platform_system_sepolicy/public/ueventd.te

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2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# ueventd seclabel is specified in init.rc since
# it lives in the rootfs and has no unique file type.
type ueventd, domain;
type ueventd_tmpfs, file_type;
Allow /dev/klog access, drop mknod and __null__ access Allow vold, healthd, slideshow, and watchdogd access to /dev/kmsg. These processes log to the kernel dmesg ring buffer, so they need write access to that file. Addresses the following denials: avc: denied { write } for pid=134 comm="watchdogd" name="kmsg" dev="tmpfs" ino=9248 scontext=u:r:watchdogd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0 avc: denied { write } for pid=166 comm="healthd" name="kmsg" dev="tmpfs" ino=9248 scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0 avc: denied { write } for pid=180 comm="vold" name="kmsg" dev="tmpfs" ino=9248 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0 These denials were triggered by the change in https://android-review.googlesource.com/151209 . Prior to that change, any code which called klog_init would (unnecessarily) create the device node themselves, rather than using the already existing device node. Drop special /dev/__null__ handling from watchdogd. As of https://android-review.googlesource.com/148288 , watchdogd no longer creates it's own /dev/null device, so it's unnecessary for us to allow for it. Drop mknod from healthd, slideshow, and watchdogd. healthd and slideshow only needed mknod to create /dev/__kmsg__, which is now obsolete. watchdogd only needed mknod to create /dev/__kmsg__ and /dev/__null__, which again is now obsolete. Bug: 21242418 Change-Id: If01c8001084575e7441253f0fa8b4179ae33f534
2015-06-06 16:42:37 +02:00
# Write to /dev/kmsg.
allow ueventd kmsg_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
Allow /dev/klog access, drop mknod and __null__ access Allow vold, healthd, slideshow, and watchdogd access to /dev/kmsg. These processes log to the kernel dmesg ring buffer, so they need write access to that file. Addresses the following denials: avc: denied { write } for pid=134 comm="watchdogd" name="kmsg" dev="tmpfs" ino=9248 scontext=u:r:watchdogd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0 avc: denied { write } for pid=166 comm="healthd" name="kmsg" dev="tmpfs" ino=9248 scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0 avc: denied { write } for pid=180 comm="vold" name="kmsg" dev="tmpfs" ino=9248 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0 These denials were triggered by the change in https://android-review.googlesource.com/151209 . Prior to that change, any code which called klog_init would (unnecessarily) create the device node themselves, rather than using the already existing device node. Drop special /dev/__null__ handling from watchdogd. As of https://android-review.googlesource.com/148288 , watchdogd no longer creates it's own /dev/null device, so it's unnecessary for us to allow for it. Drop mknod from healthd, slideshow, and watchdogd. healthd and slideshow only needed mknod to create /dev/__kmsg__, which is now obsolete. watchdogd only needed mknod to create /dev/__kmsg__ and /dev/__null__, which again is now obsolete. Bug: 21242418 Change-Id: If01c8001084575e7441253f0fa8b4179ae33f534
2015-06-06 16:42:37 +02:00
allow ueventd self:global_capability_class_set { chown mknod net_admin setgid fsetid sys_rawio dac_override dac_read_search fowner setuid };
allow ueventd device:file create_file_perms;
r_dir_file(ueventd, rootfs)
# ueventd needs write access to files in /sys to regenerate uevents
allow ueventd sysfs_type:file w_file_perms;
r_dir_file(ueventd, sysfs_type)
allow ueventd sysfs_type:{ file lnk_file } { relabelfrom relabelto setattr };
allow ueventd sysfs_type:dir { relabelfrom relabelto setattr };
allow ueventd tmpfs:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow ueventd dev_type:dir create_dir_perms;
allow ueventd dev_type:lnk_file { create unlink };
allow ueventd dev_type:chr_file { getattr create setattr unlink };
allow ueventd dev_type:blk_file { getattr relabelfrom relabelto create setattr unlink };
allow ueventd self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
allow ueventd efs_file:dir search;
allow ueventd efs_file:file r_file_perms;
# Get SELinux enforcing status.
r_dir_file(ueventd, selinuxfs)
# Access for /vendor/ueventd.rc and /vendor/firmware
r_dir_file(ueventd, { vendor_file_type -vendor_app_file -vendor_overlay_file })
# Access for /apex/*/firmware
allow ueventd apex_mnt_dir:dir r_dir_perms;
# Get file contexts for new device nodes
allow ueventd file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
# Use setfscreatecon() to label /dev directories and files.
allow ueventd self:process setfscreate;
# Allow ueventd to read androidboot.android_dt_dir from kernel cmdline or bootconfig.
allow ueventd proc_cmdline:file r_file_perms;
allow ueventd proc_bootconfig:file r_file_perms;
# Everything is labeled as rootfs in recovery mode. ueventd has to execute
# the dynamic linker and shared libraries.
recovery_only(`
allow ueventd rootfs:file { r_file_perms execute };
')
# Suppress denials for ueventd to getattr /postinstall. This occurs when the
# linker tries to resolve paths in ld.config.txt.
dontaudit ueventd postinstall_mnt_dir:dir getattr;
# ueventd loads modules in response to modalias events.
allow ueventd self:global_capability_class_set sys_module;
allow ueventd vendor_file:system module_load;
allow ueventd kernel:key search;
# ueventd is using bootstrap bionic
allow ueventd system_bootstrap_lib_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow ueventd system_bootstrap_lib_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
# Allow ueventd to run shell scripts from vendor
allow ueventd vendor_shell_exec:file execute;
#####
##### neverallow rules
#####
# Restrict ueventd access on block devices to maintenence operations.
neverallow ueventd dev_type:blk_file ~{ getattr relabelfrom relabelto create setattr unlink };
# Only relabelto as we would never want to relabelfrom port_device
neverallow ueventd port_device:chr_file ~{ getattr create setattr unlink relabelto };
# Nobody should be able to ptrace ueventd
neverallow * ueventd:process ptrace;
# ueventd should never execute a program without changing to another domain.
neverallow ueventd { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;