platform_system_core/run-as/run-as.cpp
Luis Hector Chavez ef62f3fcbb Add a way to disable run-as at runtime
This change adds the ro.boot.disable_runas system property, that when
set, disables the run-as command. This is done to reduce the surface
area of programs that have file based capabilities in Chrome OS, and
what they can do when running in non-developer mode.

Bug: 31630024
Test: run-as still works in aosp_sailfish
Test: run-as still works in Android in Chrome OS (in developer mode)
Change-Id: Iaf1d6f9ceb65081b7a9e17b9b91d8855e4080133
2018-06-27 11:09:28 -07:00

237 lines
7.6 KiB
C++

/*
* Copyright (C) 2010 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <error.h>
#include <paths.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/capability.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <libminijail.h>
#include <scoped_minijail.h>
#include <android-base/properties.h>
#include <packagelistparser/packagelistparser.h>
#include <private/android_filesystem_config.h>
#include <selinux/android.h>
// The purpose of this program is to run a command as a specific
// application user-id. Typical usage is:
//
// run-as <package-name> <command> <args>
//
// The 'run-as' binary is installed with CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID file
// capabilities, but will check the following:
//
// - that the ro.boot.disable_runas property is not set
// - that it is invoked from the 'shell' or 'root' user (abort otherwise)
// - that '<package-name>' is the name of an installed and debuggable package
// - that the package's data directory is well-formed
//
// If so, it will drop to the application's user id / group id, cd to the
// package's data directory, then run the command there.
//
// This can be useful for a number of different things on production devices:
//
// - Allow application developers to look at their own application data
// during development.
//
// - Run the 'gdbserver' binary executable to allow native debugging
//
static bool packagelist_parse_callback(pkg_info* this_package, void* userdata) {
pkg_info* p = reinterpret_cast<pkg_info*>(userdata);
if (strcmp(p->name, this_package->name) == 0) {
*p = *this_package;
return false; // Stop searching.
}
packagelist_free(this_package);
return true; // Keep searching.
}
static bool check_directory(const char* path, uid_t uid) {
struct stat st;
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(lstat(path, &st)) == -1) return false;
// /data/user/0 is a known safe symlink.
if (strcmp("/data/user/0", path) == 0) return true;
// Must be a real directory, not a symlink.
if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) return false;
// Must be owned by specific uid/gid.
if (st.st_uid != uid || st.st_gid != uid) return false;
// Must not be readable or writable by others.
if ((st.st_mode & (S_IROTH|S_IWOTH)) != 0) return false;
return true;
}
// This function is used to check the data directory path for safety.
// We check that every sub-directory is owned by the 'system' user
// and exists and is not a symlink. We also check that the full directory
// path is properly owned by the user ID.
static bool check_data_path(const char* data_path, uid_t uid) {
// The path should be absolute.
if (data_path[0] != '/') return false;
// Look for all sub-paths, we do that by finding
// directory separators in the input path and
// checking each sub-path independently.
for (int nn = 1; data_path[nn] != '\0'; nn++) {
char subpath[PATH_MAX];
/* skip non-separator characters */
if (data_path[nn] != '/') continue;
/* handle trailing separator case */
if (data_path[nn+1] == '\0') break;
/* found a separator, check that data_path is not too long. */
if (nn >= (int)(sizeof subpath)) return false;
/* reject any '..' subpath */
if (nn >= 3 &&
data_path[nn-3] == '/' &&
data_path[nn-2] == '.' &&
data_path[nn-1] == '.') {
return false;
}
/* copy to 'subpath', then check ownership */
memcpy(subpath, data_path, nn);
subpath[nn] = '\0';
if (!check_directory(subpath, AID_SYSTEM)) return false;
}
// All sub-paths were checked, now verify that the full data
// directory is owned by the application uid.
return check_directory(data_path, uid);
}
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
// Check arguments.
if (argc < 2) {
error(1, 0, "usage: run-as <package-name> [--user <uid>] <command> [<args>]\n");
}
// This program runs with CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities on Android
// production devices. Check user id of caller --- must be 'shell' or 'root'.
if (getuid() != AID_SHELL && getuid() != AID_ROOT) {
error(1, 0, "only 'shell' or 'root' users can run this program");
}
// Some devices can disable running run-as, such as Chrome OS when running in
// non-developer mode.
if (android::base::GetBoolProperty("ro.boot.disable_runas", false)) {
error(1, 0, "run-as is disabled from the kernel commandline");
}
char* pkgname = argv[1];
int cmd_argv_offset = 2;
// Get user_id from command line if provided.
int userId = 0;
if ((argc >= 4) && !strcmp(argv[2], "--user")) {
userId = atoi(argv[3]);
if (userId < 0) error(1, 0, "negative user id: %d", userId);
cmd_argv_offset += 2;
}
// Retrieve package information from system, switching egid so we can read the file.
gid_t old_egid = getegid();
if (setegid(AID_PACKAGE_INFO) == -1) error(1, errno, "setegid(AID_PACKAGE_INFO) failed");
pkg_info info;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
info.name = pkgname;
if (!packagelist_parse(packagelist_parse_callback, &info)) {
error(1, errno, "packagelist_parse failed");
}
if (info.uid == 0) {
error(1, 0, "unknown package: %s", pkgname);
}
if (setegid(old_egid) == -1) error(1, errno, "couldn't restore egid");
// Verify that user id is not too big.
if ((UID_MAX - info.uid) / AID_USER_OFFSET < (uid_t)userId) {
error(1, 0, "user id too big: %d", userId);
}
// Calculate user app ID.
uid_t userAppId = (AID_USER_OFFSET * userId) + info.uid;
// Reject system packages.
if (userAppId < AID_APP) {
error(1, 0, "package not an application: %s", pkgname);
}
// Reject any non-debuggable package.
if (!info.debuggable) {
error(1, 0, "package not debuggable: %s", pkgname);
}
// Check that the data directory path is valid.
if (!check_data_path(info.data_dir, userAppId)) {
error(1, 0, "package has corrupt installation: %s", pkgname);
}
// Ensure that we change all real/effective/saved IDs at the
// same time to avoid nasty surprises.
uid_t uid = userAppId;
uid_t gid = userAppId;
ScopedMinijail j(minijail_new());
minijail_change_uid(j.get(), uid);
minijail_change_gid(j.get(), gid);
minijail_keep_supplementary_gids(j.get());
minijail_enter(j.get());
if (selinux_android_setcontext(uid, 0, info.seinfo, pkgname) < 0) {
error(1, errno, "couldn't set SELinux security context");
}
// cd into the data directory, and set $HOME correspondingly.
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(chdir(info.data_dir)) == -1) {
error(1, errno, "couldn't chdir to package's data directory");
}
setenv("HOME", info.data_dir, 1);
// Reset parts of the environment, like su would.
setenv("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH, 1);
unsetenv("IFS");
// Set the user-specific parts for this user.
passwd* pw = getpwuid(uid);
setenv("LOGNAME", pw->pw_name, 1);
setenv("SHELL", pw->pw_shell, 1);
setenv("USER", pw->pw_name, 1);
// User specified command for exec.
if ((argc >= cmd_argv_offset + 1) &&
(execvp(argv[cmd_argv_offset], argv+cmd_argv_offset) == -1)) {
error(1, errno, "exec failed for %s", argv[cmd_argv_offset]);
}
// Default exec shell.
execlp(_PATH_BSHELL, "sh", NULL);
error(1, errno, "exec failed");
}