platform_system_sepolicy/private/webview_zygote.te

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# webview_zygote is an auxiliary zygote process that is used to spawn
# isolated_app processes for rendering untrusted web content.
typeattribute webview_zygote coredomain;
# The webview_zygote needs to be able to transition domains.
typeattribute webview_zygote mlstrustedsubject;
# Allow access to temporary files, which is normally permitted through
# a domain macro.
tmpfs_domain(webview_zygote);
userfaultfd_use(webview_zygote)
# Allow reading/executing installed binaries to enable preloading the
# installed WebView implementation.
allow webview_zygote apk_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow webview_zygote apk_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute };
# Access to the WebView relro file.
allow webview_zygote shared_relro_file:dir search;
allow webview_zygote shared_relro_file:file r_file_perms;
# Set the UID/GID of the process.
allow webview_zygote self:global_capability_class_set { setgid setuid };
# Drop capabilities from bounding set.
allow webview_zygote self:global_capability_class_set setpcap;
# Switch SELinux context to app domains.
allow webview_zygote self:process setcurrent;
allow webview_zygote isolated_app:process dyntransition;
# For art.
allow webview_zygote { apex_art_data_file dalvikcache_data_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
allow webview_zygote dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow webview_zygote { apex_art_data_file dalvikcache_data_file }:file { r_file_perms execute };
allow webview_zygote apex_module_data_file:dir search;
# Allow webview_zygote to create JIT memory.
allow webview_zygote self:process execmem;
# Allow webview_zygote to stat the files that it opens. It must
# be able to inspect them so that it can reopen them on fork
# if necessary: b/30963384.
allow webview_zygote debugfs_trace_marker:file getattr;
# Allow webview_zygote to manage the pgroup of its children.
allow webview_zygote system_server:process getpgid;
# Interaction between the webview_zygote and its children.
allow webview_zygote isolated_app:process setpgid;
# TODO (b/63631799) fix this access
# Suppress denials to storage. Webview zygote should not be accessing.
dontaudit webview_zygote mnt_expand_file:dir getattr;
# TODO (b/72957399) remove this when webview_zygote is reparented to
# app_process zygote
dontaudit webview_zygote dex2oat_exec:file execute;
# Get seapp_contexts
allow webview_zygote seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
# Check validity of SELinux context before use.
selinux_check_context(webview_zygote)
# Check SELinux permissions.
selinux_check_access(webview_zygote)
# Directory listing in /system.
allow webview_zygote system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
# Read and inspect temporary files (like system properties) managed by zygote.
allow webview_zygote zygote_tmpfs:file { read getattr };
# Child of zygote.
allow webview_zygote zygote:fd use;
allow webview_zygote zygote:process sigchld;
# Allow apps access to /vendor/overlay
r_dir_file(webview_zygote, vendor_overlay_file)
allow webview_zygote same_process_hal_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
allow webview_zygote system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
# Send unsolicited message to system_server
unix_socket_send(webview_zygote, system_unsolzygote, system_server)
#####
##### Neverallow
#####
# Only permit transition to isolated_app.
neverallow webview_zygote { domain -isolated_app }:process dyntransition;
# Only setcon() transitions, no exec() based transitions, except for crash_dump.
neverallow webview_zygote { domain -crash_dump }:process transition;
# Must not exec() a program without changing domains.
# Having said that, exec() above is not allowed.
neverallow webview_zygote *:file execute_no_trans;
# The only way to enter this domain is for the zygote to fork a new
# webview_zygote child.
neverallow { domain -zygote } webview_zygote:process dyntransition;
# Disallow write access to properties.
neverallow webview_zygote property_socket:sock_file write;
neverallow webview_zygote property_type:property_service set;
# Should not have any access to app data files.
neverallow webview_zygote app_data_file_type:file { rwx_file_perms };
neverallow webview_zygote {
service_manager_type
-activity_service
-webviewupdate_service
}:service_manager find;
# Isolated apps shouldn't be able to access the driver directly.
neverallow webview_zygote gpu_device:chr_file { rwx_file_perms };
# Do not allow webview_zygote access to /cache.
neverallow webview_zygote cache_file:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
neverallow webview_zygote cache_file:file ~{ read getattr };
# Do not allow most socket access. This is socket_class_set, excluding unix_dgram_socket,
# unix_stream_socket, and netlink_selinux_socket.
neverallow webview_zygote domain:{
socket tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket netlink_socket packet_socket key_socket
appletalk_socket netlink_route_socket netlink_tcpdiag_socket
netlink_nflog_socket netlink_xfrm_socket netlink_audit_socket
netlink_dnrt_socket netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket netlink_iscsi_socket
netlink_fib_lookup_socket netlink_connector_socket netlink_netfilter_socket
netlink_generic_socket netlink_scsitransport_socket netlink_rdma_socket netlink_crypto_socket
Define extended_socket_class policy capability and socket classes Add a definition for the extended_socket_class policy capability used to enable the use of separate socket security classes for all network address families rather than the generic socket class. The capability also enables the use of separate security classes for ICMP and SCTP sockets, which were previously mapped to rawip_socket class. Add definitions for the new socket classes and access vectors enabled by this capability. Add the new socket classes to the socket_class_set macro, and exclude them from webview_zygote domain as with other socket classes. Allowing access by specific domains to the new socket security classes is left to future commits. Domains previously allowed permissions to the 'socket' class will require permission to the more specific socket class when running on kernels with this support. The kernel support will be included upstream in Linux 4.11. The relevant kernel commits are da69a5306ab92e07224da54aafee8b1dccf024f6 ("selinux: support distinctions among all network address families"), ef37979a2cfa3905adbf0c2a681ce16c0aaea92d ("selinux: handle ICMPv6 consistently with ICMP"), and b4ba35c75a0671a06b978b6386b54148efddf39f ("selinux: drop unused socket security classes"). This change requires selinux userspace commit d479baa82d67c9ac56c1a6fa041abfb9168aa4b3 ("libsepol: Define extended_socket_class policy capability") in order to build the policy with this capability enabled. This commit is already in AOSP master. Test: policy builds Change-Id: I788b4be9f0ec0bf2356c0bbef101cd42a1af49bb Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2016-12-08 19:35:27 +01:00
sctp_socket icmp_socket ax25_socket ipx_socket netrom_socket atmpvc_socket
x25_socket rose_socket decnet_socket atmsvc_socket rds_socket irda_socket
pppox_socket llc_socket can_socket tipc_socket bluetooth_socket iucv_socket
rxrpc_socket isdn_socket phonet_socket ieee802154_socket caif_socket
alg_socket nfc_socket vsock_socket kcm_socket qipcrtr_socket smc_socket
xdp_socket
} *;
# Do not allow access to Bluetooth-related system properties.
# neverallow rules for Bluetooth-related data files are listed above.
neverallow webview_zygote {
bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop
bluetooth_audio_hal_prop
bluetooth_prop
exported_bluetooth_prop
}:file create_file_perms;