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On-device signing: Switch to using a TEE-backed keystore key.

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We previously used a Strongbox key; but since we'll need to start
verifying the public key component with an HMAC operation on every boot,
switch to a TEE key instead, as TEE operations are much faster, and
this should help bring boot time down.

This also requires some logic to deal with keys in Strongbox on
updating devices.

Bug: 187862706
Test: TEST_MAPPING; manual upgrade test.
Change-Id: Ib99d689dbef02d2f0c34bfa4c852205b1ec680a7
This commit is contained in:
Martijn Coenen 2021-05-19 11:06:29 +02:00
parent 79261a4454
commit 9b885740bf
1 changed files with 13 additions and 6 deletions
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19
ondevice-signing/KeystoreKey.cpp
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@ -136,12 +136,9 @@ bool KeystoreKey::initialize() {
return false;
}
auto status = mService->getSecurityLevel(SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX, &mSecurityLevel);
auto status = mService->getSecurityLevel(SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT, &mSecurityLevel);
if (!status.isOk()) {
status = mService->getSecurityLevel(SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT, &mSecurityLevel);
if (!status.isOk()) {
return false;
}
return false;
}
auto descriptor = getKeyDescriptor();
@ -150,7 +147,6 @@ bool KeystoreKey::initialize() {
LOG(INFO) << "Trying to retrieve existing keystore key...";
status = mService->getKeyEntry(descriptor, &keyEntryResponse);
bool keyValid = false;
if (status.isOk()) {
// Make sure this is an early boot key
for (const auto& auth : keyEntryResponse.metadata.authorizations) {
@ -164,6 +160,17 @@ bool KeystoreKey::initialize() {
if (!keyValid) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Found invalid keystore key without MAX_BOOT_LEVEL tag";
}
// On some earlier builds, we created this key on the Strongbox security level;
// we now use TEE keys instead (mostly for speed). It shouldn't matter since
// verified boot is protected by the TEE anyway. If the key happens to be on
// the wrong security level, delete it (this should happen just once).
if (keyEntryResponse.metadata.keySecurityLevel != SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Discarding key with security level: "
<< android::hardware::security::keymint::toString(
keyEntryResponse.metadata.keySecurityLevel);
keyValid = false;
}
}
if (!keyValid) {