platform_system_sepolicy/public/cameraserver.te

# cameraserver - camera daemon
type cameraserver, domain;
type cameraserver_exec, exec_type, file_type;

binder_use(cameraserver)
binder_call(cameraserver, binderservicedomain)
binder_call(cameraserver, appdomain)
binder_service(cameraserver)

hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_camera)

hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_graphics_allocator)

allow cameraserver ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;

# Talk with graphics composer fences
allow cameraserver hal_graphics_composer:fd use;

add_service(cameraserver, cameraserver_service)
allow cameraserver appops_service:service_manager find;
allow cameraserver audioserver_service:service_manager find;
allow cameraserver batterystats_service:service_manager find;
allow cameraserver cameraproxy_service:service_manager find;
allow cameraserver mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
allow cameraserver processinfo_service:service_manager find;
allow cameraserver scheduling_policy_service:service_manager find;
allow cameraserver surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;

allow cameraserver hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;

###
### neverallow rules
###

# cameraserver should never execute any executable without a
# domain transition
neverallow cameraserver { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;

# The goal of the mediaserver split is to place media processing code into
# restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited
# permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio
# hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera
# hardware/content. Etc.
#
# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
# Lengthier explanation here:
# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
neverallow cameraserver domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;