2014-02-21 19:45:29 +01:00
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# Domain for shell processes spawned by ADB or console service.
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2014-06-11 13:10:09 +02:00
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type shell, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
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2013-09-27 16:38:14 +02:00
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type shell_exec, exec_type, file_type;
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2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
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2014-01-07 18:47:10 +01:00
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# Create and use network sockets.
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net_domain(shell)
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2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
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# Run app_process.
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2013-10-23 19:25:53 +02:00
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# XXX Transition into its own domain?
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2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
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app_domain(shell)
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2013-12-02 20:18:11 +01:00
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2014-12-15 21:01:35 +01:00
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# logcat
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2014-03-17 21:00:38 +01:00
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read_logd(shell)
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control_logd(shell)
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2014-12-15 21:01:35 +01:00
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# logcat -L (directly, or via dumpstate)
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allow shell pstorefs:dir search;
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allow shell pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
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2014-03-17 21:00:38 +01:00
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2014-06-05 22:27:44 +02:00
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# read files in /data/anr
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allow shell anr_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow shell anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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2014-06-11 13:10:09 +02:00
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# Access /data/local/tmp.
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allow shell shell_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow shell shell_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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allow shell shell_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
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2014-12-10 08:49:31 +01:00
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allow shell shell_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
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2014-06-11 13:10:09 +02:00
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# adb bugreport
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unix_socket_connect(shell, dumpstate, dumpstate)
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allow shell devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow shell tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow shell console_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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2014-06-11 18:09:15 +02:00
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allow shell input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
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2014-06-11 13:10:09 +02:00
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allow shell input_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow shell system_file:file x_file_perms;
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allow shell shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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allow shell zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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r_dir_file(shell, apk_data_file)
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# Set properties.
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2015-05-05 03:22:45 +02:00
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set_prop(shell, shell_prop)
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set_prop(shell, ctl_dumpstate_prop)
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set_prop(shell, debug_prop)
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set_prop(shell, powerctl_prop)
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2014-06-11 13:10:09 +02:00
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# systrace support - allow atrace to run
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# debugfs doesn't support labeling individual files, so we have
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# to grant read access to all of /sys/kernel/debug.
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# Directory read access and file write access is already granted
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# in domain.te.
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allow shell debugfs:file r_file_perms;
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# allow shell to run dmesg
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allow shell kernel:system syslog_read;
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2014-12-31 00:21:50 +01:00
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2015-01-24 00:55:42 +01:00
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# allow shell access to services
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2014-12-31 00:21:50 +01:00
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allow shell servicemanager:service_manager list;
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2015-04-04 01:46:33 +02:00
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# don't allow shell to access GateKeeper service
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allow shell { service_manager_type -gatekeeper_service }:service_manager find;
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2015-03-03 20:20:15 +01:00
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service_manager_local_audit_domain(shell)
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2015-01-16 22:39:59 +01:00
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# allow shell to look through /proc/ for ps, top
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allow shell domain:dir { search open read getattr };
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allow shell domain:{ file lnk_file } { open read getattr };
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2014-12-05 06:40:22 +01:00
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2015-03-16 16:43:22 +01:00
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# allow shell to read /proc/pid/attr/current for ps -Z
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allow shell domain:process getattr;
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2014-12-05 06:40:22 +01:00
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# enable shell domain to read/write files/dirs for bootchart data
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# User will creates the start and stop file via adb shell
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# and read other files created by init process under /data/bootchart
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allow shell bootchart_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
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allow shell bootchart_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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2015-04-16 17:43:10 +02:00
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# Do not allow shell to hard link to any files.
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# In particular, if shell hard links to app data
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# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
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# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
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# bugs, so we want to ensure the shell user never has this
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# capability.
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neverallow shell file_type:file link;
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