init: remove unfinished fsverity signature support for APEX sepolicy
The APEX sepolicy feature has unfinished support for verifying the sepolicy file using fsverity with a builtin signature. However, this was never finished and doesn't really make sense, since the already-implemented scheme that uses a full-file hash combined with a userspace signature check is better suited to the problem. Therefore, remove this unfinished code. Bug: 290064770 Test: presubmit and booting Cuttlefish Change-Id: I3403a3303bcea32c7340642b843cd1541fe1fd2f
This commit is contained in:
parent
314e70966a
commit
0b2c5cde1f
2 changed files with 2 additions and 46 deletions
|
@ -166,11 +166,9 @@ libinit_cc_defaults {
|
|||
"libbootloader_message",
|
||||
"libc++fs",
|
||||
"libcgrouprc_format",
|
||||
"libfsverity_init",
|
||||
"liblmkd_utils",
|
||||
"liblz4",
|
||||
"libzstd",
|
||||
"libmini_keyctl_static",
|
||||
"libmodprobe",
|
||||
"libprocinfo",
|
||||
"libprotobuf-cpp-lite",
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -74,10 +74,8 @@
|
|||
#include <android-base/unique_fd.h>
|
||||
#include <fs_avb/fs_avb.h>
|
||||
#include <fs_mgr.h>
|
||||
#include <fsverity_init.h>
|
||||
#include <libgsi/libgsi.h>
|
||||
#include <libsnapshot/snapshot.h>
|
||||
#include <mini_keyctl_utils.h>
|
||||
#include <selinux/android.h>
|
||||
#include <ziparchive/zip_archive.h>
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -510,7 +508,6 @@ bool OpenMonolithicPolicy(PolicyFile* policy_file) {
|
|||
|
||||
constexpr const char* kSigningCertRelease =
|
||||
"/system/etc/selinux/com.android.sepolicy.cert-release.der";
|
||||
constexpr const char* kFsVerityProcPath = "/proc/sys/fs/verity";
|
||||
const std::string kSepolicyApexMetadataDir = "/metadata/sepolicy/";
|
||||
const std::string kSepolicyApexSystemDir = "/system/etc/selinux/apex/";
|
||||
const std::string kSepolicyZip = "SEPolicy.zip";
|
||||
|
@ -614,24 +611,6 @@ Result<void> GetPolicyFromApex(const std::string& dir) {
|
|||
return {};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Result<void> LoadSepolicyApexCerts() {
|
||||
key_serial_t keyring_id = android::GetKeyringId(".fs-verity");
|
||||
if (keyring_id < 0) {
|
||||
return Error() << "Failed to find .fs-verity keyring id";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TODO(b/199914227) the release key should always exist. Once it's checked in, start
|
||||
// throwing an error here if it doesn't exist.
|
||||
if (access(kSigningCertRelease, F_OK) == 0) {
|
||||
LoadKeyFromFile(keyring_id, "fsv_sepolicy_apex_release", kSigningCertRelease);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Result<void> SepolicyFsVerityCheck() {
|
||||
return Error() << "TODO implement support for fsverity SEPolicy.";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Result<void> SepolicyCheckSignature(const std::string& dir) {
|
||||
std::string signature;
|
||||
if (!android::base::ReadFileToString(dir + kSepolicySignature, &signature)) {
|
||||
|
@ -654,18 +633,7 @@ Result<void> SepolicyCheckSignature(const std::string& dir) {
|
|||
return verifySignature(sepolicyStr, signature, *releaseKey);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Result<void> SepolicyVerify(const std::string& dir, bool supportsFsVerity) {
|
||||
if (supportsFsVerity) {
|
||||
auto fsVerityCheck = SepolicyFsVerityCheck();
|
||||
if (fsVerityCheck.ok()) {
|
||||
return fsVerityCheck;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// TODO(b/199914227) If the device supports fsverity, but we fail here, we should fail to
|
||||
// boot and not carry on. For now, fallback to a signature checkuntil the fsverity
|
||||
// logic is implemented.
|
||||
LOG(INFO) << "Falling back to standard signature check. " << fsVerityCheck.error();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Result<void> SepolicyVerify(const std::string& dir) {
|
||||
auto sepolicySignature = SepolicyCheckSignature(dir);
|
||||
if (!sepolicySignature.ok()) {
|
||||
return Error() << "Apex SEPolicy failed signature check";
|
||||
|
@ -698,23 +666,13 @@ void CleanupApexSepolicy() {
|
|||
// 6. Sets selinux into enforcing mode and continues normal booting.
|
||||
//
|
||||
void PrepareApexSepolicy() {
|
||||
bool supportsFsVerity = access(kFsVerityProcPath, F_OK) == 0;
|
||||
if (supportsFsVerity) {
|
||||
auto loadSepolicyApexCerts = LoadSepolicyApexCerts();
|
||||
if (!loadSepolicyApexCerts.ok()) {
|
||||
// TODO(b/199914227) If the device supports fsverity, but we fail here, we should fail
|
||||
// to boot and not carry on. For now, fallback to a signature checkuntil the fsverity
|
||||
// logic is implemented.
|
||||
LOG(INFO) << loadSepolicyApexCerts.error();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// If apex sepolicy zip exists in /metadata/sepolicy, use that, otherwise use version on
|
||||
// /system.
|
||||
auto dir = (access((kSepolicyApexMetadataDir + kSepolicyZip).c_str(), F_OK) == 0)
|
||||
? kSepolicyApexMetadataDir
|
||||
: kSepolicyApexSystemDir;
|
||||
|
||||
auto sepolicyVerify = SepolicyVerify(dir, supportsFsVerity);
|
||||
auto sepolicyVerify = SepolicyVerify(dir);
|
||||
if (!sepolicyVerify.ok()) {
|
||||
LOG(INFO) << "Error: " << sepolicyVerify.error();
|
||||
// If signature verification fails, fall back to version on /system.
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in a new issue