platform_system_sepolicy/private/access_vectors

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2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
#
# Define common prefixes for access vectors
#
# common common_name { permission_name ... }
#
# Define a common prefix for file access vectors.
#
common file
{
ioctl
read
write
create
getattr
setattr
lock
relabelfrom
relabelto
append
sepolicy: Define and allow map permission Kernel commit 3ba4bf5f1e2c ("selinux: add a map permission check for mmap") added a map permission check on mmap so that we can distinguish memory mapped access (since it has different implications for revocation). The purpose of a separate map permission check on mmap(2) is to permit policy to prohibit memory mapping of specific files for which we need to ensure that every access is revalidated, particularly useful for scenarios where we expect the file to be relabeled at runtime in order to reflect state changes (e.g. cross-domain solution, assured pipeline without data copying). The kernel commit is anticipated to be included in Linux 4.13. This change defines map permission for the Android policy. It mirrors the definition in the kernel classmap by adding it to the common definitions for files and sockets. This will break compatibility for kernels that predate the dynamic class/perm mapping support (< 2.6.33); on such kernels, one would instead need to add map permission to the end of each file and socket access vector. This change also adds map permission to the global macro definitions for file permissions, thereby allowing it in any allow rule that uses these macros, and to specific rules allowing mapping of files from /system and executable types. This should cover most cases where it is needed, although it may still need to be added to specific allow rules when the global macros are not used. Test: Policy builds Change-Id: Iab3ccd2b6587618e68ecab58218838749fe5e7f5 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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map
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unlink
link
rename
execute
quotaon
mounton
audit_access
open
execmod
watch
watch_mount
watch_sb
watch_with_perm
watch_reads
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}
#
# Define a common prefix for socket access vectors.
#
common socket
{
# inherited from file
ioctl
read
write
create
getattr
setattr
lock
relabelfrom
relabelto
append
sepolicy: Define and allow map permission Kernel commit 3ba4bf5f1e2c ("selinux: add a map permission check for mmap") added a map permission check on mmap so that we can distinguish memory mapped access (since it has different implications for revocation). The purpose of a separate map permission check on mmap(2) is to permit policy to prohibit memory mapping of specific files for which we need to ensure that every access is revalidated, particularly useful for scenarios where we expect the file to be relabeled at runtime in order to reflect state changes (e.g. cross-domain solution, assured pipeline without data copying). The kernel commit is anticipated to be included in Linux 4.13. This change defines map permission for the Android policy. It mirrors the definition in the kernel classmap by adding it to the common definitions for files and sockets. This will break compatibility for kernels that predate the dynamic class/perm mapping support (< 2.6.33); on such kernels, one would instead need to add map permission to the end of each file and socket access vector. This change also adds map permission to the global macro definitions for file permissions, thereby allowing it in any allow rule that uses these macros, and to specific rules allowing mapping of files from /system and executable types. This should cover most cases where it is needed, although it may still need to be added to specific allow rules when the global macros are not used. Test: Policy builds Change-Id: Iab3ccd2b6587618e68ecab58218838749fe5e7f5 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2017-07-10 15:32:10 +02:00
map
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# socket-specific
bind
connect
listen
accept
getopt
setopt
shutdown
recvfrom
sendto
name_bind
}
#
# Define a common prefix for ipc access vectors.
#
common ipc
{
create
destroy
getattr
setattr
read
write
associate
unix_read
unix_write
}
#
# Define a common for capability access vectors.
#
common cap
{
# The capabilities are defined in include/linux/capability.h
# Capabilities >= 32 are defined in the cap2 common.
# Care should be taken to ensure that these are consistent with
# those definitions. (Order matters)
chown
dac_override
dac_read_search
fowner
fsetid
kill
setgid
setuid
setpcap
linux_immutable
net_bind_service
net_broadcast
net_admin
net_raw
ipc_lock
ipc_owner
sys_module
sys_rawio
sys_chroot
sys_ptrace
sys_pacct
sys_admin
sys_boot
sys_nice
sys_resource
sys_time
sys_tty_config
mknod
lease
audit_write
audit_control
setfcap
}
common cap2
{
mac_override # unused by SELinux
mac_admin
syslog
wake_alarm
block_suspend
audit_read
perfmon
}
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#
# Define the access vectors.
#
# class class_name [ inherits common_name ] { permission_name ... }
#
# Define the access vector interpretation for file-related objects.
#
class filesystem
{
mount
remount
unmount
getattr
relabelfrom
relabelto
associate
quotamod
quotaget
watch
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}
class dir
inherits file
{
add_name
remove_name
reparent
search
rmdir
}
class file
inherits file
{
execute_no_trans
entrypoint
}
class anon_inode
inherits file
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class lnk_file
inherits file
class chr_file
inherits file
{
execute_no_trans
entrypoint
}
class blk_file
inherits file
class sock_file
inherits file
class fifo_file
inherits file
class fd
{
use
}
#
# Define the access vector interpretation for network-related objects.
#
class socket
inherits socket
class tcp_socket
inherits socket
{
node_bind
name_connect
}
class udp_socket
inherits socket
{
node_bind
}
class rawip_socket
inherits socket
{
node_bind
}
class node
{
recvfrom
sendto
}
class netif
{
ingress
egress
}
class netlink_socket
inherits socket
class packet_socket
inherits socket
class key_socket
inherits socket
class unix_stream_socket
inherits socket
{
connectto
}
class unix_dgram_socket
inherits socket
#
# Define the access vector interpretation for process-related objects
#
class process
{
fork
transition
sigchld # commonly granted from child to parent
sigkill # cannot be caught or ignored
sigstop # cannot be caught or ignored
signull # for kill(pid, 0)
signal # all other signals
ptrace
getsched
setsched
getsession
getpgid
setpgid
getcap
setcap
share
getattr
setexec
setfscreate
noatsecure
siginh
setrlimit
rlimitinh
dyntransition
setcurrent
execmem
execstack
execheap
setkeycreate
setsockcreate
getrlimit
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}
class process2
{
nnp_transition
nosuid_transition
}
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#
# Define the access vector interpretation for ipc-related objects
#
class ipc
inherits ipc
class sem
inherits ipc
class msgq
inherits ipc
{
enqueue
}
class msg
{
send
receive
}
class shm
inherits ipc
{
lock
}
#
# Define the access vector interpretation for the security server.
#
class security
{
compute_av
compute_create
compute_member
check_context
load_policy
compute_relabel
compute_user
setenforce # was avc_toggle in system class
setbool
setsecparam
setcheckreqprot
read_policy
validate_trans
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}
#
# Define the access vector interpretation for system operations.
#
class system
{
ipc_info
syslog_read
syslog_mod
syslog_console
module_request
module_load
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}
#
# Define the access vector interpretation for controlling capabilities
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#
class capability
inherits cap
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class capability2
inherits cap2
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#
# Extended Netlink classes
#
class netlink_route_socket
inherits socket
{
nlmsg_read
nlmsg_write
nlmsg_readpriv
nlmsg_getneigh
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}
class netlink_tcpdiag_socket
inherits socket
{
nlmsg_read
nlmsg_write
}
class netlink_nflog_socket
inherits socket
class netlink_xfrm_socket
inherits socket
{
nlmsg_read
nlmsg_write
}
class netlink_selinux_socket
inherits socket
class netlink_audit_socket
inherits socket
{
nlmsg_read
nlmsg_write
nlmsg_relay
nlmsg_readpriv
nlmsg_tty_audit
}
class netlink_dnrt_socket
inherits socket
# Define the access vector interpretation for controlling
# access to IPSec network data by association
#
class association
{
sendto
recvfrom
setcontext
polmatch
}
# Updated Netlink class for KOBJECT_UEVENT family.
class netlink_kobject_uevent_socket
inherits socket
class appletalk_socket
inherits socket
class packet
{
send
recv
relabelto
forward_in
forward_out
}
class key
{
view
read
write
search
link
setattr
create
}
class dccp_socket
inherits socket
{
node_bind
name_connect
}
class memprotect
{
mmap_zero
}
# network peer labels
class peer
{
recv
}
class kernel_service
{
use_as_override
create_files_as
}
class tun_socket
inherits socket
{
attach_queue
}
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class binder
{
impersonate
call
set_context_mgr
transfer
}
class netlink_iscsi_socket
inherits socket
class netlink_fib_lookup_socket
inherits socket
class netlink_connector_socket
inherits socket
class netlink_netfilter_socket
inherits socket
class netlink_generic_socket
inherits socket
class netlink_scsitransport_socket
inherits socket
class netlink_rdma_socket
inherits socket
class netlink_crypto_socket
inherits socket
class infiniband_pkey
{
access
}
class infiniband_endport
{
manage_subnet
}
#
# Define the access vector interpretation for controlling capabilities
# in user namespaces
#
class cap_userns
inherits cap
class cap2_userns
inherits cap2
Define extended_socket_class policy capability and socket classes Add a definition for the extended_socket_class policy capability used to enable the use of separate socket security classes for all network address families rather than the generic socket class. The capability also enables the use of separate security classes for ICMP and SCTP sockets, which were previously mapped to rawip_socket class. Add definitions for the new socket classes and access vectors enabled by this capability. Add the new socket classes to the socket_class_set macro, and exclude them from webview_zygote domain as with other socket classes. Allowing access by specific domains to the new socket security classes is left to future commits. Domains previously allowed permissions to the 'socket' class will require permission to the more specific socket class when running on kernels with this support. The kernel support will be included upstream in Linux 4.11. The relevant kernel commits are da69a5306ab92e07224da54aafee8b1dccf024f6 ("selinux: support distinctions among all network address families"), ef37979a2cfa3905adbf0c2a681ce16c0aaea92d ("selinux: handle ICMPv6 consistently with ICMP"), and b4ba35c75a0671a06b978b6386b54148efddf39f ("selinux: drop unused socket security classes"). This change requires selinux userspace commit d479baa82d67c9ac56c1a6fa041abfb9168aa4b3 ("libsepol: Define extended_socket_class policy capability") in order to build the policy with this capability enabled. This commit is already in AOSP master. Test: policy builds Change-Id: I788b4be9f0ec0bf2356c0bbef101cd42a1af49bb Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2016-12-08 19:35:27 +01:00
#
# Define the access vector interpretation for the new socket classes
# enabled by the extended_socket_class policy capability.
#
#
# The next two classes were previously mapped to rawip_socket and therefore
# have the same definition as rawip_socket (until further permissions
# are defined).
#
class sctp_socket
inherits socket
{
node_bind
name_connect
association
Define extended_socket_class policy capability and socket classes Add a definition for the extended_socket_class policy capability used to enable the use of separate socket security classes for all network address families rather than the generic socket class. The capability also enables the use of separate security classes for ICMP and SCTP sockets, which were previously mapped to rawip_socket class. Add definitions for the new socket classes and access vectors enabled by this capability. Add the new socket classes to the socket_class_set macro, and exclude them from webview_zygote domain as with other socket classes. Allowing access by specific domains to the new socket security classes is left to future commits. Domains previously allowed permissions to the 'socket' class will require permission to the more specific socket class when running on kernels with this support. The kernel support will be included upstream in Linux 4.11. The relevant kernel commits are da69a5306ab92e07224da54aafee8b1dccf024f6 ("selinux: support distinctions among all network address families"), ef37979a2cfa3905adbf0c2a681ce16c0aaea92d ("selinux: handle ICMPv6 consistently with ICMP"), and b4ba35c75a0671a06b978b6386b54148efddf39f ("selinux: drop unused socket security classes"). This change requires selinux userspace commit d479baa82d67c9ac56c1a6fa041abfb9168aa4b3 ("libsepol: Define extended_socket_class policy capability") in order to build the policy with this capability enabled. This commit is already in AOSP master. Test: policy builds Change-Id: I788b4be9f0ec0bf2356c0bbef101cd42a1af49bb Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2016-12-08 19:35:27 +01:00
}
class icmp_socket
inherits socket
{
node_bind
}
#
# The remaining network socket classes were previously
# mapped to the socket class and therefore have the
# same definition as socket.
#
class ax25_socket
inherits socket
class ipx_socket
inherits socket
class netrom_socket
inherits socket
class atmpvc_socket
inherits socket
class x25_socket
inherits socket
class rose_socket
inherits socket
class decnet_socket
inherits socket
class atmsvc_socket
inherits socket
class rds_socket
inherits socket
class irda_socket
inherits socket
class pppox_socket
inherits socket
class llc_socket
inherits socket
class can_socket
inherits socket
class tipc_socket
inherits socket
class bluetooth_socket
inherits socket
class iucv_socket
inherits socket
class rxrpc_socket
inherits socket
class isdn_socket
inherits socket
class phonet_socket
inherits socket
class ieee802154_socket
inherits socket
class caif_socket
inherits socket
class alg_socket
inherits socket
class nfc_socket
inherits socket
class vsock_socket
inherits socket
class kcm_socket
inherits socket
class qipcrtr_socket
inherits socket
class smc_socket
inherits socket
class bpf
{
map_create
map_read
map_write
prog_load
prog_run
}
class property_service
{
set
}
class service_manager
{
add
find
list
}
class hwservice_manager
{
add
find
list
}
class keystore_key
{
get_state
get
insert
delete
exist
list
reset
password
lock
unlock
is_empty
sign
verify
grant
duplicate
clear_uid
add_auth
user_changed
gen_unique_id
}
class keystore2
{
add_auth
change_password
change_user
clear_ns
clear_uid
delete_all_keys
early_boot_ended
get_attestation_key
get_auth_token
get_last_auth_time
get_state
list
lock
pull_metrics
report_off_body
reset
unlock
}
class keystore2_key
{
convert_storage_key_to_ephemeral
delete
gen_unique_id
get_info
grant
manage_blob
rebind
req_forced_op
update
use
use_dev_id
}
class diced
{
demote
demote_self
derive
get_attestation_chain
use_seal
use_sign
}
class drmservice {
consumeRights
setPlaybackStatus
openDecryptSession
closeDecryptSession
initializeDecryptUnit
decrypt
finalizeDecryptUnit
pread
}
class xdp_socket
inherits socket
class perf_event
{
open
cpu
kernel
tracepoint
read
write
}
class lockdown
{
integrity
confidentiality
}
Add SELinux Policy For io_uring Brings in the io_uring class and associated restrictions and adds a new macro, `io_uring_use`, to sepolicy. In more detail, this change: * Adds a new macro expands to ensure the domain it is passed can undergo a type transition to a new type, `<domain>_iouring`, when the anon_inode being accessed is labeled `[io_uring]`. It also allows the domain to create, read, write, and map the io_uring anon_inode. * Adds the ability for a domain to use the `IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL` flag during `io_uring_setup` so that a syscall to `io_uring_enter` is not required by the caller each time it wishes to submit IO. This can be enabled securely as long as we don't enable sharing of io_uring file descriptors across domains. The kernel polling thread created by `SQPOLL` will inherit the credentials of the thread that created the io_uring [1]. * Removes the selinux policy that restricted all domains that make use of the `userfault_fd` macro from any `anon_inode` created by another domain. This is overly restrictive, as it prohibits the use of two different `anon_inode` use cases in a single domain e.g. userfaultfd and io_uring. This change also replaces existing sepolicy in fastbootd and snapuserd that enabled the use of io_uring. [1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-security-module/patch/163159041500.470089.11310853524829799938.stgit@olly/ Bug: 253385258 Test: m selinux_policy Test: cd external/liburing; mm; atest liburing_test; # requires WIP CL ag/20291423 Test: Manually deliver OTAs (built with m dist) to a recent Pixel device and ensure snapuserd functions correctly (no io_uring failures) Change-Id: I96f38760b3df64a1d33dcd6e5905445ccb125d3f
2022-11-14 23:06:36 +01:00
class io_uring
{
override_creds
sqpoll
cmd
}