platform_system_sepolicy/public/neverallow_macros

#
# Common neverallow permissions
define(`no_w_file_perms', `{ append create link unlink relabelfrom rename setattr write }')
define(`no_rw_file_perms', `{ no_w_file_perms open read ioctl lock }')
define(`no_x_file_perms', `{ execute execute_no_trans }')
define(`no_w_dir_perms',  `{ add_name create link relabelfrom remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr write }')
recovery.te: add /data neverallow rules Recovery should never be accessing files from /data. In particular, /data may be encrypted, and the files within /data will be inaccessible to recovery, because recovery doesn't know the decryption key. Enforce write/execute restrictions on recovery. We can't tighten it up further because domain.te contains some /data read-only access rules, which shouldn't apply to recovery but do. Create neverallow_macros, used for storing permission macros useful for neverallow rules. Standardize recovery.te and property_data_file on the new macros. Change-Id: I02346ab924fe2fdb2edc7659cb68c4f8dffa1e88 2014-11-06 00:30:41 +01:00			`#`
			`# Common neverallow permissions`
			define(`no_w_file_perms', `{ append create link unlink relabelfrom rename setattr write }')
system_server: neverallow blk_file read/write With the exception of the factory reset protection block device, don't allow system_server to read or write to any other block devices. This helps protect against a system->root escalation when system_server has the ability to directly minipulate raw block devices / partitions / partition tables. This change adds a neverallow rule, which is a compile time assertion that no SELinux policy is written which allows this access. No new rules are added or removed. Change-Id: I388408423097ef7cf4950197b79d4be9d666362c 2015-03-11 20:44:27 +01:00			define(`no_rw_file_perms', `{ no_w_file_perms open read ioctl lock }')
recovery.te: add /data neverallow rules Recovery should never be accessing files from /data. In particular, /data may be encrypted, and the files within /data will be inaccessible to recovery, because recovery doesn't know the decryption key. Enforce write/execute restrictions on recovery. We can't tighten it up further because domain.te contains some /data read-only access rules, which shouldn't apply to recovery but do. Create neverallow_macros, used for storing permission macros useful for neverallow rules. Standardize recovery.te and property_data_file on the new macros. Change-Id: I02346ab924fe2fdb2edc7659cb68c4f8dffa1e88 2014-11-06 00:30:41 +01:00			define(`no_x_file_perms', `{ execute execute_no_trans }')
			define(`no_w_dir_perms', `{ add_name create link relabelfrom remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr write }')