platform_system_sepolicy/private/genfs_contexts

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# Label inodes with the fs label.
genfscon rootfs / u:object_r:rootfs:s0
# proc labeling can be further refined (longest matching prefix).
genfscon proc / u:object_r:proc:s0
genfscon proc /asound u:object_r:proc_asound:s0
genfscon proc /buddyinfo u:object_r:proc_buddyinfo:s0
genfscon proc /cmdline u:object_r:proc_cmdline:s0
genfscon proc /config.gz u:object_r:config_gz:s0
genfscon proc /diskstats u:object_r:proc_diskstats:s0
genfscon proc /filesystems u:object_r:proc_filesystems:s0
genfscon proc /interrupts u:object_r:proc_interrupts:s0
genfscon proc /iomem u:object_r:proc_iomem:s0
genfscon proc /keys u:object_r:proc_keys:s0
genfscon proc /kmsg u:object_r:proc_kmsg:s0
genfscon proc /loadavg u:object_r:proc_loadavg:s0
genfscon proc /lowmemorykiller u:object_r:proc_lowmemorykiller:s0
genfscon proc /meminfo u:object_r:proc_meminfo:s0
genfscon proc /misc u:object_r:proc_misc:s0
genfscon proc /modules u:object_r:proc_modules:s0
genfscon proc /mounts u:object_r:proc_mounts:s0
genfscon proc /net u:object_r:proc_net:s0
genfscon proc /net/tcp u:object_r:proc_net_tcp_udp:s0
genfscon proc /net/udp u:object_r:proc_net_tcp_udp:s0
genfscon proc /net/xt_qtaguid/ctrl u:object_r:proc_qtaguid_ctrl:s0
genfscon proc /net/xt_qtaguid/ u:object_r:proc_qtaguid_stat:s0
genfscon proc /cpuinfo u:object_r:proc_cpuinfo:s0
genfscon proc /pagetypeinfo u:object_r:proc_pagetypeinfo:s0
genfscon proc /pressure/cpu u:object_r:proc_pressure_cpu:s0
genfscon proc /pressure/io u:object_r:proc_pressure_io:s0
genfscon proc /pressure/memory u:object_r:proc_pressure_mem:s0
genfscon proc /slabinfo u:object_r:proc_slabinfo:s0
genfscon proc /softirqs u:object_r:proc_timer:s0
genfscon proc /stat u:object_r:proc_stat:s0
genfscon proc /swaps u:object_r:proc_swaps:s0
Address system_server denials. Label /proc/sysrq-trigger and allow access. Label /dev/socket/mtpd and allow access. Resolves denials such as: avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { call } for pid=1007 comm="Binder_8" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=binder avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="watchdog" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026533682 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { write } for pid=11567 comm="LegacyVpnRunner" name="mtpd" dev="tmpfs" ino=36627 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file avc: denied { ptrace } for pid=10924 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { sigkill } for pid=26077 comm="NativeCrashRepo" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="android.bg" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[11467]" dev="sockfs" ino=11467 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[12076]" dev="sockfs" ino=12076 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserv er:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" laddr=192.168.159.172 lport=51576 faddr=93.127.173.40 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" lport=15658 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[443742]" dev="sockfs" ino=443742 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s 0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[444842]" dev="sockfs" ino=444842 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1326 comm="Binder_9" lport=16216 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1676 comm="Binder_6" laddr=192.168.156.130 lport=51044 faddr=74.125.214.81 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" path="/dev/mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { read } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" name="mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { unlink } for pid=14866 comm="system_server" name="wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=285715 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=32300 comm="Binder_1" laddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 lport=4939 faddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 fport=53318 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=10840 comm="pool-17-thread-" path="socket:[205990]" dev="sockfs" ino=205990 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { write } for pid=20817 comm="dumpsys" path="/mnt/shell/emulated/0/aupt-output/bugreport-2014-02-22-11-17-16.txt.tmp" dev="fuse" ino=3100784040 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: I481ac26667b487031a5d3317b0a028a027a8e641 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-03-05 15:50:08 +01:00
genfscon proc /sysrq-trigger u:object_r:proc_sysrq:s0
genfscon proc /kpageflags u:object_r:proc_kpageflags:s0
genfscon proc /sys/abi/swp u:object_r:proc_abi:s0
genfscon proc /sys/fs/pipe-max-size u:object_r:proc_pipe_conf:s0
Restrict the ability to set usermodehelpers and proc security settings. Limit the ability to write to the files that configure kernel usermodehelpers and security-sensitive proc settings to the init domain. Permissive domains can also continue to set these values. The current list is not exhaustive, just an initial set. Not all of these files will exist on all kernels/devices. Controlling access to certain kernel usermodehelpers, e.g. cgroup release_agent, will require kernel changes to support and cannot be addressed here. Expected output on e.g. flo after the change: ls -Z /sys/kernel/uevent_helper /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern /proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/poweroff_cmd /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space /proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 uevent_helper -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 suid_dumpable -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 core_pattern -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 dmesg_restrict -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 hotplug -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 kptr_restrict -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 poweroff_cmd -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 randomize_va_space -rw------- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 bset -rw------- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 inheritable Change-Id: I3f24b4bb90f0916ead863be6afd66d15ac5e8de0 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-12-06 15:31:40 +01:00
genfscon proc /sys/fs/protected_hardlinks u:object_r:proc_security:s0
genfscon proc /sys/fs/protected_symlinks u:object_r:proc_security:s0
genfscon proc /sys/fs/suid_dumpable u:object_r:proc_security:s0
genfscon proc /sys/fs/verity/require_signatures u:object_r:proc_fs_verity:s0
Restrict the ability to set usermodehelpers and proc security settings. Limit the ability to write to the files that configure kernel usermodehelpers and security-sensitive proc settings to the init domain. Permissive domains can also continue to set these values. The current list is not exhaustive, just an initial set. Not all of these files will exist on all kernels/devices. Controlling access to certain kernel usermodehelpers, e.g. cgroup release_agent, will require kernel changes to support and cannot be addressed here. Expected output on e.g. flo after the change: ls -Z /sys/kernel/uevent_helper /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern /proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/poweroff_cmd /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space /proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 uevent_helper -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 suid_dumpable -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 core_pattern -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 dmesg_restrict -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 hotplug -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 kptr_restrict -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 poweroff_cmd -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 randomize_va_space -rw------- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 bset -rw------- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 inheritable Change-Id: I3f24b4bb90f0916ead863be6afd66d15ac5e8de0 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-12-06 15:31:40 +01:00
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/core_pattern u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/core_pipe_limit u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/domainname u:object_r:proc_hostname:s0
Restrict the ability to set usermodehelpers and proc security settings. Limit the ability to write to the files that configure kernel usermodehelpers and security-sensitive proc settings to the init domain. Permissive domains can also continue to set these values. The current list is not exhaustive, just an initial set. Not all of these files will exist on all kernels/devices. Controlling access to certain kernel usermodehelpers, e.g. cgroup release_agent, will require kernel changes to support and cannot be addressed here. Expected output on e.g. flo after the change: ls -Z /sys/kernel/uevent_helper /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern /proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/poweroff_cmd /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space /proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 uevent_helper -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 suid_dumpable -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 core_pattern -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 dmesg_restrict -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 hotplug -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 kptr_restrict -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 poweroff_cmd -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 randomize_va_space -rw------- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 bset -rw------- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 inheritable Change-Id: I3f24b4bb90f0916ead863be6afd66d15ac5e8de0 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-12-06 15:31:40 +01:00
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict u:object_r:proc_security:s0
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/hostname u:object_r:proc_hostname:s0
Restrict the ability to set usermodehelpers and proc security settings. Limit the ability to write to the files that configure kernel usermodehelpers and security-sensitive proc settings to the init domain. Permissive domains can also continue to set these values. The current list is not exhaustive, just an initial set. Not all of these files will exist on all kernels/devices. Controlling access to certain kernel usermodehelpers, e.g. cgroup release_agent, will require kernel changes to support and cannot be addressed here. Expected output on e.g. flo after the change: ls -Z /sys/kernel/uevent_helper /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern /proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/poweroff_cmd /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space /proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 uevent_helper -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 suid_dumpable -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 core_pattern -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 dmesg_restrict -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 hotplug -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 kptr_restrict -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 poweroff_cmd -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 randomize_va_space -rw------- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 bset -rw------- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 inheritable Change-Id: I3f24b4bb90f0916ead863be6afd66d15ac5e8de0 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-12-06 15:31:40 +01:00
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/hotplug u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/hung_task_ u:object_r:proc_hung_task:s0
Restrict the ability to set usermodehelpers and proc security settings. Limit the ability to write to the files that configure kernel usermodehelpers and security-sensitive proc settings to the init domain. Permissive domains can also continue to set these values. The current list is not exhaustive, just an initial set. Not all of these files will exist on all kernels/devices. Controlling access to certain kernel usermodehelpers, e.g. cgroup release_agent, will require kernel changes to support and cannot be addressed here. Expected output on e.g. flo after the change: ls -Z /sys/kernel/uevent_helper /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern /proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/poweroff_cmd /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space /proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 uevent_helper -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 suid_dumpable -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 core_pattern -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 dmesg_restrict -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 hotplug -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 kptr_restrict -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 poweroff_cmd -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 randomize_va_space -rw------- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 bset -rw------- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 inheritable Change-Id: I3f24b4bb90f0916ead863be6afd66d15ac5e8de0 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-12-06 15:31:40 +01:00
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/kptr_restrict u:object_r:proc_security:s0
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/modprobe u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/modules_disabled u:object_r:proc_security:s0
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/panic_on_oops u:object_r:proc_panic:s0
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/perf_event_max_sample_rate u:object_r:proc_perf:s0
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid u:object_r:proc_perf:s0
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/perf_cpu_time_max_percent u:object_r:proc_perf:s0
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/perf_event_mlock_kb u:object_r:proc_perf:s0
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/pid_max u:object_r:proc_pid_max:s0
Restrict the ability to set usermodehelpers and proc security settings. Limit the ability to write to the files that configure kernel usermodehelpers and security-sensitive proc settings to the init domain. Permissive domains can also continue to set these values. The current list is not exhaustive, just an initial set. Not all of these files will exist on all kernels/devices. Controlling access to certain kernel usermodehelpers, e.g. cgroup release_agent, will require kernel changes to support and cannot be addressed here. Expected output on e.g. flo after the change: ls -Z /sys/kernel/uevent_helper /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern /proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/poweroff_cmd /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space /proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 uevent_helper -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 suid_dumpable -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 core_pattern -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 dmesg_restrict -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 hotplug -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 kptr_restrict -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 poweroff_cmd -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 randomize_va_space -rw------- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 bset -rw------- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 inheritable Change-Id: I3f24b4bb90f0916ead863be6afd66d15ac5e8de0 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-12-06 15:31:40 +01:00
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/poweroff_cmd u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/random u:object_r:proc_random:s0
Restrict the ability to set usermodehelpers and proc security settings. Limit the ability to write to the files that configure kernel usermodehelpers and security-sensitive proc settings to the init domain. Permissive domains can also continue to set these values. The current list is not exhaustive, just an initial set. Not all of these files will exist on all kernels/devices. Controlling access to certain kernel usermodehelpers, e.g. cgroup release_agent, will require kernel changes to support and cannot be addressed here. Expected output on e.g. flo after the change: ls -Z /sys/kernel/uevent_helper /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern /proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/poweroff_cmd /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space /proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 uevent_helper -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 suid_dumpable -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 core_pattern -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 dmesg_restrict -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 hotplug -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 kptr_restrict -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 poweroff_cmd -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 randomize_va_space -rw------- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 bset -rw------- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 inheritable Change-Id: I3f24b4bb90f0916ead863be6afd66d15ac5e8de0 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-12-06 15:31:40 +01:00
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/randomize_va_space u:object_r:proc_security:s0
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_child_runs_first u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_latency_ns u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_rt_period_us u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_rt_runtime_us u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_schedstats u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_tunable_scaling u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_wakeup_granularity_ns u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sysrq u:object_r:proc_sysrq:s0
Restrict the ability to set usermodehelpers and proc security settings. Limit the ability to write to the files that configure kernel usermodehelpers and security-sensitive proc settings to the init domain. Permissive domains can also continue to set these values. The current list is not exhaustive, just an initial set. Not all of these files will exist on all kernels/devices. Controlling access to certain kernel usermodehelpers, e.g. cgroup release_agent, will require kernel changes to support and cannot be addressed here. Expected output on e.g. flo after the change: ls -Z /sys/kernel/uevent_helper /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern /proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/poweroff_cmd /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space /proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 uevent_helper -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 suid_dumpable -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 core_pattern -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 dmesg_restrict -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 hotplug -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 kptr_restrict -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 poweroff_cmd -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 randomize_va_space -rw------- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 bset -rw------- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 inheritable Change-Id: I3f24b4bb90f0916ead863be6afd66d15ac5e8de0 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-12-06 15:31:40 +01:00
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/usermodehelper u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0
genfscon proc /sys/net u:object_r:proc_net:s0
genfscon proc /sys/vm/dirty_background_ratio u:object_r:proc_dirty:s0
genfscon proc /sys/vm/dirty_expire_centisecs u:object_r:proc_dirty:s0
genfscon proc /sys/vm/extra_free_kbytes u:object_r:proc_extra_free_kbytes:s0
genfscon proc /sys/vm/max_map_count u:object_r:proc_max_map_count:s0
genfscon proc /sys/vm/mmap_min_addr u:object_r:proc_security:s0
genfscon proc /sys/vm/mmap_rnd_bits u:object_r:proc_security:s0
genfscon proc /sys/vm/mmap_rnd_compat_bits u:object_r:proc_security:s0
genfscon proc /sys/vm/page-cluster u:object_r:proc_page_cluster:s0
genfscon proc /sys/vm/drop_caches u:object_r:proc_drop_caches:s0
genfscon proc /sys/vm/overcommit_memory u:object_r:proc_overcommit_memory:s0
genfscon proc /sys/vm/min_free_order_shift u:object_r:proc_min_free_order_shift:s0
genfscon proc /timer_list u:object_r:proc_timer:s0
genfscon proc /timer_stats u:object_r:proc_timer:s0
genfscon proc /tty/drivers u:object_r:proc_tty_drivers:s0
genfscon proc /uid/ u:object_r:proc_uid_time_in_state:s0
genfscon proc /uid_cputime/show_uid_stat u:object_r:proc_uid_cputime_showstat:s0
genfscon proc /uid_cputime/remove_uid_range u:object_r:proc_uid_cputime_removeuid:s0
genfscon proc /uid_io/stats u:object_r:proc_uid_io_stats:s0
genfscon proc /uid_procstat/set u:object_r:proc_uid_procstat_set:s0
genfscon proc /uid_time_in_state u:object_r:proc_uid_time_in_state:s0
genfscon proc /uid_concurrent_active_time u:object_r:proc_uid_concurrent_active_time:s0
genfscon proc /uid_concurrent_policy_time u:object_r:proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time:s0
genfscon proc /uid_cpupower/ u:object_r:proc_uid_cpupower:s0
genfscon proc /uptime u:object_r:proc_uptime:s0
genfscon proc /version u:object_r:proc_version:s0
genfscon proc /vmallocinfo u:object_r:proc_vmallocinfo:s0
genfscon proc /vmstat u:object_r:proc_vmstat:s0
genfscon proc /zoneinfo u:object_r:proc_zoneinfo:s0
genfscon fusectl / u:object_r:fusectlfs:s0
# selinuxfs booleans can be individually labeled.
genfscon selinuxfs / u:object_r:selinuxfs:s0
genfscon cgroup / u:object_r:cgroup:s0
genfscon cgroup2 / u:object_r:cgroup_bpf:s0
# sysfs labels can be set by userspace.
genfscon sysfs / u:object_r:sysfs:s0
genfscon sysfs /devices/system/cpu u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0
genfscon sysfs /class/android_usb u:object_r:sysfs_android_usb:s0
genfscon sysfs /class/extcon u:object_r:sysfs_extcon:s0
genfscon sysfs /class/leds u:object_r:sysfs_leds:s0
genfscon sysfs /class/net u:object_r:sysfs_net:s0
genfscon sysfs /class/rfkill/rfkill0/state u:object_r:sysfs_bluetooth_writable:s0
genfscon sysfs /class/rfkill/rfkill1/state u:object_r:sysfs_bluetooth_writable:s0
genfscon sysfs /class/rfkill/rfkill2/state u:object_r:sysfs_bluetooth_writable:s0
genfscon sysfs /class/rfkill/rfkill3/state u:object_r:sysfs_bluetooth_writable:s0
genfscon sysfs /class/rtc u:object_r:sysfs_rtc:s0
genfscon sysfs /class/switch u:object_r:sysfs_switch:s0
genfscon sysfs /class/wakeup u:object_r:sysfs_wakeup:s0
genfscon sysfs /devices/platform/nfc-power/nfc_power u:object_r:sysfs_nfc_power_writable:s0
genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/android_usb u:object_r:sysfs_android_usb:s0
genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/block/ u:object_r:sysfs_devices_block:s0
genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/block/dm- u:object_r:sysfs_dm:s0
genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/block/loop u:object_r:sysfs_loop:s0
genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/block/zram0 u:object_r:sysfs_zram:s0
genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/block/zram1 u:object_r:sysfs_zram:s0
genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/block/zram0/uevent u:object_r:sysfs_zram_uevent:s0
genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/block/zram1/uevent u:object_r:sysfs_zram_uevent:s0
genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/misc/hw_random u:object_r:sysfs_hwrandom:s0
genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/net u:object_r:sysfs_net:s0
genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/switch u:object_r:sysfs_switch:s0
genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/wakeup u:object_r:sysfs_wakeup:s0
genfscon sysfs /firmware/devicetree/base/firmware/android u:object_r:sysfs_dt_firmware_android:s0
genfscon sysfs /fs/ext4/features u:object_r:sysfs_fs_ext4_features:s0
genfscon sysfs /fs/f2fs u:object_r:sysfs_fs_f2fs:s0
genfscon sysfs /power/autosleep u:object_r:sysfs_power:s0
genfscon sysfs /power/state u:object_r:sysfs_power:s0
genfscon sysfs /power/suspend_stats u:object_r:sysfs_suspend_stats:s0
genfscon sysfs /power/wakeup_count u:object_r:sysfs_power:s0
genfscon sysfs /power/wake_lock u:object_r:sysfs_wake_lock:s0
genfscon sysfs /power/wake_unlock u:object_r:sysfs_wake_lock:s0
genfscon sysfs /kernel/memory_state_time u:object_r:sysfs_power:s0
genfscon sysfs /kernel/ion u:object_r:sysfs_ion:s0
genfscon sysfs /kernel/ipv4 u:object_r:sysfs_ipv4:s0
genfscon sysfs /kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage u:object_r:sysfs_transparent_hugepage:s0
genfscon sysfs /kernel/notes u:object_r:sysfs_kernel_notes:s0
genfscon sysfs /kernel/uevent_helper u:object_r:sysfs_usermodehelper:s0
genfscon sysfs /kernel/wakeup_reasons u:object_r:sysfs_wakeup_reasons:s0
genfscon sysfs /module/dm_verity/parameters/prefetch_cluster u:object_r:sysfs_dm_verity:s0
genfscon sysfs /module/lowmemorykiller u:object_r:sysfs_lowmemorykiller:s0
genfscon sysfs /module/tcp_cubic/parameters u:object_r:sysfs_net:s0
genfscon sysfs /module/wlan/parameters/fwpath u:object_r:sysfs_wlan_fwpath:s0
genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/timed_output/vibrator/enable u:object_r:sysfs_vibrator:s0
genfscon debugfs /kprobes u:object_r:debugfs_kprobes:s0
genfscon debugfs /mmc0 u:object_r:debugfs_mmc:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_debug:s0
genfscon tracefs / u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_debug:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/tracing_on u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /tracing_on u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/trace u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /trace u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/per_cpu/cpu u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /per_cpu/cpu u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/instances u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0
genfscon tracefs /instances u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/instances/wifi u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /instances/wifi u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/trace_marker u:object_r:debugfs_trace_marker:s0
genfscon tracefs /trace_marker u:object_r:debugfs_trace_marker:s0
genfscon debugfs /wakeup_sources u:object_r:debugfs_wakeup_sources:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/header_page u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_get_data_block/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_iget/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_sync_file_enter/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_sync_file_exit/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_write_begin/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_write_end/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ext4/ext4_da_write_begin/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ext4/ext4_da_write_end/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ext4/ext4_es_lookup_extent_enter/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ext4/ext4_es_lookup_extent_exit/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ext4/ext4_load_inode/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ext4/ext4_sync_file_enter/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ext4/ext4_sync_file_exit/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/block/block_rq_issue/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/block/block_rq_complete/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/header_page u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/f2fs/f2fs_get_data_block/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/f2fs/f2fs_iget/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/f2fs/f2fs_sync_file_enter/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/f2fs/f2fs_sync_file_exit/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/f2fs/f2fs_write_begin/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/f2fs/f2fs_write_end/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/ext4/ext4_da_write_begin/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/ext4/ext4_da_write_end/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/ext4/ext4_es_lookup_extent_enter/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/ext4/ext4_es_lookup_extent_exit/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/ext4/ext4_load_inode/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/ext4/ext4_sync_file_enter/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/ext4/ext4_sync_file_exit/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/block/block_rq_issue/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/block/block_rq_complete/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /trace_clock u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /buffer_size_kb u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /options/overwrite u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /options/print-tgid u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /options/record-tgid u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /saved_cmdlines_size u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_switch/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_wakeup/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_blocked_reason/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_cpu_hotplug/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_process_exit/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/cgroup/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/power/cpu_frequency/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/power/cpu_idle/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/power/clock_set_rate/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/power/cpu_frequency_limits/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/power/gpu_frequency/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/power/suspend_resume/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/cpufreq_interactive/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_direct_reclaim_begin/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_direct_reclaim_end/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_kswapd_wake/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_kswapd_sleep/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_transaction/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_transaction_received/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_lock/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_locked/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_unlock/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_transaction_alloc_buf/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/lowmemorykiller/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/sync/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/fence/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/dma_fence/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/filemap/mm_filemap_add_to_page_cache/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/filemap/mm_filemap_delete_from_page_cache/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/kmem/rss_stat/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/kmem/ion_heap_grow/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/kmem/ion_heap_shrink/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/ion/ion_stat/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/mm_event/mm_event_record/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/oom/oom_score_adj_update/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/task/task_rename/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/task/task_newtask/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/ftrace/print/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/gpu_mem/gpu_mem_total u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/thermal/thermal_temperature/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/thermal/cdev_update/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/cpuhp/cpuhp_enter/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/cpuhp/cpuhp_exit/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/trace_clock u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/buffer_size_kb u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/options/overwrite u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/options/print-tgid u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/options/record-tgid u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/saved_cmdlines_size u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_switch/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_wakeup/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_blocked_reason/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_cpu_hotplug/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_process_exit/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/cgroup/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/cpu_frequency/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/cpu_idle/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/clock_set_rate/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/cpu_frequency_limits/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/gpu_frequency/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/suspend_resume/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/cpufreq_interactive/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_direct_reclaim_begin/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_direct_reclaim_end/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_kswapd_wake/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_kswapd_sleep/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_transaction/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_transaction_received/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_lock/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_locked/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_unlock/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_transaction_alloc_buf/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/lowmemorykiller/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sync/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/fence/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/dma_fence/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/filemap/mm_filemap_add_to_page_cache/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/filemap/mm_filemap_delete_from_page_cache/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/kmem/rss_stat/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/kmem/ion_heap_grow/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/kmem/ion_heap_shrink/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ion/ion_stat/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/mm_event/mm_event_record/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/oom/oom_score_adj_update/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/task/task_rename/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/task/task_newtask/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ftrace/print/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/gpu_mem/gpu_mem_total u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/thermal/thermal_temperature/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/thermal/cdev_update/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/cpuhp/cpuhp_enter/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/cpuhp/cpuhp_exit/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /kcov u:object_r:debugfs_kcov:s0
genfscon securityfs / u:object_r:securityfs:s0
Add sepolicy for binderfs /dev/binder, /dev/hwbinder and /dev/vndbinder are relocating to /dev/binderfs/binder /dev/binderfs/hwbinder and /dev/binderfs/vndbinder. This patch adds the sepolicy to allow the switch. The following are some of the denials that get taken care of by this patch(there are too many to copy). audit(1575835230.863:16): avc: denied { search } for comm="servicemanager" name="/" dev="binder" ino=1 scontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 audit(1575835230.863:16): avc: denied { read } for comm="servicemanager" name="binder" dev="binder" ino=4 scontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 audit(1575835230.863:17): avc: denied { write } for comm="servicemanager" name="binder" dev="binder" ino=4 scontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 audit(1575835230.863:17): avc: denied { open } for comm="servicemanager" path="/dev/binderfs/binder" dev="binder" ino=4 scontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 audit(1575835230.863:18): avc: denied { ioctl } for comm="servicemanager" path="/dev/binderfs/binder" dev="binder" ino=4 ioctlcmd=0x6209 scontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 audit(1575835230.863:19): avc: denied { map } for comm="servicemanager" path="/dev/binderfs/binder" dev="binder" ino=4 scontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 audit(1575835230.867:20): avc: denied { search } for comm="vndservicemanag" name="/" dev="binder" ino=1 scontext=u:r:vndservicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 audit(1575835230.867:20): avc: denied { read } for comm="vndservicemanag" name="vndbinder" dev="binder" ino=6 scontext=u:r:vndservicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 audit(1575835230.867:21): avc: denied { write } for comm="vndservicemanag" name="vndbinder" dev="binder" ino=6 scontext=u:r:vndservicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 audit(1575835230.867:21): avc: denied { open } for comm="vndservicemanag" path="/dev/binderfs/vndbinder" dev="binder" ino=6 scontext=u:r:vndservicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 audit(1575835230.867:22): avc: denied { ioctl } for comm="vndservicemanag" path="/dev/binderfs/vndbinder" dev="binder" ino=6 ioctlcmd=0x6209 scontext=u:r:vndservicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 audit(1575835230.867:23): avc: denied { map } for comm="vndservicemanag" path="/dev/binderfs/vndbinder" dev="binder" ino=6 scontext=u:r:vndservicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 audit(1575835230.871:25): avc: denied { search } for comm="hwservicemanage" name="/" dev="binder" ino=1 scontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 audit(1575835238.351:72): avc: denied { search } for comm="android.hardwar" name="proc" dev="binder" ino=1048586 scontext=u:r:hal_configstore_default:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 Test: boots without any issues when binderfs in enabled. Bug: 136497735 Change-Id: Ib0f8f2156c960eb7b394dd7c79ae96c7da8bc213
2019-12-08 21:11:01 +01:00
genfscon binder /binder u:object_r:binder_device:s0
genfscon binder /hwbinder u:object_r:hwbinder_device:s0
genfscon binder /vndbinder u:object_r:vndbinder_device:s0
genfscon binder /binder_logs u:object_r:binderfs_logs:s0
genfscon binder /binder_logs/proc u:object_r:binderfs_logs_proc:s0
genfscon inotifyfs / u:object_r:inotify:s0
genfscon vfat / u:object_r:vfat:s0
Add sepolicy for binderfs /dev/binder, /dev/hwbinder and /dev/vndbinder are relocating to /dev/binderfs/binder /dev/binderfs/hwbinder and /dev/binderfs/vndbinder. This patch adds the sepolicy to allow the switch. The following are some of the denials that get taken care of by this patch(there are too many to copy). audit(1575835230.863:16): avc: denied { search } for comm="servicemanager" name="/" dev="binder" ino=1 scontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 audit(1575835230.863:16): avc: denied { read } for comm="servicemanager" name="binder" dev="binder" ino=4 scontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 audit(1575835230.863:17): avc: denied { write } for comm="servicemanager" name="binder" dev="binder" ino=4 scontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 audit(1575835230.863:17): avc: denied { open } for comm="servicemanager" path="/dev/binderfs/binder" dev="binder" ino=4 scontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 audit(1575835230.863:18): avc: denied { ioctl } for comm="servicemanager" path="/dev/binderfs/binder" dev="binder" ino=4 ioctlcmd=0x6209 scontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 audit(1575835230.863:19): avc: denied { map } for comm="servicemanager" path="/dev/binderfs/binder" dev="binder" ino=4 scontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 audit(1575835230.867:20): avc: denied { search } for comm="vndservicemanag" name="/" dev="binder" ino=1 scontext=u:r:vndservicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 audit(1575835230.867:20): avc: denied { read } for comm="vndservicemanag" name="vndbinder" dev="binder" ino=6 scontext=u:r:vndservicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 audit(1575835230.867:21): avc: denied { write } for comm="vndservicemanag" name="vndbinder" dev="binder" ino=6 scontext=u:r:vndservicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 audit(1575835230.867:21): avc: denied { open } for comm="vndservicemanag" path="/dev/binderfs/vndbinder" dev="binder" ino=6 scontext=u:r:vndservicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 audit(1575835230.867:22): avc: denied { ioctl } for comm="vndservicemanag" path="/dev/binderfs/vndbinder" dev="binder" ino=6 ioctlcmd=0x6209 scontext=u:r:vndservicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 audit(1575835230.867:23): avc: denied { map } for comm="vndservicemanag" path="/dev/binderfs/vndbinder" dev="binder" ino=6 scontext=u:r:vndservicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 audit(1575835230.871:25): avc: denied { search } for comm="hwservicemanage" name="/" dev="binder" ino=1 scontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 audit(1575835238.351:72): avc: denied { search } for comm="android.hardwar" name="proc" dev="binder" ino=1048586 scontext=u:r:hal_configstore_default:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 Test: boots without any issues when binderfs in enabled. Bug: 136497735 Change-Id: Ib0f8f2156c960eb7b394dd7c79ae96c7da8bc213
2019-12-08 21:11:01 +01:00
genfscon binder / u:object_r:binderfs:s0
genfscon exfat / u:object_r:exfat:s0
genfscon debugfs / u:object_r:debugfs:s0
genfscon fuse / u:object_r:fuse:s0
genfscon configfs / u:object_r:configfs:s0
genfscon sdcardfs / u:object_r:sdcardfs:s0
genfscon esdfs / u:object_r:sdcardfs:s0
genfscon pstore / u:object_r:pstorefs:s0
genfscon functionfs / u:object_r:functionfs:s0
genfscon usbfs / u:object_r:usbfs:s0
genfscon binfmt_misc / u:object_r:binfmt_miscfs:s0
genfscon bpf / u:object_r:fs_bpf:s0