SHELL, 0, "data/local/tmp" },
{ 00771, AID_SHELL, AID_SHELL, 0, "data/local" },
{ 00770, AID_DHCP, AID_DHCP, 0, "data/misc/dhcp" },
{ 00771, AID_SHARED_RELRO, AID_SHARED_RELRO, 0, "data/misc/shared_relro" },
{ 01771, AID_SYSTEM, AID_MISC, 0, "data/misc" },
{ 00775, AID_MEDIA_RW, AID_MEDIA_RW, 0, "data/media/Music" },
{ 00775, AID_MEDIA_RW, AID_MEDIA_RW, 0, "data/media" },
{ 00750, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "data/nativetest" },
{ 00750, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "data/nativetest64" },
{ 00750, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "data/benchmarktest" },
{ 00750, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "data/benchmarktest64" },
{ 00775, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "data/preloads" },
{ 00771, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM, 0, "data" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_SYSTEM, 0, "mnt" },
Set bin directories to 0751 Currently, /system/bin, /system/xbin, /product/bin, and /vendor/bin are 0755, which allows any process to iterate through those directories and list out the contents. For the vast majority of processes, this is unnecessary. They only need to know whether a particular binary exists or doesn't exist, but they don't need to know the other binaries within those directories. Allowing this is particularly problematic for SELinux. In particular, some third party Android applications try to examine every file in the bin directories, generating SELinux audit noise along the way. This audit noise makes it harder to see real bugs, and falsely implies an architectural dependency between the application and random files in directories like /system/bin. This change removes the ability to list the contents of the various bin directories, preventing random probing by such apps. The ability to execute files, or to probe a specific file by name, remain unchanged. Addresses SELinux denials similar to the following: avc: denied { getattr } for comm="Thread-11" path="/system/bin/atrace" dev="dm-0" ino=189 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_27:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:atrace_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 app=uk.co.santander.santanderUK avc: denied { getattr } for comm="Binder:26637_2" path="/system/bin/atrace" dev="dm-0" ino=168 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:atrace_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 app=com.tencent.mm avc: denied { getattr } for comm="Thread-12" path="/system/bin/apexd" dev="dm-0" ino=451 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_27:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:apexd_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 app=com.grppl.android.shell.CMBlloydsTSB73 Shell access to these directories continues to be allowed, to allow for host-side CTS tests. Also adjust the indentation of some clang directives, to make the presubmit hooks happy. Test: Device boots and no apparent problems. Change-Id: Ibe75682fac1983d39f3f479a5850ab5a96f6627d
2018-11-11 17:39:20 +01:00
{ 00751, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "product/bin" },
{ 00751, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "product/apex/*/bin" },
{ 00777, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "sdcard" },
{ 00751, AID_ROOT, AID_SDCARD_R, 0, "storage" },
flattened apex: fix /apex/com.android.tethering/bin/for-system{,/clatd} mode from packages/modules/Connectivity/Tethering/apex/canned_fs_config /bin/for-system 0 1000 0750 /bin/for-system/clatd 1029 1029 06755 the Tethering apex mounts at /apex/com.android.tethering, but that's a bind mount, it really lives at /system/... in the flattened fs image. Testing via: aosp$ export OVERRIDE_TARGET_FLATTEN_APEX=true aosp$ a_make_target aosp_cf_x86_phone-userdebug $ sudo mkdir /mnt/point && sudo mount -o loop,ro /aosp/out/target/product/vsoc_x86/system.img /mnt/point && egrep /mnt/point /proc/mounts && sudo ls -dlnZ /mnt/point/system/apex/com.android.tethering/bin/for-system{,/clatd} && sudo umount /mnt/point && sudo rmdir /mnt/point /dev/loop0 /mnt/point erofs ro,relatime,user_xattr,acl,cache_strategy=readaround 0 0 drwxr-x---. 2 0 1000 u:object_r:system_file:s0 44 Apr 11 03:12 /mnt/point/system/apex/com.android.tethering/bin/for-system -rwsr-sr-x. 1 1029 1029 u:object_r:clatd_exec:s0 18876 Apr 11 03:12 /mnt/point/system/apex/com.android.tethering/bin/for-system/clatd while without this patch it showed: drwxr-x--x. 2 0 2000 u:object_r:system_file:s0 44 Apr 11 01:53 /mnt/point/system/apex/com.android.tethering/bin/for-system -rwxr-xr-x. 1 0 2000 u:object_r:clatd_exec:s0 18876 Apr 11 01:53 /mnt/point/system/apex/com.android.tethering/bin/for-system/clatd Test: TreeHugger Bug: 273821347 Bug: 277646103 Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Change-Id: I9714b1e935afbe27c2eb4be3f96a9742eb752e92
2023-04-11 08:08:32 +02:00
{ 00750, AID_ROOT, AID_SYSTEM, 0, "system/apex/com.android.tethering/bin/for-system" },
{ 00751, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "system/bin" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "system/etc/ppp" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "system/vendor" },
{ 00750, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "system/xbin" },
{ 00751, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "system/apex/*/bin" },
{ 00750, AID_ROOT, AID_SYSTEM, 0, "system_ext/apex/com.android.tethering/bin/for-system" },
{ 00751, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "system_ext/bin" },
{ 00751, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "system_ext/apex/*/bin" },
Set bin directories to 0751 Currently, /system/bin, /system/xbin, /product/bin, and /vendor/bin are 0755, which allows any process to iterate through those directories and list out the contents. For the vast majority of processes, this is unnecessary. They only need to know whether a particular binary exists or doesn't exist, but they don't need to know the other binaries within those directories. Allowing this is particularly problematic for SELinux. In particular, some third party Android applications try to examine every file in the bin directories, generating SELinux audit noise along the way. This audit noise makes it harder to see real bugs, and falsely implies an architectural dependency between the application and random files in directories like /system/bin. This change removes the ability to list the contents of the various bin directories, preventing random probing by such apps. The ability to execute files, or to probe a specific file by name, remain unchanged. Addresses SELinux denials similar to the following: avc: denied { getattr } for comm="Thread-11" path="/system/bin/atrace" dev="dm-0" ino=189 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_27:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:atrace_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 app=uk.co.santander.santanderUK avc: denied { getattr } for comm="Binder:26637_2" path="/system/bin/atrace" dev="dm-0" ino=168 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:atrace_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 app=com.tencent.mm avc: denied { getattr } for comm="Thread-12" path="/system/bin/apexd" dev="dm-0" ino=451 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_27:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:apexd_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 app=com.grppl.android.shell.CMBlloydsTSB73 Shell access to these directories continues to be allowed, to allow for host-side CTS tests. Also adjust the indentation of some clang directives, to make the presubmit hooks happy. Test: Device boots and no apparent problems. Change-Id: Ibe75682fac1983d39f3f479a5850ab5a96f6627d
2018-11-11 17:39:20 +01:00
{ 00751, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "vendor/bin" },
{ 00751, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "vendor/apex/*/bin" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "vendor" },
{},
Set bin directories to 0751 Currently, /system/bin, /system/xbin, /product/bin, and /vendor/bin are 0755, which allows any process to iterate through those directories and list out the contents. For the vast majority of processes, this is unnecessary. They only need to know whether a particular binary exists or doesn't exist, but they don't need to know the other binaries within those directories. Allowing this is particularly problematic for SELinux. In particular, some third party Android applications try to examine every file in the bin directories, generating SELinux audit noise along the way. This audit noise makes it harder to see real bugs, and falsely implies an architectural dependency between the application and random files in directories like /system/bin. This change removes the ability to list the contents of the various bin directories, preventing random probing by such apps. The ability to execute files, or to probe a specific file by name, remain unchanged. Addresses SELinux denials similar to the following: avc: denied { getattr } for comm="Thread-11" path="/system/bin/atrace" dev="dm-0" ino=189 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_27:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:atrace_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 app=uk.co.santander.santanderUK avc: denied { getattr } for comm="Binder:26637_2" path="/system/bin/atrace" dev="dm-0" ino=168 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:atrace_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 app=com.tencent.mm avc: denied { getattr } for comm="Thread-12" path="/system/bin/apexd" dev="dm-0" ino=451 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_27:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:apexd_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 app=com.grppl.android.shell.CMBlloydsTSB73 Shell access to these directories continues to be allowed, to allow for host-side CTS tests. Also adjust the indentation of some clang directives, to make the presubmit hooks happy. Test: Device boots and no apparent problems. Change-Id: Ibe75682fac1983d39f3f479a5850ab5a96f6627d
2018-11-11 17:39:20 +01:00
// clang-format on
};
#ifndef __ANDROID_VNDK__
auto __for_testing_only__android_dirs = android_dirs;
#endif
// Rules for files.
// These rules are applied based on "first match", so they
// should start with the most specific path and work their
// way up to the root. Prefixes ending in * denotes wildcard
// and will allow partial matches.
static const char sys_conf_dir[] = "/system/etc/fs_config_dirs";
static const char sys_conf_file[] = "/system/etc/fs_config_files";
// No restrictions are placed on the vendor and oem file-system config files,
// although the developer is advised to restrict the scope to the /vendor or
// oem/ file-system since the intent is to provide support for customized
// portions of a separate vendor.img or oem.img. Has to remain open so that
// customization can also land on /system/vendor, /system/oem, /system/odm,
// /system/product or /system/system_ext.
//
// We expect build-time checking or filtering when constructing the associated
// fs_config_* files (see build/tools/fs_config/fs_config_generate.c)
static const char ven_conf_dir[] = "/vendor/etc/fs_config_dirs";
static const char ven_conf_file[] = "/vendor/etc/fs_config_files";
static const char oem_conf_dir[] = "/oem/etc/fs_config_dirs";
static const char oem_conf_file[] = "/oem/etc/fs_config_files";
static const char odm_conf_dir[] = "/odm/etc/fs_config_dirs";
static const char odm_conf_file[] = "/odm/etc/fs_config_files";
static const char product_conf_dir[] = "/product/etc/fs_config_dirs";
static const char product_conf_file[] = "/product/etc/fs_config_files";
static const char system_ext_conf_dir[] = "/system_ext/etc/fs_config_dirs";
static const char system_ext_conf_file[] = "/system_ext/etc/fs_config_files";
static const char* conf[][2] = {
{sys_conf_file, sys_conf_dir}, {ven_conf_file, ven_conf_dir},
{oem_conf_file, oem_conf_dir}, {odm_conf_file, odm_conf_dir},
{product_conf_file, product_conf_dir}, {system_ext_conf_file, system_ext_conf_dir},
};
// Do not use android_files to grant Linux capabilities. Use ambient capabilities in their
// associated init.rc file instead. See https://source.android.com/devices/tech/config/ambient.
// Do not place any new vendor/, data/vendor/, etc entries in android_files.
// Vendor entries should be done via a vendor or device specific config.fs.
// See https://source.android.com/devices/tech/config/filesystem#using-file-system-capabilities
static const struct fs_path_config android_files[] = {
// clang-format off
{ 00644, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM, 0, "data/app/*" },
{ 00644, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM, 0, "data/app-ephemeral/*" },
{ 00644, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM, 0, "data/app-private/*" },
{ 00644, AID_APP, AID_APP, 0, "data/data/*" },
{ 00644, AID_MEDIA_RW, AID_MEDIA_RW, 0, "data/media/*" },
{ 00640, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "data/nativetest/tests.txt" },
{ 00640, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "data/nativetest64/tests.txt" },
{ 00750, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "data/nativetest/*" },
{ 00750, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "data/nativetest64/*" },
{ 00750, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "data/benchmarktest/*" },
{ 00750, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "data/benchmarktest64/*" },
{ 00600, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "default.prop" }, // legacy
{ 00600, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "system/etc/prop.default" },
{ 00600, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "odm/build.prop" }, // legacy; only for P release
{ 00600, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "odm/default.prop" }, // legacy; only for P release
{ 00600, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "odm/etc/build.prop" },
{ 00444, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, odm_conf_dir + 1 },
{ 00444, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, odm_conf_file + 1 },
{ 00444, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, oem_conf_dir + 1 },
{ 00444, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, oem_conf_file + 1 },
{ 00600, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "product/build.prop" },
{ 00444, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, product_conf_dir + 1 },
{ 00444, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, product_conf_file + 1 },
{ 00600, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "system_ext/build.prop" },
{ 00444, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, system_ext_conf_dir + 1 },
{ 00444, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, system_ext_conf_file + 1 },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "system/bin/crash_dump32" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "system/bin/crash_dump64" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "system/bin/debuggerd" },
{ 00550, AID_LOGD, AID_LOGD, 0, "system/bin/logd" },
{ 00700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "system/bin/secilc" },
{ 00750, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "system/bin/uncrypt" },
{ 00600, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "system/build.prop" },
{ 00444, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, sys_conf_dir + 1 },
{ 00444, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, sys_conf_file + 1 },
{ 00440, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "system/etc/init.goldfish.rc" },
{ 00550, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "system/etc/init.goldfish.sh" },
{ 00550, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "system/etc/init.ril" },
{ 00555, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "system/etc/ppp/*" },
{ 00555, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "system/etc/rc.*" },
{ 00750, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "vendor/bin/install-recovery.sh" },
{ 00600, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "vendor/build.prop" },
{ 00600, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "vendor/default.prop" },
{ 00440, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "vendor/etc/recovery.img" },
{ 00444, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, ven_conf_dir + 1 },
{ 00444, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, ven_conf_file + 1 },
// the following two files are INTENTIONALLY set-uid, but they
// are NOT included on user builds.
{ 06755, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "system/xbin/procmem" },
{ 04750, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "system/xbin/su" },
// the following files have enhanced capabilities and ARE included
// in user builds.
flattened apex: fix /apex/com.android.tethering/bin/for-system{,/clatd} mode from packages/modules/Connectivity/Tethering/apex/canned_fs_config /bin/for-system 0 1000 0750 /bin/for-system/clatd 1029 1029 06755 the Tethering apex mounts at /apex/com.android.tethering, but that's a bind mount, it really lives at /system/... in the flattened fs image. Testing via: aosp$ export OVERRIDE_TARGET_FLATTEN_APEX=true aosp$ a_make_target aosp_cf_x86_phone-userdebug $ sudo mkdir /mnt/point && sudo mount -o loop,ro /aosp/out/target/product/vsoc_x86/system.img /mnt/point && egrep /mnt/point /proc/mounts && sudo ls -dlnZ /mnt/point/system/apex/com.android.tethering/bin/for-system{,/clatd} && sudo umount /mnt/point && sudo rmdir /mnt/point /dev/loop0 /mnt/point erofs ro,relatime,user_xattr,acl,cache_strategy=readaround 0 0 drwxr-x---. 2 0 1000 u:object_r:system_file:s0 44 Apr 11 03:12 /mnt/point/system/apex/com.android.tethering/bin/for-system -rwsr-sr-x. 1 1029 1029 u:object_r:clatd_exec:s0 18876 Apr 11 03:12 /mnt/point/system/apex/com.android.tethering/bin/for-system/clatd while without this patch it showed: drwxr-x--x. 2 0 2000 u:object_r:system_file:s0 44 Apr 11 01:53 /mnt/point/system/apex/com.android.tethering/bin/for-system -rwxr-xr-x. 1 0 2000 u:object_r:clatd_exec:s0 18876 Apr 11 01:53 /mnt/point/system/apex/com.android.tethering/bin/for-system/clatd Test: TreeHugger Bug: 273821347 Bug: 277646103 Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Change-Id: I9714b1e935afbe27c2eb4be3f96a9742eb752e92
2023-04-11 08:08:32 +02:00
{ 06755, AID_CLAT, AID_CLAT, 0, "system/apex/com.android.tethering/bin/for-system/clatd" },
{ 06755, AID_CLAT, AID_CLAT, 0, "system_ext/apex/com.android.tethering/bin/for-system/clatd" },
{ 00700, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SHELL, CAP_MASK_LONG(CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND),
"system/bin/inputflinger" },
{ 00750, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, CAP_MASK_LONG(CAP_SETUID) |
CAP_MASK_LONG(CAP_SETGID),
"system/bin/run-as" },
{ 00750, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, CAP_MASK_LONG(CAP_SETUID) |
CAP_MASK_LONG(CAP_SETGID),
"system/bin/simpleperf_app_runner" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "first_stage_ramdisk/system/bin/e2fsck" },
#ifdef __LP64__
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "first_stage_ramdisk/system/bin/linker64" },
#else
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "first_stage_ramdisk/system/bin/linker" },
#endif
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "first_stage_ramdisk/system/bin/resize2fs" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "first_stage_ramdisk/system/bin/snapuserd" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "first_stage_ramdisk/system/bin/snapuserd_ramdisk" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "first_stage_ramdisk/system/bin/tune2fs" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "first_stage_ramdisk/system/bin/fsck.f2fs" },
// generic defaults
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "bin/*" },
{ 00640, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "fstab.*" },
{ 00750, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "init*" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "odm/bin/*" },
{ 00644, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "odm/framework/*" },
{ 00644, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "odm/app/*" },
{ 00644, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "odm/priv-app/*" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "product/bin/*" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "product/apex/*bin/*" },
{ 00644, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "product/framework/*" },
{ 00644, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "product/app/*" },
{ 00644, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "product/priv-app/*" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "system/bin/*" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "system/xbin/*" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "system/apex/*/bin/*" },
{ 00644, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "system/framework/*" },
{ 00644, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "system/app/*" },
{ 00644, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "system/priv-app/*" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "system_ext/bin/*" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "system_ext/apex/*/bin/*" },
{ 00644, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "system_ext/framework/*" },
{ 00644, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "system_ext/app/*" },
{ 00644, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "system_ext/priv-app/*" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "vendor/bin/*" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "vendor/apex/*bin/*" },
{ 00755, AID_ROOT, AID_SHELL, 0, "vendor/xbin/*" },
{ 00644, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "vendor/framework/*" },
{ 00644, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "vendor/app/*" },
{ 00644, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, 0, "vendor/priv-app/*" },
{},
// clang-format on
};
#ifndef __ANDROID_VNDK__
auto __for_testing_only__android_files = android_files;
#endif
static size_t strip(const char* path, size_t len, const char suffix[]) {
if (len < strlen(suffix)) return len;
if (strncmp(path + len - strlen(suffix), suffix, strlen(suffix))) return len;
return len - strlen(suffix);
}
static int fs_config_open(int dir, int which, const char* target_out_path) {
int fd = -1;
if (target_out_path && *target_out_path) {
// target_out_path is the path to the directory holding content of
// system partition but as we cannot guarantee it ends with '/system'
// or with or without a trailing slash, need to strip them carefully.
char* name = NULL;
size_t len = strlen(target_out_path);
len = strip(target_out_path, len, "/");
len = strip(target_out_path, len, "/system");
if (asprintf(&name, "%.*s%s", (int)len, target_out_path, conf[which][dir]) != -1) {
fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(name, O_RDONLY));
free(name);
}
}
if (fd < 0) {
fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(conf[which][dir], O_RDONLY));
}
return fd;
}
// if path is "odm/<stuff>", "oem/<stuff>", "product/<stuff>",
// "system_ext/<stuff>" or "vendor/<stuff>"
static bool is_partition(const std::string& path) {
static const char* partitions[] = {"odm/", "oem/", "product/", "system_ext/", "vendor/"};
for (size_t i = 0; i < (sizeof(partitions) / sizeof(partitions[0])); ++i) {
if (StartsWith(path, partitions[i])) return true;
}
return false;
}
// alias prefixes of "<partition>/<stuff>" to "system/<partition>/<stuff>" or
// "system/<partition>/<stuff>" to "<partition>/<stuff>"
static bool fs_config_cmp(bool dir, const char* prefix, size_t len, const char* path, size_t plen) {
std::string pattern(prefix, len);
std::string input(path, plen);
// Massage pattern and input so that they can be used by fnmatch where
// directories have to end with /.
if (dir) {
if (!EndsWith(input, "/")) {
input.append("/");
}
if (!EndsWith(pattern, "/*")) {
if (EndsWith(pattern, "/")) {
pattern.append("*");
} else {
pattern.append("/*");
}
}
}
// no FNM_PATHNAME is set in order to match a/b/c/d with a/*
// FNM_ESCAPE is set in order to prevent using \\? and \\* and maintenance issues.
const int fnm_flags = FNM_NOESCAPE;
if (fnmatch(pattern.c_str(), input.c_str(), fnm_flags) == 0) return true;
// Check match between logical partition's files and patterns.
static constexpr const char* kLogicalPartitions[] = {"system/product/", "system/system_ext/",
"system/vendor/", "vendor/odm/"};
for (auto& logical_partition : kLogicalPartitions) {
if (StartsWith(input, logical_partition)) {
std::string input_in_partition = input.substr(input.find('/') + 1);
if (!is_partition(input_in_partition)) continue;
if (fnmatch(pattern.c_str(), input_in_partition.c_str(), fnm_flags) == 0) {
return true;
}
}
}
return false;
}
#ifndef __ANDROID_VNDK__
auto __for_testing_only__fs_config_cmp = fs_config_cmp;
#endif
bool get_fs_config(const char* path, bool dir, const char* target_out_path,
struct fs_config* fs_conf) {
const struct fs_path_config* pc;
size_t which, plen;
if (path[0] == '/') {
path++;
}
plen = strlen(path);
for (which = 0; which < (sizeof(conf) / sizeof(conf[0])); ++which) {
struct fs_path_config_from_file header;
int fd = fs_config_open(dir, which, target_out_path);
if (fd < 0) continue;
while (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(read(fd, &header, sizeof(header))) == sizeof(header)) {
char* prefix;
uint16_t host_len = header.len;
ssize_t len, remainder = host_len - sizeof(header);
if (remainder <= 0) {
ALOGE("%s len is corrupted", conf[which][dir]);
break;
}
prefix = static_cast<char*>(calloc(1, remainder));
if (!prefix) {
ALOGE("%s out of memory", conf[which][dir]);
break;
}
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(read(fd, prefix, remainder)) != remainder) {
free(prefix);
ALOGE("%s prefix is truncated", conf[which][dir]);
break;
}
len = strnlen(prefix, remainder);
if (len >= remainder) { // missing a terminating null
free(prefix);
ALOGE("%s is corrupted", conf[which][dir]);
break;
}
if (fs_config_cmp(dir, prefix, len, path, plen)) {
free(prefix);
close(fd);
fs_conf->uid = header.uid;
fs_conf->gid = header.gid;
fs_conf->mode = header.mode;
fs_conf->capabilities = header.capabilities;
return true;
}
free(prefix);
}
close(fd);
}
for (pc = dir ? android_dirs : android_files; pc->prefix; pc++) {
if (fs_config_cmp(dir, pc->prefix, strlen(pc->prefix), path, plen)) {
fs_conf->uid = pc->uid;
fs_conf->gid = pc->gid;
fs_conf->mode = pc->mode;
fs_conf->capabilities = pc->capabilities;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
void fs_config(const char* path, int dir, const char* target_out_path, unsigned* uid, unsigned* gid,
unsigned* mode, uint64_t* capabilities) {
struct fs_config conf;
if (get_fs_config(path, dir, target_out_path, &conf)) {
*uid = conf.uid;
*gid = conf.gid;
*mode = (*mode & S_IFMT) | conf.mode;
*capabilities = conf.capabilities;
} else {
*uid = AID_ROOT;
*gid = AID_ROOT;
*mode = (*mode & S_IFMT) | (dir ? 0755 : 0644);
*capabilities = 0;
}
}