platform_system_sepolicy/public/attributes

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######################################
# Attribute declarations
#
# All types used for devices.
# On change, update CHECK_FC_ASSERT_ATTRS
# in tools/checkfc.c
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attribute dev_type;
# All types used for processes.
attribute domain;
# All types used for filesystems.
# On change, update CHECK_FC_ASSERT_ATTRS
# definition in tools/checkfc.c.
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attribute fs_type;
# All types used for context= mounts.
attribute contextmount_type;
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# All types used for files that can exist on a labeled fs.
# Do not use for pseudo file types.
# On change, update CHECK_FC_ASSERT_ATTRS
# definition in tools/checkfc.c.
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attribute file_type;
# All types used for domain entry points.
attribute exec_type;
# All types used for /data files.
attribute data_file_type;
expandattribute data_file_type false;
# All types in /data, not in /data/vendor
attribute core_data_file_type;
expandattribute core_data_file_type false;
# All types in /vendor
attribute vendor_file_type;
# All types used for procfs files.
attribute proc_type;
expandattribute proc_type false;
Start the process of locking down proc/net Files in /proc/net leak information. This change is the first step in determining which files apps may use, whitelisting benign access, and otherwise removing access while providing safe alternative APIs. To that end, this change: * Introduces the proc_net_type attribute which will assigned to any new SELinux types in /proc/net to avoid removing access to privileged processes. These processes may be evaluated later, but are lower priority than apps. * Labels /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} as proc_net_vpn due to existing use by VPN apps. This may be replaced by an alternative API. * Audits all other proc/net access for apps. * Audits proc/net access for other processes which are currently granted broad read access to /proc/net but should not be including storaged, zygote, clatd, logd, preopt2cachename and vold. Bug: 9496886 Bug: 68016944 Test: Boot Taimen-userdebug. On both wifi and cellular: stream youtube navigate maps, send text message, make voice call, make video call. Verify no avc "granted" messages in the logs. Test: A few VPN apps including "VPN Monster", "Turbo VPN", and "Freighter". Verify no logspam with the current setup. Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases Test: atest netd_integration_test Test: atest QtaguidPermissionTest Test: atest FileSystemPermissionTest Change-Id: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457 Merged-In: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457 (cherry picked from commit 087318957f26e921d62f2e234fc14bff3c59030e)
2018-04-10 21:47:48 +02:00
# Types in /proc/net, excluding qtaguid types.
# TODO(b/9496886) Lock down access to /proc/net.
# This attribute is used to audit access to proc_net. it is temporary and will
# be removed.
attribute proc_net_type;
expandattribute proc_net_type true;
# All types used for sysfs files.
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attribute sysfs_type;
# All types use for debugfs files.
attribute debugfs_type;
# Attribute used for all sdcards
attribute sdcard_type;
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# All types used for nodes/hosts.
attribute node_type;
# All types used for network interfaces.
attribute netif_type;
# All types used for network ports.
attribute port_type;
# All types used for property service
# On change, update CHECK_PC_ASSERT_ATTRS
# definition in tools/checkfc.c.
attribute property_type;
# All properties defined in core SELinux policy. Should not be
# used by device specific properties
attribute core_property_type;
limit shell's access to log.* properties Restrict the ability of the shell to set the log.* properties. Namely: only allow the shell to set such properities on eng and userdebug builds. The shell (and other domains) can continue to read log.* properties on all builds. While there: harmonize permissions for log.* and persist.log.tag. Doing so introduces two changes: - log.* is now writable from from |system_app|. This mirrors the behavior of persist.log.tag, which is writable to support "Developer options" -> "Logger buffer sizes" -> "Off". (Since this option is visible on user builds, the permission is enabled for all builds.) - persist.log.tag can now be set from |shell| on userdebug_or_eng(). BUG=28221972 TEST=manual (see below) Testing details - user build (log.tag) $ adb shell setprop log.tag.foo V $ adb shell getprop log.tag <blank line> $ adb bugreport | grep log.tag.foo [ 146.525836] init: avc: denied { set } for property=log.tag.foo pid=4644 uid=2000 gid=2000 scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:log_prop:s0 tclass=property_service permissive=0 [ 146.525878] init: sys_prop: permission denied uid:2000 name:log.tag.foo - userdebug build (log.tag) $ adb shell getprop log.tag.foo <blank line> $ adb shell setprop log.tag.foo V $ adb shell getprop log.tag.foo V - user build (persist.log.tag) $ adb shell getprop | grep log.tag <no match> - Developer options -> Logger buffer sizes -> Off $ adb shell getprop | grep log.tag [persist.log.tag]: [Settings] [persist.log.tag.snet_event_log]: [I] Change-Id: Idf00e7a623723a7c46bf6d01e386aeca92b2ad75
2016-04-15 20:10:06 +02:00
# All properties used to configure log filtering.
attribute log_property_type;
# All service_manager types created by system_server
attribute system_server_service;
# services which should be available to all but isolated apps
attribute app_api_service;
# services which should be available to all ephemeral apps
attribute ephemeral_app_api_service;
# services which export only system_api
attribute system_api_service;
# All types used for services managed by servicemanager.
# On change, update CHECK_SC_ASSERT_ATTRS
# definition in tools/checkfc.c.
attribute service_manager_type;
# All types used for services managed by hwservicemanager
attribute hwservice_manager_type;
Assert apps can access only approved HwBinder services App domains which host arbitrary code must not have access to arbitrary HwBinder services. Such access unnecessarily increases the attack surface. The reason is twofold: 1. HwBinder servers do not perform client authentication because HIDL currently does not expose caller UID information and, even if it did, many HwBinder services either operate at a layer below that of apps (e.g., HALs) or must not rely on app identity for authorization. Thus, to be safe, the default assumption is that a HwBinder service treats all its clients as equally authorized to perform operations offered by the service. 2. HAL servers (a subset of HwBinder services) contain code with higher incidence rate of security issues than system/core components and have access to lower layes of the stack (all the way down to hardware) thus increasing opportunities for bypassing the Android security model. HwBinder services offered by core components (as opposed to vendor components) are considered safer because of point #2 above. Always same-process aka always-passthrough HwBinder services are considered safe for access by these apps. This is because these HALs by definition do not offer any additional access beyond what its client already as, because these services run in the process of the client. This commit thus introduces these two categories of HwBinder services in neverallow rules. Test: mmm system/sepolicy -- this does not change on-device policy Bug: 34454312 Change-Id: I4f5f4dd10b3fc3bb9d262dda532d4a23dcdf061d
2017-04-22 02:06:43 +02:00
# All HwBinder services guaranteed to be passthrough. These services always run
# in the process of their clients, and thus operate with the same access as
# their clients.
attribute same_process_hwservice;
# All HwBinder services guaranteed to be offered only by core domain components
attribute coredomain_hwservice;
# All types used for services managed by vndservicemanager
attribute vndservice_manager_type;
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# All domains that can override MLS restrictions.
# i.e. processes that can read up and write down.
attribute mlstrustedsubject;
# All types that can override MLS restrictions.
# i.e. files that can be read by lower and written by higher
attribute mlstrustedobject;
# All domains used for apps.
attribute appdomain;
# All third party apps.
attribute untrusted_app_all;
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# All domains used for apps with network access.
attribute netdomain;
# All domains used for apps with bluetooth access.
attribute bluetoothdomain;
# All domains used for binder service domains.
attribute binderservicedomain;
# update_engine related domains that need to apply an update and run
# postinstall. This includes the background daemon and the sideload tool from
# recovery for A/B devices.
attribute update_engine_common;
# All core domains (as opposed to vendor/device-specific domains)
attribute coredomain;
# All socket devices owned by core domain components
attribute coredomain_socket;
expandattribute coredomain_socket false;
# All vendor domains which violate the requirement of not using Binder
# TODO(b/35870313): Remove this once there are no violations
attribute binder_in_vendor_violators;
expandattribute binder_in_vendor_violators false;
# All vendor domains which violate the requirement of not using sockets for
# communicating with core components
# TODO(b/36577153): Remove this once there are no violations
attribute socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators;
expandattribute socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators false;
# All vendor domains which violate the requirement of not executing
# system processes
# TODO(b/36463595)
attribute vendor_executes_system_violators;
expandattribute vendor_executes_system_violators false;
# All domains which violate the requirement of not sharing files by path
# between between vendor and core domains.
# TODO(b/34980020)
attribute data_between_core_and_vendor_violators;
expandattribute data_between_core_and_vendor_violators false;
# All system domains which violate the requirement of not executing vendor
# binaries/libraries.
# TODO(b/62041836)
attribute system_executes_vendor_violators;
expandattribute system_executes_vendor_violators false;
# hwservices that are accessible from untrusted applications
# WARNING: Use of this attribute should be avoided unless
# absolutely necessary. It is a temporary allowance to aid the
# transition to treble and will be removed in a future platform
# version, requiring all hwservices that are labeled with this
# attribute to be submitted to AOSP in order to maintain their
# app-visibility.
attribute untrusted_app_visible_hwservice;
expandattribute untrusted_app_visible_hwservice false;
# halserver domains that are accessible to untrusted applications. These
# domains are typically those hosting hwservices attributed by the
# untrusted_app_visible_hwservice.
# WARNING: Use of this attribute should be avoided unless absolutely necessary.
# It is a temporary allowance to aid the transition to treble and will be
# removed in the future platform version, requiring all halserver domains that
# are labeled with this attribute to be submitted to AOSP in order to maintain
# their app-visibility.
attribute untrusted_app_visible_halserver;
expandattribute untrusted_app_visible_halserver false;
# PDX services
attribute pdx_endpoint_dir_type;
attribute pdx_endpoint_socket_type;
expandattribute pdx_endpoint_socket_type false;
attribute pdx_channel_socket_type;
expandattribute pdx_channel_socket_type false;
pdx_service_attributes(display_client)
pdx_service_attributes(display_manager)
pdx_service_attributes(display_screenshot)
pdx_service_attributes(display_vsync)
pdx_service_attributes(performance_client)
pdx_service_attributes(bufferhub_client)
Use _client and _server for Audio HAL policy This starts the switch for HAL policy to the approach where: * domains which are clients of Foo HAL are associated with hal_foo_client attribute, * domains which offer the Foo HAL service over HwBinder are associated with hal_foo_server attribute, * policy needed by the implementation of Foo HAL service is written against the hal_foo attribute. This policy is granted to domains which offer the Foo HAL service over HwBinder and, if Foo HAL runs in the so-called passthrough mode (inside the process of each client), also granted to all domains which are clients of Foo HAL. hal_foo is there to avoid duplicating the rules for hal_foo_client and hal_foo_server to cover the passthrough/in-process Foo HAL and binderized/out-of-process Foo HAL cases. A benefit of associating all domains which are clients of Foo HAL with hal_foo (when Foo HAL is in passthrough mode) is that this removes the need for device-specific policy to be able to reference these domains directly (in order to add device-specific allow rules). Instead, device-specific policy only needs to reference hal_foo and should no longer need to care which particular domains on the device are clients of Foo HAL. This can be seen in simplification of the rules for audioserver domain which is a client of Audio HAL whose policy is being restructured in this commit. This commit uses Audio HAL as an example to illustrate the approach. Once this commit lands, other HALs will also be switched to this approach. Test: Google Play Music plays back radios Test: Google Camera records video with sound and that video is then successfully played back with sound Test: YouTube app plays back clips with sound Test: YouTube in Chrome plays back clips with sound Bug: 34170079 Change-Id: I2597a046753edef06123f0476c2ee6889fc17f20
2017-02-13 23:40:49 +01:00
# All HAL servers
attribute halserverdomain;
# All HAL clients
attribute halclientdomain;
expandattribute halclientdomain true;
# Exempt for halserverdomain to access sockets. Only builds for automotive
# device types are allowed to use this attribute (enforced by CTS).
# Unlike phone, in a car many modules are external from Android perspective and
# HALs should be able to communicate with those devices through sockets.
attribute hal_automotive_socket_exemption;
# HALs
hal_attribute(allocator);
hal_attribute(audio);
hal_attribute(audiocontrol);
hal_attribute(authsecret);
hal_attribute(bluetooth);
hal_attribute(bootctl);
hal_attribute(broadcastradio);
hal_attribute(camera);
hal_attribute(cas);
hal_attribute(configstore);
hal_attribute(confirmationui);
hal_attribute(contexthub);
hal_attribute(drm);
hal_attribute(dumpstate);
hal_attribute(evs);
hal_attribute(fingerprint);
hal_attribute(gatekeeper);
hal_attribute(gnss);
hal_attribute(graphics_allocator);
hal_attribute(graphics_composer);
hal_attribute(health);
hal_attribute(ir);
hal_attribute(keymaster);
hal_attribute(light);
hal_attribute(lowpan);
hal_attribute(memtrack);
hal_attribute(neuralnetworks);
hal_attribute(nfc);
hal_attribute(oemlock);
hal_attribute(omx);
hal_attribute(power);
hal_attribute(secure_element);
hal_attribute(sensors);
hal_attribute(telephony);
hal_attribute(tetheroffload);
hal_attribute(thermal);
hal_attribute(tv_cec);
hal_attribute(tv_input);
hal_attribute(usb);
hal_attribute(usb_gadget);
hal_attribute(vehicle);
hal_attribute(vibrator);
hal_attribute(vr);
hal_attribute(weaver);
hal_attribute(wifi);
hal_attribute(wifi_hostapd);
hal_attribute(wifi_offload);
hal_attribute(wifi_supplicant);
# HwBinder services offered across the core-vendor boundary
#
# We annotate server domains with x_server to loosen the coupling between
# system and vendor images. For example, it should be possible to move a service
# from one core domain to another, without having to update the vendor image
# which contains clients of this service.
attribute display_service_server;
attribute wifi_keystore_service_server;