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SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# nfc subsystem
Create attribute for moving perms out of domain Motivation: Domain is overly permissive. Start removing permissions from domain and assign them to the domain_deprecated attribute. Domain_deprecated and domain can initially be assigned to all domains. The goal is to not assign domain_deprecated to new domains and to start removing domain_deprecated where it is not required or reassigning the appropriate permissions to the inheriting domain when necessary. Bug: 25433265 Change-Id: I8b11cb137df7bdd382629c98d916a73fe276413c
2015-11-03 18:54:39 +01:00
type nfc, domain, domain_deprecated;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
app_domain(nfc)
Resolve overlapping rules between app.te and net.te. There is some overlap between socket rules in app.te and the net.te rules, but they aren't quite identical since not all app domains presently include the net_domain() macro and because the rules in app.te allow more permissions for netlink_route_socket and allow rawip_socket permissions for ping. The current app.te rules prevent one from ever creating a non-networked app domain. Resolve this overlap by: 1) Adding the missing permissions allowed by app.te to net.te for netlink_route_socket and rawip_socket. 2) Adding net_domain() calls to all existing app domains that do not already have it. 3) Deleting the redundant socket rules from app.te. Then we'll have no effective change in what is allowed for apps but allow one to define app domains in the future that are not allowed network access. Also cleanup net.te to use the create_socket_perms macro rather than * and add macros for stream socket permissions. Change-Id: I6e80d65b0ccbd48bd2b7272c083a4473e2b588a9 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-02-24 16:48:03 +01:00
net_domain(nfc)
Address bug report denials. Triggering a bug report via Settings > Developer Options > Take bug report generates a number of denials. Two bugs here: 1) According to the "allowed" list in frameworks/native/cmds/servicemanager/service_manager.c , media apps, nfc, radio, and apps with system/root UIDs can register as a binder service. However, they were not placed into the binder_service domain. Fix them. 2) The bugreport mechanism queries all the services and java programs and asks them to write to a shell owned file. Grant the corresponding SELinux capability. Addresses the following denials: <5>[ 149.342181] type=1400 audit(1389419775.872:17): avc: denied { write } for pid=4023 comm="dumpsys" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:keystore:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 149.371844] type=1400 audit(1389419775.902:18): avc: denied { write } for pid=4023 comm="dumpsys" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 149.980161] type=1400 audit(1389419776.512:22): avc: denied { write } for pid=4023 comm="dumpsys" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 150.095066] type=1400 audit(1389419776.622:23): avc: denied { write } for pid=1514 comm="Binder_C" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 150.096748] type=1400 audit(1389419776.632:24): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=3178 comm="Binder_3" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 150.097090] type=1400 audit(1389419776.632:25): avc: denied { write } for pid=1514 comm="Binder_C" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 154.545583] type=1400 audit(1389419781.072:43): avc: denied { write } for pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 156.000877] type=1400 audit(1389419782.532:44): avc: denied { write } for pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 156.022567] type=1400 audit(1389419782.552:45): avc: denied { write } for pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 156.043463] type=1400 audit(1389419782.572:46): avc: denied { write } for pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 156.062550] type=1400 audit(1389419782.592:47): avc: denied { write } for pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: I365d530c38ce176617e48b620c05c4aae01324d3
2014-01-11 08:05:25 +01:00
binder_service(nfc)
Confine all app domains, but make them permissive for now. As has already been done for untrusted_app, isolated_app, and bluetooth, make all the other domains used for app processes confined while making them permissive until sufficient testing has been done. Change-Id: If55fe7af196636c49d10fc18be2f44669e2626c5 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-10-23 19:12:55 +02:00
Allow the NFC process to access hwservicemanager. Add a macro to make this easier for other processes as well. Change-Id: I489d0ce042fe5ef88dc767a6fbdb9b795be91601 (cherry picked from commit c2b9c1561e4bd7ac86d78b44ca7927994e781da0)
2016-07-08 13:49:09 +02:00
# hwbinder access
hwbinder_use(nfc)
Allow NFC to read/write nfc. system properties. (cherry pick of commit 05383ebfb439bed8436912ed28db550e8842b343) Bug: 17298769 Change-Id: I1994ff9f9da9b13249099f6c9bcec88dcdc2bb97
2014-09-26 00:13:41 +02:00
# Set NFC properties
Replace unix_socket_connect() and explicit property sets with macro A common source of mistakes when authoring sepolicy is properly setting up property sets. This is a 3 part step of: 1. Allowing the unix domain connection to the init/property service 2. Allowing write on the property_socket file 3. Allowing the set on class property_service The macro unix_socket_connect() handled 1 and 2, but could be confusing for first time policy authors. 3 had to be explicitly added. To correct this, we introduce a new macros: set_prop(sourcedomain, targetprop) This macro handles steps 1, 2 and 3. No difference in sediff is expected. Change-Id: I630ba0178439c935d08062892990d43a3cc1239e Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@linux.intel.com>
2015-05-05 03:22:45 +02:00
set_prop(nfc, nfc_prop)
Allow NFC to read/write nfc. system properties. (cherry pick of commit 05383ebfb439bed8436912ed28db550e8842b343) Bug: 17298769 Change-Id: I1994ff9f9da9b13249099f6c9bcec88dcdc2bb97
2014-09-26 00:13:41 +02:00
Confine all app domains, but make them permissive for now. As has already been done for untrusted_app, isolated_app, and bluetooth, make all the other domains used for app processes confined while making them permissive until sufficient testing has been done. Change-Id: If55fe7af196636c49d10fc18be2f44669e2626c5 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-10-23 19:12:55 +02:00
# NFC device access.
allow nfc nfc_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# Data file accesses.
allow nfc nfc_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow nfc nfc_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
Trim media related nfc permissions Change-Id: I5863c56a53419d2327ab62a7189034711cda7fcc
2016-02-06 00:04:31 +01:00
# SoundPool loading and playback
allow nfc audioserver_service:service_manager find;
nfc: allow access to drmserver_service (cherry picked from commit 24ad5862bdd5b967e09825efd94d9c2d6f56c8c1) avc: denied { find } for service=drm.drmManager pid=4320 uid=1027 scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:drmserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager Arrange in alphabetical order. Bug: 30112127 Change-Id: I6592497a937c6a6d2c7c3d444beba3db333f4852
2016-07-13 19:15:37 +02:00
allow nfc drmserver_service:service_manager find;
selinux rules for codec process Bug: 22775369 Change-Id: Ic6abe3d0e18ba6f7554d027e0ec05fd19011709b
2016-02-03 01:10:37 +01:00
allow nfc mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
nfc: allow access to drmserver_service (cherry picked from commit 24ad5862bdd5b967e09825efd94d9c2d6f56c8c1) avc: denied { find } for service=drm.drmManager pid=4320 uid=1027 scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:drmserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager Arrange in alphabetical order. Bug: 30112127 Change-Id: I6592497a937c6a6d2c7c3d444beba3db333f4852
2016-07-13 19:15:37 +02:00
allow nfc mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
allow nfc mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
Trim media related nfc permissions Change-Id: I5863c56a53419d2327ab62a7189034711cda7fcc
2016-02-06 00:04:31 +01:00
Allow nfc nfc and radio service access. Address the following denials: SELinux : avc: denied { find } for service=phone scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_service:s0 tclass=service_manager SELinux : avc: denied { find } for service=nfc scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:nfc_service:s0 tclass=service_manager Bug: 18929632 Change-Id: I54c3d194f9401eb5dc6f2114ebddea241c433f71
2015-01-15 22:58:34 +01:00
allow nfc nfc_service:service_manager { add find };
allow nfc radio_service:service_manager find;
Restrict service_manager find and list access. All domains are currently granted list and find service_manager permissions, but this is not necessary. Pare the permissions which did not trigger any of the auditallow reporting. Bug: 18106000 Change-Id: Ie0ce8de2af8af2cbe4ce388a2dcf4534694c994a
2014-12-12 01:01:27 +01:00
allow nfc surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
Add system_api_service and app_api_service attributes. System services differ in designed access level. Add attributes reflecting this distinction and label services appropriately. Begin moving access to the newly labeled services by removing them from tmp_system_server_service into the newly made system_server_service attribute. Reflect the move of system_server_service from a type to an attribute by removing access to system_server_service where appropriate. Change-Id: I7fd06823328daaea6d6f96e4d6bd00332382230b
2015-04-03 01:50:08 +02:00
allow nfc app_api_service:service_manager find;
allow nfc system_api_service:service_manager find;
Record observed system_server servicemanager service requests. Also formally allow dumpstate access to all services and grant system_server access to address the following non-system_server_service entries: avc: granted { find } for service=drm.drmManager scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:drmserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager avc: granted { find } for service=nfc scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:nfc_service:s0 tclass=service_manager Bug: 18106000 Change-Id: Iad16b36acf44bce52c4824f8b53c0e7731c25602
2015-03-03 20:20:15 +01:00
nfc: allow sending bugreports via nfc Same change as 9819a6 but for nfc. Nfc can receive bugreport data for beaming to another device. This comes across as an open file descriptor. Allow nfc access to bugreports. Addresses the following denial: avc: denied { read } for path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2015-03-30-04-49-57.txt" dev="mmcblk0p27" ino=82334 scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file op_res=-13 ppid=435 pcomm="main" tgid=23475 tgcomm="m.android.shell" Change-Id: I3efefcdb46444a1a6520803cb5e68bbdf29d3ad6
2015-04-02 11:16:42 +02:00
# already open bugreport file descriptors may be shared with
# the nfc process, from a file in
# /data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-*.
allow nfc shell_data_file:file read;
add policy for android.hardware.nfc@1.0-service android.hardware.nfc@1.0-service is the generic binderized HIDL package implementation of android.hardware.nfc@1.0 Denials: avc: denied { read write } for pid=432 comm="android.hardwar" name="pn548" dev="tmpfs" ino=10228 scontext=u:r:android_hardware_nfc_1_0_service:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:nfc_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { search } for pid=443 comm="Binder:430_1" name="nfc" dev="dm-0" ino=670433 scontext=u:r:android_hardware_nfc_1_0_service:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:nfc_data_file:s0 tclass=dir Test: pass Change-Id: Id022b8d1706253ef65a37406c74ff883e12415b2 Signed-off-by: Iliyan Malchev <malchev@google.com>
2016-09-26 09:06:43 +02:00
# allow NFC process to call into the NFC HAL
binder_call(nfc, android_hardware_nfc_1_0_service)
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