a377ff0d4a
Arguably, we don't need a ScopedMinijail for a program that only execs, but I'd rather keep the code consistent and have all uses of Minijail be good examples. Bug: 30156807 Change-Id: I08a968835e0f3e2afcd5e7736626edbed658cde2
228 lines
7.2 KiB
C++
228 lines
7.2 KiB
C++
/*
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* Copyright (C) 2010 The Android Open Source Project
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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* You may obtain a copy of the License at
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*
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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* limitations under the License.
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*/
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <error.h>
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#include <paths.h>
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#include <pwd.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <sys/capability.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <libminijail.h>
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#include <scoped_minijail.h>
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#include <packagelistparser/packagelistparser.h>
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#include <private/android_filesystem_config.h>
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#include <selinux/android.h>
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// The purpose of this program is to run a command as a specific
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// application user-id. Typical usage is:
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//
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// run-as <package-name> <command> <args>
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//
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// The 'run-as' binary is installed with CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID file
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// capabilities, but will check the following:
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//
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// - that it is invoked from the 'shell' or 'root' user (abort otherwise)
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// - that '<package-name>' is the name of an installed and debuggable package
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// - that the package's data directory is well-formed
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//
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// If so, it will drop to the application's user id / group id, cd to the
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// package's data directory, then run the command there.
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//
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// This can be useful for a number of different things on production devices:
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//
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// - Allow application developers to look at their own application data
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// during development.
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//
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// - Run the 'gdbserver' binary executable to allow native debugging
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//
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static bool packagelist_parse_callback(pkg_info* this_package, void* userdata) {
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pkg_info* p = reinterpret_cast<pkg_info*>(userdata);
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if (strcmp(p->name, this_package->name) == 0) {
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*p = *this_package;
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return false; // Stop searching.
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}
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packagelist_free(this_package);
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return true; // Keep searching.
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}
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static bool check_directory(const char* path, uid_t uid) {
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struct stat st;
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if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(lstat(path, &st)) == -1) return false;
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// /data/user/0 is a known safe symlink.
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if (strcmp("/data/user/0", path) == 0) return true;
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// Must be a real directory, not a symlink.
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if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) return false;
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// Must be owned by specific uid/gid.
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if (st.st_uid != uid || st.st_gid != uid) return false;
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// Must not be readable or writable by others.
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if ((st.st_mode & (S_IROTH|S_IWOTH)) != 0) return false;
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return true;
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}
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// This function is used to check the data directory path for safety.
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// We check that every sub-directory is owned by the 'system' user
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// and exists and is not a symlink. We also check that the full directory
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// path is properly owned by the user ID.
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static bool check_data_path(const char* data_path, uid_t uid) {
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// The path should be absolute.
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if (data_path[0] != '/') return false;
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// Look for all sub-paths, we do that by finding
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// directory separators in the input path and
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// checking each sub-path independently.
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for (int nn = 1; data_path[nn] != '\0'; nn++) {
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char subpath[PATH_MAX];
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/* skip non-separator characters */
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if (data_path[nn] != '/') continue;
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/* handle trailing separator case */
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if (data_path[nn+1] == '\0') break;
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/* found a separator, check that data_path is not too long. */
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if (nn >= (int)(sizeof subpath)) return false;
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/* reject any '..' subpath */
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if (nn >= 3 &&
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data_path[nn-3] == '/' &&
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data_path[nn-2] == '.' &&
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data_path[nn-1] == '.') {
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return false;
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}
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/* copy to 'subpath', then check ownership */
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memcpy(subpath, data_path, nn);
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subpath[nn] = '\0';
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if (!check_directory(subpath, AID_SYSTEM)) return false;
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}
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// All sub-paths were checked, now verify that the full data
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// directory is owned by the application uid.
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return check_directory(data_path, uid);
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}
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int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
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// Check arguments.
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if (argc < 2) {
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error(1, 0, "usage: run-as <package-name> [--user <uid>] <command> [<args>]\n");
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}
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// This program runs with CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities on Android
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// production devices. Check user id of caller --- must be 'shell' or 'root'.
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if (getuid() != AID_SHELL && getuid() != AID_ROOT) {
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error(1, 0, "only 'shell' or 'root' users can run this program");
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}
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char* pkgname = argv[1];
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int cmd_argv_offset = 2;
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// Get user_id from command line if provided.
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int userId = 0;
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if ((argc >= 4) && !strcmp(argv[2], "--user")) {
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userId = atoi(argv[3]);
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if (userId < 0) error(1, 0, "negative user id: %d", userId);
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cmd_argv_offset += 2;
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}
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// Retrieve package information from system, switching egid so we can read the file.
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gid_t old_egid = getegid();
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if (setegid(AID_PACKAGE_INFO) == -1) error(1, errno, "setegid(AID_PACKAGE_INFO) failed");
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pkg_info info;
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memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
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info.name = pkgname;
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if (!packagelist_parse(packagelist_parse_callback, &info)) {
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error(1, errno, "packagelist_parse failed");
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}
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if (info.uid == 0) {
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error(1, 0, "unknown package: %s", pkgname);
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}
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if (setegid(old_egid) == -1) error(1, errno, "couldn't restore egid");
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// Verify that user id is not too big.
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if ((UID_MAX - info.uid) / AID_USER < (uid_t)userId) {
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error(1, 0, "user id too big: %d", userId);
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}
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// Calculate user app ID.
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uid_t userAppId = (AID_USER * userId) + info.uid;
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// Reject system packages.
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if (userAppId < AID_APP) {
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error(1, 0, "package not an application: %s", pkgname);
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}
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// Reject any non-debuggable package.
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if (!info.debuggable) {
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error(1, 0, "package not debuggable: %s", pkgname);
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}
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// Check that the data directory path is valid.
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if (!check_data_path(info.data_dir, userAppId)) {
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error(1, 0, "package has corrupt installation: %s", pkgname);
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}
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// Ensure that we change all real/effective/saved IDs at the
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// same time to avoid nasty surprises.
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uid_t uid = userAppId;
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uid_t gid = userAppId;
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ScopedMinijail j(minijail_new());
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minijail_change_uid(j.get(), uid);
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minijail_change_gid(j.get(), gid);
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minijail_enter(j.get());
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if (selinux_android_setcontext(uid, 0, info.seinfo, pkgname) < 0) {
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error(1, errno, "couldn't set SELinux security context");
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}
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// cd into the data directory, and set $HOME correspondingly.
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if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(chdir(info.data_dir)) == -1) {
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error(1, errno, "couldn't chdir to package's data directory");
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}
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setenv("HOME", info.data_dir, 1);
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// Reset parts of the environment, like su would.
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setenv("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH, 1);
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unsetenv("IFS");
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// Set the user-specific parts for this user.
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passwd* pw = getpwuid(uid);
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setenv("LOGNAME", pw->pw_name, 1);
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setenv("SHELL", pw->pw_shell, 1);
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setenv("USER", pw->pw_name, 1);
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// User specified command for exec.
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if ((argc >= cmd_argv_offset + 1) &&
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(execvp(argv[cmd_argv_offset], argv+cmd_argv_offset) == -1)) {
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error(1, errno, "exec failed for %s", argv[cmd_argv_offset]);
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}
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// Default exec shell.
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execlp(_PATH_BSHELL, "sh", NULL);
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error(1, errno, "exec failed");
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}
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