platform_system_sepolicy/private/file_contexts

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2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
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# Root
/ u:object_r:rootfs:s0
# Data files
/adb_keys u:object_r:adb_keys_file:s0
/build\.prop u:object_r:rootfs:s0
/default\.prop u:object_r:rootfs:s0
/fstab\..* u:object_r:rootfs:s0
/init\..* u:object_r:rootfs:s0
/res(/.*)? u:object_r:rootfs:s0
/selinux_version u:object_r:rootfs:s0
/ueventd\..* u:object_r:rootfs:s0
/verity_key u:object_r:rootfs:s0
# Executables
/init u:object_r:init_exec:s0
/sbin(/.*)? u:object_r:rootfs:s0
# For kernel modules
/lib(/.*)? u:object_r:rootfs:s0
# Empty directories
/lost\+found u:object_r:rootfs:s0
/acct u:object_r:cgroup:s0
/config u:object_r:rootfs:s0
/data_mirror u:object_r:mirror_data_file:s0
/debug_ramdisk u:object_r:tmpfs:s0
/mnt u:object_r:tmpfs:s0
/postinstall u:object_r:postinstall_mnt_dir:s0
/postinstall/apex u:object_r:postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:s0
/proc u:object_r:rootfs:s0
/sys u:object_r:sysfs:s0
/apex u:object_r:apex_mnt_dir:s0
# Symlinks
/bin u:object_r:rootfs:s0
/bugreports u:object_r:rootfs:s0
/charger u:object_r:rootfs:s0
/d u:object_r:rootfs:s0
/etc u:object_r:rootfs:s0
/sdcard u:object_r:rootfs:s0
# SELinux policy files
/vendor_file_contexts u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
/nonplat_file_contexts u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
/plat_file_contexts u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
/product_file_contexts u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
/mapping_sepolicy\.cil u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
/nonplat_sepolicy\.cil u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
/plat_sepolicy\.cil u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
/plat_property_contexts u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
/product_property_contexts u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
/nonplat_property_contexts u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
/vendor_property_contexts u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
/seapp_contexts u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
/nonplat_seapp_contexts u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
/vendor_seapp_contexts u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
/plat_seapp_contexts u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
/sepolicy u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
/plat_service_contexts u:object_r:service_contexts_file:s0
/plat_hwservice_contexts u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
/nonplat_service_contexts u:object_r:nonplat_service_contexts_file:s0
# Use nonplat_service_contexts_file to allow servicemanager to read it
# on non full-treble devices.
/vendor_service_contexts u:object_r:nonplat_service_contexts_file:s0
/nonplat_hwservice_contexts u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
/vendor_hwservice_contexts u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
/vndservice_contexts u:object_r:vndservice_contexts_file:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
##########################
# Devices
#
/dev(/.*)? u:object_r:device:s0
/dev/adf[0-9]* u:object_r:graphics_device:s0
/dev/adf-interface[0-9]*\.[0-9]* u:object_r:graphics_device:s0
/dev/adf-overlay-engine[0-9]*\.[0-9]* u:object_r:graphics_device:s0
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/dev/ashmem u:object_r:ashmem_device:s0
/dev/ashmem(.*)? u:object_r:ashmem_libcutils_device:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/dev/audio.* u:object_r:audio_device:s0
/dev/binder u:object_r:binder_device:s0
/dev/block(/.*)? u:object_r:block_device:s0
/dev/block/dm-[0-9]+ u:object_r:dm_device:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/dev/block/loop[0-9]* u:object_r:loop_device:s0
Updated policy for external storage. An upcoming platform release is redesigning how external storage works. At a high level, vold is taking on a more active role in managing devices that dynamically appear. This change also creates further restricted domains for tools doing low-level access of external storage devices, including sgdisk and blkid. It also extends sdcardd to be launchable by vold, since launching by init will eventually go away. For compatibility, rules required to keep AOSP builds working are marked with "TODO" to eventually remove. Slightly relax system_server external storage rules to allow calls like statfs(). Still neverallow open file descriptors, since they can cause kernel to kill us. Here are the relevant violations that this CL is designed to allow: avc: denied { search } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user/0" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=6658 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { setattr } for name="10" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { open } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="tmpfs" ino=11979 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { use } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { read write } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=netlink_kobject_uevent_socket avc: denied { read } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { write } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { mounton } for path="/storage/emulated" dev="tmpfs" ino=8913 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=7444 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self/primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file avc: denied { read } for name="primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { read } for name="disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { open } for path="/storage/public:81F3-13EC" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="fuse" ino=2 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { read } for name="public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { search } for name="block" dev="tmpfs" ino=2494 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:block_device:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="media_rw" dev="tmpfs" ino=3127 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_media_rw_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="pipe:[3648]" dev="pipefs" ino=3648 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4182]" dev="pipefs" ino=4182 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd Change-Id: Idf3b8561baecf7faa603fac5ababdcc5708288e1
2015-03-27 19:25:39 +01:00
/dev/block/vold/.+ u:object_r:vold_device:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/dev/block/ram[0-9]* u:object_r:ram_device:s0
/dev/block/zram[0-9]* u:object_r:ram_device:s0
/dev/boringssl/selftest(/.*)? u:object_r:boringssl_self_test_marker:s0
/dev/bus/usb(.*)? u:object_r:usb_device:s0
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/dev/console u:object_r:console_device:s0
/dev/cpu_variant:.* u:object_r:dev_cpu_variant:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/dev/device-mapper u:object_r:dm_device:s0
/dev/eac u:object_r:audio_device:s0
/dev/event-log-tags u:object_r:runtime_event_log_tags_file:s0
/dev/cgroup_info(/.*)? u:object_r:cgroup_rc_file:s0
/dev/fscklogs(/.*)? u:object_r:fscklogs:s0
2012-05-31 15:44:51 +02:00
/dev/fuse u:object_r:fuse_device:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/dev/graphics(/.*)? u:object_r:graphics_device:s0
/dev/hw_random u:object_r:hw_random_device:s0
/dev/hwbinder u:object_r:hwbinder_device:s0
/dev/input(/.*)? u:object_r:input_device:s0
/dev/iio:device[0-9]+ u:object_r:iio_device:s0
2012-06-20 03:46:16 +02:00
/dev/ion u:object_r:ion_device:s0
/dev/keychord u:object_r:keychord_device:s0
/dev/loop-control u:object_r:loop_control_device:s0
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/dev/modem.* u:object_r:radio_device:s0
2012-01-06 16:25:53 +01:00
/dev/mtp_usb u:object_r:mtp_device:s0
/dev/pmsg0 u:object_r:pmsg_device:s0
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/dev/pn544 u:object_r:nfc_device:s0
/dev/port u:object_r:port_device:s0
/dev/ppp u:object_r:ppp_device:s0
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/dev/ptmx u:object_r:ptmx_device:s0
/dev/pvrsrvkm u:object_r:gpu_device:s0
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/dev/kmsg u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0
/dev/kmsg_debug u:object_r:kmsg_debug_device:s0
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/dev/null u:object_r:null_device:s0
/dev/nvhdcp1 u:object_r:video_device:s0
/dev/random u:object_r:random_device:s0
/dev/rpmsg-omx[0-9] u:object_r:rpmsg_device:s0
/dev/rproc_user u:object_r:rpmsg_device:s0
/dev/rtc[0-9] u:object_r:rtc_device:s0
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/dev/snd(/.*)? u:object_r:audio_device:s0
/dev/socket(/.*)? u:object_r:socket_device:s0
/dev/socket/adbd u:object_r:adbd_socket:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/dev/socket/dnsproxyd u:object_r:dnsproxyd_socket:s0
/dev/socket/dumpstate u:object_r:dumpstate_socket:s0
/dev/socket/fwmarkd u:object_r:fwmarkd_socket:s0
/dev/socket/lmkd u:object_r:lmkd_socket:s0
/dev/socket/logd u:object_r:logd_socket:s0
/dev/socket/logdr u:object_r:logdr_socket:s0
/dev/socket/logdw u:object_r:logdw_socket:s0
/dev/socket/statsdw u:object_r:statsdw_socket:s0
/dev/socket/mdns u:object_r:mdns_socket:s0
/dev/socket/mdnsd u:object_r:mdnsd_socket:s0
Address system_server denials. Label /proc/sysrq-trigger and allow access. Label /dev/socket/mtpd and allow access. Resolves denials such as: avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { call } for pid=1007 comm="Binder_8" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=binder avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="watchdog" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026533682 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { write } for pid=11567 comm="LegacyVpnRunner" name="mtpd" dev="tmpfs" ino=36627 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file avc: denied { ptrace } for pid=10924 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { sigkill } for pid=26077 comm="NativeCrashRepo" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="android.bg" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[11467]" dev="sockfs" ino=11467 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[12076]" dev="sockfs" ino=12076 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserv er:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" laddr=192.168.159.172 lport=51576 faddr=93.127.173.40 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" lport=15658 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[443742]" dev="sockfs" ino=443742 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s 0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[444842]" dev="sockfs" ino=444842 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1326 comm="Binder_9" lport=16216 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1676 comm="Binder_6" laddr=192.168.156.130 lport=51044 faddr=74.125.214.81 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" path="/dev/mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { read } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" name="mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { unlink } for pid=14866 comm="system_server" name="wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=285715 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=32300 comm="Binder_1" laddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 lport=4939 faddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 fport=53318 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=10840 comm="pool-17-thread-" path="socket:[205990]" dev="sockfs" ino=205990 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { write } for pid=20817 comm="dumpsys" path="/mnt/shell/emulated/0/aupt-output/bugreport-2014-02-22-11-17-16.txt.tmp" dev="fuse" ino=3100784040 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: I481ac26667b487031a5d3317b0a028a027a8e641 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-03-05 15:50:08 +01:00
/dev/socket/mtpd u:object_r:mtpd_socket:s0
/dev/socket/pdx/system/buffer_hub u:object_r:pdx_bufferhub_dir:s0
/dev/socket/pdx/system/buffer_hub/client u:object_r:pdx_bufferhub_client_endpoint_socket:s0
/dev/socket/pdx/system/performance u:object_r:pdx_performance_dir:s0
/dev/socket/pdx/system/performance/client u:object_r:pdx_performance_client_endpoint_socket:s0
/dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/display u:object_r:pdx_display_dir:s0
/dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/display/client u:object_r:pdx_display_client_endpoint_socket:s0
/dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/display/manager u:object_r:pdx_display_manager_endpoint_socket:s0
/dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/display/screenshot u:object_r:pdx_display_screenshot_endpoint_socket:s0
/dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/display/vsync u:object_r:pdx_display_vsync_endpoint_socket:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/dev/socket/property_service u:object_r:property_socket:s0
/dev/socket/racoon u:object_r:racoon_socket:s0
/dev/socket/recovery u:object_r:recovery_socket:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/dev/socket/rild u:object_r:rild_socket:s0
/dev/socket/rild-debug u:object_r:rild_debug_socket:s0
/dev/socket/tombstoned_crash u:object_r:tombstoned_crash_socket:s0
/dev/socket/tombstoned_java_trace u:object_r:tombstoned_java_trace_socket:s0
/dev/socket/tombstoned_intercept u:object_r:tombstoned_intercept_socket:s0
/dev/socket/traced_consumer u:object_r:traced_consumer_socket:s0
/dev/socket/traced_perf u:object_r:traced_perf_socket:s0
/dev/socket/traced_producer u:object_r:traced_producer_socket:s0
/dev/socket/heapprofd u:object_r:heapprofd_socket:s0
/dev/socket/uncrypt u:object_r:uncrypt_socket:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/dev/socket/wpa_eth[0-9] u:object_r:wpa_socket:s0
/dev/socket/wpa_wlan[0-9] u:object_r:wpa_socket:s0
/dev/socket/zygote u:object_r:zygote_socket:s0
/dev/socket/zygote_secondary u:object_r:zygote_socket:s0
/dev/socket/usap_pool_primary u:object_r:zygote_socket:s0
/dev/socket/usap_pool_secondary u:object_r:zygote_socket:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/dev/spdif_out.* u:object_r:audio_device:s0
/dev/tty u:object_r:owntty_device:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/dev/tty[0-9]* u:object_r:tty_device:s0
/dev/ttyS[0-9]* u:object_r:serial_device:s0
/dev/ttyUSB[0-9]* u:object_r:usb_serial_device:s0
/dev/ttyACM[0-9]* u:object_r:usb_serial_device:s0
/dev/tun u:object_r:tun_device:s0
/dev/uhid u:object_r:uhid_device:s0
/dev/uinput u:object_r:uhid_device:s0
/dev/uio[0-9]* u:object_r:uio_device:s0
/dev/urandom u:object_r:random_device:s0
/dev/usb_accessory u:object_r:usbaccessory_device:s0
/dev/v4l-touch[0-9]* u:object_r:input_device:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/dev/video[0-9]* u:object_r:video_device:s0
/dev/vndbinder u:object_r:vndbinder_device:s0
/dev/watchdog u:object_r:watchdog_device:s0
/dev/xt_qtaguid u:object_r:qtaguid_device:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/dev/zero u:object_r:zero_device:s0
/dev/__properties__ u:object_r:properties_device:s0
/dev/__properties__/property_info u:object_r:property_info:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
#############################
# Linker configuration
#
/linkerconfig(/.*)? u:object_r:linkerconfig_file:s0
#############################
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# System files
#
/system(/.*)? u:object_r:system_file:s0
/system/apex/com.android.art u:object_r:art_apex_dir:s0
/system/lib(64)?(/.*)? u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
/system/lib(64)?/bootstrap(/.*)? u:object_r:system_bootstrap_lib_file:s0
/system/bin/atrace u:object_r:atrace_exec:s0
/system/bin/auditctl u:object_r:auditctl_exec:s0
/system/bin/bcc u:object_r:rs_exec:s0
/system/bin/blank_screen u:object_r:blank_screen_exec:s0
/system/bin/boringssl_self_test(32|64) u:object_r:boringssl_self_test_exec:s0
/system/bin/charger u:object_r:charger_exec:s0
/system/bin/e2fsdroid u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0
/system/bin/mke2fs u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0
Do not allow init to execute anything without changing domains. Remove the ability of init to execute programs from / or /system without changing domains. This forces all helper programs and services invoked by init to be assigned their own domain. Introduce separate domains for running the helper programs executed from the fs_mgr library by init. This requires a domain for e2fsck (named fsck for generality) and a domain for running mkswap (named toolbox since mkswap is just a symlink to the toolbox binary and the domain transition occurs on executing the binary, not based on the symlink in any way). e2fsck is invoked on any partitions marked with the check mount option in the fstab file, typically userdata and cache but never system. We allow it to read/write the userdata_block_device and cache_block_device types but also allow it to read/write the default block_device type until we can get the more specific types assigned in all of the device-specific policies. mkswap is invoked on any swap partition defined in the fstab file. We introduce a new swap_block_device type for this purpose, to be assigned to any such block devices in the device-specific policies, and only allow it to read/write such block devices. As there seem to be no devices in AOSP with swap partitions in their fstab files, this does not appear to risk any breakage for existing devices. With the introduction of these domains, we can de-privilege init to only having read access to block devices for mounting filesystems; it no longer needs direct write access to such devices AFAICT. To avoid breaking execution of toolbox by system services, apps, or the shell, we allow all domains other than kernel and init the ability to run toolbox in their own domain. This is broader than strictly required; we could alternatively only add it to those domains that already had x_file_perms to system_file but this would require a coordinated change with device-specific policy. Change-Id: Ib05de2d2bc2781dad48b70ba385577cb855708e4 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-09-23 15:11:30 +02:00
/system/bin/e2fsck -- u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
/system/bin/fsck\.exfat -- u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
/system/bin/fsck\.f2fs -- u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
/system/bin/init u:object_r:init_exec:s0
# TODO(/123600489): merge mini-keyctl into toybox
/system/bin/mini-keyctl -- u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0
/system/bin/fsverity_init u:object_r:fsverity_init_exec:s0
/system/bin/sload_f2fs -- u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0
/system/bin/make_f2fs -- u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0
Updated policy for external storage. An upcoming platform release is redesigning how external storage works. At a high level, vold is taking on a more active role in managing devices that dynamically appear. This change also creates further restricted domains for tools doing low-level access of external storage devices, including sgdisk and blkid. It also extends sdcardd to be launchable by vold, since launching by init will eventually go away. For compatibility, rules required to keep AOSP builds working are marked with "TODO" to eventually remove. Slightly relax system_server external storage rules to allow calls like statfs(). Still neverallow open file descriptors, since they can cause kernel to kill us. Here are the relevant violations that this CL is designed to allow: avc: denied { search } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user/0" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=6658 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { setattr } for name="10" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { open } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="tmpfs" ino=11979 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { use } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { read write } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=netlink_kobject_uevent_socket avc: denied { read } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { write } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { mounton } for path="/storage/emulated" dev="tmpfs" ino=8913 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=7444 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self/primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file avc: denied { read } for name="primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { read } for name="disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { open } for path="/storage/public:81F3-13EC" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="fuse" ino=2 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { read } for name="public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { search } for name="block" dev="tmpfs" ino=2494 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:block_device:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="media_rw" dev="tmpfs" ino=3127 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_media_rw_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="pipe:[3648]" dev="pipefs" ino=3648 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4182]" dev="pipefs" ino=4182 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd Change-Id: Idf3b8561baecf7faa603fac5ababdcc5708288e1
2015-03-27 19:25:39 +01:00
/system/bin/fsck_msdos -- u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
/system/bin/tcpdump -- u:object_r:tcpdump_exec:s0
/system/bin/tune2fs -- u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
/system/bin/resize2fs -- u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
Do not allow init to execute anything without changing domains. Remove the ability of init to execute programs from / or /system without changing domains. This forces all helper programs and services invoked by init to be assigned their own domain. Introduce separate domains for running the helper programs executed from the fs_mgr library by init. This requires a domain for e2fsck (named fsck for generality) and a domain for running mkswap (named toolbox since mkswap is just a symlink to the toolbox binary and the domain transition occurs on executing the binary, not based on the symlink in any way). e2fsck is invoked on any partitions marked with the check mount option in the fstab file, typically userdata and cache but never system. We allow it to read/write the userdata_block_device and cache_block_device types but also allow it to read/write the default block_device type until we can get the more specific types assigned in all of the device-specific policies. mkswap is invoked on any swap partition defined in the fstab file. We introduce a new swap_block_device type for this purpose, to be assigned to any such block devices in the device-specific policies, and only allow it to read/write such block devices. As there seem to be no devices in AOSP with swap partitions in their fstab files, this does not appear to risk any breakage for existing devices. With the introduction of these domains, we can de-privilege init to only having read access to block devices for mounting filesystems; it no longer needs direct write access to such devices AFAICT. To avoid breaking execution of toolbox by system services, apps, or the shell, we allow all domains other than kernel and init the ability to run toolbox in their own domain. This is broader than strictly required; we could alternatively only add it to those domains that already had x_file_perms to system_file but this would require a coordinated change with device-specific policy. Change-Id: Ib05de2d2bc2781dad48b70ba385577cb855708e4 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-09-23 15:11:30 +02:00
/system/bin/toolbox -- u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0
/system/bin/toybox -- u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0
/system/bin/ld\.mc u:object_r:rs_exec:s0
/system/bin/logcat -- u:object_r:logcat_exec:s0
/system/bin/logcatd -- u:object_r:logcat_exec:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/system/bin/sh -- u:object_r:shell_exec:s0
/system/bin/run-as -- u:object_r:runas_exec:s0
/system/bin/bootanimation u:object_r:bootanim_exec:s0
/system/bin/bootstat u:object_r:bootstat_exec:s0
/system/bin/app_process32 u:object_r:zygote_exec:s0
/system/bin/app_process64 u:object_r:zygote_exec:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/system/bin/servicemanager u:object_r:servicemanager_exec:s0
/system/bin/hwservicemanager u:object_r:hwservicemanager_exec:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/system/bin/surfaceflinger u:object_r:surfaceflinger_exec:s0
/system/bin/gpuservice u:object_r:gpuservice_exec:s0
/system/bin/bufferhubd u:object_r:bufferhubd_exec:s0
/system/bin/performanced u:object_r:performanced_exec:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/system/bin/drmserver u:object_r:drmserver_exec:s0
/system/bin/dumpstate u:object_r:dumpstate_exec:s0
/system/bin/incident u:object_r:incident_exec:s0
/system/bin/incidentd u:object_r:incidentd_exec:s0
/system/bin/incident_helper u:object_r:incident_helper_exec:s0
/system/bin/iw u:object_r:iw_exec:s0
/system/bin/netutils-wrapper-1\.0 u:object_r:netutils_wrapper_exec:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/system/bin/vold u:object_r:vold_exec:s0
/system/bin/netd u:object_r:netd_exec:s0
/system/bin/wificond u:object_r:wificond_exec:s0
/system/bin/audioserver u:object_r:audioserver_exec:s0
/system/bin/mediadrmserver u:object_r:mediadrmserver_exec:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/system/bin/mediaserver u:object_r:mediaserver_exec:s0
/system/bin/mediametrics u:object_r:mediametrics_exec:s0
/system/bin/cameraserver u:object_r:cameraserver_exec:s0
/system/bin/mediaextractor u:object_r:mediaextractor_exec:s0
/system/bin/mediaswcodec u:object_r:mediaswcodec_exec:s0
/system/bin/mediatranscoding u:object_r:mediatranscoding_exec:s0
/system/bin/mdnsd u:object_r:mdnsd_exec:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/system/bin/installd u:object_r:installd_exec:s0
/system/bin/otapreopt_chroot u:object_r:otapreopt_chroot_exec:s0
/system/bin/otapreopt_slot u:object_r:otapreopt_slot_exec:s0
/system/bin/art_apex_boot_integrity u:object_r:art_apex_boot_integrity_exec:s0
/system/bin/credstore u:object_r:credstore_exec:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/system/bin/keystore u:object_r:keystore_exec:s0
/system/bin/fingerprintd u:object_r:fingerprintd_exec:s0
/system/bin/gatekeeperd u:object_r:gatekeeperd_exec:s0
/system/bin/crash_dump32 u:object_r:crash_dump_exec:s0
/system/bin/crash_dump64 u:object_r:crash_dump_exec:s0
/system/bin/tombstoned u:object_r:tombstoned_exec:s0
/system/bin/recovery-persist u:object_r:recovery_persist_exec:s0
/system/bin/recovery-refresh u:object_r:recovery_refresh_exec:s0
2012-05-31 15:44:51 +02:00
/system/bin/sdcard u:object_r:sdcardd_exec:s0
/system/bin/snapshotctl u:object_r:snapshotctl_exec:s0
2012-08-15 12:25:14 +02:00
/system/bin/dhcpcd u:object_r:dhcp_exec:s0
/system/bin/dhcpcd-6\.8\.2 u:object_r:dhcp_exec:s0
/system/bin/mtpd u:object_r:mtp_exec:s0
/system/bin/pppd u:object_r:ppp_exec:s0
/system/bin/racoon u:object_r:racoon_exec:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/system/xbin/su u:object_r:su_exec:s0
Enable SELinux protections for netd. This change does several things: 1) Restore domain.te to the version present at cd516a32663b4eb11b2e3356b86450020e59e279 . This is the version currently being distributed in AOSP. 2) Add "allow domain properties_device:file r_file_perms;" to domain.te, to allow all domains to read /dev/__properties__ . This change was missing from AOSP. 3) Restore netd.te to the version present at 80c9ba5267f1a6ceffcf979471d101948b520ad6 . This is the version currently being distributed in AOSP. 4) Remove anything involving module loading from netd.te. CTS enforces that Android kernels can't have module loading enabled. 5) Add several new capabilities, plus data file rules, to netd.te, since netd needs to write to files owned by wifi. 6) Add a new unconfined domain called dnsmasq.te, and allow transitions from netd to that domain. Over time, we'll tighten up the dnsmasq.te domain. 7) Add a new unconfined domain called hostapd.te, and allow transitions from netd to that domain. Over time, we'll tighten up the hostapd.te domain. The net effect of these changes is to re-enable SELinux protections for netd. The policy is FAR from perfect, and allows a lot of wiggle room, but we can improve it over time. Testing: as much as possible, I've exercised networking related functionality, including turning on and off wifi, entering airplane mode, and enabling tethering and portable wifi hotspots. It's quite possible I've missed something, and if we experience problems, I can roll back this change. Bug: 9618347 Change-Id: I23ff3eebcef629bc7baabcf6962f25f116c4a3c0
2013-06-28 00:11:02 +02:00
/system/bin/dnsmasq u:object_r:dnsmasq_exec:s0
/system/bin/healthd u:object_r:healthd_exec:s0
/system/bin/clatd u:object_r:clatd_exec:s0
/system/bin/linker(64)? u:object_r:system_linker_exec:s0
/system/bin/linkerconfig u:object_r:linkerconfig_exec:s0
/system/bin/bootstrap/linker(64)? u:object_r:system_linker_exec:s0
/system/bin/llkd u:object_r:llkd_exec:s0
/system/bin/lmkd u:object_r:lmkd_exec:s0
/system/bin/usbd u:object_r:usbd_exec:s0
/system/bin/inputflinger u:object_r:inputflinger_exec:s0
/system/bin/logd u:object_r:logd_exec:s0
/system/bin/lpdumpd u:object_r:lpdumpd_exec:s0
/system/bin/rss_hwm_reset u:object_r:rss_hwm_reset_exec:s0
/system/bin/perfetto u:object_r:perfetto_exec:s0
/system/bin/traced u:object_r:traced_exec:s0
/system/bin/traced_perf u:object_r:traced_perf_exec:s0
/system/bin/traced_probes u:object_r:traced_probes_exec:s0
/system/bin/heapprofd u:object_r:heapprofd_exec:s0
/system/bin/uncrypt u:object_r:uncrypt_exec:s0
/system/bin/update_verifier u:object_r:update_verifier_exec:s0
/system/bin/logwrapper u:object_r:system_file:s0
/system/bin/vdc u:object_r:vdc_exec:s0
/system/bin/cppreopts\.sh u:object_r:cppreopts_exec:s0
/system/bin/preloads_copy\.sh u:object_r:preloads_copy_exec:s0
/system/bin/preopt2cachename u:object_r:preopt2cachename_exec:s0
/system/bin/dex2oat(d)? u:object_r:dex2oat_exec:s0
/system/bin/dexoptanalyzer(d)? u:object_r:dexoptanalyzer_exec:s0
/system/bin/viewcompiler u:object_r:viewcompiler_exec:s0
/system/bin/profman(d)? u:object_r:profman_exec:s0
/system/bin/iorapd u:object_r:iorapd_exec:s0
/system/bin/iorap\.inode2filename u:object_r:iorap_inode2filename_exec:s0
/system/bin/iorap\.prefetcherd u:object_r:iorap_prefetcherd_exec:s0
Updated policy for external storage. An upcoming platform release is redesigning how external storage works. At a high level, vold is taking on a more active role in managing devices that dynamically appear. This change also creates further restricted domains for tools doing low-level access of external storage devices, including sgdisk and blkid. It also extends sdcardd to be launchable by vold, since launching by init will eventually go away. For compatibility, rules required to keep AOSP builds working are marked with "TODO" to eventually remove. Slightly relax system_server external storage rules to allow calls like statfs(). Still neverallow open file descriptors, since they can cause kernel to kill us. Here are the relevant violations that this CL is designed to allow: avc: denied { search } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user/0" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=6658 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { setattr } for name="10" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { open } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="tmpfs" ino=11979 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { use } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { read write } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=netlink_kobject_uevent_socket avc: denied { read } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { write } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { mounton } for path="/storage/emulated" dev="tmpfs" ino=8913 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=7444 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self/primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file avc: denied { read } for name="primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { read } for name="disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { open } for path="/storage/public:81F3-13EC" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="fuse" ino=2 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { read } for name="public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { search } for name="block" dev="tmpfs" ino=2494 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:block_device:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="media_rw" dev="tmpfs" ino=3127 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_media_rw_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="pipe:[3648]" dev="pipefs" ino=3648 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4182]" dev="pipefs" ino=4182 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd Change-Id: Idf3b8561baecf7faa603fac5ababdcc5708288e1
2015-03-27 19:25:39 +01:00
/system/bin/sgdisk u:object_r:sgdisk_exec:s0
/system/bin/blkid u:object_r:blkid_exec:s0
/system/bin/tzdatacheck u:object_r:tzdatacheck_exec:s0
/system/bin/flags_health_check -- u:object_r:flags_health_check_exec:s0
/system/bin/idmap u:object_r:idmap_exec:s0
/system/bin/idmap2(d)? u:object_r:idmap_exec:s0
/system/bin/update_engine u:object_r:update_engine_exec:s0
/system/bin/storaged u:object_r:storaged_exec:s0
/system/bin/wpantund u:object_r:wpantund_exec:s0
/system/bin/virtual_touchpad u:object_r:virtual_touchpad_exec:s0
/system/bin/hw/android\.frameworks\.bufferhub@1\.0-service u:object_r:fwk_bufferhub_exec:s0
/system/bin/hw/android\.hidl\.allocator@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_allocator_default_exec:s0
/system/bin/hw/android\.system\.suspend@1\.0-service u:object_r:system_suspend_exec:s0
/system/etc/cgroups\.json u:object_r:cgroup_desc_file:s0
/system/etc/event-log-tags u:object_r:system_event_log_tags_file:s0
/system/etc/group u:object_r:system_group_file:s0
/system/etc/ld\.config.* u:object_r:system_linker_config_file:s0
/system/etc/passwd u:object_r:system_passwd_file:s0
/system/etc/seccomp_policy(/.*)? u:object_r:system_seccomp_policy_file:s0
/system/etc/security/cacerts(/.*)? u:object_r:system_security_cacerts_file:s0
/system/etc/selinux/mapping/[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.cil u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
/system/etc/selinux/plat_mac_permissions\.xml u:object_r:mac_perms_file:s0
/system/etc/selinux/plat_property_contexts u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
/system/etc/selinux/plat_service_contexts u:object_r:service_contexts_file:s0
/system/etc/selinux/plat_hwservice_contexts u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
/system/etc/selinux/plat_file_contexts u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
/system/etc/selinux/plat_seapp_contexts u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
/system/etc/selinux/plat_sepolicy\.cil u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
/system/etc/selinux/plat_and_mapping_sepolicy\.cil\.sha256 u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
/system/etc/task_profiles\.json u:object_r:task_profiles_file:s0
/system/usr/share/zoneinfo(/.*)? u:object_r:system_zoneinfo_file:s0
/system/bin/vr_hwc u:object_r:vr_hwc_exec:s0
/system/bin/adbd u:object_r:adbd_exec:s0
/system/bin/vold_prepare_subdirs u:object_r:vold_prepare_subdirs_exec:s0
/system/bin/stats u:object_r:stats_exec:s0
/system/bin/statsd u:object_r:statsd_exec:s0
/system/bin/bpfloader u:object_r:bpfloader_exec:s0
/system/bin/wait_for_keymaster u:object_r:wait_for_keymaster_exec:s0
/system/bin/watchdogd u:object_r:watchdogd_exec:s0
/system/bin/apexd u:object_r:apexd_exec:s0
/system/bin/gsid u:object_r:gsid_exec:s0
2020-01-10 20:02:43 +01:00
/system/bin/simpleperf u:object_r:simpleperf_exec:s0
/system/bin/simpleperf_app_runner u:object_r:simpleperf_app_runner_exec:s0
/system/bin/notify_traceur\.sh u:object_r:notify_traceur_exec:s0
/system/bin/migrate_legacy_obb_data\.sh u:object_r:migrate_legacy_obb_data_exec:s0
/system/bin/android\.frameworks\.automotive\.display@1\.0-service u:object_r:automotive_display_service_exec:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
#############################
# Vendor files
#
/(vendor|system/vendor)(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/sh u:object_r:vendor_shell_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/toybox_vendor u:object_r:vendor_toolbox_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/toolbox u:object_r:vendor_toolbox_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc/cgroups\.json u:object_r:vendor_cgroup_desc_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc/task_profiles\.json u:object_r:vendor_task_profiles_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/egl(/.*)? u:object_r:same_process_hal_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/vndk-sp(/.*)? u:object_r:vndk_sp_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/manifest\.xml u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/compatibility_matrix\.xml u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc/vintf(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/app(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_app_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/priv-app(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_app_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/overlay(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_overlay_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/framework(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_framework_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/apex(/[^/]+){0,2} u:object_r:vendor_apex_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/misc_writer u:object_r:vendor_misc_writer_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/boringssl_self_test(32|64) u:object_r:vendor_boringssl_self_test_exec:s0
(/vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/modules/incrementalfs\.ko u:object_r:vendor_incremental_module:s0
# HAL location
/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/hw u:object_r:vendor_hal_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc/selinux/(vendor|nonplat)_service_contexts u:object_r:nonplat_service_contexts_file:s0
Moving recovery resources from /system to /vendor This change is part of a topic that moves the recovery resources from the system partition to the vendor partition, if it exists, or the vendor directory on the system partition otherwise. The recovery resources are moving from the system image to the vendor partition so that a single system image may be used with either an A/B or a non-A/B vendor image. The topic removes a delta in the system image that prevented such reuse in the past. The recovery resources that are moving are involved with updating the recovery partition after an update. In a non-A/B configuration, the system boots from the recovery partition, updates the other partitions (system, vendor, etc.) Then, the next time the system boots normally, a script updates the recovery partition (if necessary). This script, the executables it invokes, and the data files that it uses were previously on the system partition. The resources that are moving include the following. * install-recovery.sh * applypatch * recovery-resource.dat (if present) * recovery-from-boot.p (if present) This change includes the sepolicy changes to move the recovery resources from system to vendor. The big change is renaming install_recovery*.te to vendor_install_recovery*.te to emphasize the move to vendor. Other changes follow from that. The net result is that the application of the recovery patch has the same permissions that it had when it lived in system. Bug: 68319577 Test: Ensure that recovery partition is updated correctly. Change-Id: If29cb22b2a7a5ce1b25d45ef8635e6cb81103327
2019-09-18 01:59:42 +02:00
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/install-recovery\.sh u:object_r:vendor_install_recovery_exec:s0
#############################
# OEM and ODM files
#
/(odm|vendor/odm)(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
/(odm|vendor/odm)/lib(64)?/egl(/.*)? u:object_r:same_process_hal_file:s0
/(odm|vendor/odm)/lib(64)?/hw u:object_r:vendor_hal_file:s0
/(odm|vendor/odm)/lib(64)?/vndk-sp(/.*)? u:object_r:vndk_sp_file:s0
/(odm|vendor/odm)/bin/sh u:object_r:vendor_shell_exec:s0
/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
/(odm|vendor/odm)/app(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_app_file:s0
/(odm|vendor/odm)/priv-app(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_app_file:s0
/(odm|vendor/odm)/overlay(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_overlay_file:s0
/(odm|vendor/odm)/framework(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_framework_file:s0
# Input configuration
/(odm|vendor/odm|vendor|system/vendor)/usr/keylayout(/.*)?\.kl u:object_r:vendor_keylayout_file:s0
/(odm|vendor/odm|vendor|system/vendor)/usr/keychars(/.*)?\.kcm u:object_r:vendor_keychars_file:s0
/(odm|vendor/odm|vendor|system/vendor)/usr/idc(/.*)?\.idc u:object_r:vendor_idc_file:s0
/oem(/.*)? u:object_r:oemfs:s0
/oem/overlay(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_overlay_file:s0
# The precompiled monolithic sepolicy will be under /odm only when
# BOARD_USES_ODMIMAGE is true: a separate odm.img is built.
/odm/etc/selinux/precompiled_sepolicy u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
/odm/etc/selinux/precompiled_sepolicy\.plat_and_mapping\.sha256 u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc/selinux/odm_sepolicy\.cil u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc/selinux/odm_file_contexts u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc/selinux/odm_seapp_contexts u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc/selinux/odm_property_contexts u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc/selinux/odm_hwservice_contexts u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc/selinux/odm_mac_permissions\.xml u:object_r:mac_perms_file:s0
#############################
# Product files
#
/(product|system/product)(/.*)? u:object_r:system_file:s0
/(product|system/product)/etc/group u:object_r:system_group_file:s0
/(product|system/product)/etc/passwd u:object_r:system_passwd_file:s0
/(product|system/product)/overlay(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_overlay_file:s0
/(product|system/product)/etc/selinux/product_file_contexts u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
/(product|system/product)/etc/selinux/product_hwservice_contexts u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
/(product|system/product)/etc/selinux/product_property_contexts u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
/(product|system/product)/etc/selinux/product_seapp_contexts u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
/(product|system/product)/etc/selinux/product_service_contexts u:object_r:service_contexts_file:s0
/(product|system/product)/etc/selinux/product_mac_permissions\.xml u:object_r:mac_perms_file:s0
/(product|system/product)/lib(64)?(/.*)? u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
#############################
# SystemExt files
#
/(system_ext|system/system_ext)(/.*)? u:object_r:system_file:s0
/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/group u:object_r:system_group_file:s0
/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/passwd u:object_r:system_passwd_file:s0
/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/overlay(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_overlay_file:s0
/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_file_contexts u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_hwservice_contexts u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_property_contexts u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_seapp_contexts u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_service_contexts u:object_r:service_contexts_file:s0
/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_mac_permissions\.xml u:object_r:mac_perms_file:s0
/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/bin/aidl_lazy_test_server u:object_r:aidl_lazy_test_server_exec:s0
#############################
# Vendor files from /(product|system/product)/vendor_overlay
#
# NOTE: For additional vendor file contexts for vendor overlay files,
# use device specific file_contexts.
#
/(product|system/product)/vendor_overlay/[0-9]+/.* u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
#############################
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# Data files
#
Initial policy for expanded storage. Expanded storage supports a subset of the features of the internal data partition. Mirror that policy for consistency. vold is also granted enough permissions to prepare initial directories. avc: denied { write } for name="ext" dev="tmpfs" ino=3130 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { add_name } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { create } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { setattr } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=7243 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { mounton } for path="/mnt/ext/57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=7243 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/ext" dev="tmpfs" ino=3130 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { setattr } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=4471 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/expand/57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b/media" dev="dm-0" ino=145153 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { rmdir } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=6380 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { create } for name="tmp" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { setattr } for name="tmp" dev="dm-0" ino=72578 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 Bug: 19993667 Change-Id: I73c98b36e7c066f21650a9e16ea82c5a0ef3d6c5
2015-04-07 01:21:54 +02:00
# NOTE: When modifying existing label rules, changes may also need to
# propagate to the "Expanded data files" section.
#
/data u:object_r:system_data_root_file:s0
/data/(.*)? u:object_r:system_data_file:s0
Relabel /data/system/packages.list to new type. Conservatively grant access to packages_list_file to everything that had access to system_data_file:file even if the comment in the SELinux policy suggests it was for another use. Ran a diff on the resulting SEPolicy, the only difference of domains being granted is those that had system_data_file:dir permissiosn which is clearly not applicable for packages.list diff -u0 <(sesearch --allow -t system_data_file ~/sepolicy | sed 's/system_data_file/packages_list_file/') <(sesearch --allow -t packages_list_file ~/sepolicy_new) --- /proc/self/fd/16 2019-03-19 20:01:44.378409146 +0000 +++ /proc/self/fd/18 2019-03-19 20:01:44.378409146 +0000 @@ -3 +2,0 @@ -allow appdomain packages_list_file:dir getattr; @@ -6 +4,0 @@ -allow coredomain packages_list_file:dir getattr; @@ -8 +5,0 @@ -allow domain packages_list_file:dir search; @@ -35 +31,0 @@ -allow system_server packages_list_file:dir { rename search setattr read lock create reparent getattr write relabelfrom ioctl rmdir remove_name open add_name }; @@ -40 +35,0 @@ -allow tee packages_list_file:dir { search read lock getattr ioctl open }; @@ -43,3 +37,0 @@ -allow traced_probes packages_list_file:dir { read getattr open search }; -allow vendor_init packages_list_file:dir { search setattr read create getattr write relabelfrom ioctl rmdir remove_name open add_name }; -allow vold packages_list_file:dir { search setattr read lock create getattr mounton write ioctl rmdir remove_name open add_name }; @@ -48 +39,0 @@ -allow vold_prepare_subdirs packages_list_file:dir { read write relabelfrom rmdir remove_name open add_name }; @@ -50 +40,0 @@ -allow zygote packages_list_file:dir { search read lock getattr ioctl open }; Bug: 123186697 Change-Id: Ieabf313653deb5314872b63cd47dadd535af7b07
2019-03-19 19:14:38 +01:00
/data/system/packages\.list u:object_r:packages_list_file:s0
/data/unencrypted(/.*)? u:object_r:unencrypted_data_file:s0
/data/backup(/.*)? u:object_r:backup_data_file:s0
/data/secure/backup(/.*)? u:object_r:backup_data_file:s0
/data/system/ndebugsocket u:object_r:system_ndebug_socket:s0
/data/system/unsolzygotesocket u:object_r:system_unsolzygote_socket:s0
/data/drm(/.*)? u:object_r:drm_data_file:s0
/data/resource-cache(/.*)? u:object_r:resourcecache_data_file:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/data/dalvik-cache(/.*)? u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
/data/ota(/.*)? u:object_r:ota_data_file:s0
/data/ota_package(/.*)? u:object_r:ota_package_file:s0
/data/adb(/.*)? u:object_r:adb_data_file:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/data/anr(/.*)? u:object_r:anr_data_file:s0
/data/apex(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_data_file:s0
/data/apex/active/(.*)? u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
/data/apex/backup/(.*)? u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
/data/app(/.*)? u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0
# Traditional /data/app/[packageName]-[randomString]/base.apk location
/data/app/[^/]+/oat(/.*)? u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
# /data/app/[randomStringA]/[packageName]-[randomStringB]/base.apk layout
/data/app/[^/]+/[^/]+/oat(/.*)? u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
/data/app/vmdl[^/]+\.tmp(/.*)? u:object_r:apk_tmp_file:s0
/data/app/vmdl[^/]+\.tmp/oat(/.*)? u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
/data/app-private(/.*)? u:object_r:apk_private_data_file:s0
/data/app-private/vmdl.*\.tmp(/.*)? u:object_r:apk_private_tmp_file:s0
/data/gsi(/.*)? u:object_r:gsi_data_file:s0
/data/gsi/ota(/.*)? u:object_r:ota_image_data_file:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
/data/tombstones(/.*)? u:object_r:tombstone_data_file:s0
/data/vendor/tombstones/wifi(/.*)? u:object_r:tombstone_wifi_data_file:s0
/data/local/tmp(/.*)? u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0
/data/local/tmp/ltp(/.*)? u:object_r:nativetest_data_file:s0
/data/local/traces(/.*)? u:object_r:trace_data_file:s0
/data/media(/.*)? u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0
/data/mediadrm(/.*)? u:object_r:media_data_file:s0
/data/nativetest(/.*)? u:object_r:nativetest_data_file:s0
/data/nativetest64(/.*)? u:object_r:nativetest_data_file:s0
# This directory was removed after Q Beta 2, but we need to preserve labels for upgrading devices.
/data/pkg_staging(/.*)? u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
/data/property(/.*)? u:object_r:property_data_file:s0
/data/preloads(/.*)? u:object_r:preloads_data_file:s0
/data/preloads/media(/.*)? u:object_r:preloads_media_file:s0
/data/preloads/demo(/.*)? u:object_r:preloads_media_file:s0
/data/server_configurable_flags(/.*)? u:object_r:server_configurable_flags_data_file:s0
/data/app-staging(/.*)? u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# Misc data
/data/misc/adb(/.*)? u:object_r:adb_keys_file:s0
/data/misc/apexdata(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_module_data_file:s0
/data/misc/apexdata/com.android.permission(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_permission_data_file:s0
/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.wifi(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_wifi_data_file:s0
/data/misc/apexrollback(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_rollback_data_file:s0
/data/misc/apns(/.*)? u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0
/data/misc/audio(/.*)? u:object_r:audio_data_file:s0
/data/misc/audioserver(/.*)? u:object_r:audioserver_data_file:s0
/data/misc/audiohal(/.*)? u:object_r:audiohal_data_file:s0
/data/misc/bootstat(/.*)? u:object_r:bootstat_data_file:s0
/data/misc/boottrace(/.*)? u:object_r:boottrace_data_file:s0
/data/misc/bluetooth(/.*)? u:object_r:bluetooth_data_file:s0
/data/misc/bluetooth/logs(/.*)? u:object_r:bluetooth_logs_data_file:s0
/data/misc/bluedroid(/.*)? u:object_r:bluetooth_data_file:s0
/data/misc/bluedroid/\.a2dp_ctrl u:object_r:bluetooth_socket:s0
/data/misc/bluedroid/\.a2dp_data u:object_r:bluetooth_socket:s0
/data/misc/camera(/.*)? u:object_r:camera_data_file:s0
/data/misc/carrierid(/.*)? u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0
2012-08-15 12:25:14 +02:00
/data/misc/dhcp(/.*)? u:object_r:dhcp_data_file:s0
/data/misc/dhcp-6\.8\.2(/.*)? u:object_r:dhcp_data_file:s0
/data/misc/emergencynumberdb(/.*)? u:object_r:emergency_data_file:s0
/data/misc/gatekeeper(/.*)? u:object_r:gatekeeper_data_file:s0
/data/misc/incidents(/.*)? u:object_r:incident_data_file:s0
/data/misc/installd(/.*)? u:object_r:install_data_file:s0
/data/misc/keychain(/.*)? u:object_r:keychain_data_file:s0
/data/misc/credstore(/.*)? u:object_r:credstore_data_file:s0
/data/misc/keystore(/.*)? u:object_r:keystore_data_file:s0
/data/misc/logd(/.*)? u:object_r:misc_logd_file:s0
/data/misc/media(/.*)? u:object_r:media_data_file:s0
/data/misc/net(/.*)? u:object_r:net_data_file:s0
/data/misc/network_watchlist(/.*)? u:object_r:network_watchlist_data_file:s0
/data/misc/perfetto-traces(/.*)? u:object_r:perfetto_traces_data_file:s0
/data/misc/prereboot(/.*)? u:object_r:prereboot_data_file:s0
/data/misc/recovery(/.*)? u:object_r:recovery_data_file:s0
/data/misc/shared_relro(/.*)? u:object_r:shared_relro_file:s0
/data/misc/sms(/.*)? u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0
/data/misc/snapshotctl_log(/.*)? u:object_r:snapshotctl_log_data_file:s0
/data/misc/stats-active-metric(/.*)? u:object_r:stats_data_file:s0
/data/misc/stats-data(/.*)? u:object_r:stats_data_file:s0
/data/misc/stats-service(/.*)? u:object_r:stats_data_file:s0
/data/misc/systemkeys(/.*)? u:object_r:systemkeys_data_file:s0
/data/misc/textclassifier(/.*)? u:object_r:textclassifier_data_file:s0
/data/misc/train-info(/.*)? u:object_r:stats_data_file:s0
/data/misc/user(/.*)? u:object_r:misc_user_data_file:s0
/data/misc/vpn(/.*)? u:object_r:vpn_data_file:s0
/data/misc/wifi(/.*)? u:object_r:wifi_data_file:s0
/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/wifi(/.*)? u:object_r:wifi_data_file:s0
/data/misc/wifi/sockets(/.*)? u:object_r:wpa_socket:s0
/data/misc/wifi/sockets/wpa_ctrl.* u:object_r:system_wpa_socket:s0
/data/misc/zoneinfo(/.*)? u:object_r:zoneinfo_data_file:s0
/data/misc/vold(/.*)? u:object_r:vold_data_file:s0
/data/misc/iorapd(/.*)? u:object_r:iorapd_data_file:s0
/data/misc/update_engine(/.*)? u:object_r:update_engine_data_file:s0
/data/misc/update_engine_log(/.*)? u:object_r:update_engine_log_data_file:s0
/data/system/dropbox(/.*)? u:object_r:dropbox_data_file:s0
/data/system/heapdump(/.*)? u:object_r:heapdump_data_file:s0
/data/misc/trace(/.*)? u:object_r:method_trace_data_file:s0
/data/misc/wmtrace(/.*)? u:object_r:wm_trace_data_file:s0
# TODO(calin) label profile reference differently so that only
# profman run as a special user can write to them
/data/misc/profiles/cur(/.*)? u:object_r:user_profile_data_file:s0
/data/misc/profiles/ref(/.*)? u:object_r:user_profile_data_file:s0
/data/misc/profman(/.*)? u:object_r:profman_dump_data_file:s0
/data/vendor(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_data_file:s0
/data/vendor_ce(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_data_file:s0
/data/vendor_de(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_data_file:s0
# storaged proto files
/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/storaged(/.*)? u:object_r:storaged_data_file:s0
/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/storaged(/.*)? u:object_r:storaged_data_file:s0
# Fingerprint data
/data/system/users/[0-9]+/fpdata(/.*)? u:object_r:fingerprintd_data_file:s0
# Fingerprint vendor data file
/data/vendor_de/[0-9]+/fpdata(/.*)? u:object_r:fingerprint_vendor_data_file:s0
# Face vendor data file
/data/vendor_de/[0-9]+/facedata(/.*)? u:object_r:face_vendor_data_file:s0
/data/vendor_ce/[0-9]+/facedata(/.*)? u:object_r:face_vendor_data_file:s0
# Iris vendor data file
/data/vendor_de/[0-9]+/irisdata(/.*)? u:object_r:iris_vendor_data_file:s0
# Bootchart data
/data/bootchart(/.*)? u:object_r:bootchart_data_file:s0
# App data snapshots (managed by installd).
/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/rollback(/.*)? u:object_r:rollback_data_file:s0
/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/rollback(/.*)? u:object_r:rollback_data_file:s0
# Apex data directories
/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexdata(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_module_data_file:s0
/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexdata(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_module_data_file:s0
/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexdata/com.android.permission(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_permission_data_file:s0
/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexdata/com.android.permission(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_permission_data_file:s0
/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexdata/com\.android\.wifi(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_wifi_data_file:s0
/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexdata/com\.android\.wifi(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_wifi_data_file:s0
# Apex rollback directories
/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexrollback(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_rollback_data_file:s0
/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexrollback(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_rollback_data_file:s0
# Incremental directories
/data/incremental(/.*)? u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0
/data/incremental/MT_[^/]+/mount/.pending_reads u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0
/data/incremental/MT_[^/]+/mount/.log u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0
Initial policy for expanded storage. Expanded storage supports a subset of the features of the internal data partition. Mirror that policy for consistency. vold is also granted enough permissions to prepare initial directories. avc: denied { write } for name="ext" dev="tmpfs" ino=3130 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { add_name } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { create } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { setattr } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=7243 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { mounton } for path="/mnt/ext/57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=7243 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/ext" dev="tmpfs" ino=3130 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { setattr } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=4471 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/expand/57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b/media" dev="dm-0" ino=145153 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { rmdir } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=6380 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { create } for name="tmp" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { setattr } for name="tmp" dev="dm-0" ino=72578 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 Bug: 19993667 Change-Id: I73c98b36e7c066f21650a9e16ea82c5a0ef3d6c5
2015-04-07 01:21:54 +02:00
#############################
# Expanded data files
#
/mnt/expand(/.*)? u:object_r:mnt_expand_file:s0
/mnt/expand/[^/]+(/.*)? u:object_r:system_data_file:s0
/mnt/expand/[^/]+/app(/.*)? u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0
/mnt/expand/[^/]+/app/[^/]+/oat(/.*)? u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
# /mnt/expand/..../app/[randomStringA]/[packageName]-[randomStringB]/base.apk layout
/mnt/expand/[^/]+/app/[^/]+/[^/]+/oat(/.*)? u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
Initial policy for expanded storage. Expanded storage supports a subset of the features of the internal data partition. Mirror that policy for consistency. vold is also granted enough permissions to prepare initial directories. avc: denied { write } for name="ext" dev="tmpfs" ino=3130 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { add_name } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { create } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { setattr } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=7243 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { mounton } for path="/mnt/ext/57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=7243 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/ext" dev="tmpfs" ino=3130 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { setattr } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=4471 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/expand/57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b/media" dev="dm-0" ino=145153 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { rmdir } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=6380 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { create } for name="tmp" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { setattr } for name="tmp" dev="dm-0" ino=72578 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 Bug: 19993667 Change-Id: I73c98b36e7c066f21650a9e16ea82c5a0ef3d6c5
2015-04-07 01:21:54 +02:00
/mnt/expand/[^/]+/app/vmdl[^/]+\.tmp(/.*)? u:object_r:apk_tmp_file:s0
/mnt/expand/[^/]+/app/vmdl[^/]+\.tmp/oat(/.*)? u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
/mnt/expand/[^/]+/local/tmp(/.*)? u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0
/mnt/expand/[^/]+/media(/.*)? u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0
/mnt/expand/[^/]+/misc/vold(/.*)? u:object_r:vold_data_file:s0
Initial policy for expanded storage. Expanded storage supports a subset of the features of the internal data partition. Mirror that policy for consistency. vold is also granted enough permissions to prepare initial directories. avc: denied { write } for name="ext" dev="tmpfs" ino=3130 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { add_name } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { create } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { setattr } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=7243 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { mounton } for path="/mnt/ext/57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=7243 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/ext" dev="tmpfs" ino=3130 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { setattr } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=4471 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/expand/57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b/media" dev="dm-0" ino=145153 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { rmdir } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=6380 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { create } for name="tmp" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { setattr } for name="tmp" dev="dm-0" ino=72578 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 Bug: 19993667 Change-Id: I73c98b36e7c066f21650a9e16ea82c5a0ef3d6c5
2015-04-07 01:21:54 +02:00
# coredump directory for userdebug/eng devices
/cores(/.*)? u:object_r:coredump_file:s0
# Wallpaper files
/data/system/users/[0-9]+/wallpaper_lock_orig u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0
/data/system/users/[0-9]+/wallpaper_lock u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0
/data/system/users/[0-9]+/wallpaper_orig u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0
/data/system/users/[0-9]+/wallpaper u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0
# Ringtone files
/data/system_de/[0-9]+/ringtones(/.*)? u:object_r:ringtone_file:s0
# ShortcutManager icons, e.g.
# /data/system_ce/0/shortcut_service/bitmaps/com.example.app/1457472879282.png
/data/system_ce/[0-9]+/shortcut_service/bitmaps(/.*)? u:object_r:shortcut_manager_icons:s0
# User icon files
/data/system/users/[0-9]+/photo\.png u:object_r:icon_file:s0
# vold per-user data
/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/vold(/.*)? u:object_r:vold_data_file:s0
/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/vold(/.*)? u:object_r:vold_data_file:s0
# iorapd per-user data
/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/iorapd(/.*)? u:object_r:iorapd_data_file:s0
# Backup service persistent per-user bookkeeping
/data/system_ce/[0-9]+/backup(/.*)? u:object_r:backup_data_file:s0
# Backup service temporary per-user data for inter-change with apps
/data/system_ce/[0-9]+/backup_stage(/.*)? u:object_r:backup_data_file:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
#############################
# efs files
#
/efs(/.*)? u:object_r:efs_file:s0
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
#############################
# Cache files
#
/cache(/.*)? u:object_r:cache_file:s0
/cache/recovery(/.*)? u:object_r:cache_recovery_file:s0
# General backup/restore interchange with apps
/cache/backup_stage(/.*)? u:object_r:cache_backup_file:s0
# LocalTransport (backup) uses this subtree
/cache/backup(/.*)? u:object_r:cache_private_backup_file:s0
#############################
# Overlayfs support directories
#
/cache/overlay(/.*)? u:object_r:overlayfs_file:s0
/mnt/scratch(/.*)? u:object_r:overlayfs_file:s0
/data/cache(/.*)? u:object_r:cache_file:s0
/data/cache/recovery(/.*)? u:object_r:cache_recovery_file:s0
# General backup/restore interchange with apps
/data/cache/backup_stage(/.*)? u:object_r:cache_backup_file:s0
# LocalTransport (backup) uses this subtree
/data/cache/backup(/.*)? u:object_r:cache_private_backup_file:s0
#############################
# Metadata files
#
/metadata(/.*)? u:object_r:metadata_file:s0
/metadata/apex(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_metadata_file:s0
/metadata/vold(/.*)? u:object_r:vold_metadata_file:s0
/metadata/gsi(/.*)? u:object_r:gsi_metadata_file:s0
/metadata/gsi/ota(/.*)? u:object_r:ota_metadata_file:s0
/metadata/password_slots(/.*)? u:object_r:password_slot_metadata_file:s0
/metadata/ota(/.*)? u:object_r:ota_metadata_file:s0
/metadata/bootstat(/.*)? u:object_r:metadata_bootstat_file:s0
#############################
# asec containers
/mnt/asec(/.*)? u:object_r:asec_apk_file:s0
/mnt/asec/[^/]+/[^/]+\.zip u:object_r:asec_public_file:s0
/mnt/asec/[^/]+/lib(/.*)? u:object_r:asec_public_file:s0
/data/app-asec(/.*)? u:object_r:asec_image_file:s0
Updated policy for external storage. An upcoming platform release is redesigning how external storage works. At a high level, vold is taking on a more active role in managing devices that dynamically appear. This change also creates further restricted domains for tools doing low-level access of external storage devices, including sgdisk and blkid. It also extends sdcardd to be launchable by vold, since launching by init will eventually go away. For compatibility, rules required to keep AOSP builds working are marked with "TODO" to eventually remove. Slightly relax system_server external storage rules to allow calls like statfs(). Still neverallow open file descriptors, since they can cause kernel to kill us. Here are the relevant violations that this CL is designed to allow: avc: denied { search } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user/0" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=6658 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { setattr } for name="10" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { open } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="tmpfs" ino=11979 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { use } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { read write } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=netlink_kobject_uevent_socket avc: denied { read } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { write } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { mounton } for path="/storage/emulated" dev="tmpfs" ino=8913 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=7444 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self/primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file avc: denied { read } for name="primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { read } for name="disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { open } for path="/storage/public:81F3-13EC" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="fuse" ino=2 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { read } for name="public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { search } for name="block" dev="tmpfs" ino=2494 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:block_device:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="media_rw" dev="tmpfs" ino=3127 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_media_rw_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="pipe:[3648]" dev="pipefs" ino=3648 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4182]" dev="pipefs" ino=4182 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd Change-Id: Idf3b8561baecf7faa603fac5ababdcc5708288e1
2015-03-27 19:25:39 +01:00
#############################
# external storage
/mnt/media_rw(/.*)? u:object_r:mnt_media_rw_file:s0
/mnt/user(/.*)? u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0
/mnt/pass_through(/.*)? u:object_r:mnt_pass_through_file:s0
/mnt/sdcard u:object_r:mnt_sdcard_file:s0
/mnt/runtime(/.*)? u:object_r:storage_file:s0
Updated policy for external storage. An upcoming platform release is redesigning how external storage works. At a high level, vold is taking on a more active role in managing devices that dynamically appear. This change also creates further restricted domains for tools doing low-level access of external storage devices, including sgdisk and blkid. It also extends sdcardd to be launchable by vold, since launching by init will eventually go away. For compatibility, rules required to keep AOSP builds working are marked with "TODO" to eventually remove. Slightly relax system_server external storage rules to allow calls like statfs(). Still neverallow open file descriptors, since they can cause kernel to kill us. Here are the relevant violations that this CL is designed to allow: avc: denied { search } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user/0" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=6658 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { setattr } for name="10" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { open } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="tmpfs" ino=11979 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { use } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { read write } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=netlink_kobject_uevent_socket avc: denied { read } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { write } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { mounton } for path="/storage/emulated" dev="tmpfs" ino=8913 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=7444 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self/primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file avc: denied { read } for name="primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { read } for name="disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { open } for path="/storage/public:81F3-13EC" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="fuse" ino=2 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { read } for name="public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { search } for name="block" dev="tmpfs" ino=2494 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:block_device:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="media_rw" dev="tmpfs" ino=3127 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_media_rw_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="pipe:[3648]" dev="pipefs" ino=3648 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4182]" dev="pipefs" ino=4182 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd Change-Id: Idf3b8561baecf7faa603fac5ababdcc5708288e1
2015-03-27 19:25:39 +01:00
/storage(/.*)? u:object_r:storage_file:s0
#############################
# mount point for read-write vendor partitions
/mnt/vendor(/.*)? u:object_r:mnt_vendor_file:s0
#############################
# mount point for read-write product partitions
/mnt/product(/.*)? u:object_r:mnt_product_file:s0