2013-08-05 08:32:56 +02:00
|
|
|
# 464xlat daemon
|
2017-05-15 22:19:03 +02:00
|
|
|
type clatd, domain;
|
2018-09-27 19:21:37 +02:00
|
|
|
type clatd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
|
2013-08-05 08:32:56 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
net_domain(clatd)
|
2014-02-21 17:08:15 +01:00
|
|
|
|
Start the process of locking down proc/net
Files in /proc/net leak information. This change is the first step in
determining which files apps may use, whitelisting benign access, and
otherwise removing access while providing safe alternative APIs.
To that end, this change:
* Introduces the proc_net_type attribute which will assigned to any
new SELinux types in /proc/net to avoid removing access to privileged
processes. These processes may be evaluated later, but are lower
priority than apps.
* Labels /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} as proc_net_vpn due to existing
use by VPN apps. This may be replaced by an alternative API.
* Audits all other proc/net access for apps.
* Audits proc/net access for other processes which are currently
granted broad read access to /proc/net but should not be including
storaged, zygote, clatd, logd, preopt2cachename and vold.
Bug: 9496886
Bug: 68016944
Test: Boot Taimen-userdebug. On both wifi and cellular: stream youtube
navigate maps, send text message, make voice call, make video call.
Verify no avc "granted" messages in the logs.
Test: A few VPN apps including "VPN Monster", "Turbo VPN", and
"Freighter". Verify no logspam with the current setup.
Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases
Test: atest netd_integration_test
Test: atest QtaguidPermissionTest
Test: atest FileSystemPermissionTest
Change-Id: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
Merged-In: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
(cherry picked from commit 087318957f26e921d62f2e234fc14bff3c59030e)
2018-04-10 21:47:48 +02:00
|
|
|
r_dir_file(clatd, proc_net_type)
|
|
|
|
|
userdebug_or_eng(`
|
|
|
|
|
auditallow clatd proc_net_type:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr open read };
|
|
|
|
|
')
|
2016-09-10 01:27:17 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-02-21 17:08:15 +01:00
|
|
|
# Access objects inherited from netd.
|
|
|
|
|
allow clatd netd:fd use;
|
|
|
|
|
allow clatd netd:fifo_file { read write };
|
2014-03-14 13:22:19 +01:00
|
|
|
# TODO: Check whether some or all of these sockets should be close-on-exec.
|
2014-02-21 17:08:15 +01:00
|
|
|
allow clatd netd:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { read write };
|
|
|
|
|
allow clatd netd:netlink_nflog_socket { read write };
|
|
|
|
|
allow clatd netd:netlink_route_socket { read write };
|
|
|
|
|
allow clatd netd:udp_socket { read write };
|
|
|
|
|
allow clatd netd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
|
2014-03-14 13:22:19 +01:00
|
|
|
allow clatd netd:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
|
2014-02-21 17:08:15 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-11-09 23:51:26 +01:00
|
|
|
allow clatd self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw setuid setgid };
|
2014-02-21 17:08:15 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 01:49:15 +01:00
|
|
|
# clatd calls mmap(MAP_LOCKED) with a 1M buffer. MAP_LOCKED first checks
|
|
|
|
|
# capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK), and then checks to see the requested amount is
|
2015-06-16 10:30:03 +02:00
|
|
|
# under RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. If the latter check succeeds clatd won't have
|
|
|
|
|
# needed CAP_IPC_LOCK. But this is not guaranteed to succeed on all devices
|
|
|
|
|
# so we permit any requests we see from clatd asking for this capability.
|
|
|
|
|
# See https://android-review.googlesource.com/127940 and
|
|
|
|
|
# https://b.corp.google.com/issues/21736319
|
2017-11-09 23:51:26 +01:00
|
|
|
allow clatd self:global_capability_class_set ipc_lock;
|
2015-02-27 01:49:15 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-02-24 21:06:11 +01:00
|
|
|
allow clatd self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
|
2016-05-17 06:12:17 +02:00
|
|
|
allow clatd self:{ packet_socket rawip_socket tun_socket } create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
|
2014-02-21 17:08:15 +01:00
|
|
|
allow clatd tun_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
|
