platform_system_sepolicy/system_server.te

611 lines
24 KiB
Text
Raw Normal View History

#
# System Server aka system_server spawned by zygote.
# Most of the framework services run in this process.
#
type system_server, domain, domain_deprecated, mlstrustedsubject;
# Define a type for tmpfs-backed ashmem regions.
tmpfs_domain(system_server)
# For art.
allow system_server dalvikcache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow system_server dalvikcache_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute };
# Enable system server to check the foreign dex usage markers.
# We need search on top level directories so that we can get to the files
allow system_server user_profile_data_file:dir search;
allow system_server user_profile_data_file:file getattr;
allow system_server user_profile_foreign_dex_data_file:dir { add_name open read write search remove_name };
allow system_server user_profile_foreign_dex_data_file:file { getattr rename unlink };
# /data/resource-cache
allow system_server resourcecache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
allow system_server resourcecache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
Address system_server denials. Label /proc/sysrq-trigger and allow access. Label /dev/socket/mtpd and allow access. Resolves denials such as: avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { call } for pid=1007 comm="Binder_8" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=binder avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="watchdog" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026533682 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { write } for pid=11567 comm="LegacyVpnRunner" name="mtpd" dev="tmpfs" ino=36627 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file avc: denied { ptrace } for pid=10924 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { sigkill } for pid=26077 comm="NativeCrashRepo" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="android.bg" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[11467]" dev="sockfs" ino=11467 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[12076]" dev="sockfs" ino=12076 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserv er:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" laddr=192.168.159.172 lport=51576 faddr=93.127.173.40 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" lport=15658 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[443742]" dev="sockfs" ino=443742 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s 0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[444842]" dev="sockfs" ino=444842 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1326 comm="Binder_9" lport=16216 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1676 comm="Binder_6" laddr=192.168.156.130 lport=51044 faddr=74.125.214.81 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" path="/dev/mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { read } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" name="mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { unlink } for pid=14866 comm="system_server" name="wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=285715 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=32300 comm="Binder_1" laddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 lport=4939 faddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 fport=53318 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=10840 comm="pool-17-thread-" path="socket:[205990]" dev="sockfs" ino=205990 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { write } for pid=20817 comm="dumpsys" path="/mnt/shell/emulated/0/aupt-output/bugreport-2014-02-22-11-17-16.txt.tmp" dev="fuse" ino=3100784040 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: I481ac26667b487031a5d3317b0a028a027a8e641 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-03-05 15:50:08 +01:00
# ptrace to processes in the same domain for debugging crashes.
allow system_server self:process ptrace;
# Child of the zygote.
allow system_server zygote:fd use;
allow system_server zygote:process sigchld;
allow system_server zygote_tmpfs:file read;
Address system_server denials. Label /proc/sysrq-trigger and allow access. Label /dev/socket/mtpd and allow access. Resolves denials such as: avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { call } for pid=1007 comm="Binder_8" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=binder avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="watchdog" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026533682 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { write } for pid=11567 comm="LegacyVpnRunner" name="mtpd" dev="tmpfs" ino=36627 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file avc: denied { ptrace } for pid=10924 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { sigkill } for pid=26077 comm="NativeCrashRepo" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="android.bg" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[11467]" dev="sockfs" ino=11467 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[12076]" dev="sockfs" ino=12076 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserv er:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" laddr=192.168.159.172 lport=51576 faddr=93.127.173.40 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" lport=15658 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[443742]" dev="sockfs" ino=443742 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s 0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[444842]" dev="sockfs" ino=444842 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1326 comm="Binder_9" lport=16216 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1676 comm="Binder_6" laddr=192.168.156.130 lport=51044 faddr=74.125.214.81 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" path="/dev/mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { read } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" name="mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { unlink } for pid=14866 comm="system_server" name="wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=285715 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=32300 comm="Binder_1" laddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 lport=4939 faddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 fport=53318 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=10840 comm="pool-17-thread-" path="socket:[205990]" dev="sockfs" ino=205990 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { write } for pid=20817 comm="dumpsys" path="/mnt/shell/emulated/0/aupt-output/bugreport-2014-02-22-11-17-16.txt.tmp" dev="fuse" ino=3100784040 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: I481ac26667b487031a5d3317b0a028a027a8e641 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-03-05 15:50:08 +01:00
# May kill zygote on crashes.
allow system_server zygote:process sigkill;
# Read /system/bin/app_process.
allow system_server zygote_exec:file r_file_perms;
# Needed to close the zygote socket, which involves getopt / getattr
allow system_server zygote:unix_stream_socket { getopt getattr };
# system server gets network and bluetooth permissions.
net_domain(system_server)
# in addition to ioctls whitelisted for all domains, also allow system_server
# to use privileged ioctls commands. Needed to set up VPNs.
allowxperm system_server self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
bluetooth_domain(system_server)
# These are the capabilities assigned by the zygote to the
# system server.
allow system_server self:capability {
ipc_lock
kill
net_admin
net_bind_service
net_broadcast
net_raw
sys_boot
sys_nice
sys_resource
sys_time
sys_tty_config
};
wakelock_use(system_server)
# Triggered by /proc/pid accesses, not allowed.
dontaudit system_server self:capability sys_ptrace;
# Trigger module auto-load.
allow system_server kernel:system module_request;
# Allow alarmtimers to be set
allow system_server self:capability2 wake_alarm;
# Use netlink uevent sockets.
allow system_server self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
Address system_server denials. Label /proc/sysrq-trigger and allow access. Label /dev/socket/mtpd and allow access. Resolves denials such as: avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { call } for pid=1007 comm="Binder_8" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=binder avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="watchdog" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026533682 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { write } for pid=11567 comm="LegacyVpnRunner" name="mtpd" dev="tmpfs" ino=36627 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file avc: denied { ptrace } for pid=10924 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { sigkill } for pid=26077 comm="NativeCrashRepo" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="android.bg" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[11467]" dev="sockfs" ino=11467 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[12076]" dev="sockfs" ino=12076 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserv er:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" laddr=192.168.159.172 lport=51576 faddr=93.127.173.40 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" lport=15658 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[443742]" dev="sockfs" ino=443742 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s 0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[444842]" dev="sockfs" ino=444842 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1326 comm="Binder_9" lport=16216 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1676 comm="Binder_6" laddr=192.168.156.130 lport=51044 faddr=74.125.214.81 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" path="/dev/mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { read } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" name="mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { unlink } for pid=14866 comm="system_server" name="wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=285715 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=32300 comm="Binder_1" laddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 lport=4939 faddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 fport=53318 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=10840 comm="pool-17-thread-" path="socket:[205990]" dev="sockfs" ino=205990 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { write } for pid=20817 comm="dumpsys" path="/mnt/shell/emulated/0/aupt-output/bugreport-2014-02-22-11-17-16.txt.tmp" dev="fuse" ino=3100784040 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: I481ac26667b487031a5d3317b0a028a027a8e641 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-03-05 15:50:08 +01:00
# Use generic netlink sockets.
allow system_server self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
allow system_server self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
Address system_server denials. Label /proc/sysrq-trigger and allow access. Label /dev/socket/mtpd and allow access. Resolves denials such as: avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { call } for pid=1007 comm="Binder_8" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=binder avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="watchdog" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026533682 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { write } for pid=11567 comm="LegacyVpnRunner" name="mtpd" dev="tmpfs" ino=36627 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file avc: denied { ptrace } for pid=10924 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { sigkill } for pid=26077 comm="NativeCrashRepo" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="android.bg" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[11467]" dev="sockfs" ino=11467 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[12076]" dev="sockfs" ino=12076 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserv er:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" laddr=192.168.159.172 lport=51576 faddr=93.127.173.40 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" lport=15658 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[443742]" dev="sockfs" ino=443742 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s 0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[444842]" dev="sockfs" ino=444842 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1326 comm="Binder_9" lport=16216 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1676 comm="Binder_6" laddr=192.168.156.130 lport=51044 faddr=74.125.214.81 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" path="/dev/mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { read } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" name="mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { unlink } for pid=14866 comm="system_server" name="wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=285715 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=32300 comm="Binder_1" laddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 lport=4939 faddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 fport=53318 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=10840 comm="pool-17-thread-" path="socket:[205990]" dev="sockfs" ino=205990 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { write } for pid=20817 comm="dumpsys" path="/mnt/shell/emulated/0/aupt-output/bugreport-2014-02-22-11-17-16.txt.tmp" dev="fuse" ino=3100784040 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: I481ac26667b487031a5d3317b0a028a027a8e641 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-03-05 15:50:08 +01:00
# Use generic "sockets" where the address family is not known
# to the kernel. The ioctl permission is specifically omitted here, but may
# be added to device specific policy along with the ioctl commands to be
# whitelisted.
allow system_server self:socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
# Set and get routes directly via netlink.
allow system_server self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
# Kill apps.
allow system_server { appdomain autoplay_app }:process { sigkill signal };
# Set scheduling info for apps.
allow system_server { appdomain autoplay_app }:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server audioserver:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server cameraserver:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server mediaserver:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server bootanim:process { getsched setsched };
# Read /proc/pid data for all domains. This is used by ProcessCpuTracker
# within system_server to keep track of memory and CPU usage for
# all processes on the device. In addition, /proc/pid files access is needed
# for dumping stack traces of native processes.
r_dir_file(system_server, domain)
# Read/Write to /proc/net/xt_qtaguid/ctrl and and /dev/xt_qtaguid.
allow system_server qtaguid_proc:file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server qtaguid_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# Read /proc/uid_cputime/show_uid_stat.
allow system_server proc_uid_cputime_showstat:file r_file_perms;
# Write /proc/uid_cputime/remove_uid_range.
allow system_server proc_uid_cputime_removeuid:file { w_file_perms getattr };
Address system_server denials. Label /proc/sysrq-trigger and allow access. Label /dev/socket/mtpd and allow access. Resolves denials such as: avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { call } for pid=1007 comm="Binder_8" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=binder avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="watchdog" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026533682 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { write } for pid=11567 comm="LegacyVpnRunner" name="mtpd" dev="tmpfs" ino=36627 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file avc: denied { ptrace } for pid=10924 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { sigkill } for pid=26077 comm="NativeCrashRepo" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="android.bg" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[11467]" dev="sockfs" ino=11467 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[12076]" dev="sockfs" ino=12076 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserv er:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" laddr=192.168.159.172 lport=51576 faddr=93.127.173.40 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" lport=15658 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[443742]" dev="sockfs" ino=443742 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s 0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[444842]" dev="sockfs" ino=444842 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1326 comm="Binder_9" lport=16216 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1676 comm="Binder_6" laddr=192.168.156.130 lport=51044 faddr=74.125.214.81 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" path="/dev/mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { read } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" name="mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { unlink } for pid=14866 comm="system_server" name="wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=285715 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=32300 comm="Binder_1" laddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 lport=4939 faddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 fport=53318 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=10840 comm="pool-17-thread-" path="socket:[205990]" dev="sockfs" ino=205990 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { write } for pid=20817 comm="dumpsys" path="/mnt/shell/emulated/0/aupt-output/bugreport-2014-02-22-11-17-16.txt.tmp" dev="fuse" ino=3100784040 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: I481ac26667b487031a5d3317b0a028a027a8e641 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-03-05 15:50:08 +01:00
# Write to /proc/sysrq-trigger.
allow system_server proc_sysrq:file rw_file_perms;
# Read /proc/stat for CPU usage statistics
allow system_server proc_stat:file r_file_perms;
# Read /sys/kernel/debug/wakeup_sources.
allow system_server debugfs:file r_file_perms;
# The DhcpClient and WifiWatchdog use packet_sockets
allow system_server self:packet_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
# NetworkDiagnostics requires explicit bind() calls to ping sockets. These aren't actually the same
# as raw sockets, but the kernel doesn't yet distinguish between the two.
allow system_server node:rawip_socket node_bind;
# 3rd party VPN clients require a tun_socket to be created
allow system_server self:tun_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
# Talk to init and various daemons via sockets.
unix_socket_connect(system_server, installd, installd)
unix_socket_connect(system_server, lmkd, lmkd)
Address system_server denials. Label /proc/sysrq-trigger and allow access. Label /dev/socket/mtpd and allow access. Resolves denials such as: avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { call } for pid=1007 comm="Binder_8" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=binder avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="watchdog" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026533682 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { write } for pid=11567 comm="LegacyVpnRunner" name="mtpd" dev="tmpfs" ino=36627 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file avc: denied { ptrace } for pid=10924 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { sigkill } for pid=26077 comm="NativeCrashRepo" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="android.bg" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[11467]" dev="sockfs" ino=11467 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[12076]" dev="sockfs" ino=12076 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserv er:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" laddr=192.168.159.172 lport=51576 faddr=93.127.173.40 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" lport=15658 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[443742]" dev="sockfs" ino=443742 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s 0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[444842]" dev="sockfs" ino=444842 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1326 comm="Binder_9" lport=16216 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1676 comm="Binder_6" laddr=192.168.156.130 lport=51044 faddr=74.125.214.81 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" path="/dev/mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { read } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" name="mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { unlink } for pid=14866 comm="system_server" name="wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=285715 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=32300 comm="Binder_1" laddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 lport=4939 faddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 fport=53318 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=10840 comm="pool-17-thread-" path="socket:[205990]" dev="sockfs" ino=205990 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { write } for pid=20817 comm="dumpsys" path="/mnt/shell/emulated/0/aupt-output/bugreport-2014-02-22-11-17-16.txt.tmp" dev="fuse" ino=3100784040 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: I481ac26667b487031a5d3317b0a028a027a8e641 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-03-05 15:50:08 +01:00
unix_socket_connect(system_server, mtpd, mtp)
unix_socket_connect(system_server, netd, netd)
unix_socket_connect(system_server, vold, vold)
unix_socket_connect(system_server, zygote, zygote)
unix_socket_connect(system_server, racoon, racoon)
unix_socket_send(system_server, wpa, wpa)
unix_socket_connect(system_server, uncrypt, uncrypt)
# Communicate over a socket created by surfaceflinger.
allow system_server surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt };
# Perform Binder IPC.
binder_use(system_server)
binder_call(system_server, binderservicedomain)
binder_call(system_server, gatekeeperd)
binder_call(system_server, fingerprintd)
binder_call(system_server, { appdomain autoplay_app })
binder_call(system_server, dumpstate)
binder_call(system_server, netd)
binder_call(system_server, wificond)
binder_service(system_server)
# Ask debuggerd to dump backtraces for native stacks of interest.
#
# This is derived from the list that system server defines as interesting native processes
# to dump during ANRs or watchdog aborts, defined in NATIVE_STACKS_OF_INTEREST in
# frameworks/base/services/core/java/com/android/server/Watchdog.java.
allow system_server {
audioserver
bluetooth
cameraserver
drmserver
inputflinger
mediacodec
mediadrmserver
mediaextractor
mediaserver
sdcardd
surfaceflinger
}:debuggerd dump_backtrace;
Address system_server denials. Label /proc/sysrq-trigger and allow access. Label /dev/socket/mtpd and allow access. Resolves denials such as: avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { call } for pid=1007 comm="Binder_8" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=binder avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="watchdog" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026533682 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { write } for pid=11567 comm="LegacyVpnRunner" name="mtpd" dev="tmpfs" ino=36627 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file avc: denied { ptrace } for pid=10924 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { sigkill } for pid=26077 comm="NativeCrashRepo" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="android.bg" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[11467]" dev="sockfs" ino=11467 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[12076]" dev="sockfs" ino=12076 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserv er:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" laddr=192.168.159.172 lport=51576 faddr=93.127.173.40 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" lport=15658 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[443742]" dev="sockfs" ino=443742 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s 0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[444842]" dev="sockfs" ino=444842 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1326 comm="Binder_9" lport=16216 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1676 comm="Binder_6" laddr=192.168.156.130 lport=51044 faddr=74.125.214.81 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" path="/dev/mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { read } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" name="mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { unlink } for pid=14866 comm="system_server" name="wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=285715 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=32300 comm="Binder_1" laddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 lport=4939 faddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 fport=53318 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=10840 comm="pool-17-thread-" path="socket:[205990]" dev="sockfs" ino=205990 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { write } for pid=20817 comm="dumpsys" path="/mnt/shell/emulated/0/aupt-output/bugreport-2014-02-22-11-17-16.txt.tmp" dev="fuse" ino=3100784040 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: I481ac26667b487031a5d3317b0a028a027a8e641 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-03-05 15:50:08 +01:00
# Use sockets received over binder from various services.
allow system_server audioserver:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms;
allow system_server audioserver:udp_socket rw_socket_perms;
Address system_server denials. Label /proc/sysrq-trigger and allow access. Label /dev/socket/mtpd and allow access. Resolves denials such as: avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { call } for pid=1007 comm="Binder_8" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=binder avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="watchdog" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026533682 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { write } for pid=11567 comm="LegacyVpnRunner" name="mtpd" dev="tmpfs" ino=36627 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file avc: denied { ptrace } for pid=10924 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { sigkill } for pid=26077 comm="NativeCrashRepo" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="android.bg" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[11467]" dev="sockfs" ino=11467 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[12076]" dev="sockfs" ino=12076 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserv er:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" laddr=192.168.159.172 lport=51576 faddr=93.127.173.40 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" lport=15658 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[443742]" dev="sockfs" ino=443742 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s 0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[444842]" dev="sockfs" ino=444842 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1326 comm="Binder_9" lport=16216 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1676 comm="Binder_6" laddr=192.168.156.130 lport=51044 faddr=74.125.214.81 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" path="/dev/mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { read } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" name="mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { unlink } for pid=14866 comm="system_server" name="wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=285715 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=32300 comm="Binder_1" laddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 lport=4939 faddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 fport=53318 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=10840 comm="pool-17-thread-" path="socket:[205990]" dev="sockfs" ino=205990 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { write } for pid=20817 comm="dumpsys" path="/mnt/shell/emulated/0/aupt-output/bugreport-2014-02-22-11-17-16.txt.tmp" dev="fuse" ino=3100784040 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: I481ac26667b487031a5d3317b0a028a027a8e641 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-03-05 15:50:08 +01:00
allow system_server mediaserver:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms;
allow system_server mediaserver:udp_socket rw_socket_perms;
# Use sockets received over binder from various services.
allow system_server mediadrmserver:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms;
allow system_server mediadrmserver:udp_socket rw_socket_perms;
# Check SELinux permissions.
selinux_check_access(system_server)
# XXX Label sysfs files with a specific type?
allow system_server sysfs:file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server sysfs_nfc_power_writable:file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server sysfs_devices_system_cpu:file w_file_perms;
allow system_server sysfs_mac_address:file r_file_perms;
allow system_server sysfs_thermal:dir search;
allow system_server sysfs_thermal:file r_file_perms;
# TODO: added to match above sysfs rule. Remove me?
allow system_server sysfs_usb:file w_file_perms;
# Access devices.
allow system_server device:dir r_dir_perms;
allow system_server mdns_socket:sock_file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server alarm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server iio_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
allow system_server input_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
Address system_server denials. Label /proc/sysrq-trigger and allow access. Label /dev/socket/mtpd and allow access. Resolves denials such as: avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { call } for pid=1007 comm="Binder_8" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=binder avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="watchdog" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026533682 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { write } for pid=11567 comm="LegacyVpnRunner" name="mtpd" dev="tmpfs" ino=36627 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file avc: denied { ptrace } for pid=10924 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { sigkill } for pid=26077 comm="NativeCrashRepo" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="android.bg" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[11467]" dev="sockfs" ino=11467 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[12076]" dev="sockfs" ino=12076 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserv er:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" laddr=192.168.159.172 lport=51576 faddr=93.127.173.40 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" lport=15658 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[443742]" dev="sockfs" ino=443742 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s 0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[444842]" dev="sockfs" ino=444842 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1326 comm="Binder_9" lport=16216 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1676 comm="Binder_6" laddr=192.168.156.130 lport=51044 faddr=74.125.214.81 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" path="/dev/mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { read } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" name="mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { unlink } for pid=14866 comm="system_server" name="wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=285715 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=32300 comm="Binder_1" laddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 lport=4939 faddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 fport=53318 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=10840 comm="pool-17-thread-" path="socket:[205990]" dev="sockfs" ino=205990 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { write } for pid=20817 comm="dumpsys" path="/mnt/shell/emulated/0/aupt-output/bugreport-2014-02-22-11-17-16.txt.tmp" dev="fuse" ino=3100784040 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: I481ac26667b487031a5d3317b0a028a027a8e641 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-03-05 15:50:08 +01:00
allow system_server radio_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
allow system_server tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server usbaccessory_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
fix mediaserver selinux denials. mediaserver needs the ability to read media_rw_data_file files. Allow it. Similarly, this is also needed for drmserver. Addresses the following denials: <5>[ 22.812859] type=1400 audit(1389041093.955:17): avc: denied { read } for pid=1655 comm="MediaScannerSer" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124115.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122204 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 22.813103] type=1400 audit(1389041093.955:18): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124115.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122204 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 22.832041] type=1400 audit(1389041093.975:19): avc: denied { read } for pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124115.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122204 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 52.357470] type=1400 audit(1389041123.494:29): avc: denied { read } for pid=2757 comm="ImageLoader" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124520.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122211 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 52.357717] type=1400 audit(1389041123.494:30): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124520.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122211 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 52.382276] type=1400 audit(1389041123.524:31): avc: denied { read } for pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124520.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122211 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file Allow anyone who has access to video_device:chr_file to also have read access to video_device:dir. Otherwise, the chracter devices may not be reachable. Bug: 12416198 Change-Id: I649cd52ec7f1a25afb3aea479482e3f270bfe074
2014-01-06 21:39:19 +01:00
allow system_server video_device:dir r_dir_perms;
allow system_server video_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server adbd_socket:sock_file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server rtc_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server audio_device:dir r_dir_perms;
# write access needed for MIDI
allow system_server audio_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# tun device used for 3rd party vpn apps
allow system_server tun_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# Manage system data files.
allow system_server system_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server system_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
allow system_server keychain_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server keychain_data_file:file create_file_perms;
allow system_server keychain_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
# Manage /data/app.
allow system_server apk_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server apk_data_file:{ file lnk_file } { create_file_perms link };
allow system_server apk_tmp_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server apk_tmp_file:file create_file_perms;
# Manage /data/app-private.
allow system_server apk_private_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server apk_private_data_file:file create_file_perms;
allow system_server apk_private_tmp_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server apk_private_tmp_file:file create_file_perms;
# Manage files within asec containers.
allow system_server asec_apk_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server asec_apk_file:file create_file_perms;
allow system_server asec_public_file:file create_file_perms;
# Manage /data/anr.
allow system_server anr_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server anr_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Manage /data/backup.
allow system_server backup_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server backup_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Write to /data/system/heapdump
allow system_server heapdump_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow system_server heapdump_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Manage /data/misc/adb.
allow system_server adb_keys_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server adb_keys_file:file create_file_perms;
# Manage /data/misc/sms.
# TODO: Split into a separate type?
allow system_server radio_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server radio_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Manage /data/misc/systemkeys.
allow system_server systemkeys_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server systemkeys_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Access /data/tombstones.
allow system_server tombstone_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow system_server tombstone_data_file:file r_file_perms;
# Manage /data/misc/vpn.
allow system_server vpn_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server vpn_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Manage /data/misc/wifi.
allow system_server wifi_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server wifi_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Manage /data/misc/zoneinfo.
allow system_server zoneinfo_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server zoneinfo_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Walk /data/data subdirectories.
# Types extracted from seapp_contexts type= fields.
allow system_server { system_app_data_file bluetooth_data_file nfc_data_file radio_data_file shell_data_file app_data_file autoplay_data_file }:dir { getattr read search };
# Also permit for unlabeled /data/data subdirectories and
# for unlabeled asec containers on upgrades from 4.2.
allow system_server unlabeled:dir r_dir_perms;
# Read pkg.apk file before it has been relabeled by vold.
allow system_server unlabeled:file r_file_perms;
# Populate com.android.providers.settings/databases/settings.db.
allow system_server system_app_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server system_app_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Receive and use open app data files passed over binder IPC.
# Types extracted from seapp_contexts type= fields.
allow system_server { system_app_data_file bluetooth_data_file nfc_data_file radio_data_file shell_data_file app_data_file }:file { getattr read write };
# Receive and use open /data/media files passed over binder IPC.
allow system_server media_rw_data_file:file { getattr read write };
# Relabel apk files.
allow system_server { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:{ dir file } { relabelfrom relabelto };
allow system_server { apk_data_file apk_private_data_file }:{ dir file } { relabelfrom relabelto };
# Relabel wallpaper.
allow system_server system_data_file:file relabelfrom;
allow system_server wallpaper_file:file relabelto;
allow system_server wallpaper_file:file { rw_file_perms rename unlink };
# Backup of wallpaper imagery uses temporary hard links to avoid data churn
allow system_server { system_data_file wallpaper_file }:file link;
# ShortcutManager icons
allow system_server system_data_file:dir relabelfrom;
allow system_server shortcut_manager_icons:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
allow system_server shortcut_manager_icons:file create_file_perms;
# Manage ringtones.
allow system_server ringtone_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
allow system_server ringtone_file:file create_file_perms;
# Relabel icon file.
allow system_server icon_file:file relabelto;
allow system_server icon_file:file { rw_file_perms unlink };
# FingerprintService.java does a restorecon of the directory /data/system/users/[0-9]+/fpdata(/.*)?
allow system_server system_data_file:dir relabelfrom;
# Property Service write
set_prop(system_server, system_prop)
set_prop(system_server, safemode_prop)
set_prop(system_server, dhcp_prop)
set_prop(system_server, net_radio_prop)
set_prop(system_server, system_radio_prop)
set_prop(system_server, debug_prop)
set_prop(system_server, powerctl_prop)
set_prop(system_server, fingerprint_prop)
set_prop(system_server, device_logging_prop)
set_prop(system_server, wifi_prop)
userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(system_server, wifi_log_prop)')
# ctl interface
set_prop(system_server, ctl_default_prop)
set_prop(system_server, ctl_bugreport_prop)
# cppreopt property
set_prop(system_server, cppreopt_prop)
# Create a socket for receiving info from wpa.
type_transition system_server wifi_data_file:sock_file system_wpa_socket;
type_transition system_server wpa_socket:sock_file system_wpa_socket;
allow system_server wpa_socket:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow system_server system_wpa_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
# Remove sockets created by wpa_supplicant
allow system_server wpa_socket:sock_file unlink;
# Create a socket for connections from debuggerd.
type_transition system_server system_data_file:sock_file system_ndebug_socket "ndebugsocket";
allow system_server system_ndebug_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
# Manage cache files.
allow system_server { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir { relabelfrom create_dir_perms };
allow system_server { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file { relabelfrom create_file_perms };
allow system_server { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:fifo_file create_file_perms;
# Run system programs, e.g. dexopt. Needed? (b/28035297)
allow system_server system_file:file rx_file_perms;
allow system_server system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow system_server system_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
auditallow system_server system_file:file execute_no_trans;
# LocationManager(e.g, GPS) needs to read and write
# to uart driver and ctrl proc entry
allow system_server gps_control:file rw_file_perms;
Address system_server denials. Label /proc/sysrq-trigger and allow access. Label /dev/socket/mtpd and allow access. Resolves denials such as: avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { call } for pid=1007 comm="Binder_8" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=binder avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="watchdog" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026533682 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { write } for pid=11567 comm="LegacyVpnRunner" name="mtpd" dev="tmpfs" ino=36627 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file avc: denied { ptrace } for pid=10924 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { sigkill } for pid=26077 comm="NativeCrashRepo" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="android.bg" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[11467]" dev="sockfs" ino=11467 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[12076]" dev="sockfs" ino=12076 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserv er:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" laddr=192.168.159.172 lport=51576 faddr=93.127.173.40 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" lport=15658 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[443742]" dev="sockfs" ino=443742 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s 0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[444842]" dev="sockfs" ino=444842 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1326 comm="Binder_9" lport=16216 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1676 comm="Binder_6" laddr=192.168.156.130 lport=51044 faddr=74.125.214.81 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" path="/dev/mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { read } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" name="mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { unlink } for pid=14866 comm="system_server" name="wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=285715 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=32300 comm="Binder_1" laddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 lport=4939 faddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 fport=53318 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=10840 comm="pool-17-thread-" path="socket:[205990]" dev="sockfs" ino=205990 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { write } for pid=20817 comm="dumpsys" path="/mnt/shell/emulated/0/aupt-output/bugreport-2014-02-22-11-17-16.txt.tmp" dev="fuse" ino=3100784040 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: I481ac26667b487031a5d3317b0a028a027a8e641 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-03-05 15:50:08 +01:00
# Allow system_server to use app-created sockets and pipes.
allow system_server { appdomain autoplay_app }:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } { getattr getopt setopt read write shutdown };
allow system_server { appdomain autoplay_app }:{ fifo_file unix_stream_socket } { getattr read write };
# Allow abstract socket connection
allow system_server rild:unix_stream_socket connectto;
# BackupManagerService needs to manipulate backup data files
allow system_server cache_backup_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow system_server cache_backup_file:file create_file_perms;
# LocalTransport works inside /cache/backup
allow system_server cache_private_backup_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server cache_private_backup_file:file create_file_perms;
# Allow system to talk to usb device
allow system_server usb_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server usb_device:dir r_dir_perms;
# Allow system to talk to sensors
allow system_server sensors_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# Read from HW RNG (needed by EntropyMixer).
allow system_server hw_random_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
# Read and delete files under /dev/fscklogs.
r_dir_file(system_server, fscklogs)
allow system_server fscklogs:dir { write remove_name };
allow system_server fscklogs:file unlink;
# logd access, system_server inherit logd write socket
# (urge is to deprecate this long term)
allow system_server zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
initial lmkd policy. * Allow writes to /proc/PID/oom_score_adj * Allow writes to /sys/module/lowmemorykiller/* Addresses the following denials: <5>[ 3.825371] type=1400 audit(9781555.430:5): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="minfree" dev="sysfs" ino=6056 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 48.874747] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:16): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="896" dev="proc" ino=9589 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 48.874889] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:17): avc: denied { dac_override } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" capability=1 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tclass=capability <5>[ 48.874982] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:18): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=8942 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 48.875075] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:19): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=8942 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 49.409231] type=1400 audit(9781601.169:20): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="minfree" dev="sysfs" ino=6056 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.081990] type=1400 audit(9781760.839:24): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1556" dev="proc" ino=10961 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 209.082240] type=1400 audit(9781760.839:25): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11654 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.082498] type=1400 audit(9781760.839:26): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11654 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.119673] type=1400 audit(9781760.879:27): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1577" dev="proc" ino=12708 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 209.119937] type=1400 audit(9781760.879:28): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11657 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.120105] type=1400 audit(9781760.879:29): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11657 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.235597] type=1400 audit(9781760.999:30): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1600" dev="proc" ino=11659 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 209.235798] type=1400 audit(9781760.999:31): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11667 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.236006] type=1400 audit(9781760.999:32): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11667 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.297283] type=1400 audit(9781766.059:64): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11211 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.297415] type=1400 audit(9781766.059:65): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11211 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.355060] type=1400 audit(9781766.119:66): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12907 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.355236] type=1400 audit(9781766.119:67): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12907 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.516920] type=1400 audit(9781766.279:68): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1907" dev="proc" ino=11742 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 214.678861] type=1400 audit(9781766.439:69): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12915 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.678992] type=1400 audit(9781766.439:70): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12915 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.708284] type=1400 audit(9781766.469:71): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1765" dev="proc" ino=12851 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 214.708435] type=1400 audit(9781766.469:72): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12870 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.708648] type=1400 audit(9781766.469:73): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12870 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: Ie3c1ab8ce9e77742d0cc3c73f40010afd018ccd4
2014-02-13 21:19:50 +01:00
# Read from log daemon.
read_logd(system_server)
initial lmkd policy. * Allow writes to /proc/PID/oom_score_adj * Allow writes to /sys/module/lowmemorykiller/* Addresses the following denials: <5>[ 3.825371] type=1400 audit(9781555.430:5): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="minfree" dev="sysfs" ino=6056 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 48.874747] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:16): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="896" dev="proc" ino=9589 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 48.874889] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:17): avc: denied { dac_override } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" capability=1 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tclass=capability <5>[ 48.874982] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:18): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=8942 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 48.875075] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:19): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=8942 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 49.409231] type=1400 audit(9781601.169:20): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="minfree" dev="sysfs" ino=6056 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.081990] type=1400 audit(9781760.839:24): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1556" dev="proc" ino=10961 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 209.082240] type=1400 audit(9781760.839:25): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11654 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.082498] type=1400 audit(9781760.839:26): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11654 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.119673] type=1400 audit(9781760.879:27): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1577" dev="proc" ino=12708 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 209.119937] type=1400 audit(9781760.879:28): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11657 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.120105] type=1400 audit(9781760.879:29): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11657 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.235597] type=1400 audit(9781760.999:30): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1600" dev="proc" ino=11659 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 209.235798] type=1400 audit(9781760.999:31): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11667 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.236006] type=1400 audit(9781760.999:32): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11667 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.297283] type=1400 audit(9781766.059:64): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11211 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.297415] type=1400 audit(9781766.059:65): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11211 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.355060] type=1400 audit(9781766.119:66): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12907 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.355236] type=1400 audit(9781766.119:67): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12907 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.516920] type=1400 audit(9781766.279:68): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1907" dev="proc" ino=11742 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 214.678861] type=1400 audit(9781766.439:69): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12915 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.678992] type=1400 audit(9781766.439:70): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12915 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.708284] type=1400 audit(9781766.469:71): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1765" dev="proc" ino=12851 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 214.708435] type=1400 audit(9781766.469:72): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12870 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.708648] type=1400 audit(9781766.469:73): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12870 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: Ie3c1ab8ce9e77742d0cc3c73f40010afd018ccd4
2014-02-13 21:19:50 +01:00
# Be consistent with DAC permissions. Allow system_server to write to
# /sys/module/lowmemorykiller/parameters/adj
# /sys/module/lowmemorykiller/parameters/minfree
allow system_server sysfs_lowmemorykiller:file { getattr w_file_perms };
# Read /sys/fs/pstore/console-ramoops
# Don't worry about overly broad permissions for now, as there's
# only one file in /sys/fs/pstore
allow system_server pstorefs:dir r_dir_perms;
allow system_server pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
# /sys access
allow system_server sysfs_zram:dir search;
allow system_server sysfs_zram:file r_file_perms;
allow system_server audioserver_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server drmserver_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server batteryproperties_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server keystore_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server gatekeeper_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server fingerprintd_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server netd_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server nfc_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server radio_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server system_server_service:service_manager { add find };
allow system_server surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server keystore:keystore_key {
get_state
get
insert
delete
exist
list
reset
password
lock
unlock
is_empty
sign
verify
grant
duplicate
clear_uid
add_auth
user_changed
};
# Allow system server to search and write to the persistent factory reset
# protection partition. This block device does not get wiped in a factory reset.
allow system_server block_device:dir search;
allow system_server frp_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
# Clean up old cgroups
allow system_server cgroup:dir { remove_name rmdir };
# /oem access
r_dir_file(system_server, oemfs)
Updated policy for external storage. An upcoming platform release is redesigning how external storage works. At a high level, vold is taking on a more active role in managing devices that dynamically appear. This change also creates further restricted domains for tools doing low-level access of external storage devices, including sgdisk and blkid. It also extends sdcardd to be launchable by vold, since launching by init will eventually go away. For compatibility, rules required to keep AOSP builds working are marked with "TODO" to eventually remove. Slightly relax system_server external storage rules to allow calls like statfs(). Still neverallow open file descriptors, since they can cause kernel to kill us. Here are the relevant violations that this CL is designed to allow: avc: denied { search } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user/0" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=6658 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { setattr } for name="10" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { open } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="tmpfs" ino=11979 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { use } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { read write } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=netlink_kobject_uevent_socket avc: denied { read } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { write } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { mounton } for path="/storage/emulated" dev="tmpfs" ino=8913 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=7444 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self/primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file avc: denied { read } for name="primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { read } for name="disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { open } for path="/storage/public:81F3-13EC" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="fuse" ino=2 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { read } for name="public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { search } for name="block" dev="tmpfs" ino=2494 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:block_device:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="media_rw" dev="tmpfs" ino=3127 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_media_rw_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="pipe:[3648]" dev="pipefs" ino=3648 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4182]" dev="pipefs" ino=4182 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd Change-Id: Idf3b8561baecf7faa603fac5ababdcc5708288e1
2015-03-27 19:25:39 +01:00
# Allow resolving per-user storage symlinks
allow system_server { mnt_user_file storage_file }:dir { getattr search };
allow system_server { mnt_user_file storage_file }:lnk_file { getattr read };
# Allow statfs() on storage devices, which happens fast enough that
# we shouldn't be killed during unsafe removal
allow system_server sdcard_type:dir { getattr search };
Initial policy for expanded storage. Expanded storage supports a subset of the features of the internal data partition. Mirror that policy for consistency. vold is also granted enough permissions to prepare initial directories. avc: denied { write } for name="ext" dev="tmpfs" ino=3130 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { add_name } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { create } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { setattr } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=7243 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { mounton } for path="/mnt/ext/57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=7243 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/ext" dev="tmpfs" ino=3130 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { setattr } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=4471 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/expand/57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b/media" dev="dm-0" ino=145153 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { rmdir } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=6380 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { create } for name="tmp" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { setattr } for name="tmp" dev="dm-0" ino=72578 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 Bug: 19993667 Change-Id: I73c98b36e7c066f21650a9e16ea82c5a0ef3d6c5
2015-04-07 01:21:54 +02:00
# Traverse into expanded storage
allow system_server mnt_expand_file:dir r_dir_perms;
# Allow system process to relabel the fingerprint directory after mkdir
# and delete the directory and files when no longer needed
allow system_server fingerprintd_data_file:dir { r_dir_perms remove_name rmdir relabelto write };
allow system_server fingerprintd_data_file:file { getattr unlink };
# Allow system process to read network MAC address
allow system_server sysfs_mac_address:file r_file_perms;
userdebug_or_eng(`
# Allow system server to create and write method traces in /data/misc/trace.
allow system_server method_trace_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
allow system_server method_trace_data_file:file { create w_file_perms };
# Allow system server to read dmesg
allow system_server kernel:system syslog_read;
')
# For AppFuse.
allow system_server vold:fd use;
allow system_server fuse_device:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
# For configuring sdcardfs
allow system_server configfs:dir { create_dir_perms };
allow system_server configfs:file { getattr open unlink write };
# Connect to adbd and use a socket transferred from it.
# Used for e.g. jdwp.
allow system_server adbd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow system_server adbd:fd use;
allow system_server adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr getopt ioctl read write shutdown };
# Access to /data/media.
# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
# accesses to the underlying FS.
allow system_server media_rw_data_file:dir search;
# Allow invoking tools like "timeout"
allow system_server toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
# Postinstall
#
# For OTA dexopt, allow calls coming from postinstall.
binder_call(system_server, postinstall)
allow system_server postinstall:fifo_file write;
allow system_server update_engine:fd use;
allow system_server update_engine:fifo_file write;
# Access to /data/preloads
allow system_server preloads_data_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
allow system_server preloads_data_file:dir { r_dir_perms write remove_name rmdir };
r_dir_file(system_server, cgroup)
allow system_server ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
r_dir_file(system_server, proc)
r_dir_file(system_server, proc_meminfo)
r_dir_file(system_server, proc_net)
r_dir_file(system_server, rootfs)
r_dir_file(system_server, sysfs_type)
###
### Neverallow rules
###
### system_server should NEVER do any of this
Updated policy for external storage. An upcoming platform release is redesigning how external storage works. At a high level, vold is taking on a more active role in managing devices that dynamically appear. This change also creates further restricted domains for tools doing low-level access of external storage devices, including sgdisk and blkid. It also extends sdcardd to be launchable by vold, since launching by init will eventually go away. For compatibility, rules required to keep AOSP builds working are marked with "TODO" to eventually remove. Slightly relax system_server external storage rules to allow calls like statfs(). Still neverallow open file descriptors, since they can cause kernel to kill us. Here are the relevant violations that this CL is designed to allow: avc: denied { search } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user/0" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=6658 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { setattr } for name="10" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { open } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="tmpfs" ino=11979 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { use } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { read write } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=netlink_kobject_uevent_socket avc: denied { read } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { write } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { mounton } for path="/storage/emulated" dev="tmpfs" ino=8913 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=7444 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self/primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file avc: denied { read } for name="primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { read } for name="disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { open } for path="/storage/public:81F3-13EC" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="fuse" ino=2 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { read } for name="public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { search } for name="block" dev="tmpfs" ino=2494 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:block_device:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="media_rw" dev="tmpfs" ino=3127 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_media_rw_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="pipe:[3648]" dev="pipefs" ino=3648 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4182]" dev="pipefs" ino=4182 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd Change-Id: Idf3b8561baecf7faa603fac5ababdcc5708288e1
2015-03-27 19:25:39 +01:00
# Do not allow opening files from external storage as unsafe ejection
# could cause the kernel to kill the system_server.
neverallow system_server sdcard_type:dir { open read write };
neverallow system_server sdcard_type:file rw_file_perms;
# system server should never be operating on zygote spawned app data
# files directly. Rather, they should always be passed via a
# file descriptor.
# Types extracted from seapp_contexts type= fields, excluding
# those types that system_server needs to open directly.
neverallow system_server { bluetooth_data_file nfc_data_file shell_data_file app_data_file }:file { open create unlink link };
# Forking and execing is inherently dangerous and racy. See, for
# example, https://www.linuxprogrammingblog.com/threads-and-fork-think-twice-before-using-them
# Prevent the addition of new file execs to stop the problem from
# getting worse. b/28035297
neverallow system_server { file_type -toolbox_exec -logcat_exec -system_file }:file execute_no_trans;
# System server should never transition to a new domain. This compliments
# and enforces the already pre-existing PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS flag.
neverallow system_server *:process { transition dyntransition };
# system_server should never be executing dex2oat. This is either
# a bug (for example, bug 16317188), or represents an attempt by
# system server to dynamically load a dex file, something we do not
# want to allow.
neverallow system_server dex2oat_exec:file no_x_file_perms;
# system_server should never execute or load executable shared libraries
# in /data except for /data/dalvik-cache files.
neverallow system_server {
data_file_type
-dalvikcache_data_file #mapping with PROT_EXEC
}:file no_x_file_perms;
# The only block device system_server should be accessing is
# the frp_block_device. This helps avoid a system_server to root
# escalation by writing to raw block devices.
neverallow system_server { dev_type -frp_block_device }:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
# system_server should never use JIT functionality
neverallow system_server self:process execmem;
neverallow system_server ashmem_device:chr_file execute;
neverallow system_server system_server_tmpfs:file execute;