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platform_system_sepolicy/public/dhcp.te

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Move domain_deprecated into private policy This attribute is being actively removed from policy. Since attributes are not being versioned, partners must not be able to access and use this attribute. Move it from private and verify in the logs that rild and tee are not using these permissions. Bug: 38316109 Test: build and boot Marlin Test: Verify that rild and tee are not being granted any of these permissions. Change-Id: I31beeb5bdf3885195310b086c1af3432dc6a349b
2017-05-15 22:19:03 +02:00
type dhcp, domain;
Introduce system_file_type system_file_type is a new attribute used to identify files which exist on the /system partition. It's useful for allow rules in init, which are based off of a blacklist of writable files. Additionally, it's useful for constructing neverallow rules to prevent regressions. Additionally, add commented out tests which enforce that all files on the /system partition have the system_file_type attribute. These tests will be uncommented in a future change after all the device-specific policies are cleaned up. Test: Device boots and no obvious problems. Change-Id: Id9bae6625f042594c8eba74ca712abb09702c1e5
2018-09-27 19:21:37 +02:00
type dhcp_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
dhcp policy.
2012-08-15 12:25:14 +02:00
Revert "Revert "Various minor policy fixes based on CTS."" This reverts commit ba84bf1dec64d745b6efc516799b2c722a672cd9 Hidden dependency resolved. Change-Id: I9f0844f643abfda8405db2c722a36c847882c392
2013-03-26 19:00:13 +01:00
net_domain(dhcp)
Confine dhcp, but leave it permissive for now. Change-Id: I11b185ff539915174bd2da53bfaa2cad87173008 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-10-29 19:42:35 +01:00
allow dhcp cgroup:dir { create write add_name };
sepolicy: Add rules for non-init namespaces In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit 8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode. This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels. This is essentially: 1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns, respectively. 2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g 3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g 4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new classes are still appropriate. Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add only cap_userns or cap2_userns; Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel. Bug: crbug.com/754831 Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f
2017-11-09 23:51:26 +01:00
allow dhcp self:global_capability_class_set { setgid setuid net_admin net_raw net_bind_service };
Enforce ioctl command whitelisting on all sockets Remove the ioctl permission for most socket types. For others, such as tcp/udp/rawip/unix_dgram/unix_stream set a default unprivileged whitelist that individual domains may extend (except where neverallowed like untrusted_app). Enforce via a neverallowxperm rule. Change-Id: I15548d830f8eff1fd4d64005c5769ca2be8d4ffe
2016-05-17 06:12:17 +02:00
allow dhcp self:packet_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
Clean up socket rules. Replace * or any permission set containing create with create_socket_perms or create_stream_socket_perms. Add net_domain() to all domains using network sockets and delete rules already covered by domain.te or net.te. For netlink_route_socket, only nlmsg_write needs to be separately granted to specific domains that are permitted to modify the routing table. Clarification: read/write permissions are just ability to perform read/recv() or write/send() on the socket, whereas nlmsg_read/ nlmsg_write permissions control ability to observe or modify the underlying kernel state accessed via the socket. See security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c in the kernel for the mapping of netlink message types to nlmsg_read or nlmsg_write. Delete legacy rule for b/12061011. This change does not touch any rules where only read/write were allowed to a socket created by another domain (inherited across exec or received across socket or binder IPC). We may wish to rewrite some or all of those rules with the rw_socket_perms macro but that is a separate change. Change-Id: Ib0637ab86f6d388043eff928e5d96beb02e5450e Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-02-24 21:06:11 +01:00
allow dhcp self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
Confine dhcp, but leave it permissive for now. Change-Id: I11b185ff539915174bd2da53bfaa2cad87173008 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-10-29 19:42:35 +01:00
allow dhcp shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
allow dhcp system_file:file rx_file_perms;
restore permissions to /vendor for non-treble devices Relabeling /vendor and /system/vendor to vendor_file removed previously granted permissions. Restore these for non-treble devices. Addresses: avc: denied { execute_no_trans } for pid=2944 comm="dumpstate" path="/system/vendor/bin/wpa_cli" dev="mmcblk0p10" ino=1929 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vendor_file:s0 tclass=file And potentially some other bugs that have yet to surface. Bug: 37105075 Test: build Fugu Change-Id: I8e7bd9c33819bf8206f7c110cbce72366afbcef8
2017-04-14 06:58:12 +02:00
not_full_treble(`allow dhcp vendor_file:file rx_file_perms;')
drop dhcp auditallow toolbox_exec is executed by dhcpcd-run-hooks. Addresses the following auditallow log spam: avc: granted { read open } for comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" path="/system/bin/toybox" dev="dm-0" ino=650 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read } for comm="setprop" name="toybox" dev="dm-0" ino=650 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { execute } for comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="toybox" dev="dm-0" ino=650 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { execute_no_trans } for comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" path="/system/bin/toybox" dev="dm-0" ino=650 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read execute } for comm="setprop" path="/system/bin/toybox" dev="dm-0" ino=639 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: Ib83c291961a5573397830032a67a2f6861ae2e71
2016-01-14 01:37:20 +01:00
# dhcpcd runs dhcpcd-hooks/*, which runs getprop / setprop (toolbox_exec)
Only allow toolbox exec where /system exec was already allowed. When the toolbox domain was introduced, we allowed all domains to exec it to avoid breakage. However, only domains that were previously allowed the ability to exec /system files would have been able to do this prior to the introduction of the toolbox domain. Remove the rule from domain.te and add rules to all domains that are already allowed execute_no_trans to system_file. Requires coordination with device-specific policy changes with the same Change-Id. Change-Id: Ie46209f0412f9914857dc3d7c6b0917b7031aae5 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2015-08-25 17:38:29 +02:00
allow dhcp toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
drop dhcp auditallow toolbox_exec is executed by dhcpcd-run-hooks. Addresses the following auditallow log spam: avc: granted { read open } for comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" path="/system/bin/toybox" dev="dm-0" ino=650 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read } for comm="setprop" name="toybox" dev="dm-0" ino=650 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { execute } for comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="toybox" dev="dm-0" ino=650 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { execute_no_trans } for comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" path="/system/bin/toybox" dev="dm-0" ino=650 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read execute } for comm="setprop" path="/system/bin/toybox" dev="dm-0" ino=639 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: Ib83c291961a5573397830032a67a2f6861ae2e71
2016-01-14 01:37:20 +01:00
Create proc_net type for /proc/sys/net entries. /proc/sys/net could use its own type to help distinguish among some of the proc access rules. Fix dhcp and netd because of this. Change-Id: I6e16cba660f07bc25f437bf43e1eba851a88d538 Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
2014-01-07 19:46:56 +01:00
# For /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/promote_secondaries
Start the process of locking down proc/net Files in /proc/net leak information. This change is the first step in determining which files apps may use, whitelisting benign access, and otherwise removing access while providing safe alternative APIs. To that end, this change: * Introduces the proc_net_type attribute which will assigned to any new SELinux types in /proc/net to avoid removing access to privileged processes. These processes may be evaluated later, but are lower priority than apps. * Labels /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} as proc_net_vpn due to existing use by VPN apps. This may be replaced by an alternative API. * Audits all other proc/net access for apps. * Audits proc/net access for other processes which are currently granted broad read access to /proc/net but should not be including storaged, zygote, clatd, logd, preopt2cachename and vold. Bug: 9496886 Bug: 68016944 Test: Boot Taimen-userdebug. On both wifi and cellular: stream youtube navigate maps, send text message, make voice call, make video call. Verify no avc "granted" messages in the logs. Test: A few VPN apps including "VPN Monster", "Turbo VPN", and "Freighter". Verify no logspam with the current setup. Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases Test: atest netd_integration_test Test: atest QtaguidPermissionTest Test: atest FileSystemPermissionTest Change-Id: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457 Merged-In: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457 (cherry picked from commit 087318957f26e921d62f2e234fc14bff3c59030e)
2018-04-10 21:47:48 +02:00
allow dhcp proc_net_type:file write;
Replace unix_socket_connect() and explicit property sets with macro A common source of mistakes when authoring sepolicy is properly setting up property sets. This is a 3 part step of: 1. Allowing the unix domain connection to the init/property service 2. Allowing write on the property_socket file 3. Allowing the set on class property_service The macro unix_socket_connect() handled 1 and 2, but could be confusing for first time policy authors. 3 had to be explicitly added. To correct this, we introduce a new macros: set_prop(sourcedomain, targetprop) This macro handles steps 1, 2 and 3. No difference in sediff is expected. Change-Id: I630ba0178439c935d08062892990d43a3cc1239e Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@linux.intel.com>
2015-05-05 03:22:45 +02:00
set_prop(dhcp, dhcp_prop)
set_prop(dhcp, pan_result_prop)
dhcp policy.
2012-08-15 12:25:14 +02:00
Confine dhcp, but leave it permissive for now. Change-Id: I11b185ff539915174bd2da53bfaa2cad87173008 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-10-29 19:42:35 +01:00
allow dhcp dhcp_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow dhcp dhcp_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# PAN connections
allow dhcp netd:fd use;
allow dhcp netd:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow dhcp netd:{ dgram_socket_class_set unix_stream_socket } { read write };
allow dhcp netd:{ netlink_kobject_uevent_socket netlink_route_socket netlink_nflog_socket } { read write };
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