platform_system_sepolicy/private/storaged.te

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# storaged daemon
type storaged, domain, coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
type storaged_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
init_daemon_domain(storaged)
# Read access to pseudo filesystems
r_dir_file(storaged, domain)
# Read /proc/uid_io/stats
allow storaged proc_uid_io_stats:file r_file_perms;
# Read /data/system/packages.list
allow storaged system_data_file:file r_file_perms;
Relabel /data/system/packages.list to new type. Conservatively grant access to packages_list_file to everything that had access to system_data_file:file even if the comment in the SELinux policy suggests it was for another use. Ran a diff on the resulting SEPolicy, the only difference of domains being granted is those that had system_data_file:dir permissiosn which is clearly not applicable for packages.list diff -u0 <(sesearch --allow -t system_data_file ~/sepolicy | sed 's/system_data_file/packages_list_file/') <(sesearch --allow -t packages_list_file ~/sepolicy_new) --- /proc/self/fd/16 2019-03-19 20:01:44.378409146 +0000 +++ /proc/self/fd/18 2019-03-19 20:01:44.378409146 +0000 @@ -3 +2,0 @@ -allow appdomain packages_list_file:dir getattr; @@ -6 +4,0 @@ -allow coredomain packages_list_file:dir getattr; @@ -8 +5,0 @@ -allow domain packages_list_file:dir search; @@ -35 +31,0 @@ -allow system_server packages_list_file:dir { rename search setattr read lock create reparent getattr write relabelfrom ioctl rmdir remove_name open add_name }; @@ -40 +35,0 @@ -allow tee packages_list_file:dir { search read lock getattr ioctl open }; @@ -43,3 +37,0 @@ -allow traced_probes packages_list_file:dir { read getattr open search }; -allow vendor_init packages_list_file:dir { search setattr read create getattr write relabelfrom ioctl rmdir remove_name open add_name }; -allow vold packages_list_file:dir { search setattr read lock create getattr mounton write ioctl rmdir remove_name open add_name }; @@ -48 +39,0 @@ -allow vold_prepare_subdirs packages_list_file:dir { read write relabelfrom rmdir remove_name open add_name }; @@ -50 +40,0 @@ -allow zygote packages_list_file:dir { search read lock getattr ioctl open }; Bug: 123186697 Change-Id: Ieabf313653deb5314872b63cd47dadd535af7b07
2019-03-19 19:14:38 +01:00
allow storaged packages_list_file:file r_file_perms;
# Store storaged proto file
allow storaged storaged_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow storaged storaged_data_file:file create_file_perms;
userdebug_or_eng(`
# Read access to debugfs
allow storaged debugfs_mmc:dir search;
allow storaged debugfs_mmc:file r_file_perms;
')
# Needed to provide debug dump output via dumpsys pipes.
allow storaged shell:fd use;
allow storaged shell:fifo_file write;
# Needed for GMScore to call dumpsys storaged
allow storaged priv_app:fd use;
# b/142672293: No other priv-app should need this allow rule now that GMS core runs in its own domain.
# Remove after no logs are seen for this rule.
userdebug_or_eng(`
auditallow storaged priv_app:fd use;
')
allow storaged gmscore_app:fd use;
allow storaged { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:file write;
allow storaged permission_service:service_manager find;
# Binder permissions
add_service(storaged, storaged_service)
binder_use(storaged)
binder_call(storaged, system_server)
hal_client_domain(storaged, hal_health)
# Implements a dumpsys interface.
allow storaged dumpstate:fd use;
# use a subset of the package manager service
allow storaged package_native_service:service_manager find;
# Kernel does extra check on CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE for libbinder when storaged is
# running as root. See b/35323867 #3.
dontaudit storaged self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search };
# For collecting bugreports.
allow storaged dumpstate:fifo_file write;
###
### neverallow
###
neverallow storaged domain:process ptrace;
neverallow storaged self:capability_class_set *;