623d140cc0
bionic hard codes the PAGE_SIZE macro as 4096. This is going away as Android begins to support larger page sizes. trusty uses PAGE_SIZE to round up the allocation size of the DMA buffers and mmap sizes. This is not explicitly needed since the kernel will always give you a page-aligned and page-sized multiple allocation when allocating a dmabuf or mmap-ing. Remove this PAGE_SIZE usage from TrustyApp, app_fuzzer, coverage, line-coverage, modulewrapper. Bug: 294914413 Test: Boot test on 16k device Change-Id: Iad922e0a152cb80db2e59e696d7556602fd17d67 Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com> |
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fuzz | ||
include | ||
.clang-format | ||
Android.bp | ||
android.hardware.confirmationui-service.trusty.rc | ||
android.hardware.confirmationui-service.trusty.xml | ||
fuzzer.cpp | ||
NotSoSecureInput.cpp | ||
README | ||
service.cpp | ||
TrustyApp.cpp | ||
TrustyApp.h | ||
TrustyConfirmationUI.cpp | ||
TrustyConfirmationUI.h |
## Secure UI Architecture To implement confirmationui a secure UI architecture is required. This entails a way to display the confirmation dialog driven by a reduced trusted computing base, typically a trusted execution environment (TEE), without having to rely on Linux and the Android system for integrity and authenticity of input events. This implementation provides neither. But it provides most of the functionlity required to run a full Android Protected Confirmation feature when integrated into a secure UI architecture. ## Secure input (NotSoSecureInput) This implementation does not provide any security guaranties. The input method (NotSoSecureInput) runs a cryptographic protocols that is sufficiently secure IFF the end point is implemented on a trustworthy secure input device. But since the endpoint is currently in the HAL service itself this implementation is not secure. NOTE that a secure input device end point needs a good source of entropy for generating nonces. The current implementation (NotSoSecureInput.cpp#generateNonce) uses a constant nonce.