platform_system_security/keystore/permissions.cpp
Victor Hsieh 2bcd5376ec Stop reading fs-verity certificate from keystore
We punting support for extra certificate to S.

Test: boot
Bug: 112038744
Change-Id: I3bc342a7df0c47c02494ef6fdae24e7ad00a8507
2020-02-26 12:39:15 -08:00

213 lines
5.8 KiB
C++

/*
* Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#define LOG_TAG "keystore"
#include "permissions.h"
#include <cutils/sockets.h>
#include <log/log.h>
#include <private/android_filesystem_config.h>
#include <selinux/android.h>
#include "keystore_utils.h"
/* perm_labels associcated with keystore_key SELinux class verbs. */
const char* perm_labels[] = {
"get_state",
"get",
"insert",
"delete",
"exist",
"list",
"reset",
"password",
"lock",
"unlock",
"is_empty",
"sign",
"verify",
"grant",
"duplicate",
"clear_uid",
"add_auth",
"user_changed",
"gen_unique_id",
};
struct user_euid {
uid_t uid;
uid_t euid;
};
user_euid user_euids[] = {{AID_VPN, AID_SYSTEM},
{AID_WIFI, AID_SYSTEM},
{AID_ROOT, AID_SYSTEM},
#ifdef GRANT_ROOT_ALL_PERMISSIONS
// Allow VTS tests to act on behalf of the wifi user
{AID_WIFI, AID_ROOT}
#endif
};
struct user_perm {
uid_t uid;
perm_t perms;
};
static user_perm user_perms[] = {
{AID_SYSTEM, static_cast<perm_t>((uint32_t)(~0))},
{AID_VPN, static_cast<perm_t>(P_GET | P_SIGN | P_VERIFY)},
{AID_WIFI, static_cast<perm_t>(P_GET | P_SIGN | P_VERIFY)},
{AID_BLUETOOTH, static_cast<perm_t>(P_GET | P_INSERT | P_DELETE | P_EXIST | P_SIGN | P_VERIFY)},
#ifdef GRANT_ROOT_ALL_PERMISSIONS
// Allow VTS tests running as root to perform all operations
{AID_ROOT, static_cast<perm_t>((uint32_t)(~0))},
#else
{AID_ROOT, static_cast<perm_t>(P_GET)},
#endif
};
static const perm_t DEFAULT_PERMS = static_cast<perm_t>(
P_GET_STATE | P_GET | P_INSERT | P_DELETE | P_EXIST | P_LIST | P_SIGN | P_VERIFY |
P_GEN_UNIQUE_ID /* Only privileged apps can do this, but enforcement is done by SELinux */);
struct audit_data {
pid_t pid;
uid_t uid;
const char* sid;
};
const char* get_perm_label(perm_t perm) {
unsigned int index = ffs(perm);
if (index > 0 && index <= (sizeof(perm_labels) / sizeof(perm_labels[0]))) {
return perm_labels[index - 1];
} else {
ALOGE("Keystore: Failed to retrieve permission label.\n");
abort();
}
}
static int audit_callback(void* data, security_class_t /* cls */, char* buf, size_t len) {
struct audit_data* ad = reinterpret_cast<struct audit_data*>(data);
if (!ad) {
ALOGE("No keystore audit data");
return 0;
}
const char* sid = ad->sid ? ad->sid : "N/A";
snprintf(buf, len, "pid=%d uid=%d sid=%s", ad->pid, ad->uid, sid);
return 0;
}
static char* tctx;
int configure_selinux() {
union selinux_callback cb;
cb.func_audit = audit_callback;
selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_AUDIT, cb);
cb.func_log = selinux_log_callback;
selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, cb);
if (getcon(&tctx) != 0) {
ALOGE("SELinux: Could not acquire target context. Aborting keystore.\n");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static bool keystore_selinux_check_access(uid_t uid, perm_t perm, pid_t spid, const char* ssid) {
audit_data ad;
char* sctx = nullptr;
const char* selinux_class = "keystore_key";
const char* str_perm = get_perm_label(perm);
if (!str_perm) {
return false;
}
if (ssid == nullptr && getpidcon(spid, &sctx) != 0) {
ALOGE("SELinux: Failed to get source pid context.\n");
return false;
}
const char* use_sid = ssid ? ssid : sctx;
ad.pid = spid;
ad.uid = uid;
ad.sid = use_sid;
bool allowed = selinux_check_access(use_sid, tctx, selinux_class, str_perm,
reinterpret_cast<void*>(&ad)) == 0;
freecon(sctx);
return allowed;
}
/**
* Returns the UID that the callingUid should act as. This is here for
* legacy support of the WiFi and VPN systems and should be removed
* when WiFi can operate in its own namespace.
*/
uid_t get_keystore_euid(uid_t uid) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(user_euids) / sizeof(user_euids[0]); i++) {
struct user_euid user = user_euids[i];
if (user.uid == uid) {
return user.euid;
}
}
return uid;
}
bool has_permission(uid_t uid, perm_t perm, pid_t spid, const char* sid) {
// All system users are equivalent for multi-user support.
if (get_app_id(uid) == AID_SYSTEM) {
uid = AID_SYSTEM;
}
if (sid == nullptr) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "121035042");
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(user_perms) / sizeof(user_perms[0]); i++) {
struct user_perm user = user_perms[i];
if (user.uid == uid) {
return (user.perms & perm) && keystore_selinux_check_access(uid, perm, spid, sid);
}
}
return (DEFAULT_PERMS & perm) && keystore_selinux_check_access(uid, perm, spid, sid);
}
/**
* Returns true if the callingUid is allowed to interact in the targetUid's
* namespace.
*/
bool is_granted_to(uid_t callingUid, uid_t targetUid) {
if (callingUid == targetUid) {
return true;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(user_euids) / sizeof(user_euids[0]); i++) {
struct user_euid user = user_euids[i];
if (user.euid == callingUid && user.uid == targetUid) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}