7a0611b006
Due to the work done for b/156305599 ("Ensure no process except vold can create directories like /data/system_ce/0"), the SELinux policy now enforces that vold is the only process that can write to directories that contain per-user encrypted subdirectories. This is essential to prevent bugs where directories that are supposed to be encrypted get created too early so are not actually encrypted as intended. However, this only works when SELinux is in enforcing mode. When SELinux is in permissive mode, only DAC is enforced, and the file modes allow other processes to write to many of these directories. That allows system_server to break things once again. Therefore, remove the write bit from the file modes so that write access is always denied to processes that don't have CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. This is not as strong a restriction as the SELinux policy, which still applies independently, but it does keep out system_server by itself. Also remove the sticky bit from /data/misc_ce and /data/misc_de, since there is no reason for it. (It probably was originally copied from /data/misc, which might need it. But misc_{ce,de} don't need it.) Bug: 285239971 Test: Booted Cuttlefish Change-Id: I1213a4d18c5f851acf213d786400d79d73777ed0 |
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.. | ||
avb | ||
etc | ||
adb_debug.prop | ||
Android.bp | ||
Android.mk | ||
asan.options | ||
asan_extract.rc | ||
asan_extract.sh | ||
init-debug.rc | ||
init.environ.rc.in | ||
init.no_zygote.rc | ||
init.rc | ||
init.usb.configfs.rc | ||
init.usb.rc | ||
init.zygote32.rc | ||
init.zygote64.rc | ||
init.zygote64_32.rc | ||
OWNERS | ||
ramdisk_node_list | ||
ueventd.rc |