platform_system_security/keystore/blob.cpp
Janis Danisevskis c1460141c0 KeyStore: use security level to chose keymaster device
Keymaster4 introduces security levels. Android devices
may have multiple keymaster implementations, one for each
possible security level, where the presence of a strong
security level implies the presence of all lower levels.

This patch adds code that enumerates all keymaster device
implementations available from ServiceManager and populates
Keystore's keymaster device database with at most one keymaster
implementation per security level. It gives precedence to
newer versions if multiple implementations exist for the same security
level.

The security level is chosen by a set of flags passed to the keystore
operations generate, import, addRngEntropy.
For existing keys the right security level is chosen by the blob flags.

To that end a new flag KEYSTORE_FLAG_STRONGBOX was added, and the
security level is expressed through a combination of
KEYSTORE_FLAG_FALLBACK (F) and KEYSTORE_FLAG_STRONGBOX (S).
Encoding is as follows:

             F     S
Software     1     X (don't care)
TEE          0     0
Strongbox    0     1

Some operations in keystore cli2 where amended with the optional
--seclevel flags. Allowing the user to chose the security level for the
given operation. Possible options are "software", "strongbox", and "tee"
where tee is the default value.

Test: Existing KeyStore CTS tests run

Change-Id: I01ef238f5e7067e480cf9b171630237236046bb1
2017-12-27 16:38:09 -08:00

338 lines
12 KiB
C++

/*
* Copyright (C) 2015 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#define LOG_TAG "keystore"
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <cutils/log.h>
#include "blob.h"
#include "entropy.h"
#include "keystore_utils.h"
namespace {
constexpr size_t kGcmIvSizeBytes = 96 / 8;
template <typename T, void (*FreeFunc)(T*)> struct OpenSslObjectDeleter {
void operator()(T* p) { FreeFunc(p); }
};
#define DEFINE_OPENSSL_OBJECT_POINTER(name) \
typedef OpenSslObjectDeleter<name, name##_free> name##_Delete; \
typedef std::unique_ptr<name, name##_Delete> name##_Ptr;
DEFINE_OPENSSL_OBJECT_POINTER(EVP_CIPHER_CTX);
#if defined(__clang__)
#define OPTNONE __attribute__((optnone))
#elif defined(__GNUC__)
#define OPTNONE __attribute__((optimize("O0")))
#else
#error Need a definition for OPTNONE
#endif
class ArrayEraser {
public:
ArrayEraser(uint8_t* arr, size_t size) : mArr(arr), mSize(size) {}
OPTNONE ~ArrayEraser() { std::fill(mArr, mArr + mSize, 0); }
private:
volatile uint8_t* mArr;
size_t mSize;
};
/*
* Encrypt 'len' data at 'in' with AES-GCM, using 128-bit key at 'key', 96-bit IV at 'iv' and write
* output to 'out' (which may be the same location as 'in') and 128-bit tag to 'tag'.
*/
ResponseCode AES_gcm_encrypt(const uint8_t* in, uint8_t* out, size_t len, const uint8_t* key,
const uint8_t* iv, uint8_t* tag) {
const EVP_CIPHER* cipher = EVP_aes_128_gcm();
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_Ptr ctx(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new());
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), cipher, nullptr /* engine */, key, iv);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx.get(), 0 /* no padding needed with GCM */);
std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]> out_tmp(new uint8_t[len]);
uint8_t* out_pos = out_tmp.get();
int out_len;
EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx.get(), out_pos, &out_len, in, len);
out_pos += out_len;
EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx.get(), out_pos, &out_len);
out_pos += out_len;
if (out_pos - out_tmp.get() != static_cast<ssize_t>(len)) {
ALOGD("Encrypted ciphertext is the wrong size, expected %zu, got %zd", len,
out_pos - out_tmp.get());
return ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR;
}
std::copy(out_tmp.get(), out_pos, out);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, kGcmTagLength, tag);
return ResponseCode::NO_ERROR;
}
/*
* Decrypt 'len' data at 'in' with AES-GCM, using 128-bit key at 'key', 96-bit IV at 'iv', checking
* 128-bit tag at 'tag' and writing plaintext to 'out' (which may be the same location as 'in').
*/
ResponseCode AES_gcm_decrypt(const uint8_t* in, uint8_t* out, size_t len, const uint8_t* key,
const uint8_t* iv, const uint8_t* tag) {
const EVP_CIPHER* cipher = EVP_aes_128_gcm();
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_Ptr ctx(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new());
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), cipher, nullptr /* engine */, key, iv);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx.get(), 0 /* no padding needed with GCM */);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, kGcmTagLength, const_cast<uint8_t*>(tag));
std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]> out_tmp(new uint8_t[len]);
ArrayEraser out_eraser(out_tmp.get(), len);
uint8_t* out_pos = out_tmp.get();
int out_len;
EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx.get(), out_pos, &out_len, in, len);
out_pos += out_len;
if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx.get(), out_pos, &out_len)) {
ALOGD("Failed to decrypt blob; ciphertext or tag is likely corrupted");
return ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR;
}
out_pos += out_len;
if (out_pos - out_tmp.get() != static_cast<ssize_t>(len)) {
ALOGD("Encrypted plaintext is the wrong size, expected %zu, got %zd", len,
out_pos - out_tmp.get());
return ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR;
}
std::copy(out_tmp.get(), out_pos, out);
return ResponseCode::NO_ERROR;
}
} // namespace
Blob::Blob(const uint8_t* value, size_t valueLength, const uint8_t* info, uint8_t infoLength,
BlobType type) {
memset(&mBlob, 0, sizeof(mBlob));
if (valueLength > kValueSize) {
valueLength = kValueSize;
ALOGW("Provided blob length too large");
}
if (infoLength + valueLength > kValueSize) {
infoLength = kValueSize - valueLength;
ALOGW("Provided info length too large");
}
mBlob.length = valueLength;
memcpy(mBlob.value, value, valueLength);
mBlob.info = infoLength;
memcpy(mBlob.value + valueLength, info, infoLength);
mBlob.version = CURRENT_BLOB_VERSION;
mBlob.type = uint8_t(type);
if (type == TYPE_MASTER_KEY) {
mBlob.flags = KEYSTORE_FLAG_ENCRYPTED;
} else {
mBlob.flags = KEYSTORE_FLAG_NONE;
}
}
Blob::Blob(blobv3 b) {
mBlob = b;
}
Blob::Blob() {
memset(&mBlob, 0, sizeof(mBlob));
}
bool Blob::isEncrypted() const {
if (mBlob.version < 2) {
return true;
}
return mBlob.flags & KEYSTORE_FLAG_ENCRYPTED;
}
bool Blob::isSuperEncrypted() const {
return mBlob.flags & KEYSTORE_FLAG_SUPER_ENCRYPTED;
}
bool Blob::isCriticalToDeviceEncryption() const {
return mBlob.flags & KEYSTORE_FLAG_CRITICAL_TO_DEVICE_ENCRYPTION;
}
inline uint8_t setFlag(uint8_t flags, bool set, KeyStoreFlag flag) {
return set ? (flags | flag) : (flags & ~flag);
}
void Blob::setEncrypted(bool encrypted) {
mBlob.flags = setFlag(mBlob.flags, encrypted, KEYSTORE_FLAG_ENCRYPTED);
}
void Blob::setSuperEncrypted(bool superEncrypted) {
mBlob.flags = setFlag(mBlob.flags, superEncrypted, KEYSTORE_FLAG_SUPER_ENCRYPTED);
}
void Blob::setCriticalToDeviceEncryption(bool critical) {
mBlob.flags = setFlag(mBlob.flags, critical, KEYSTORE_FLAG_CRITICAL_TO_DEVICE_ENCRYPTION);
}
void Blob::setFallback(bool fallback) {
if (fallback) {
mBlob.flags |= KEYSTORE_FLAG_FALLBACK;
} else {
mBlob.flags &= ~KEYSTORE_FLAG_FALLBACK;
}
}
ResponseCode Blob::writeBlob(const std::string& filename, const uint8_t* aes_key, State state,
Entropy* entropy) {
ALOGV("writing blob %s", filename.c_str());
const size_t dataLength = mBlob.length;
mBlob.length = htonl(mBlob.length);
if (isEncrypted() || isSuperEncrypted()) {
if (state != STATE_NO_ERROR) {
ALOGD("couldn't insert encrypted blob while not unlocked");
return ResponseCode::LOCKED;
}
memset(mBlob.initialization_vector, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (!entropy->generate_random_data(mBlob.initialization_vector, kGcmIvSizeBytes)) {
ALOGW("Could not read random data for: %s", filename.c_str());
return ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR;
}
auto rc = AES_gcm_encrypt(mBlob.value /* in */, mBlob.value /* out */, dataLength, aes_key,
mBlob.initialization_vector, mBlob.aead_tag);
if (rc != ResponseCode::NO_ERROR) return rc;
}
size_t fileLength = offsetof(blobv3, value) + dataLength + mBlob.info;
const char* tmpFileName = ".tmp";
int out =
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(tmpFileName, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC | O_CREAT, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR));
if (out < 0) {
ALOGW("could not open file: %s: %s", tmpFileName, strerror(errno));
return ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR;
}
const size_t writtenBytes = writeFully(out, (uint8_t*)&mBlob, fileLength);
if (close(out) != 0) {
return ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR;
}
if (writtenBytes != fileLength) {
ALOGW("blob not fully written %zu != %zu", writtenBytes, fileLength);
unlink(tmpFileName);
return ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR;
}
if (rename(tmpFileName, filename.c_str()) == -1) {
ALOGW("could not rename blob to %s: %s", filename.c_str(), strerror(errno));
return ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR;
}
return ResponseCode::NO_ERROR;
}
ResponseCode Blob::readBlob(const std::string& filename, const uint8_t* aes_key, State state) {
ALOGV("reading blob %s", filename.c_str());
const int in = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(filename.c_str(), O_RDONLY));
if (in < 0) {
return (errno == ENOENT) ? ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND : ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR;
}
// fileLength may be less than sizeof(mBlob)
const size_t fileLength = readFully(in, (uint8_t*)&mBlob, sizeof(mBlob));
if (close(in) != 0) {
return ResponseCode::SYSTEM_ERROR;
}
if (fileLength == 0) {
return ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED;
}
if ((isEncrypted() || isSuperEncrypted())) {
if (state == STATE_LOCKED) return ResponseCode::LOCKED;
if (state == STATE_UNINITIALIZED) return ResponseCode::UNINITIALIZED;
}
if (fileLength < offsetof(blobv3, value)) return ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED;
if (mBlob.version == 3) {
const ssize_t encryptedLength = ntohl(mBlob.length);
if (isEncrypted() || isSuperEncrypted()) {
auto rc = AES_gcm_decrypt(mBlob.value /* in */, mBlob.value /* out */, encryptedLength,
aes_key, mBlob.initialization_vector, mBlob.aead_tag);
if (rc != ResponseCode::NO_ERROR) return rc;
}
} else if (mBlob.version < 3) {
blobv2& blob = reinterpret_cast<blobv2&>(mBlob);
const size_t headerLength = offsetof(blobv2, encrypted);
const ssize_t encryptedLength = fileLength - headerLength - blob.info;
if (encryptedLength < 0) return ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED;
if (isEncrypted() || isSuperEncrypted()) {
if (encryptedLength % AES_BLOCK_SIZE != 0) {
return ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED;
}
AES_KEY key;
AES_set_decrypt_key(aes_key, kAesKeySize * 8, &key);
AES_cbc_encrypt(blob.encrypted, blob.encrypted, encryptedLength, &key, blob.vector,
AES_DECRYPT);
key = {}; // clear key
uint8_t computedDigest[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
ssize_t digestedLength = encryptedLength - MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
MD5(blob.digested, digestedLength, computedDigest);
if (memcmp(blob.digest, computedDigest, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) {
return ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED;
}
}
}
const ssize_t maxValueLength = fileLength - offsetof(blobv3, value) - mBlob.info;
mBlob.length = ntohl(mBlob.length);
if (mBlob.length < 0 || mBlob.length > maxValueLength ||
mBlob.length + mBlob.info + AES_BLOCK_SIZE > static_cast<ssize_t>(sizeof(mBlob.value))) {
return ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED;
}
if (mBlob.info != 0 && mBlob.version < 3) {
// move info from after padding to after data
memmove(mBlob.value + mBlob.length, mBlob.value + maxValueLength, mBlob.info);
}
return ResponseCode::NO_ERROR;
}
keystore::SecurityLevel Blob::getSecurityLevel() const {
return keystore::flagsToSecurityLevel(mBlob.flags);
}
void Blob::setSecurityLevel(keystore::SecurityLevel secLevel) {
mBlob.flags &= ~(KEYSTORE_FLAG_FALLBACK | KEYSTORE_FLAG_STRONGBOX);
mBlob.flags |= keystore::securityLevelToFlags(secLevel);
}