eedd38a82a
This has been something the kernel does automatically since 2014, so there's no obvious reason to add extra work during boot to duplicate that effort. Bug: http://b/179086242 Test: treehugger Change-Id: I44cce99a892e4f2a6a303c2126bd29f955f5fb23
219 lines
7.4 KiB
C++
219 lines
7.4 KiB
C++
/*
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* Copyright (C) 2017 The Android Open Source Project
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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* You may obtain a copy of the License at
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*
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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* limitations under the License.
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*/
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#include "security.h"
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <linux/perf_event.h>
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#include <selinux/selinux.h>
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#include <sys/ioctl.h>
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#include <sys/syscall.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <fstream>
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#include <android-base/logging.h>
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#include <android-base/properties.h>
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#include <android-base/unique_fd.h>
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using android::base::unique_fd;
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using android::base::SetProperty;
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namespace android {
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namespace init {
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static bool SetHighestAvailableOptionValue(const std::string& path, int min, int max) {
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std::ifstream inf(path, std::fstream::in);
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if (!inf) {
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LOG(ERROR) << "Cannot open for reading: " << path;
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return false;
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}
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int current = max;
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while (current >= min) {
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// try to write out new value
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std::string str_val = std::to_string(current);
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std::ofstream of(path, std::fstream::out);
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if (!of) {
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LOG(ERROR) << "Cannot open for writing: " << path;
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return false;
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}
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of << str_val << std::endl;
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of.close();
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// check to make sure it was recorded
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inf.seekg(0);
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std::string str_rec;
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inf >> str_rec;
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if (str_val.compare(str_rec) == 0) {
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break;
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}
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current--;
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}
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inf.close();
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if (current < min) {
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LOG(ERROR) << "Unable to set minimum option value " << min << " in " << path;
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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#define MMAP_RND_PATH "/proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_bits"
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#define MMAP_RND_COMPAT_PATH "/proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_compat_bits"
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static bool SetMmapRndBitsMin(int start, int min, bool compat) {
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std::string path;
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if (compat) {
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path = MMAP_RND_COMPAT_PATH;
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} else {
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path = MMAP_RND_PATH;
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}
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return SetHighestAvailableOptionValue(path, min, start);
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}
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// Set /proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_bits and potentially
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// /proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_compat_bits to the maximum supported values.
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// Returns -1 if unable to set these to an acceptable value.
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//
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// To support this sysctl, the following upstream commits are needed:
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//
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// d07e22597d1d mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR
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// e0c25d958f78 arm: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
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// 8f0d3aa9de57 arm64: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
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// 9e08f57d684a x86: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
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// ec9ee4acd97c drivers: char: random: add get_random_long()
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// 5ef11c35ce86 mm: ASLR: use get_random_long()
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Result<void> SetMmapRndBitsAction(const BuiltinArguments&) {
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// values are arch-dependent
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#if defined(USER_MODE_LINUX)
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// uml does not support mmap_rnd_bits
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return {};
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#elif defined(__aarch64__)
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// arm64 supports 18 - 33 bits depending on pagesize and VA_SIZE
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if (SetMmapRndBitsMin(33, 24, false) && SetMmapRndBitsMin(16, 16, true)) {
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return {};
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}
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#elif defined(__x86_64__)
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// x86_64 supports 28 - 32 bits
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if (SetMmapRndBitsMin(32, 32, false) && SetMmapRndBitsMin(16, 16, true)) {
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return {};
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}
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#elif defined(__arm__) || defined(__i386__)
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// check to see if we're running on 64-bit kernel
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bool h64 = !access(MMAP_RND_COMPAT_PATH, F_OK);
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// supported 32-bit architecture must have 16 bits set
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if (SetMmapRndBitsMin(16, 16, h64)) {
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return {};
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}
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#else
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LOG(ERROR) << "Unknown architecture";
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#endif
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LOG(FATAL) << "Unable to set adequate mmap entropy value!";
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return Error();
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}
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#define KPTR_RESTRICT_PATH "/proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict"
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#define KPTR_RESTRICT_MINVALUE 2
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#define KPTR_RESTRICT_MAXVALUE 4
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// Set kptr_restrict to the highest available level.
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//
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// Aborts if unable to set this to an acceptable value.
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Result<void> SetKptrRestrictAction(const BuiltinArguments&) {
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std::string path = KPTR_RESTRICT_PATH;
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if (!SetHighestAvailableOptionValue(path, KPTR_RESTRICT_MINVALUE, KPTR_RESTRICT_MAXVALUE)) {
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LOG(FATAL) << "Unable to set adequate kptr_restrict value!";
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return Error();
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}
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return {};
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}
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// Test for whether the kernel has SELinux hooks for the perf_event_open()
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// syscall. If the hooks are present, we can stop using the other permission
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// mechanism (perf_event_paranoid sysctl), and use only the SELinux policy to
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// control access to the syscall. The hooks are expected on all Android R
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// release kernels, but might be absent on devices that upgrade while keeping an
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// older kernel.
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//
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// There is no direct/synchronous way of finding out that a syscall failed due
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// to SELinux. Therefore we test for a combination of a success and a failure
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// that are explained by the platform's SELinux policy for the "init" domain:
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// * cpu-scoped perf_event is allowed
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// * ioctl() on the event fd is disallowed with EACCES
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//
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// Since init has CAP_SYS_ADMIN, these tests are not affected by the system-wide
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// perf_event_paranoid sysctl.
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//
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// If the SELinux hooks are detected, a special sysprop
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// (sys.init.perf_lsm_hooks) is set, which translates to a modification of
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// perf_event_paranoid (through init.rc sysprop actions).
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//
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// TODO(b/137092007): this entire test can be removed once the platform stops
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// supporting kernels that precede the perf_event_open hooks (Android common
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// kernels 4.4 and 4.9).
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Result<void> TestPerfEventSelinuxAction(const BuiltinArguments&) {
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// Special case: for *development devices* that boot with permissive
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// SELinux, treat the LSM hooks as present for the effect of lowering the
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// perf_event_paranoid sysctl. The sysprop is reused for pragmatic reasons,
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// as there no existing way for init rules to check for permissive boot at
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// the time of writing.
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if (ALLOW_PERMISSIVE_SELINUX) {
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if (!security_getenforce()) {
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LOG(INFO) << "Permissive SELinux boot, forcing sys.init.perf_lsm_hooks to 1.";
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SetProperty("sys.init.perf_lsm_hooks", "1");
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return {};
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}
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}
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// Use a trivial event that will be configured, but not started.
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struct perf_event_attr pe = {
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.type = PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE,
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.size = sizeof(struct perf_event_attr),
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.config = PERF_COUNT_SW_TASK_CLOCK,
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.disabled = 1,
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.exclude_kernel = 1,
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};
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// Open the above event targeting cpu 0. (EINTR not possible.)
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unique_fd fd(static_cast<int>(syscall(__NR_perf_event_open, &pe, /*pid=*/-1,
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/*cpu=*/0,
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/*group_fd=*/-1, /*flags=*/0)));
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if (fd == -1) {
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PLOG(ERROR) << "Unexpected perf_event_open error";
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return {};
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}
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int ioctl_ret = ioctl(fd, PERF_EVENT_IOC_RESET);
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if (ioctl_ret != -1) {
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// Success implies that the kernel doesn't have the hooks.
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return {};
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} else if (errno != EACCES) {
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PLOG(ERROR) << "Unexpected perf_event ioctl error";
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return {};
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}
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// Conclude that the SELinux hooks are present.
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SetProperty("sys.init.perf_lsm_hooks", "1");
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return {};
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}
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} // namespace init
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} // namespace android
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