From 4a875ce6ff678d01648e89f1186debd5a1db6377 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Gao Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2016 14:20:18 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] debuggerd: verify that traced threads belong to the right process. Fix two races in debuggerd's PTRACE_ATTACH logic: 1. The target thread in a crash dump request could exit between the /proc//task/ check and the PTRACE_ATTACH. 2. Sibling threads could exit between listing /proc//task and the PTRACE_ATTACH. Bug: http://b/29555636 Change-Id: I4dfe1ea30e2c211d2389321bd66e3684dd757591 --- debuggerd/debuggerd.cpp | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/debuggerd/debuggerd.cpp b/debuggerd/debuggerd.cpp index 908af107a..7b57c2012 100644 --- a/debuggerd/debuggerd.cpp +++ b/debuggerd/debuggerd.cpp @@ -183,6 +183,16 @@ out: return allowed; } +static bool pid_contains_tid(pid_t pid, pid_t tid) { + char task_path[PATH_MAX]; + if (snprintf(task_path, PATH_MAX, "/proc/%d/task/%d", pid, tid) >= PATH_MAX) { + ALOGE("debuggerd: task path overflow (pid = %d, tid = %d)\n", pid, tid); + exit(1); + } + + return access(task_path, F_OK) == 0; +} + static int read_request(int fd, debugger_request_t* out_request) { ucred cr; socklen_t len = sizeof(cr); @@ -227,16 +237,13 @@ static int read_request(int fd, debugger_request_t* out_request) { if (msg.action == DEBUGGER_ACTION_CRASH) { // Ensure that the tid reported by the crashing process is valid. - char buf[64]; - struct stat s; - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "/proc/%d/task/%d", out_request->pid, out_request->tid); - if (stat(buf, &s)) { - ALOGE("tid %d does not exist in pid %d. ignoring debug request\n", - out_request->tid, out_request->pid); + // This check needs to happen again after ptracing the requested thread to prevent a race. + if (!pid_contains_tid(out_request->pid, out_request->tid)) { + ALOGE("tid %d does not exist in pid %d. ignoring debug request\n", out_request->tid, + out_request->pid); return -1; } - } else if (cr.uid == 0 - || (cr.uid == AID_SYSTEM && msg.action == DEBUGGER_ACTION_DUMP_BACKTRACE)) { + } else if (cr.uid == 0 || (cr.uid == AID_SYSTEM && msg.action == DEBUGGER_ACTION_DUMP_BACKTRACE)) { // Only root or system can ask us to attach to any process and dump it explicitly. // However, system is only allowed to collect backtraces but cannot dump tombstones. status = get_process_info(out_request->tid, &out_request->pid, @@ -413,10 +420,31 @@ static void redirect_to_32(int fd, debugger_request_t* request) { } #endif -static void ptrace_siblings(pid_t pid, pid_t main_tid, std::set& tids) { - char task_path[64]; +// Attach to a thread, and verify that it's still a member of the given process +static bool ptrace_attach_thread(pid_t pid, pid_t tid) { + if (ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, tid, 0, 0) != 0) { + return false; + } - snprintf(task_path, sizeof(task_path), "/proc/%d/task", pid); + // Make sure that the task we attached to is actually part of the pid we're dumping. + if (!pid_contains_tid(pid, tid)) { + if (ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, tid, 0, 0) != 0) { + ALOGE("debuggerd: failed to detach from thread '%d'", tid); + exit(1); + } + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +static void ptrace_siblings(pid_t pid, pid_t main_tid, std::set& tids) { + char task_path[PATH_MAX]; + + if (snprintf(task_path, PATH_MAX, "/proc/%d/task", pid) >= PATH_MAX) { + ALOGE("debuggerd: task path overflow (pid = %d)\n", pid); + abort(); + } std::unique_ptr d(opendir(task_path), closedir); @@ -443,7 +471,7 @@ static void ptrace_siblings(pid_t pid, pid_t main_tid, std::set& tids) { continue; } - if (ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, tid, 0, 0) < 0) { + if (!ptrace_attach_thread(pid, tid)) { ALOGE("debuggerd: ptrace attach to %d failed: %s", tid, strerror(errno)); continue; } @@ -568,11 +596,33 @@ static void worker_process(int fd, debugger_request_t& request) { // debugger_signal_handler(). // Attach to the target process. - if (ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, request.tid, 0, 0) != 0) { + if (!ptrace_attach_thread(request.pid, request.tid)) { ALOGE("debuggerd: ptrace attach failed: %s", strerror(errno)); exit(1); } + // DEBUGGER_ACTION_CRASH requests can come from arbitrary processes and the tid field in the + // request is sent from the other side. If an attacker can cause a process to be spawned with the + // pid of their process, they could trick debuggerd into dumping that process by exiting after + // sending the request. Validate the trusted request.uid/gid to defend against this. + if (request.action == DEBUGGER_ACTION_CRASH) { + pid_t pid; + uid_t uid; + gid_t gid; + if (get_process_info(request.tid, &pid, &uid, &gid) != 0) { + ALOGE("debuggerd: failed to get process info for tid '%d'", request.tid); + exit(1); + } + + if (pid != request.pid || uid != request.uid || gid != request.gid) { + ALOGE( + "debuggerd: attached task %d does not match request: " + "expected pid=%d,uid=%d,gid=%d, actual pid=%d,uid=%d,gid=%d", + request.tid, request.pid, request.uid, request.gid, pid, uid, gid); + exit(1); + } + } + // Don't attach to the sibling threads if we want to attach gdb. // Supposedly, it makes the process less reliable. bool attach_gdb = should_attach_gdb(request);