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platform_system_sepolicy/ueventd.te

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SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# ueventd seclabel is specified in init.rc since
# it lives in the rootfs and has no unique file type.
type ueventd, domain;
tmpfs_domain(ueventd)
Start confining ueventd * Keep ueventd in permissive * Drop unconfined macro to collect logs * Restore allow rules to current NSA maintained policy Change-Id: Ic4ee8e24ccd8887fed151ae1e4f197512849f57b
2013-10-06 21:36:11 +02:00
write_klog(ueventd)
security_access_policy(ueventd)
allow ueventd init:process sigchld;
allow ueventd self:capability { chown mknod net_admin setgid fsetid sys_rawio dac_override fowner };
allow ueventd device:file create_file_perms;
allow ueventd device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow ueventd sysfs:file rw_file_perms;
allow ueventd sysfs_type lnk_file ueventd is allowed to change files and directories in /sys, but not symbolic links. This is, at a minimum, causing the following denial: type=1400 audit(0.0:5): avc: denied { getattr } for comm="ueventd" path="/sys/devices/tegradc.0/driver" dev=sysfs ino=3386 scontext=u:r:ueventd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_tegradc:s0 tclass=lnk_file Allow ueventd to modify labeling / attributes of symlinks. Change-Id: If641a218e07ef479d1283f3171b2743f3956386d
2014-07-10 08:07:10 +02:00
allow ueventd sysfs_type:{ file lnk_file } { relabelfrom relabelto setattr getattr };
ueventd: Add policy support for ueventd labeling changes Currently, ueventd only modifies the SELinux label on a file if the entry exists in /ueventd.rc. Add policy support to enable an independent restorecon_recursive whenever a uevent message occurs. Change-Id: I0ccb5395ec0be9282095b844a5022e8c0d8903ac
2014-07-04 01:10:01 +02:00
allow ueventd sysfs_type:dir { relabelfrom relabelto setattr r_dir_perms };
Add sysfs_type attribute to sysfs, coalesce ueventd rules. As per the discussion in: https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/92903/ Add sysfs_type attribute to sysfs type so that it is included in rules on sysfs_type, allow setattr to all sysfs_type for ueventd for chown/chmod, and get rid of redundant rules. Change-Id: I1228385d5703168c3852ec75605ed8da7c99b83d Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-05-08 19:18:52 +02:00
allow ueventd sysfs_devices_system_cpu:file rw_file_perms;
Start confining ueventd * Keep ueventd in permissive * Drop unconfined macro to collect logs * Restore allow rules to current NSA maintained policy Change-Id: Ic4ee8e24ccd8887fed151ae1e4f197512849f57b
2013-10-06 21:36:11 +02:00
allow ueventd tmpfs:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow ueventd dev_type:dir create_dir_perms;
allow ueventd dev_type:lnk_file { create unlink };
allow ueventd dev_type:chr_file { create setattr unlink };
allow ueventd dev_type:blk_file { create setattr unlink };
Clean up socket rules. Replace * or any permission set containing create with create_socket_perms or create_stream_socket_perms. Add net_domain() to all domains using network sockets and delete rules already covered by domain.te or net.te. For netlink_route_socket, only nlmsg_write needs to be separately granted to specific domains that are permitted to modify the routing table. Clarification: read/write permissions are just ability to perform read/recv() or write/send() on the socket, whereas nlmsg_read/ nlmsg_write permissions control ability to observe or modify the underlying kernel state accessed via the socket. See security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c in the kernel for the mapping of netlink message types to nlmsg_read or nlmsg_write. Delete legacy rule for b/12061011. This change does not touch any rules where only read/write were allowed to a socket created by another domain (inherited across exec or received across socket or binder IPC). We may wish to rewrite some or all of those rules with the rw_socket_perms macro but that is a separate change. Change-Id: Ib0637ab86f6d388043eff928e5d96beb02e5450e Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-02-24 21:06:11 +01:00
allow ueventd self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
Start confining ueventd * Keep ueventd in permissive * Drop unconfined macro to collect logs * Restore allow rules to current NSA maintained policy Change-Id: Ic4ee8e24ccd8887fed151ae1e4f197512849f57b
2013-10-06 21:36:11 +02:00
allow ueventd efs_file:dir search;
allow ueventd efs_file:file r_file_perms;
Restrict requesting contexts other than policy-defined defaults. Writing to the /proc/self/attr files (encapsulated by the libselinux set*con functions) enables a program to request a specific security context for various operations instead of the policy-defined defaults. The security context specified using these calls is checked by an operation-specific permission, e.g. dyntransition for setcon, transition for setexeccon, create for setfscreatecon or setsockcreatecon, but the ability to request a context at all is controlled by a process permission. Omit these permissions from domain.te and only add them back where required so that only specific domains can even request a context other than the default defined by the policy. Change-Id: I6a2fb1279318625a80f3ea8e3f0932bdbe6df676 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-05-23 17:26:19 +02:00
# Use setfscreatecon() to label /dev directories and files.
allow ueventd self:process setfscreate;
neverallow ueventd to set properties Add a compile time assertion that no SELinux rules exist which allow ueventd to set properties, or even connect to the property socket. See https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/133120/6/init/devices.cpp@941 for details. Change-Id: Ia9e932a3d94443d70644b14f36c74df4be7e9e32
2015-03-03 05:10:48 +01:00
#####
##### neverallow rules
#####
# ueventd must never set properties, otherwise deadlocks may occur.
# https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/133120/6/init/devices.cpp@941
# No writing to the property socket, connecting to init, or setting properties.
neverallow ueventd property_socket:sock_file write;
neverallow ueventd init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
neverallow ueventd property_type:property_service set;
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