platform_system_sepolicy/private/init.te

typeattribute init coredomain;

tmpfs_domain(init)

# Transitions to seclabel processes in init.rc
domain_trans(init, rootfs, slideshow)
domain_auto_trans(init, charger_exec, charger)
domain_auto_trans(init, e2fs_exec, e2fs)
domain_auto_trans(init, bpfloader_exec, bpfloader)

recovery_only(`
  # Files in recovery image are labeled as rootfs.
  domain_trans(init, rootfs, adbd)
  domain_trans(init, rootfs, charger)
  domain_trans(init, rootfs, fastbootd)
  domain_trans(init, rootfs, hal_health_server)
  domain_trans(init, rootfs, recovery)
  domain_trans(init, rootfs, linkerconfig)
  domain_trans(init, rootfs, servicemanager)
  domain_trans(init, rootfs, snapuserd)
')
domain_trans(init, shell_exec, shell)
domain_trans(init, init_exec, ueventd)
domain_trans(init, init_exec, vendor_init)
domain_trans(init, { rootfs toolbox_exec }, modprobe)
userdebug_or_eng(`
  # case where logpersistd is actually logcat -f in logd context (nee: logcatd)
  domain_auto_trans(init, logcat_exec, logpersist)

  # allow init to execute services marked with seclabel u:r:su:s0 in userdebug/eng
  allow init su:process transition;
  dontaudit init su:process noatsecure;
  allow init su:process { siginh rlimitinh };
')

# Allow init to figure out name of dm-device from it's /dev/block/dm-XX path.
# This is useful in case of remounting ext4 userdata into checkpointing mode,
# since it potentially requires tearing down dm-devices (e.g. dm-bow, dm-crypto)
# that userdata is mounted onto.
allow init sysfs_dm:file read;

# Allow init to modify the properties of loop devices.
allow init sysfs_loop:dir r_dir_perms;
allow init sysfs_loop:file rw_file_perms;

# Allow init to examine the properties of block devices.
allow init sysfs_type:file { getattr read };
# Allow init get the attributes of block devices in /dev/block.
allow init dev_type:dir r_dir_perms;
allow init dev_type:blk_file getattr;

# Allow init to write to the drop_caches file.
allow init proc_drop_caches:file rw_file_perms;

# Allow the BoringSSL self test to request a reboot upon failure
set_prop(init, powerctl_prop)

# Only init is allowed to set userspace reboot related properties.
set_prop(init, userspace_reboot_exported_prop)
neverallow { domain -init } userspace_reboot_exported_prop:property_service set;

# Second-stage init performs a test for whether the kernel has SELinux hooks
# for the perf_event_open() syscall. This is done by testing for the syscall
# outcomes corresponding to this policy.
# TODO(b/137092007): this can be removed once the platform stops supporting
# kernels that precede the perf_event_open hooks (Android common kernels 4.4
# and 4.9).
allow init self:perf_event { open cpu };
allow init self:global_capability2_class_set perfmon;
neverallow init self:perf_event { kernel tracepoint read write };
dontaudit init self:perf_event { kernel tracepoint read write };

# Allow init to communicate with snapuserd to transition Virtual A/B devices
# from the first-stage daemon to the second-stage.
allow init snapuserd_socket:sock_file write;
allow init snapuserd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
# Allow for libsnapshot's use of flock() on /metadata/ota.
allow init ota_metadata_file:dir lock;

# Allow init to restore contexts of vd_device(/dev/block/vd[..]) when labeling
# /dev/block.
allow init vd_device:blk_file relabelto;

# Only init is allowed to set the sysprop indicating whether perf_event_open()
# SELinux hooks were detected.
set_prop(init, init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop)
neverallow { domain -init } init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop:property_service set;

# Only init can write vts.native_server.on
set_prop(init, vts_status_prop)
neverallow { domain -init } vts_status_prop:property_service set;

# Only init can write normal ro.boot. properties
neverallow { domain -init } bootloader_prop:property_service set;

# Only init can write ro.boot.hypervisor properties
neverallow { domain -init } hypervisor_prop:property_service set;

# Only init can write hal.instrumentation.enable
neverallow { domain -init } hal_instrumentation_prop:property_service set;

# Only init can write ro.property_service.version
neverallow { domain -init } property_service_version_prop:property_service set;

# Only init can set keystore.boot_level
neverallow { domain -init } keystore_listen_prop:property_service set;

# Only init can set the ro.remote_provisioning.* props
neverallow { domain -init } remote_prov_prop:property_service set;

# Allow accessing /sys/kernel/tracing/instances/bootreceiver to set up tracing.
allow init debugfs_bootreceiver_tracing:file w_file_perms;

# Devices with kernels where CONFIG_HIST_TRIGGERS isn't enabled will
# attempt to write a non exisiting 'synthetic_events' file, when setting
# up synthetic events. This is a no-op in tracefs.
dontaudit init debugfs_tracing_debug:dir { write add_name };

# chown/chmod on devices.
allow init {
  dev_type
  -hw_random_device
  -keychord_device
  -kvm_device
  -port_device
}:chr_file setattr;