platform_system_sepolicy/public/te_macros

#####################################
# domain_trans(olddomain, type, newdomain)
# Allow a transition from olddomain to newdomain
# upon executing a file labeled with type.
# This only allows the transition; it does not
# cause it to occur automatically - use domain_auto_trans
# if that is what you want.
#
define(`domain_trans', `
# Old domain may exec the file and transition to the new domain.
allow $1 $2:file { getattr open read execute };
allow $1 $3:process transition;
# New domain is entered by executing the file.
allow $3 $2:file { entrypoint open read execute getattr };
# New domain can send SIGCHLD to its caller.
ifelse($1, `init', `', `allow $3 $1:process sigchld;')
# Enable AT_SECURE, i.e. libc secure mode.
dontaudit $1 $3:process noatsecure;
# XXX dontaudit candidate but requires further study.
allow $1 $3:process { siginh rlimitinh };
')

#####################################
# domain_auto_trans(olddomain, type, newdomain)
# Automatically transition from olddomain to newdomain
# upon executing a file labeled with type.
#
define(`domain_auto_trans', `
# Allow the necessary permissions.
domain_trans($1,$2,$3)
# Make the transition occur by default.
type_transition $1 $2:process $3;
')

#####################################
# file_type_trans(domain, dir_type, file_type)
# Allow domain to create a file labeled file_type in a
# directory labeled dir_type.
# This only allows the transition; it does not
# cause it to occur automatically - use file_type_auto_trans
# if that is what you want.
#
define(`file_type_trans', `
# Allow the domain to add entries to the directory.
allow $1 $2:dir ra_dir_perms;
# Allow the domain to create the file.
allow $1 $3:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
allow $1 $3:dir create_dir_perms;
')

#####################################
# file_type_auto_trans(domain, dir_type, file_type)
# Automatically label new files with file_type when
# they are created by domain in directories labeled dir_type.
#
define(`file_type_auto_trans', `
# Allow the necessary permissions.
file_type_trans($1, $2, $3)
# Make the transition occur by default.
type_transition $1 $2:dir $3;
type_transition $1 $2:notdevfile_class_set $3;
')

#####################################
# r_dir_file(domain, type)
# Allow the specified domain to read directories, files
# and symbolic links of the specified type.
define(`r_dir_file', `
allow $1 $2:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1 $2:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
')

#####################################
# tmpfs_domain(domain)
# Define and allow access to a unique type for
# this domain when creating tmpfs / shmem / ashmem files.
define(`tmpfs_domain', `
type $1_tmpfs, file_type;
type_transition $1 tmpfs:file $1_tmpfs;
allow $1 $1_tmpfs:file { read write };
allow $1 tmpfs:dir { getattr search };
')

# pdx macros for IPC. pdx is a high-level name which contains transport-specific
# rules from underlying transport (e.g. UDS-based implementation).

#####################################
# pdx_server(domain)
define(`pdx_server', `
allow $1 pdx_socket:dir create_dir_perms;
allow $1 pdx_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
')

#####################################
# use_pdx(clientdomain, serverdomain)
define(`use_pdx', `
# Open the socket.
allow $1 pdx_socket:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1 pdx_socket:sock_file rw_file_perms;
# Use the socket.
allow $1 $2:unix_stream_socket { connectto read write shutdown };
# Clients recieve an event fd from the server.
allow $1 $2:fd use;
# Servers may receive sync fences, gralloc buffers, etc, from clients.
# This could be tightened on a per-server basis, but keeping track of service
# clients is error prone.
allow $2 $1:fd use;
')

#####################################
# init_daemon_domain(domain)
# Set up a transition from init to the daemon domain
# upon executing its binary.
define(`init_daemon_domain', `
domain_auto_trans(init, $1_exec, $1)
tmpfs_domain($1)
')

#####################################
# app_domain(domain)
# Allow a base set of permissions required for all apps.
define(`app_domain', `
typeattribute $1 appdomain;
# Label ashmem objects with our own unique type.
tmpfs_domain($1)
# Map with PROT_EXEC.
allow $1 $1_tmpfs:file execute;
')

#####################################
# untrusted_app_domain(domain)
# Allow a base set of permissions required for all untrusted apps.
define(`untrusted_app_domain', `
typeattribute $1 untrusted_app_all;
')

#####################################
# net_domain(domain)
# Allow a base set of permissions required for network access.
define(`net_domain', `
typeattribute $1 netdomain;
')

#####################################
# bluetooth_domain(domain)
# Allow a base set of permissions required for bluetooth access.
define(`bluetooth_domain', `
typeattribute $1 bluetoothdomain;
')

#####################################
# hal_server_domain(domain, hal_type)
# Allow a base set of permissions required for a domain to offer a
# HAL implementation of the specified type over HwBinder.
#
# For example, default implementation of Foo HAL:
#   type hal_foo_default, domain;
#   hal_server_domain(hal_foo_default, hal_foo)
#
define(`hal_server_domain', `
typeattribute $1 halserverdomain;
typeattribute $1 $2_server;
typeattribute $1 $2;
')

#####################################
# hal_client_domain(domain, hal_type)
# Allow a base set of permissions required for a domain to be a
# client of a HAL of the specified type.
#
# For example, make some_domain a client of Foo HAL:
#   hal_client_domain(some_domain, hal_foo)
#
define(`hal_client_domain', `
typeattribute $1 halclientdomain;
typeattribute $1 $2_client;

# TODO(b/34170079): Make the inclusion of the rules below conditional also on
# non-Treble devices. For now, on non-Treble device, always grant clients of a
# HAL sufficient access to run the HAL in passthrough mode (i.e., in-process).
not_full_treble(`
typeattribute $1 $2;
# Find passthrough HAL implementations
allow $2 system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $2 vendor_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $2 vendor_file:file { read open getattr execute };
')
')

#####################################
# passthrough_hal_client_domain(domain, hal_type)
# Allow a base set of permissions required for a domain to be a
# client of a passthrough HAL of the specified type.
#
# For example, make some_domain a client of passthrough Foo HAL:
#   passthrough_hal_client_domain(some_domain, hal_foo)
#
define(`passthrough_hal_client_domain', `
typeattribute $1 halclientdomain;
typeattribute $1 $2_client;
typeattribute $1 $2;
# Find passthrough HAL implementations
allow $2 system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $2 vendor_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $2 vendor_file:file { read open getattr execute };
')

#####################################
# unix_socket_connect(clientdomain, socket, serverdomain)
# Allow a local socket connection from clientdomain via
# socket to serverdomain.
#
# Note: If you see denial records that distill to the
# following allow rules:
# allow clientdomain property_socket:sock_file write;
# allow clientdomain init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
# allow clientdomain something_prop:property_service set;
#
# This sequence is indicative of attempting to set a property.
# use set_prop(sourcedomain, targetproperty)
#
define(`unix_socket_connect', `
ifelse($2, `property', `
    ifelse($3,`init', `
       print(`deprecated: unix_socket_connect($1, $2, $3) Please use set_prop($1, <property name>) instead.')
   ')
')
__unix_socket_connect__($1, $2, $3)
')

define(`__unix_socket_connect__', `
allow $1 $2_socket:sock_file write;
allow $1 $3:unix_stream_socket connectto;
')

#####################################
# set_prop(sourcedomain, targetproperty)
# Allows source domain to set the
# targetproperty.
#
define(`set_prop', `
__unix_socket_connect__($1, property, init)
allow $1 $2:property_service set;
get_prop($1, $2)
')

#####################################
# get_prop(sourcedomain, targetproperty)
# Allows source domain to read the
# targetproperty.
#
define(`get_prop', `
allow $1 $2:file r_file_perms;
')

#####################################
# unix_socket_send(clientdomain, socket, serverdomain)
# Allow a local socket send from clientdomain via
# socket to serverdomain.
define(`unix_socket_send', `
allow $1 $2_socket:sock_file write;
allow $1 $3:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
')

#####################################
# binder_use(domain)
# Allow domain to use Binder IPC.
define(`binder_use', `
# Call the servicemanager and transfer references to it.
allow $1 servicemanager:binder { call transfer };
# servicemanager performs getpidcon on clients.
allow servicemanager $1:dir search;
allow servicemanager $1:file { read open };
allow servicemanager $1:process getattr;
# rw access to /dev/binder and /dev/ashmem is presently granted to
# all domains in domain.te.
')

#####################################
# hwbinder_use(domain)
# Allow domain to use HwBinder IPC.
define(`hwbinder_use', `
# Call the hwservicemanager and transfer references to it.
allow $1 hwservicemanager:binder { call transfer };
# Allow hwservicemanager to send out callbacks
allow hwservicemanager $1:binder { call transfer };
# hwservicemanager performs getpidcon on clients.
allow hwservicemanager $1:dir search;
allow hwservicemanager $1:file { read open };
allow hwservicemanager $1:process getattr;
# rw access to /dev/hwbinder and /dev/ashmem is presently granted to
# all domains in domain.te.
')

#####################################
# vndbinder_use(domain)
# Allow domain to use Binder IPC.
define(`vndbinder_use', `
# Talk to the vndbinder device node
allow $1 vndbinder_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# Call the vndservicemanager and transfer references to it.
allow $1 vndservicemanager:binder { call transfer };
# vndservicemanager performs getpidcon on clients.
allow vndservicemanager $1:dir search;
allow vndservicemanager $1:file { read open };
allow vndservicemanager $1:process getattr;
')

#####################################
# binder_call(clientdomain, serverdomain)
# Allow clientdomain to perform binder IPC to serverdomain.
define(`binder_call', `
# Call the server domain and optionally transfer references to it.
allow $1 $2:binder { call transfer };
# Allow the serverdomain to transfer references to the client on the reply.
allow $2 $1:binder transfer;
# Receive and use open files from the server.
allow $1 $2:fd use;
')

#####################################
# binder_service(domain)
# Mark a domain as being a Binder service domain.
# Used to allow binder IPC to the various system services.
define(`binder_service', `
typeattribute $1 binderservicedomain;
')

#####################################
# wakelock_use(domain)
# Allow domain to manage wake locks
define(`wakelock_use', `
# Access /sys/power/wake_lock and /sys/power/wake_unlock
allow $1 sysfs_wake_lock:file rw_file_perms;
# Accessing these files requires CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND
allow $1 self:capability2 block_suspend;
')

#####################################
# selinux_check_access(domain)
# Allow domain to check SELinux permissions via selinuxfs.
define(`selinux_check_access', `
r_dir_file($1, selinuxfs)
allow $1 selinuxfs:file w_file_perms;
allow $1 kernel:security compute_av;
allow $1 self:netlink_selinux_socket { read write create getattr setattr lock relabelfrom relabelto append bind connect listen accept getopt setopt shutdown recvfrom sendto name_bind };
')

#####################################
# selinux_check_context(domain)
# Allow domain to check SELinux contexts via selinuxfs.
define(`selinux_check_context', `
r_dir_file($1, selinuxfs)
allow $1 selinuxfs:file w_file_perms;
allow $1 kernel:security check_context;
')

#####################################
# create_pty(domain)
# Allow domain to create and use a pty, isolated from any other domain ptys.
define(`create_pty', `
# Each domain gets a unique devpts type.
type $1_devpts, fs_type;
# Label the pty with the unique type when created.
type_transition $1 devpts:chr_file $1_devpts;
# Allow use of the pty after creation.
allow $1 $1_devpts:chr_file { open getattr read write ioctl };
allowxperm $1 $1_devpts:chr_file ioctl unpriv_tty_ioctls;
# TIOCSTI is only ever used for exploits. Block it.
# b/33073072, b/7530569
# http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/09/26/14
neverallowxperm * $1_devpts:chr_file ioctl TIOCSTI;
# Note: devpts:dir search and ptmx_device:chr_file rw_file_perms
# allowed to everyone via domain.te.
')

#####################################
# Non system_app application set
#
define(`non_system_app_set', `{ appdomain -system_app }')

#####################################
# Recovery only
# SELinux rules which apply only to recovery mode
#
define(`recovery_only', ifelse(target_recovery, `true', $1, ))

#####################################
# Full TREBLE only
# SELinux rules which apply only to full TREBLE devices
#
define(`full_treble_only', ifelse(target_full_treble, `true', $1,
ifelse(target_full_treble, `cts',
# BEGIN_TREBLE_ONLY -- this marker is used by CTS -- do not modify
$1
# END_TREBLE_ONLY -- this marker is used by CTS -- do not modify
, )))

#####################################
# Not full TREBLE
# SELinux rules which apply only to devices which are not full TREBLE devices
#
define(`not_full_treble', ifelse(target_full_treble, `true', , $1))

#####################################
# Userdebug or eng builds
# SELinux rules which apply only to userdebug or eng builds
#
define(`userdebug_or_eng', ifelse(target_build_variant, `eng', $1, ifelse(target_build_variant, `userdebug', $1)))

#####################################
# asan builds
# SELinux rules which apply only to asan builds
#
define(`with_asan', ifelse(target_with_asan, `true', userdebug_or_eng(`$1'), ))

####################################
# Fallback crash handling for processes that can't exec crash_dump (e.g. because of seccomp).
#
define(`crash_dump_fallback', `
userdebug_or_eng(`
  allow $1 su:fifo_file append;
')
allow $1 anr_data_file:file append;
allow $1 tombstoned:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow $1 tombstoned:fd use;
allow $1 tombstoned_crash_socket:sock_file write;
allow $1 tombstone_data_file:file append;
')

#####################################
# WITH_DEXPREOPT builds
# SELinux rules which apply only when pre-opting.
#
define(`with_dexpreopt', ifelse(target_with_dexpreopt, `true', $1))

#####################################
# write_logd(domain)
# Ability to write to android log
# daemon via sockets
define(`write_logd', `
unix_socket_send($1, logdw, logd)
allow $1 pmsg_device:chr_file w_file_perms;
')

#####################################
# read_logd(domain)
# Ability to run logcat and read from android
# log daemon via sockets
define(`read_logd', `
allow $1 logcat_exec:file rx_file_perms;
unix_socket_connect($1, logdr, logd)
')

#####################################
# read_runtime_log_tags(domain)
# ability to directly map the runtime event log tags
define(`read_runtime_log_tags', `
allow $1 runtime_event_log_tags_file:file r_file_perms;
')

#####################################
# control_logd(domain)
# Ability to control
# android log daemon via sockets
define(`control_logd', `
# Group AID_LOG checked by filesystem & logd
# to permit control commands
unix_socket_connect($1, logd, logd)
')

#####################################
# use_keystore(domain)
# Ability to use keystore.
# Keystore is requires the following permissions
# to call getpidcon.
define(`use_keystore', `
  allow keystore $1:dir search;
  allow keystore $1:file { read open };
  allow keystore $1:process getattr;
  allow $1 keystore_service:service_manager find;
  binder_call($1, keystore)
')

###########################################
# use_drmservice(domain)
# Ability to use DrmService which requires
# DrmService to call getpidcon.
define(`use_drmservice', `
  allow drmserver $1:dir search;
  allow drmserver $1:file { read open };
  allow drmserver $1:process getattr;
')

###########################################
# add_service(domain, service)
# Ability for domain to add a service to service_manager
# and find it. It also creates a neverallow preventing
# others from adding it.
define(`add_service', `
  allow $1 $2:service_manager { add find };
  neverallow { domain -$1 } $2:service_manager add;
')

###########################################
# add_hwservice(domain, service)
# Ability for domain to add a service to hwservice_manager
# and find it. It also creates a neverallow preventing
# others from adding it.
define(`add_hwservice', `
  allow $1 $2:hwservice_manager { add find };
# TODO(b/34454312): Uncomment the neverallow once issues on user builds are resolved
#  neverallow { domain -$1 } $2:hwservice_manager add;
')

##########################################
# print a message with a trailing newline
# print(`args')
define(`print', `errprint(`m4: '__file__: __line__`: $*
')')