platform_system_sepolicy/shell_user.te

# Domain for shell processes spawned by ADB
type shell, domain, shelldomain, mlstrustedsubject;
type shell_exec, exec_type, file_type;

# Run app_process.
# XXX Transition into its own domain?
app_domain(shell)

# inherits from shelldomain.te
Restrict the ability to set SELinux enforcing mode to init. Also make su and shell permissive in non-user builds to allow use of setenforce without violating the neverallow rule. Change-Id: Ie76ee04e90d5a76dfaa5f56e9e3eb7e283328a3f Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> 2013-12-02 20:18:11 +01:00			`# Domain for shell processes spawned by ADB`
Confine shell domain in -user builds only. Confine the domain for an adb shell in -user builds only. The shell domain in non-user builds is left permissive. init_shell (shell spawned by init, e.g. console service) remains unconfined by this change. Introduce a shelldomain attribute for rules common to all shell domains, assign it to the shell types, and add shelldomain.te for its rules. Change-Id: I01ee2c7ef80b61a9db151abe182ef9af7623c461 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> 2013-10-23 19:25:53 +02:00			`type shell, domain, shelldomain, mlstrustedsubject;`
Restrict the ability to set SELinux enforcing mode to init. Also make su and shell permissive in non-user builds to allow use of setenforce without violating the neverallow rule. Change-Id: Ie76ee04e90d5a76dfaa5f56e9e3eb7e283328a3f Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> 2013-12-02 20:18:11 +01:00			`type shell_exec, exec_type, file_type;`

			`# Run app_process.`
Confine shell domain in -user builds only. Confine the domain for an adb shell in -user builds only. The shell domain in non-user builds is left permissive. init_shell (shell spawned by init, e.g. console service) remains unconfined by this change. Introduce a shelldomain attribute for rules common to all shell domains, assign it to the shell types, and add shelldomain.te for its rules. Change-Id: I01ee2c7ef80b61a9db151abe182ef9af7623c461 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> 2013-10-23 19:25:53 +02:00			`# XXX Transition into its own domain?`
Restrict the ability to set SELinux enforcing mode to init. Also make su and shell permissive in non-user builds to allow use of setenforce without violating the neverallow rule. Change-Id: Ie76ee04e90d5a76dfaa5f56e9e3eb7e283328a3f Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> 2013-12-02 20:18:11 +01:00			`app_domain(shell)`
Support run-as and ndk-gdb functionality. Confine run-as (but leave permissive for now) and add other allow rules required for the use of run-as and ndk-gdb functionality. Change-Id: Ifae38233c091cd34013e98830d72aac4c4adcae0 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> 2013-10-29 19:42:39 +01:00
Confine shell domain in -user builds only. Confine the domain for an adb shell in -user builds only. The shell domain in non-user builds is left permissive. init_shell (shell spawned by init, e.g. console service) remains unconfined by this change. Introduce a shelldomain attribute for rules common to all shell domains, assign it to the shell types, and add shelldomain.te for its rules. Change-Id: I01ee2c7ef80b61a9db151abe182ef9af7623c461 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> 2013-10-23 19:25:53 +02:00			`# inherits from shelldomain.te`