platform_system_sepolicy/private/netutils_wrapper.te

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typeattribute netutils_wrapper coredomain;
typeattribute netutils_wrapper bpfdomain;
r_dir_file(netutils_wrapper, system_file);
# For netutils (ip, iptables, tc)
allow netutils_wrapper self:global_capability_class_set net_raw;
allow netutils_wrapper system_file:file { execute execute_no_trans };
Start the process of locking down proc/net Files in /proc/net leak information. This change is the first step in determining which files apps may use, whitelisting benign access, and otherwise removing access while providing safe alternative APIs. To that end, this change: * Introduces the proc_net_type attribute which will assigned to any new SELinux types in /proc/net to avoid removing access to privileged processes. These processes may be evaluated later, but are lower priority than apps. * Labels /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} as proc_net_vpn due to existing use by VPN apps. This may be replaced by an alternative API. * Audits all other proc/net access for apps. * Audits proc/net access for other processes which are currently granted broad read access to /proc/net but should not be including storaged, zygote, clatd, logd, preopt2cachename and vold. Bug: 9496886 Bug: 68016944 Test: Boot Taimen-userdebug. On both wifi and cellular: stream youtube navigate maps, send text message, make voice call, make video call. Verify no avc "granted" messages in the logs. Test: A few VPN apps including "VPN Monster", "Turbo VPN", and "Freighter". Verify no logspam with the current setup. Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases Test: atest netd_integration_test Test: atest QtaguidPermissionTest Test: atest FileSystemPermissionTest Change-Id: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457 Merged-In: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457 (cherry picked from commit 087318957f26e921d62f2e234fc14bff3c59030e)
2018-04-10 21:47:48 +02:00
allow netutils_wrapper proc_net_type:file { open read getattr };
allow netutils_wrapper self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms;
allow netutils_wrapper self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
allow netutils_wrapper self:global_capability_class_set net_admin;
# ip utils need everything but ioctl
allow netutils_wrapper self:netlink_route_socket ~ioctl;
allow netutils_wrapper self:netlink_xfrm_socket ~ioctl;
# For netutils (ndc) to be able to talk to netd
allow netutils_wrapper netd_service:service_manager find;
allow netutils_wrapper dnsresolver_service:service_manager find;
allow netutils_wrapper mdns_service:service_manager find;
binder_use(netutils_wrapper);
binder_call(netutils_wrapper, netd);
# For vendor code that update the iptables rules at runtime. They need to reload
# the whole chain including the xt_bpf rules. They need to access to the pinned
# program when reloading the rule.
allow netutils_wrapper { fs_bpf fs_bpf_netd_shared fs_bpf_vendor }:dir search;
allow netutils_wrapper { fs_bpf fs_bpf_netd_shared fs_bpf_vendor }:file { getattr read };
allow netutils_wrapper { fs_bpf }:file write;
allow netutils_wrapper bpfloader:bpf prog_run;
# For /data/misc/net access to ndc and ip
r_dir_file(netutils_wrapper, net_data_file)
domain_auto_trans({
domain
-coredomain
-appdomain
}, netutils_wrapper_exec, netutils_wrapper)
# suppress spurious denials
dontaudit netutils_wrapper self:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;
dontaudit netutils_wrapper sysfs_type:file read;
# netutils wrapper may only use the following capabilities.
neverallow netutils_wrapper self:global_capability_class_set ~{ net_admin net_raw };